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THE CHANGING NATURE 
AND ROLE OF SOFT LAW 
IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND 
REGULATION 
From state-centric to globalist paradigm 
by 
Ilhami Alkan-Olsson 




This study examines the changing nature and role of "soft law" in international law. 
Focusing on international ̀ economic' soft law and regulation, the study contends that 
the transformation of international economy and politics in the 1980s have culminated 
in a paradigm shift in the international economic soft law and regulation changing both 
its nature and role. The leading "state-centric" paradigm of 1960s and 1970s has been 
replaced by a dual "globalist" paradigm, which consists of two sub-paradigms: the 
"non-state actor" and the "hegemonic state". 
The "non-state actor" paradigm refers to a non-state normative order, centred on the 
regulatory role of non-state actors. This paradigm has gained ground to (i) meet 
business need for flexible and efficient legal instrument, (ii) respond on a voluntary 
basis to `societal expectations'. The "hegemonic state" paradigm, on the other hand, 
indicates a move from soft law and de-regulation to hard law and re-regulation. The 
major reasons for this move are to facilitate the expansion of market economy and to 
accomplish the creation of a disciplined global market through bilateral and multilateral 
legalisation as well as through international economic institutions. Yet, this tendency of 
re-regulation has it is argued often been obscured by the dominant market-centred 
vocabulary, which promotes a pluralistic, hybrid and informal rule-setting and 
implementation model. 
On the whole, this study recognises that soft law may represent an opportunity for the 
normative development of international law by assuming an authoritative, interpretative 
or complementary role. Soft law can also promote a more participatory and democratic 
rule-making. The study nevertheless holds that in the foreseeable future the trend 
towards soft, voluntary, informal, and decentred regulation may have adverse effects on 
the already weak normative structure of international law, blurring further its 
normativity threshold by incorporating political and economical elements in a 
contextual and deformalised way. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The present study aims to analyse the changing nature and role of soft 
law with a focus 
on international economic law and regulation. The purpose and 
interest in analysing 
these changes is to assess the impacts of the rise of informal, non-state normative 
structures in the 1980s on the normative development of international 
law in general 
and international economic soft law in particular. 
There is a general understanding that ever since the foundation of the United 
Nations 
(UN) the scope of the international normative order has continuously expanded. 
International law now governs issues which up to the 1960s and 1970s were either 
considered as strictly internal affairs of each nation or did not exist at all on the 
international agenda. Examples are abundant. Prior to 1945, the primary concerns of 
international law were rules of conduct of diplomatic relations and immunities, the 
adjustment of territorial sovereignty and the regulation of war. Along with these 
`traditional' domains, international law is today engaged in regulation of, among others, 
international organisations, international economy, social, technological and scientific 
development, economical and human development, human rights, environment, and 
nuclear energy. 
The international normative order has not only expanded in terms of scope, but also in 
terms of "actors" that exercise influence on the formation, interpretation and 
implementation of these international obligations. As the large amount of literature 
published in various scientific disciplines frequently reminds us, states are not any 
longer alone on the international scene. Recent changes in international economics, 
politics, and technology, commonly referred as "globalisation" together with the end of 
the Cold War have had consequential effects on the structure of international relations. 
In parallel to the expansion of market economy, privatisation and deregulation 
promoted by international economic institutions, the role of "non-state actors"1 has 
rapidly been transformed. It is now maintained that a substantial body of international 
1 The, concept of "non-state actors", as it is used here, refers to those entities, which are relevant to 
international law in terms of participation in the normative process without being a state or inter-state 
organisations. This study focuses on particularly two of them, namely multinational enterprises and non- 
governmental organisations. 
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rules is not derived from the formal law-making institutions of international law. 
Accordingly, as a result of this process, the possibility of states to exercise control over 
the content of international law has diminished considerably. Apart from states, 
international organisations, formal and informal technical bodies, Treaty Bodies within 
the UN system, international conferences on various subject-matters as well as a wide 
range of non-state actors, including multinational enterprises (MNEs), non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs) are today involved in shaping international 
normative order. 
However, the traditional mechanisms of international law making, i. e., the list of 
sources of international law enumerated in Article 38 of the Statue of the International 
Court of Justice, have not evolved at the same rate as the expansion of its scope and 
proliferation of its actors. It is increasingly held that in the face of the multiplicity of 
law-making processes in `contemporary' international law, the understanding, according 
to which Article 38 sources of law exhaust the methods of international law-making has 
proven inadequate. This is obviously a challenge for the relevancy and legitimacy of 
international law. 
Soft law emerged in the post-war period as a result of the structural shortcomings of 
public international law, caused mainly by the extension of its scope, actors as well as 
the changing international power structure. The substantive adjustment of the `old' 
international legal system to the new post-colonial realities (i. e. the increasing number 
of sovereign states, changing power balance in international arenas, in particular in the 
UN General Assembly, etc. ) has resulted in the growing number and the widening role 
of international organisations. The search for a new international law and economic 
order has two important consequences; both of them have boosted the discussions and 
use of soft law. They are 
(i) The increasing use of vague and open-ended bilateral, regional and multilateral 
treaties, which has been a direct result of the enlarging scope of international law. The 
term soft law indeed was initially used to describe the "soft" provisions of legally 
binding instruments made by states, inter-state and international organisations. 
(ii) The need to establish new regulatory frameworks for new institutional and decision 
making arrangements and producers to change some existing rules as well as to create 
new rules in areas where no rules then existed. 
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As should be expected, such changes in the legal and institutional framework raise 
questions about the legal status and character of the declarations and resolutions of 
international organisations, especially those of the UN General Assembly, which has no 
power of adopting binding rules for states. Thus, the concept of soft law has been 
suggested by many as an explanation of such "quasi-legislative" activities of 
international organisations, which is sometimes described as the "grey areas" of 
international norm-making. 
To put it differently, soft law and instruments in the post-war period emerged from 
multiple sources and needs. The unifying characteristic of these diverse kinds of soft 
law and instruments is that they all have been authored by states or inter-state 
organisations solely for the use and benefit of states. Interesting to note that during this 
period, in round numbers between the 1950s and 1990s, the concept of soft law has 
been both recognised and refused as a normative concept through the optic of a state- 
centred understanding of law. The explanation of this orientation lies in the fact that for 
most of the history of international law, states have been regarded as the sole legitimate 
subjects. 
However, since the end of 1970s, we have witnessed an increasing globalisation of 
international economy involving the removal of market constraints - the liberalisation 
of trade and investment, privatisation and the deregulation of labour and capital 
markets. At this point a discourse and a set of policies, practices and institutions 
associated with neo-liberal ideology, the superiority of market economy, minimalist 
state and self-regulation has, challenging the state-centred and sovereignty-based notion 
of law, gained ground. The significant changes in state-market relations, which have 
characterised the contemporary era, are particularly evident in the perception of non- 
state ̀ law' making. Indeed, the normative agenda of globalisation has centred heavily 
on the regulatory role of non-state actors in standard setting and implementation. It is 
argued that law making, adjudication and enforcement in globalisation is no longer a 
monopoly of states; a wide-range of non-state actors play significant roles in this 
emerging process of law-making, which is more dynamic, fluid and responsive. No 
doubt, the proliferation of soft law has largely been a result of a pluralistic, hybrid and 
informal rule-setting model used to legitimate a decentred normative development. The 
last two decades have witnessed a turn from government, formal international 
legislation, legal rules, public authority and institutions to governance, "open-ended" 
10 
legalisation with a "differentiated obligation", informal norm-like acts of private 
entities, private authority, and private or hybrid regimes. 
It would be wrong, however, to regard this apparent transfer of regulatory authority 
from state to non-state actors as the only trend fuelled by a decentred, deregulated and 
privatised conception of law-making promoted by the neo-liberal globalisation. 
This 
process has not involved only a move from hard power structure and 
hard legalisation 
towards soft institutionalisation and formal/informal soft law. What has also occurred 
is 
a parallel, complementary and seemingly contradictory process of legalisation, which 
consists of both soft and hard regulation, re-regulation and the hardening of previously 
soft law and soft institutionalisation through bilateral and multilateral agreements as 
well as through the decisions and practices of international economic institutions. 
Hence, the rolling back of the state in certain areas of the economy ("re-regulation") and 
the freeing-up of markets ("de-regulation") have gone hand in hand with the 
strengthening of the already existing soft legalisation to protect, for example, certain 
types of property rights, international trade and investment. 
2 Indeed, in the last few 
decades there have been more multilateral agreements and multilateral institutions 
addressing more areas of policy than ever before3 to such an extent that some scholars 
even argue that we are currently experiencing a "rejuvenation of international laws4 and 
"a move to law in international relations"5. 
The nature, characteristics and role of international economic soft law and regulation 
from the 1960s till today, have been re-defined. This re-definition will be examined here 
through describing a paradigm shift, which took place some time in the second half of 
the 1970s. The study contends that the leading paradigm in international economic law 
during the 1960s and 1970s was "state-centric". To better conceive its characteristics, 
this paradigm will be exemplified through the "New International Economic Order" 
(NIEO). In the beginning of the 1980s the state-centric paradigm was displaced by the 
2 Utting, Peter, Rethinking Business Regulation "From Self-Regulation to Social Control ", UN Research 
Institute for Social Development, Paper number: 15, September 2005, p. 9 
D Raustiala, Kal, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, I Chicago Journal of International law (2000) 2, p. 401 
4 Simpson, Gerry, The Situation on the International Legal Theory Front: The Power of Rules and the 
Rule of Power, 11 European Journal of International Law (2000) 2, p. 439 
3 Goldstein, Judith; Kahler, Miles, Keohane, Robert, 0., and Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Introduction: 
Legalization and World Politics, 54 International Organization (2000) 3 
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dual "globalist" paradigm, which consists of two sub-paradigms, namely, "non-state 
actor" and "hegemonic state". The dual globalist paradigm became worldwide dominant 
in the 1990s. The "non-state actor" sub-paradigm is examined through the examples of 
the so-called new "lex mercatoria" and corporate social responsibility (CSR) while the 
"hegemonic state" paradigm will be exemplified through the evolution of GATT/WTO 
regime. 6 
International economy is obviously not the only field that soft law is employed by 
states, international organisations or non-state actors. Soft law is also widely used in the 
area of, among others, environment, human rights the law of the sea, the law of 
international water courses, nuclear energy, air law and outer space activities, and 
communications. Most of these domains are among the new domains of international 
law, including international economy, which used to be a matter of exclusively 
domestic regulation until the foundation of the UN. The focus of this study is on the 
characteristics of the evolution of soft law in the area of international "economic" law 
and regulation due to the fact that international economic law is a domain, which cuts 
across most of the subjects embraced by international law. As Jackson puts it, today, 
"90 per cent of the legal development in international law work is in reality international 
economic law in some form or another". 7 Thus, seen from this angle, to focus on soft 
law development in international economic law and regulation will help the reader to 
build up an overall picture of the changing nature and role of soft law in international 
law. 
Then, why does this study concentrate on the "softness" in international economic 
"soft" law and regulation? One specific reason for choosing to examine soft law is that 
the formation of soft law is frequently policy-based and is therefore a legal form that 
more openly incorporates politics. The word policy can mean several things. However, 
as Falk points out, the concept of policy, in the first place, functions as a code word for 
politics! Therefore, soft law, by allowing policy concerns to be externalised more 
6 GATTIWTO refers to both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and its successor, the 
World Trade Organisations (WTO). 
7 Jackson, J. H., Global Economics and International Economic Law, I Journal of International Economic Law (1998) p. 8 
6 Falk, Richard, A., The Place of Policy in International Law, 2 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (1972) p. 29 
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easily, facilitates tracing the interconnection between international relations, 
international law and economy? A second and more essential motivation to choose to 
examine the development of soft law is that the conceptual and practical evolution of 
soft law is closely associated to developments that occurred in international relations. In 
the 1990s, in parallel with the restructuring state/society, public/private, 
politics/economy relations, the term soft law has increasingly been used to describe 
norms adopted by non-state entities. Thus, the changing nature and role of soft law in 
the international economy provides a suitable example to illustrate the blurring 
boundaries between the public and private spheres as well as the detachment of law 
from the state indicating the tendency towards a decentred and pluralistic development 
of international economic law. 
1.1 Methodology 
The first point that should be clarified about the `method' employed in this study is that 
the study does not subscribe strictly to a particular method in the field. Of course it is 
so, if "method" is understood as a special form of procedure, a technique that is 
employed by a specific theory in international law, such as `positivism' or 
"international legal process' as a standpoint to create an `external', `objective' voice 
that outdistance the author's preferences. To put it differently, this study does not aspire 
to dissociate itself from its subject to attain pretended neutrality. Its agenda is to 
question the validity, development and effectiveness of the international legal system in 
the case of economic soft law. 
That said, the study employs different `languages' to convey its agenda. For instance, it 
criticises positivism that understands law as rules backed up by centrally organised 
sanctions and international law basically as "rules". Nonetheless, it recognises that 
international law is still largely shaped and constrained by state power and emphasises 
the importance of defining legal validity. It questions sovereignty as a `legal theory'. 
Yet it underlines its emancipatory potential against the current development towards a 
"hegemonic international law" (HIL), which refers to the abandonment of the idea of 
the equality of states and the replacement of existing norms with new rules of norms, 
9 The theme of the relation between policy, law and economy is elaborated in section 3.5.2 
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which recognise inequalities of power and its rules are indeterminate whose vagueness 
benefits the hegemon. 10 On the other hand, the study does not subscribe to an idealistic 
discourse about the constraining capacity of legal formalism for the tendency towards 
establishing HIL, but it regards the neo-realism and deformalisation tendency as aiming 
to create a policy-dependent and instrumental international law for the benefit of HIL. 
Likewise it does not endorse enthusiastically the view that states are and should stay the 
only subjects of international law yet it indicates the existence of the neo-liberal agenda 
that lies behind the dominant criticism of the concept sovereignty and legal/political 
consequences of the withering away of the nation-state. 
Some may hence find that the `methodological position' of this study is somewhat 
eclectic and self-reflective. It may well be the case. However, the preference of method 
in this study does not merely reflect a rational choice among the different methods with 
a critical perspective. Nor does it look for inhabiting a middle ground between 
contesting approaches. It partly reflects a necessity that arises from its subject, which 
involves both the conceptual framework of soft law (i. e. theory) and the impacts of the 
changing functions of soft law on the nature of international law (i. e. practice). Thus, 
the study is not convenient to accommodate the conventional distinction between theory 
and practice. But also and perhaps more importantly, the present study may be read as a 
`political act' inviting the reader to deconstruct the status quo legitimation of the current 
`political regulation' of the societal developments through concentrating on the role of 
conceptual change and the normative structuring of soft law. The language (i. e. method) 
of such an act requires looking into different approaches, theoretical endeavours and 
methods to be able to describe what have been overlooked or obscured and what have 
been highlighted or given prominence to and then evaluate the things that have been 
found in a normative manner to find out "why". Perhaps mostly in such instances the 
reader may feel the presence of critical theory even though not in its pure form if there 
is any such. 
As Bell points out, the label critical theory is generally associated with the Critical 
Theory of the Frankfurt School though lately it is also associated with postmodernism. 
However, it would be more accurate to say that the label critical theory is a "broad 
10 Vagts, Detlev, F., Hegemonic International Law, 95 The American Journal of International Law (2001) 
4, p. 843.845 
14 
discursive umbrella" under which there can be found even polarised positions. 
11 At any 
rate, critical theory has been a valuable instrument for the present study especially 
where the partiality of the theorists and the structure of societal relations are critically 
discussed. 12 
As will be shown in this study, the increasing tendency to use soft law, regardless of 
whether state or non-state originated, is explained on the basis of 
its flexibility, 
speediness, voluntarism and realism. Mörth for instance argues that the concept of soft 
law has been in circulation "in close connection with real-world events and process". 
i3 
To some extent, this understanding can be seen as the enhanced regeneration of a 
depoliticised legal pragmatism that has been a dominant spirit since the Second World 
War, which has partly been responsible for the diminishing interest in legal theory 
during the same period. The intellectual and theoretical disinclination of international 
legal academic discipline in the post-Second World War has indeed been a cause of 
concern for a number of scholars. Kennedy, among others, explains the pragmatic sprit 
of the post-war period with a pragmatism that arose from the `move to institutionalism', 
which has also resulted in the refusal of formalism in favour of pragmatist/managerial 
account of international law. This is paradoxical, because international law seems to 
have developed: more rules, more rule-observance, in a wider variety of subject matters 
than ever before. At the same time in the discipline of international law, there has been 
no noticeable interest in the philosophical dimension of these changes. In the words of 
Kennedy, "the `increasingly independent world' seemed to require management, not 
reconstruction", and as a result, most of the international law courses in law faculties 
"were about the management of international life, about the process and the avoidance 
of `politics' 9.14 In a similar vein, Purvis observes that the post-Second World War 
pragmatism "sought to incorporate the modernist insights of Legal Realism (which set 
11 Bell, Duncan, S. A., The Cambridge School and World Politics: critical theory, history and conceptual 
change, available at httpl/www. theglobalsite. ac. uk. 
12 For further reading on method and critical theory, see Kennedy, David, A New Stream of International 
Law Scholarship, 7 Wisconsin International Law Journal (1988); Purvis (1991); and Koskenniemi Martti, 
Letter to the Editors of the Symposium, 93 American Journal of International Law (1999) 2. 
13 Mörth, Ulrika (ed. ), Soft Law in Governance and Regulation, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, UK, 2004, p. 
4 
14 Kennedy, David, International Legal Education, 26 Harvard International Law Journal (1985) p. 369- 
370" 
15 
itself in opposition to legal formalism, emerged during the 1930s) into international 
law, 
to make legal argument contextual". As a consequence of this strong rejection of 
formalism and a near-total disregard of theory, most scholars have confined themselves 
to the legal analysis on international law material. 
15 Unfortunately, with the neo-realist 
revival in the end of 1970s the refusal of theory on the basis of dynamism, pragmatism 
and practicality seems to have gained new grounds. Under the intellectual/ideological 
weight of the American realist school, which has been very influential on the legal 
academic life in the post-Cold War period, international law has been reduced to 
instrumentality, which has made `theory' a marginalised occupation". 
16 This study 
however intends to be concerned with the risk of relegating theory in the context of an 
increasingly deformalised international law. It will discuss the risks and dangers of 
putting forward soft law in the name of producing a fast, flexible and effective solution 
to international problems. 
Now a few words on the `language of objectivity' while undertaking legal research. 
Considering that the "structure of international law reflects that of international 
relations", 17 it is important for international lawyers to examine what impacts the 
changes that have taken place since the 1980s may have on the structure of international 
law. However, this is a complicated task. A major reason for this difficulty is that the 
transformation of international relations is not an enclosed process and these changes 
are clearly influenced by the intellectual dominance of the liberal ideological and 
economic agenda. Anther reason and somewhat ironically, such a `scientific' 
assignment requires objectivity from international lawyers. He or she needs to put aside 
his/her subjective or ideological preferences to be taken seriously and then only without 
that subjective bias they should analyse a process, which is in fact deeply political and 
biased. This is perhaps partly due to the necessity of being `scientific' that is frequently 
seen to be the same thing as `neutral'. The downside of this, of course besides its 
15 Purvis, Nigel, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32 Harvard International Law Journal 
(1991) 1. See also, Hueck, Ingo, J., The Discipline of the History of International Law -New Trends and Methods on the History ofInternational Law, 3 Journal of the History of International law (2001) 
16 Koskenniemi, Martti, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870- 
1960, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004, p. 1 
17 Friedmann, Wolfgang, The Changing Structure of International Law, Stewens&Sons: London, 1964 in 
'Preface' 
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impossibility, is the risk to "neutralise critique, silently giving a helping hand" to the 
dominant ideology. Is 
There are also additional difficulties that arise from the structural weakness of 
international law. In order to investigate any change or process not only in law, but also 
in any discipline, it is pre-required to have certain solid (i. e. virtually settled, not much 
debatable) basic premises on which a sound comparison and/or assessment could be 
possible to make. However, there is no such a possibility to acquire a solid 
base as to 
public international law. Even today, the question whether "international 
law is really 
law? " 19 attracts much attention of not only from strictly "realist" minds but also from a 
larger audience. This is mainly due to international law's perpetual oscillation between 
law and politics as well as its often imprecise boundaries with international relations, 
ethics, and private international law. 
20 One particular difficulty of this 
impreciseness/closeness that most researches conducted in international law might face 
is the employed vocabulary. For instances, the boundaries of international law and 
international relations are at times too close to avoid employing normative vocabularies 
that have been created outside traditional public law, such as "private regime" or 
"multiple legal regimes". Moreover, when examining the legal character of soft law, the 
above-described problematic gets further complicated, especially in the cases where 
`informal' soft law and institutions are discussed. The reason for confusion and 
misconceptions are related to the interdisciplinary elements that the research on soft law 
embraces. As discussed throughout the thesis, if one is not strictly subscribed to the 
IS I owe an apology to Koskenniemi for rephrasing his critique about the understanding of methodology 
of the editors of the "Symposium on Method in International Law" (Koskenniemi, 1999, p. 353). 
" Austin John, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1954 
(published first in 1863) 
20 John R. Bolton, the former US Ambassador to the United Nations, states that "it is hard to imagine a 
more desperately tedious-sounding topic than whether 'international law is really law". Nonetheless, 
throughout in his widely discussed article, he does not refrain from engaging enthusiastically in 
answering the question. According to Bolton, "international law is not law; it is a series of political and 
moral arrangements that stand or fall on their own merits, and anything else is simply theology and 
suppression masquerading as law" (Bolton, John, R., Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, I 
Chicago Journal of International Law, 2000, p. 48). Bolton further agues that the problem about the 
'legality' of international law arises from exporting the concept of 'law' wholesale as used domestically 
into international affairs. Bolton eventually gives his own definition of law as follows: "We understand 
'law' to be a system of commands, obligations and rules that regulate relations among individuals and 
associations, and the sources of legitimate coercive authority in society" (Ibid. p. 1-2). Certainly, one 
could find an element of confusion, in this approach, between the normative quality of international law 
with the problem of its effectiveness and enforcement. 
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positivist school, which divides norms into two definitive categories as ̀
legal' and `non 
legal', it is hardly possible to be always on the `right side' of the fence. This `complaint' 
may possibly remind the reader of Kenneth Abbott's call for a "joint 
discipline" to 
narrow down the gap between international law and international relations theory. 
21 
While this study has in principle found no reason to object to employing an 
interdisciplinary vocabulary it would nonetheless object to such a `bridge' when it 
is 
used as a passage to reduce law to merely a policy choice for the hegemonic powers 
22 
Yet, even though the examination of the normative and ideological aspects of the 
relation between international law and international politics could be considered as 
`unsafe', such an undertaking is still tempting. This is so, because this examination may 
open up many intriguing possibilities not only for a renewed debate on the dynamics 
and potential of the new forms of international law making but also and perhaps more 
broadly, for the prospect of reviewing the history of international law to seize the 
continuities, discontinuity, ruptures and restorations between past and present and to re- 
conceptualise its relation with `international society'. 
All things considered, the storyline of the present study evidently has a weak ending for 
those, who wish to see a constructive description of the role of international law in 
international affairs and world justice. Admittedly, the lack of such an affirmative 
attitude (or a "problem-solving theory") may be disappointing. However, this should 
rather be explained by the `natural' limits of law to deal with social needs, which 
unavoidably demand not only normative questions but also political discourse. For, not 
many `legal positions' are purely the productions of law even though, as Koskenniemi 
puts it, "they are all equally amenable to being dressed in it". 23 Considering this, it can 
be concluded that international lawyers should not content themselves only and solely 
with a critical attitude towards the international system but they should do so from the 
perspective of the idea of law as the expression of the 'social'. 24 Any further insistence 
21 Abbott, Kenneth, W., Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Law, 14 
Yale Journal of International Law (1989) 
22 See Koskenniemi, Martti, "Carl Schmitt, Hans Morgenthau, and the Image of Law in International 
Relations" in Byers, Michael (ed. ), The Role of Law in International Politics, Oxford University Press: 
New York, 2002 
23 Koskenniemi, Martti, From Apology to Utopia, Cambridge University Press: New York (2005) p. 570. 
24 Ibid. p. 612 
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on the role of law would venture to develop into some form of utopia (or philosophy) 
albeit certain illusions may emphatically be considered worth to care for. 
1.2 Analytical categories 
As the words paradigm and paradigm shift are central in the thesis it is crucial to look a 
little closer on how they are understood and used as analytical categories in this thesis. 
A paradigm can be interpreted as representing a way of seeing something. In that sense 
paradigm is closely related to the widely used concept of discourse. There are many 
uses and interpretations of the concept, but Foucault has defined discourse as the sum of 
the exchanges of ideas in a specific context and time. 25 In the same line of reasoning 
discourse can be seen as a complex and continuous struggle over the definition and 
meaning of problems where the dominant ideas sorts out or defines what is normal, 
wrong, valuable and worthless and creates a general consensus over an ongoing 
economic, social or political process. Thus, what the concept captures is that people 
(including lawyers) live and experience within discourse in the sense that discourses 
impose frameworks, which limit what can be experienced or "what the meaning of 
experience can encompass, and thereby influence what can be said and done". 26 Thus, 
discourse, likewise paradigm, as it is interpreted here, is also understood to have this 
exclusive or monopolistic character. 
However, law cannot merely be reduced to a discourse. Law is more of a practice. On 
the intimate connection of discourse and practice, Foucault argued that madness, 
sexuality and criminality do not exist in a pure unmediated form, but they are produced 
by various techniques and procedures. Practices are created by and persist through the 
discourse, and discourse is generated and works through the power relations within and 
between the practices. 27 Recognising both the discursive and practical characteristics of 
law, this thesis understands the word of paradigm as a notion that includes both 
discourse and practice. 
25 Foucault, Michael, The History of Sexuality. An introduction, Volume 1. Penguin Books: London 
(1976) 
26 Purvis, Trevor and Hunt, Alan, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, 44 The 
British Journal of Sociology (1993) 3, p. 485 
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Another key notion in this thesis is the notion of "paradigm shift", which refers to the 
occurrences of significant changes or transformations from one fundamental set of 
assumptions. The shift is often driven by an agent of change and a shift frequently 
entails major discontinuities. As it is well known, in 1962 Thomas Kuhn argued that 
scientific advancement is not evolutionary, but rather is a "series of peaceful interludes 
punctuated by intellectually violent revolutions", and in those revolutions "one 
conceptual world view is replaced by another". 28 
Most proponents of globalisation argued that various entities, groups, organisations at 
all levels, i. e., local, national, international, and transnational, are developing new 
norms to fit the new social and economic needs. These mostly non-state or hybrid 
norms are regarded as "living law". Duncan Kennedy impressively conceptualises the 
legitimating rhetoric of the "living law". He identified a transformation of law from the 
social "is" to the adaptive "ought", which occurred around 1900. This was a 
transformation mainly based in the alleged need to develop new forms of law to fit the 
new social needs and to provide a basis for changes in the particular direction the 
dominant forces favoured. 29 This study can also be read from this perspective, as trying 
to capture the transformation of the `social' around 1980 as such, by tracing the passage 
from "is" to "ought" in the rhetoric of globalisation. The shift between two opposite 
paradigms that this study depicts and the factors that are responsible for this shift, in 
particular globalisation, can be read at least at two levels; as "is" and "ought". The "is" 
is descriptive. It describes what is there out there; technological progress, the rise of 
MNEs and so forth. However, the "is" is not apt as only being "is". The interpretation of 
"is" through the lenses of the dominant discourse which refers to the values, or system 
of thought, in a society that are most standard and widely held at a given time, 30 leads to 
the adaptive "ought" for the practice of law, where a social analysis `identifies' the 
multiple sub-state and supra-state normative orders that are operating in a `globalised' 
27 Foucault, Michael, Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison. Penguin Books: London (1977) 
28 Kuhn Thomas, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, University of Chicago: Illinois, 1996, p. 10 
29 Kennedy, Duncan, Two Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-1968,36 Suffolk University 
Law Review (2002-2003) 3, p. 651 
30 Masterman, Margaret, "The Nature of a Paradigm" in Lakatos, Imre and Musgrave, Alan (eds. ), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, (1970) p. 59 
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world "to provide a basis for changes in the particular direction". Thus, 
how one 
perceives the "is" depends very much on what discourse one looks through. 
Discussions on globalisation and the presumptions associated with it, such as the 
decline of the state and global governance, can (and should) therefore be read at two 
levels. At one level, this discussion serves to describe the factors that smoothed the path 
to the paradigm shift this study examines; thus it is descriptive. At a second level, it 
outlines globalisation and the related themes as a consensus creation process, whose 
language prescribes how it ought to be perceived and accepted; thus it is prescriptive. 
The examination of the changing nature and role of soft law with a focus on 
international economic law and regulation examines consequently how the discourse on 
globalisation acts upon and within the practice of international economic soft law. 
To exemplify; we understand and interpret the world's affairs, consciously or not, 
through the angle of a discourse that is dominant in a particular domain. For instance, 
the way the majority of people, whether professionals or laymen, saw and understood 
international economy in the post-world war period was quite different than how they 
understood it in the post-Cold-War period. The practice in this specific case is the 
particular form of international law related to a particular discourse. Some particular 
discursive circumstances give rise to a particular legal practice, forming a legal 
paradigm. This legal paradigm stays there as long as long as its underlying conditions 
prevail. 
1.3 Research limitations 
This study contends that the dominant paradigm in the international economy and 
international economic law during the 1960s and 1970s was "state-centric". One reason 
for that this law being state-centric was the need to restructure the national economies 
destroyed in the aftermath of World War II. Another reason was related to the 
emergence of new states as a result of decolonisation process and the related rise of the 
ideology of "Third Worldism". However, by the end of the 1980s, with the rise of neo- 
liberal ideology and its emphasis on the minimalist state and market economy and the 
collapse of socialism, the state-centric' paradigm vanished from sight suddenly. Instead 
a new dual paradigm labelled here for convenience "globalist" became the dominant 
paradigm. This shift included a shift in both the discourse on international economics as 
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well as a change in the practical structure of international law including a clear 
prescription for deregulation, privatisation and the liberalisation of trade and investment 
regimes, which has resulted in the transfer of economic and regulatory power from state 
to MNEs and international economic institutions. 
This study holds consequently that the perception and use of soft law has considerably 
changed with these different paradigms in terms of their characteristics, actors and 
functions. By depicting these paradigms through illustrating them with chosen examples 
displaying the basic elements of each paradigm, this study intends to demonstrate the 
changing nature and role i. e. practice of soft law in international economy. Four 
examples will be used. One example will be assessed in relation to the "state centric" 
paradigm and three examples will be assessed in relation to the dual globalist paradigm. 
The examples given in relation to the state centric paradigm is the NIEO. The NIEO, 
which had a very strong emphasis on the centrality of the state, was the dominant mode 
of international economic, political and legal debate in the 1960s and 1970s. NIEO 
influenced greatly the perception of the economic and political situation of those days as 
well as the factors that led to that in the immediate years following the World War II» 
However, it should be noted that the NIEO reflects rather the position of the so-called 
"Third World". In the economically more developed world the emphasis on the 
centrality of state took rather a different form, which today is known as the `welfare 
state'. Compared to the NIEO, this model is less convenient to illustrate the nature of 
international economic soft law due to the fact that it reflects to a lesser extent the 
tension between developed and developing countries, which shaped the essence of soft 
law in the framework of the UN. 
The "non-state actor" sub-paradigm, which together with "hegemonic state" sub- 
paradigm composes the "globalist" paradigm, is assessed by two examples: Lex 
mercatoria and the international standards of CSR. The former represents a "bottom- 
up" non-state soft law, the latter represents a "top-down" initiative referring to the 
origin of the rules. A bottom-up initiative is an example where the idea of the regulation 
came from the actors that are regulated and the top down initiative is an example where 
31 Waelde, Thomas, W., A Requiem for the 'New International Economic Order, I The Internet Journal of 
the Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy (1995) p. 2, available at http: //www. dundee. ac. uk/cepmlp/joumal/html/Vol I /v I -2. html 
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the idea of the regulation came from another source than the regulated actors. Lex 
mercatoria refers to an "anational system of general principles, customs and rules 
spontaneously referred to, elaborated and followed in the framework of international 
trade and commerce". 32 Since this set of norms, which occupies a particular position in 
between private and public international law, is allegedly generated by a worldwide 
merchant constituency through the conduct of cross-border economic transactions, is 
examined in this study as an example of "bottom-up" regulation. The international 
standards of CSR, on the other hand, have been dealt with as an example of "top-down" 
model of non-state soft law. The reason of considering CSR as a `top-down' model is 
that despite the fact that CSR codes are actually `voluntary' and self-regulatory, the 
adoption of them is mainly driven by a regulatory impulse arisen from external public 
pressure. Then again, as for the state-centric paradigm, many other examples of each of 
these sub-paradigms can be found. However, lex mercatoria, which is suggested to be 
"the most successful example of global law without state", 33 represents the 
characteristics of self-regulatory private soft law development more thoroughly than 
other comparable examples, such as International Organization for Standardisation 
(ISO) regimes, which display rather a hybrid nature. CSR is the most well-known and 
rapidly growing example of the so-called "top-down" model. Besides, it illustrates the 
interaction between the normative activities of state and non-state actors more 
comprehensively than other such examples, like most internal rules of corporate 
governance. 
The last example that is selected to assess the hegemonic state sub-paradigm of the 
global dualist paradigm is the evolution of the GATT/WTO system in the 1990s. As 
will be shown, in parallel to the changed roles of the three main institutions of the 
Bretton Woods institutions (i. e., the IMF, the World Bank and the GATT/WTO) in the 
1980s and 1990s, the degree of institutional legalisation of these organisations has also 
hardened. Since the WTO is considered as the principal international institution for the 
32 Fortier, Yves, L., The New, New 'Lex mercatoria, or, Back To the Future, 17 Arbitration International 
(2001) 2, p. 122 
33 Teubner, Gunther, "Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society" in Teubner, Gunther (ed. ) 
Global Law Without a State, Dartmouth: UK&USA, 1997, p. 3 
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management and regulation of the process of economic globalisation, 
34 the evolution of 
the GATT/WTO system is thought to reveal the basic elements of the process, in which 
non-state soft regulation and the deepening - hard legalisation under international 
economic organisations and bilateral treaties have gone hand in hand to establish the 
rules for a disciplined liberalism. 
1.4 Outline 
Chapter 2 examines the concept of soft law in international law in a period in round 
numbers between 1950 and 1990. This was a period during which soft law emerged and 
evolved essentially to respond to the demands and practices of states. Section 2.2 looks 
at the various definitions of soft law by classifying it into three broad categories as 
"treaty soft law", "non-binding soft law", and "non-state soft law". The section 
recognises that although much of soft law is incorporated within non-binding 
instruments, an increasing number of treaties contain provisions that are not intended to 
create precise obligations. In other words, the section argues that the criteria used to 
identify soft law should not be based only on the binding or non-binding character of 
the instrument, but also on the nature and specificity of the obligation states undertake. 
Section 2.3 deals with "treaty soft law" which as used here, refers to treaties, especially 
framework and umbrella treaties, the substantive provisions of which tend to be merely 
hortatory or programmatic as well as treaty provisions that do not create a precise 
obligation. Section 2.4 looks at "non-binding soft law", which applies both to those 
instruments in `non-legal forms', such as the resolutions and declarations of the UN 
General Assembly, and non-binding soft law that is part of a multilateral regime such as 
mechanisms established under various multilateral treaty to perform the role of 
authoritative interpretation of the terms of a treaty or to provide the detailed rules and 
technical standards required for implementation of some treaties. Section 2.5 seeks to 
demonstrate the factors that create a continuum between hard and soft law in a 
comparative way. Section 2.6 focuses on the reasons for adopting soft law in inter-state 
relations. This section also concerns the identification of the conditions and issue-areas 
34 See for instance Van den Bossche, Peter and Alexovicova, Iveta, Effective Global Economic 
Governance by The World Trade Organization, 8 Journal of International Economic Law (2005) 3, p. 667 
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in which the reasons of adopting soft law may vary and thus may have different or even 
opposite effects on the normative development of soft law. Section 2.7 overviews the 
historical evolution and theoretical obstacles for recognising soft law within the 
framework of traditional sources of international law. Section 2.8 focuses on the basis 
and nature of `hard' and `soft' obligation. Section 2.9 addresses two interrelated 
questions: Is soft law eventually destined to become hard law? And second, under what 
circumstances can soft law be converted into hard law? 
Chapter 3 sets the conceptual stage for the analysis of the paradigm shift in international 
economic soft law and regulation. Section 3.2 defines economic law, regulation and 
self-regulation as the key concepts of introducing soft law into international economic 
law and regulation. Section 3.3 sets up two alternative paradigms in international 
economic soft law and sketches out the paradigm shift from state-centric to a dual 
globalist paradigm. Section 3.4 describes the state-centric' paradigm while section 3.5 
portrays the dual globalist paradigm. Section 3.6 assesses the role of the doctrine of 
state sovereignty as a legal concept and the principle of sovereign equality in 
international economic law and their functions in the examined paradigm shift. Section 
3.7 examines the legal status of non-state actors focusing on the role of MNEs and 
NGOs within the international economic law making process. 
Chapter 4 identifies the factors that paved the way for the examined paradigm shift. 
Section 4.2 analyses globalisation as both a consensus creating and market-led 
integration processes that has been responsible for the paradigm change in international 
economic soft law. Section 4.3 briefly surveys the `inevitability' discourse in the 
context of technological and economic determinism. Section 4.4 examines the nature of 
the changes in state-market relations that have characterised the contemporary era of 
globalisation and economic liberalisation. Section 4.5 discuses the concept of global 
governance as a form of hybrid institutionalisation that accelerates the deformalisation 
of international law and assesses whether and to what extent global governance fills the 
institutional gaps for a global polity that a global economy allegedly demands. 
Chapter 5 examines the New International Economic Order (NIEO) as an example of 
the state-centric paradigm. Section 5.2 overviews the economic and ideological 
conditions and perception underlying the NIEO as well as its main sources. Section 5.3 
introduces the scope of the NIEO and discuses its legal nature. Section 5.4 deals with 
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the evolution of the NIEO and subsequent regulatory activities that come out from the 
NIEO or were produced to counter it. Section 5.5 examines the reasons for the rather 
sudden disappearance of the NIEO from international scene. Section 5.6 looks at the 
lasting influence of the NIEO as a state-centric model and evaluates the pros and cons 
of this model. 
Chapter 6 examines the evolution of the `new' lex mercatoria interpreted as an example 
of the "non-state actor" paradigm. While it is true that especially from a more 
traditional/sceptical perception lex mercatoria could merely be read as belonging to 
private international law, a growing number of scholars tend to classify it as a new 
category of (transnational) rules, which emanate from non-state authority, permeating 
public international law through various international instruments, such as the NAFTA, 
the ICSID and BITs, in which the dispute resolution provisions of lex mercatoria 
emerge. Section 6.2 defines lex mercatoria, as an example of "bottom-up" regulation, 
which is, as it is claimed by its proponents, solely based on contractual elements to 
sustain itself as a normative order. The section also traces origins and evolution of lex 
mercatoria. Section 6.3 describes briefly the institutional components of the new lex 
mercatoria focusing mainly on the commercial custom and international arbitration. 
Section 6.4 is centred on the issue of the autonomous character of lex mercatoria and 
discusses it in the context of legal pluralism. Section 6.5 examines lex mercatoria, the 
"global capital's own law"35 in the normative and ideological context of self-regulation 
and relates it to the blurring boundaries between public and private spheres. In the 
conclusive remarks, lex mercatoria is considered in relation to the state-centric 
approach to provide a comparative outlook by linking lex mercatoria with the NIEO. 
Chapter 7 deals with the evolution of international standards of "corporate social 
responsibility" (CSR) and perceive it as a "top-down" example of the "non-state actor" 
paradigm. Section 7.2 explains the origin of the concept not solely with the rising power 
of MNEs or the lack of international legal framework regulating the activities of MNEs, 
but also and particularly with the neo-liberal rationality, which considers CSR as an 
example for the emerging private normative order. It then gives a short account of the 
evolution of CSR and describes its substantive content and normative context. Section 
7.3 overviews the institutional framework of CSR dividing it into three groups based on 
35 Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, Toward a New Legal Common Sense, Butterworths, 2002, p. 208 
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the regulatory bodies: national and international public initiatives, 
NGOs and MNEs 
and shows the nature of the increasing interactions between them. 
Section 7.4 assesses 
CSR within the context of self-regulation, which is characterised by the concepts such 
as `customer orientation', `efficiency', `flexibility', and `market' and considers the pros 
and cons of such an approach. It further discusses the complexities of self-regulation 
and external regulations and the role of soft law in these two types of regulation. 
In the 
conclusive remarks, CSR is comparatively related to both the NIEO and 
lex mercatoria 
in order to demonstrate their mutually exclusive and complementary elements. 
Chapter 8 exemplifies hegemonic state paradigm by the evolution of the GATT/WTO 
system. Its purpose is to show that international economic law and regulation 
in the 
post-1980s has evolved not only towards a non-state, informal, soft, and self-regulatory 
normativity, but also towards a complementary harder law and strengthening 
institutionalisation. Section 8.2 discusses the concept of hegemonic international law 
and illustrates the interrelation between international law and politics focusing on the 
concept of balance of power. Section 8.3 proposes a framework to explain that the shift 
from state-led to market-oriented neo-liberal economic policies in the post-1980s does 
not only involve de-regulation and economic liberalisation, but also re-regulation 
processes. Section 8.4 overviews the institutional framework and mechanisms of the 
increasing legalisation and re-regulation of international economy. It focuses on the 
evolution of the Bretton Woods institutions from relatively soft law character with 
specific and limited assignment to a hard law with a rather extensive scope. Section 8.5 
examines the exclusive role and growing importance of the WTO as a main regulatory 
device of economic globalisation. Section 8.6 describes the evolution of the 
GATT/WTO dispute settlement process as an example of hard law development. 
Section 8.7 compares the evolution of the GATT/WTO with the NIEO and illustrates in 
what ways such hard law development may be consistent with the simultaneously 
present non-state normativity. 
Chapter 9 analyses the relationship between the state-centric and globalist paradigms in 
relation to the development of international economic soft law and regulation. Section 
9.2 presents an overview of the structure of the state-centric and globalist paradigms and 
underlines the context in which the paradigm shift occurred. Section 9.3 examines the 
discourse formation and practices of the state-centric paradigm and looks into the legal 
and practical outcomes of this paradigm. Section 9.4 deals with the significance of the 
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end of the Cold War and globalisation for the paradigm shift. Section 9.5 depicts the 
discourse formation and practices of the globalist paradigm and looks into the legal and 
practical outcomes of this paradigm. Section 9.6 presents the key elements of soft law 
developments in the state-centric paradigm and non-state-actor sub-paradigm and 
deconstructs deregulation discourse by linking it with the concept of disciplinary 
liberalism. 
Chapter 10 summarises and reflects on the possible practical and theoretical 
development of soft law in international law in general and international economic soft 
law in particular. Section 10.2 summarises the underlying findings of the thesis. Section 
10.3 speculates on the evolution of soft law both in the economic sphere and 
international law generally. Finally, section 10.4 offers the final words of this study. 
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2 THE CONCEPT OF "SOFT LAW" IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
2.1 Introduction 
An issue of major importance in the post-World War II era has been whether "soft law" 
is a normative category of international law, and if so, whether such a category 
is 
desirable or/and unavoidable as well as in what ways this "soft law" may have an 
impact on the normative development of international law. Before turning to examine 
the evolution of soft law in international economic law in the subsequent chapters, this 
chapter aims to discuss the role of soft law in international law in general with an 
ambition to place the discussions surrounding its normative quality, functions and 
nature within the traditional framework of international law-making. The reason for this 
is the observation that the increasing complexity of the processes by which international 
law can be created today is no longer adequately captured simply by reference to Article 
38 of the Statute of Permanent Court of International Justice. In order to investigate the 
role of soft law as an element in international law-making, the chapter addresses a 
number of issues: the "definition of soft law", "reasons for adopting soft law", whether 
"soft law is a challenge to the normative structure of international law", "the legal 
nature of the obligations that soft law implies" and lastly, "the interplay between hard 
and soft law". 
Article 38 of the Statute of Permanent Court of International Justice, drafted after the 
First World War, is generally accepted as containing a list of the sources of international 
law. 36 Since then, however, international law has radically changed as a result of several 
36 Sources of international law are the materials and processes out of which the rules and principles 
regulating the international community are developed. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the "Permanent 
Court of International Justice", the international court of the "League of Nations" established in 1922 is, 
as it was, preserved in the 1946 Statute of the "International Court of Justice", which is the principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations. Article 38 reads as follows: "The Court shall apply: 1. International 
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting 
States. 2. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 3. The general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 4. Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary 
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convergent factors. The Second World War, the Cold War, the growing and intensifying 
international activities following the foundation of the UN, the decolonisation process, 
and calls for a new international economic order in the 1970s, have in particular been 
significant for this change. Increased heterogeneity of the "international society" caused 
by the decolonisation process has influenced the international law system to the extent 
that the whole philosophy and foundation of the UN System has been marked by it. The 
development of the principle of the "equality of sovereign states" can alone exemplify 
this influence. Moreover, during the post-war period, the scope of international law has 
incomparably widened through the inclusions of new subject matters, such as 
international economy, human rights, and the environment. It is also argued that in the 
post-1945 period, and especially with the end of the Cold War, international 
organisations have had a dramatic impact on the institutionalisation of public 
international law by changing the mechanisms and reasoning behind its making, 
implementation, and enforcement. Besides, unlike traditional international law prior to 
World War II, which only affected states, the rules articulated by international 
organisations with a global reach, such as the UN and the WTO, affect not only states 
but also individuals through the making of multilateral treaties and the day to day 
application and interpretation of institutional law, thereby blurring the lines between 
intra and inter-state law-making. 37 Likewise, the advances of sciences and technology 
have eroded traditional distinctions between domestic and international affairs and 
created new or deepened common interests and multiplied common actions among 
states. 38 By the same token, non-state actors have exercised various degree of authority 
in the generation of rules- and decision-making as well as implementation and 
compliance assessment in connection with their increasing role especially in the 
domains of the global political economy, the environment, and human rights. As a 
means for the determination of rules of law. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to 
decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto" 
(http: //www. worldcourts. comlpcijleng/documents/1920.12.16 statute. htm). 
37 On the role of international organisations as law makers and dispute settlers, see Alvarez, Jose, E., 
International Organizations as Law-makers, Oxford University Press: New York, 2005 
38 For a general illustration of the reciprocal influence of science, technology and international law, see Lachs, Manfred, Thought on Science, Technology and World Law, 86 American Journal of International Law (1992) 4 
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result, it is argued, the allocation of power and authority in the international system has 
also significantly changed. 39 
Since international law is predominantly based on and grows out of the international 
relations, the above-mentioned structural changes in international relations have had a 
number of substantial consequences on international law: (a) International law has 
become a more complex and multifaceted system mainly as a result of the enlargement 
of its scope; (b) as "interaction between states has become both more frequent and more 
penetrating"40 the interdependency between states has also increased. In the words of 
Friedmann, international law has been transformed from the international law of 
"coexistence" governing essentially diplomatic inter-state relations, to the international 
law of "co-operation", expressed in the growing number of international organisations 
and the pursuit of common human interest. 41 (c) International law has been forced to 
accommodate to the changes created by globalisation in order to respond to the growing 
demand for fast, flexible, discretionary, and ad hoc regulations, as well as to reflect the 
post-Cold War power relations more accurately. 
Mainly associated with these developments, a new range of international legal 
commitments that either lack the requisite normative content to create enforceable rights 
and obligations or do not fall into the "traditional" categories of "treaty" or "custom" or 
"general principles of law", has gained unprecedented currency. It is therefore argued 
that since the norms of `contemporary' international law can be created in many new 
ways that can no longer be adequately captured solely by reference to the traditional 
categories of custom and treaty, there is hence a need to reassess the traditional sources 
and subjects theory of international law. 
39 Gamble, John King and Ku, Charlotte, "International Law -New Actors and New Technologies" in International Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings, Ku, Charlotte and Diehl, Paul F. (eds. ), Lynne Reinner Publisher: London, 2003, p. 505 
ao Van Hoof, G. J. H., Rethinking the Sources of International Law, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers: Deventer, 1983, p. 66 
41 Friedmann (1964) p. 85 
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2.2 Defining soft law 
Dupuy notes that the term "soft law" was coined by Lord McNair, likely in the 
beginning of the 1970s. 42 However, just as for the recognition of the existence of such 
a normative category, there is not a generally accepted definition of "soft law". There is 
no denying that any conceptualisation of the rules of international law in terms of `hard' 
versus `soft' law is inherently problematic. Indeed Gold has discouragingly stated: 
"Almost as many definitions of soft law can be found as there are writers about it". 
3 As 
discussed below, such a great variety of opinions about the conceptualisation of soft 
law, the ambiguity surrounding its crucial characteristics as `legal' norms and the 
complexity involving the identification of soft law are attributable, at least partly, to the 
nature of the international law-making, which is essentially decentralised and frequently 
implies varying degrees of normativity. 44 Yet, despite the apparent challenge arising 
from this `infinity' in regard to its definition, it is still possible to identify three broad 
categories of soft law: "treaty soft law", "non-binding soft law", and "non-state soft 
law". It is nonetheless important to note that an increasing number of scholars 
understand soft law as a combination of various elements that these three categories 
display, at least partly due to the coexistence of divergent constituents of soft norms and 
instruments. The reason for examining soft law in three categories is the understanding 
that as a `legal' concept soft law necessarily exhibits a degree of relative normativity 
42 Dupuy, Rend, Jean, "Declaratory Law and Programmatory Law: From Revolutionary Custom to "Soft 
Law' " in Akkerman, Robert, J., Sijthoff: Leyden (eds. ), Declarations on Principles. A Quest for 
Universal Peace), 1977, p. 252. The history of norms and instruments of "soft law" character actually 
goes back to a very early stage of international law. However, "it relatively rarely gave rise to 
international controversies of considerable intensity. This (... ) might be due partly to lesser significance 
of the controversial questions involved. But it was also due to the common criteria and common values 
among the members of the international community of States of that time [which actually meant almost 
solely European countries [I. A. O. ]; and consequently, to the common understanding of the character of 
their commitments (Sztucki, Jerzy, "Reflection on International `Soft Law"' in Ramberg, J., Bring, O. 
and Mahmoudi, S. (eds. ), Festskrift till Lars Hjerner: Studies on International Law, Norstedts: Stockholm 
1990, p. 557). Those contractual instruments were named as "gentlemen's agreements", "memoranda of 
understanding" or "joint communiquds" (Chinkin, Christine, "Normative Development" in Shelton, 
Dinah (ed. ) Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal 
System, Oxford University Press: New York, 2003, p. 26). 
43 Gold, Joseph, Interpretation: The IMF and International Law, Kluwer Law International: The 
Hague/London/Boston, 1996, p. 301. Elsewhere Gold gives his own definition as follows: "The intended 
vagueness of the obligations that it imposes or the weakness of its commands" exposes a norm's softness 
(Gold, Joseph, Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Agreements, 77 American Journal 
of International Law (1983) 414). 
44 See sub-section 2.7 in this chapter. 
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both at the level of law-creation modes and content. It is therefore 
important to 
demonstrate in what ways the normative assertions of the aforementioned 
definitions 
converge and compete, and in what ways these different categories of soft 
law may have 
a cumulative effect or may counteract each other. 
In the first category, labelled here for convenience "treaty soft law", the term soft 
law is 
used to describe treaties and treaty provisions, which are legally binding, nonetheless 
do 
not lay down precise obligations on state parties that can be enforceable 
by an 
international court or other international organ. Baxter for instance holds that norms of 
various degrees of cogency, persuasiveness, and consensus which are 
incorporated in 
agreements between states but do not create enforceable rights and duties may 
be 
described as soft law. 45 Scholars holding such view maintain that "the conclusion of an 
agreement in treaty form does not ensure that a hard obligation has been incurred". 
6 As 
follows, though formally binding, some treaties or treaty provisions may be soft in the 
sense that they do not involve clear and specific legal commitments nor impose real 
obligations on the parties in the way "hard law" does. In such cases, the vagueness, 
indeterminacy, or generality of a treaty or treaty provision may deprive these 
instruments of the character of "hard law". This is however not one and the same that 
such "soft" treaties or "soft" treaty provisions are "non-binding", because as stated in 
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as a legal form, treaties are 
always binding upon the parties. 47 From this perspective, as discussed in the following 
section in detail, treaties and treaty provisions may be either hard or soft, or both. Thus, 
in this category, it is the content of the treaty or treaty provision which is determinant of 
whether a treaty or treaty provision is hard or soft, not its form as a treaty. Obviously, 
the distinction between "hard" and "soft" treaties or treaty provisions is not clear cut. 
Yet, the character of the dispute resolution process may reveal whether a treaty or treaty 
45 Baxter, R. R., International Law in "Iler Infinite Variety", 29 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly (1980), p. 549. Elsewhere, Baxter explains why he prefers to use the term "international 
agreement" instead of "treaties". Accordingly, the term "treaty" in its technical meaning as used in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is legally 'binding' upon the parties. Avoiding this term, 
Baxter essays to open a possibility to include all 'agreements' regardless whether they are legally binding 
or not, such as "political treaties" (Ibid. p. 550). 
46 Chinkin (2003) p. 25 
4' Article 2 (1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as follow: "An 
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, 
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whether its particular 
designation". 
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provisions are hard or soft law: if a treaty is subject to compulsory adjudication 
in cases 
of non-compliance it can be inferred that the rules of this treaty lay down precise, thus, 
enforceable legal obligations. Hence, on this account, contrasted with 
"soft 
enforcement"48 or "dispute avoidance", the existence of "hard enforcement", which 
is 
characterised by compulsory binding settlement of disputes, appears as a 
feature that 
may reveal whether the treaty at issue is hard or soft. 
Second category, an alternative view of soft law, here labelled "non-binding soft 
law", 
focuses on the contrast between "binding" and "non-binding" instruments. 
49 According 
to Thürer, for instance, soft law refers to international norms and instruments that are 
deliberately non-binding in character but still have legal relevance, located in the 
"twilight between law and politics". 50 In a similar way, Francioni holds that 
international norms and instruments that fall outside Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ 
are "soft law". 51 When soft law is used in categorical contrast to "binding" law, this 
implies that treaties by definition are always hard law because treaties are binding upon 
state parties. In this understanding, the treaty form becomes conclusive of binding 
obligation. In other words, if the form 6f an international instrument is that of treaty it 
can then not be soft law and vice versa. Thus, as opposed to the first category of 
definition, the decisive factor in this understanding of soft law is the legal form and not 
the content of the international instruments. Soft law in this category (i. e., non-binding 
soft law) may be adopted either as an alternative to treaty law-making or exist as a part 
of a multilateral treaty-making process. When used as an alternative to treaty law 
model, soft law instruments do not constitute part of a legally binding regime 
nonetheless they aspire to have some normative significance and hold some element of 
law-making intention. Such non-binding instruments may take a number of different 
48 "Soft enforcement" refers to either non-binding conciliation before an independent third party or non- 
binding compliance procedure that aims to find an agreed solution rather than to engage in adversarial 
litigation or claims for reparation. Soft enforcement characteristically evades issues of responsibility for 
breach, and relies on a combination of inducements or the possibility of termination or suspension of 
treaty rights to secure compliance (Boyle, Alan, E., Reflections on Treaties and Soft Law, 48 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1999,4, p. 909). 
49 The term `international instrument' mainly refers to treaty, convention, agreement, protocol, 
declaration, guidelines and codes of conduct. 
50 Thürer, Daniel, Soft Law in Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (2002), 4h edition, p. 452 
Francioni, Francesco, "International 'Soft Law" in Lowe, A. Vaughan and Fitzmaurice, Malgosia 
(eds. ), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice, Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings, 
Cambridge University Press: NY, 1996, p. 167 
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forms, including resolutions of the UN General Assembly; codes of conduct, guidelines 
and recommendation of international organisations, such as the 
OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises; and declarations and final acts of international conferences, 
such as the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. As said above, non- 
binding instruments do not always represent an alternative mode of law-making to 
treaty; they may also constitute an integral part of a multilateral treaty-making process. 
In the latter case soft law is a part of a multilateral treaty-making process even though 
such soft law norms, decisions and standards are legally non-binding. It 
is often so 
because they emanate from bodies that have not been endowed with the power to adopt 
mandatory texts, but only recommendations, as in the case of decisions of Conference 
of the Parties (COP) under various multilateral environmental agreements. 
52 COPS, 
nonetheless elaborate and adopt guidelines, rules or procedures that are needed to put 
flesh on the bones of the several of treaties or protocols' 
53 key provisions, as in the 
cases of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer/Montreal 
Protocol54 and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change/the Kyoto 
Protocol. 55 
Fundamentally different from the previous two categories, the third definition of soft 
law, labelled in this study "non-state soft law", involves a structural shift between "law" 
and "'non-law", which is, it is argued, to be manifested in the increasingly blurred 
boundary between the public and private domains and in the growing pluralism of 
5z On the role of the role of Conferences of the Parties in Multilateral Environment Agreements -based 
law-making, see Brunnee, Jutta, COPing with Consent: Law-Making Under Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements, 15 Leiden Journal of International Law (2002) 1 
53 The term; protocol' refers to an agreement governed by international law that amends, supplements, or 
clarifies a treaty or other broad international agreement. 
54 For instance, the terms of the non-compliance procedures were first set out by the Decision 11/5 of the 
2"d meeting of the Parties in December 1990 and was subsequently revised and then incorporated by 
amendment as an annex IV in the Protocol in Copenhagen in 1992 (available at 
http: //ozone. unep. org/Publications/MP Handbook/Section 2Decision sArticle 8/decs-non- 
complianceDrodecure/Decisions II-5. sthml). 
55 See for instance the reporting guidelines for national communication decided by the COP. The basis for 
reporting and review under the climate change regime is established in Article 4 of the UNFCCC, which 
requires all parties to prepare national communications according to common reporting guidelines agreed 
by the COP. These non-binding "FCCC reporting guidelines" have been revised three times, each time 
specifying in more detail the information that parties must include in their reports and how this should be 
presented, with the aim of improving the comprehensiveness, accuracy, transparency and comparability 
of the date provided (Yamin, Farhana and Depledge, Joanna, The International Climate Change Regime, 
Cambridge University Press: UK, 2004, p. 332). 
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sources and subjects of international law. It is commonly asserted that one of the most 
significant developments in the process of globalisation has been the rise of non-state 
actors and their consequent participation in international rule- and policy-making as 
well as implementation processes. The rapidly enhanced role of non-state actors in both 
formal and informal law-making institutions has, as claimed, resulted in the increasing 
heterogeneity of and pluralism in the modes of law making as well as in the decrease in 
the control of states over the content of international law. 56 Many scholars, like 
Reisman, have characterised such "non-state law-making" modes as "privatisation and 
democratisation" of international law and suggested replacing the traditional division of 
`hard law' and ̀ soft law' with "state-made law", which refers to the law that is produced 
in arenas to which only state representatives have formal access, and "media-made 
law", which refers to the ̀ law', which is produced within a much larger and more open 
`law-making' process that is transmitted through multiple electronic and print 
channels. 57 Or as some others have suggested replacing this `old' division with "formal 
soft law", which is primarily defined within the inter-state/governmental realm, and 
"non-state soft law", which is confined to those norms and regimes that rely on the 
participation and recourses of non-state actors in the construction, operation, and 
implementation. 58 Hence, according to this thinking, governmental authority is in the 
non-state soft law either completely absent or does not play a constitutive role. 59 
However, as may be expected, the legal status of the instruments adopted by non-state 
actors causes much controversy for the reason that if norm-like activities of non-state 
actors should be classified as soft law or some sort of law, it involves a paradigm shift 
in the subjects and sources theory of international law. It also implies a decline of the 
public/private distinction, and therefore requires to be wrapped in a larger context of the 
tendency of deformalisation of international law. 
56 Reisman, Michael, W., "The Democratization of Contemporary International Law-making Processes 
and the Differentiation of Their Application" in Wolfrum, Rüdiger and Röben, Volker (eds. ), 
Developments ofInternational Law in Treaty Making, Springer: Berlin, 2005, p. 21 
57 Ibid. 
ss Kirton, John, J. and Trebilcock, Michael, J. (eds. ), Hard Choices, Soft Law, Ashgate: UK, 2004 
s9 Kirton and Trebilcock (2004) p. 9. Shelton, on the other hand, takes a more ̀ cautious' track. According 
to the writer, the norms adopted by non-state actors can be classified as soft law mainly because of two 
reasons: First, these norms are predominantly designed to influence states conducts and policies. Second, 
as is argued, with the increasing globalisation, 'transnational entities' that make their own rules (i. e., 
36 
Against this background, it can be argued that the binary line between binding and non- 
binding instruments as hard and respectively soft law is not clear-cut: treaties often 
include soft obligations while non-binding instruments may contain more 
detailed and 
precise provisions. By the same token, both types of instruments may 
have compliance 
procedures and supervisory mechanisms. Moreover, they do not stand 
in isolation from 
each other. Quite contrary, soft instruments are frequently used either as a precursor 
to 
hard law or as a supplement to treaties to fill in gaps in them and, in that sense 
hard and 
soft law often interact with each other. Such interaction between 
hard and law creates a 
continuum rather than enclosed categories. 
60 This study employs the term of soft law to 
refer to both "treaty soft law" and "non-binding soft law". The reason 
for the preference 
of a `broader' definition of soft law is, as already pointed out, that 
in evaluating the 
importance of soft law, account must be taken of the various ways in which soft 
law can 
be made and that in exploring the potential and influence of soft law, attention 
has to be 
given to the interaction between different types of soft law as well as between 
hard and 
soft law in various forms. On the other hand, this study does not deal with the so-called 
"non-state soft law" as a part of the normative structure of international law, but 
examines it as both a means and product of the deformalisation of international law 
resulted from a paradigm shift occurred in the process of globalisation, which has, many 
argue, fundamentally transformed boundaries between public and private and 
diminished the nation-state's regulatory power and autonomy. 
2.3 "Treaty" soft law 
The concept of "treaty soft law" refers to treaties and treaty provisions that do not 
intend to create firm obligations despite their legally binding form and that are 
`self-regulation') enter into normative relations and instruments that "look much the same as state- 
adopted norms" (Shelton, 2003, p. 4) 
60 It is held that that norms (or legalised institutions) may have a particular set of characteristics, which 
are frequently defined along three dimensions: (i) obligation, which refers to a rule or commitment that is 
legally binding upon states or other actors; (ii) precision, which refers to rules that are clearly define the 
conduct they obligate, authorise, or prescribe; and (iii) delegation refers to the granted authority of third 
parties to implement, interpret, apply the rules and to resolve disputes (Abbot, Kenneth W.; Keohane, 
Robert 0.; Moravscik, Andrew; Slaughter, Anne-Marie, and Snidal, Duncan, The Concept of 
Legalization, 54 International Organization [2000] 3, p. 401). Hence, hard law describes legally binding 
obligations that are precise and delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law while soft 
law lacks one or more of these three dimensions to a varied degree (Ibid. p. 421). 
37 
imprecise (in language) or flexible (in context), consequently lacking peremptory 
character. As mentioned above, according to Article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, treaties are legally binding upon the parties. However, treaty, as a 
legal form, does not necessarily indicate the existence of a "hard law" if it is accepted 
that "hard law" is not only about a legal form but also about enforceability (i. e. the 
presence of an enforceable legal obligation). 
61 This point was also made by Baxter, who 
argued that some treaties are soft in the sense that they impose no real obligations on the 
parties 62 
Indeed, a growing number of treaty and treaty provisions do not include immediate 
obligations for the parties; instead they merely develop programmes of actions, as 
it in 
the examples of European Social Charter (1961) and the UN Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (1966), urging or merely advising the parties to "seek to", 
"make effort to", "promote", or "avoid". 
63 Such soft law provisions included in treaties 
are often nothing more than strong recommendations for the contracting parties and the 
content of such a treaty itself may often be nothing more than a declaration of intention 
as in the example of the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution. 
More and more often, states conclude treaties to consult together, to open negotiations, 
to settle certain problems by subsequent agreement, or "to develop the best policies and 
strategies" in a rather `conventional' way (i. e., treaty form), especially in areas such as 
environment or economic/social development. 
61 It is interesting to note that the binding quality of treaties is historically a new concept. According to 
the classical understanding of sovereignty, it was utterly reasonable that a sovereign was supreme and this 
supremacy could not be surrounded. Spinoza, for instance, objected to the idea that international treaties 
could bind sovereign states. Accordingly, treaties last so long as the cause, which produced it. When this 
enticement is no longer there, it is the right of either contracting party to disengage itself from obligation 
(Spinoza, Tractatus Theologica-Politicus, P. 111,11 cited in Lauterpacht, Hersch., Spinoza and 
International Law, 8 British Year Book of International Law, 1927, p. 94). It is also interesting to note 
that the rule of pacta sunt servanda that many scholars tend to recognise as the `fundamental norm' of is 
not highly valued by Spinoza. Lauterpacht distinguishes three main features in Spinoza's doctrine of 
international relations: (i) the broad assertion that the mutual condition of states is that of states of nature 
with all its implications; (ii) the absence of any obligation to observe treaties; (iii) the notion that the state 
in its dealings with its neighbours is not bound by the cannons of morality and good faith (Ibid. p. 92-93). 
Lauterpacht also draws our attention to the influence of Spinoza on Hobbes' political theory and his 
views on international relations (Ibid. p. 95-96). 
62 Baxter (1980) p. 549 
63 Weil (1983) p. 414 
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Not very different from the aforesaid techniques, some treaty provisions may lay down 
the undertakings more of a political bargain than legal commitments. The United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provides some good 
examples of such techniques. According to Article 4.7 of this Convention, the 
commitments undertaken under the UNFCCC by developing countries are conditional 
on performance of solidarity commitments by developed countries to provide funding 
and transfer of technology. 64 As Boyle observes, such treaty provisions are almost 
impossible to breach, therefore they are not normative and cannot be described as 
creating rules in a legal sense. 65 
The conclusion of a treaty may also aim to create a framework for everyday cooperation 
as well as develop further international rules that are stricter. This is particularly true of 
the so-called framework or umbrella conventions, which refer to a new international 
legislative method, according to which a first agreement has to be reached on the 
principles of common action, while the setting of more precise rules and standards are 
to be agreed on in subsequent protocol(s) and annexe(s). The UNFCCC once again 
provides a good example of such a legislative method. In the words of Boyle, the 
UNFCCC does impose some commitments on the parties, 66 but its core articles, dealing 
with policies and measures to tackle greenhouse gas emissions, are so cautiously and 
obscurely worded and so weak that it is uncertain whether any real obligations are 
created. 67 In this sense, the UNFCCC, likewise the 1985 Vienna Convention for the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer (and the subsequent Montreal Protocol), should be seen 
as a declaration of policy rational for the subsequent (Kyoto) protocol, which sets out 
greater specificity and more precise obligations. 
In a similar way, some treaty provisions may provide guidance to the interpretation, 
elaboration, or application of hard law, or demands to continue negotiations in order to 
64 Article 4.7 of the UNFCCC reads: "The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively 
implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by 
developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and 
transfer of technology and will take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty 
eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties". 
65 Boyle (1999) p. 907 
66 For instance, the principles found in Article 3 prescribe how the regime for regulating climate change is 
to be developed by the parties. It also calls for negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol. 
61 Boyle (1999) p. 907 
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conclude a new or further/detailed agreement in order to work out a permanent 
agreement or to give effect to a previous treaty. 
68 For instance, Article 135 of the Treaty 
of Rome, which established the European Economic Community, required that a 
subsequent agreement on freedom of movement for workers from Member 
States had to 
be concluded. 69 
The so-called "political treaties", which refer to those treaties that are concluded with no 
expectation of effective enforcement, are traditionally classified as legal soft 
law. The 
name of `treaty' in such international agreements may only be a camouflage 
for a soft 
instrument. By these `treaties', states enter into alliances, or agree to co-ordinate their 
military action, or declare the neutrality of 
an area, or lay out their agreed policies for 
the future. The 1974 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War between the U. S. and 
the Soviet Union and the Yalta Agreement70 are the most quoted two examples for this 
type of treaty. Baxter also points out that a state party to such an agreement is often not 
under a legal obligation unless the treaty in question contains territorial or similar 
dispositive terms. 71 
International treaty is one form, among many, that states use to express their 
commitments in a given policy area. Then, why do states prefer the treaty form, instead 
of choosing a "non-binding form", when they do not intend to be bound by enforceable 
treaty obligation? The answer likely lies in the fact that by choosing the treaty form, 
which is legally binding, states reinforce "the credibility of their commitments, expand 
68 Chinkin names such treaty provisions "elaborative" soft law (Chinkin, 2003, p. 30). 
69 "Subject to the provisions relating to public health, public security or public policy, freedom of 
movement within Member States for workers from the countries and territories, and within the countries 
and territories for workers from Member States, shall be governed by agreements to be concluded 
subsequently with the unanimous approval of Member States" 
(http: //europa. eu. int/abe/obj/treaties/en/entr6e. htm#Article_l 35) 
70 Baxter (1980) p. 550. Although the Yalta Agreement was published in US Treaties in Force, the State 
Department declared that "the US regards the so-called Yalta Agreemci; t as simply a statement of 
common purposes by the heads of the participating states and (... ) not as of any legal effect in 
transferring territories" (35 Dept. State Bull. 484 (1956), cited in Schachter, Oscar, The Twilight 
Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 The American Journ. tI of International Law (1977) 
2, p. 298. 
71 Ibid. A refusal of a state to come to the aid of another under the terms of an alliance or the withdrawal 
of a State from a political or military pact cannot be subject to a legal dispute but political or perhaps 
economical. On the other hand, Lauterpacht considered that the Yalta agreement "incorporated definite 
rules of conduct which may be regarded as legally binding on the state in qu,: Aion" (Oppenheim, 1948, p. 
788). 
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their available political strategies, and resolve problems of incomplete contracting' . 
72 
As Lipson puts in, "treaties are a conventional way of raising the credibility of promises 
by staking national reputation on adherence". 73 In other words, "the more formal and 
public the agreement, the higher the reputational costs of non-compliance". 
74 However, 
it should be remembered that by framing the agreement in the formal legal status states 
do not restrict only their sovereignty but they impose the same restriction on the other 
state parties in order to gain from the counter-promises of others or/and to manifest their 
normative commitment. 75 
To sum up, there is no denying that much of soft law is incorporated within non-binding 
instruments. However, as already pointed out, it should equally be recognised that the 
`hard'- or `soft' nature of obligation defined in a treaty or treaty provision cannot 
necessarily be identified on the sole basis of the formally legally binding character of 
the legal instrument. One must recognise that in many cases, the "softness" of the 
instrument corresponds to the "softness" of its contents and its form. 76 Therefore, the 
criteria used to identify soft law should also take account of the nature and specificity of 
the obligation that states parties undertake. 
2.4 "Non-binding" Soft Law 
As discussed in the previous section, treaties, either bilateral or multilateral, are the 
most formal commitments that have full international legal status. Nonetheless, treaty is 
not the only form that states use to govern their relations. States can choose from a wide 
variety of forms to express their commitments, obligations and expectations. These 
`alternative' forms include "informal arrangements", such as tacit agreements, in which 
72 Abbot and Snidal (2000) p. 422 
' Lipson, Charles, Why are some international agreements informal?, 45 International Organization 
(1991) 4, p. 511 
741bid., p. 508 
75 It is commonplace to examine different approaches to international legal commitments dividing them 
into two general categories as "rationalist" and "normativist" (constructivist). Accordingly, while the 
former approach maintains that states enter into contracts to promote their interests, the latter underlines 
that states choose formal agreements, which embody shared norms and understanding, to manifest their 
normative commitment. 
76 Dupuy, Pierre-Marie, Soft Law and the International Law of Environment, 12 Michigan Journal of International Law (1990-1991) p. 429 
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obligations and commitments are implied or inferred but not openly declared, and oral 
agreements, in which bargains are expressly stated but not documented as well as joint 
declarations, final communiques, statements and ministerial conferences. 
77 
There is no doubt that many of these instruments do not possess the precise 
characteristic of law in terms of formality and enforceability. Nor are they drafted in the 
form of legally enforceable instruments. It is also true that such "soft law" instruments 
are often no more than political pronouncements. Yet, these soft law instruments are 
either drafted and signed by the representatives of the states or voted for by them, and 
consequently, may still possess some degree of normative significance. For instance, as 
discussed in section 2.6 in detail, some of such instruments, especially U. N. General 
Assembly resolutions, may provide evidence of the legal practice of nation states or 
they may generate expectations regarding future behaviour. 
As viewed above, non-binding soft law is a multi-faceted concept. It does not only 
present alternatives to treaties, but also it is sometimes used to complement them. In 
other words, some non-binding soft law instruments, decisions and standards can 
constitute a part of a multilateral treaty-making process in various ways. For instance, 
they may be a first step in a process eventually leading to conclusion of a treaty as it 
was the case in the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Guidelines on 
Environmental Impact Assessment, 78 which were subsequently incorporated in the 1991 
UNECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context. 79 Other non-binding soft law instruments may be used as mechanisms for 
authoritative interpretation or strengthening of the terms of a treaty, as in the example of 
77 Lipson notes that despite the fact that these informal agreements differ in form and political intent, 
legal scholars rarely distinguish among them (Lipson, 1991,. p. 502). 
78 "Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact Assessments", adopted by decision 14/25, of the 
Governing Council of UNEP of 17 June, 1987 
79 The Convention, which entered into force on 10 September 1997, sets out the obligations of Parties to 
assess the environmental impact of certain activities at an early stage of planning. It also lays down the 
general obligation of States to notify and consult each other on all major projects under consideration that 
are likely to have a significant adverse environmental impact across boundaries 
(http//www. unece. org/env/eia/documents/conventiontextenglish. pd o. 
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the "General Comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 
under the International Convention on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights". 80 
Another important related role of non-binding soft law as part of a multilateral treaty- 
making process is to provide the detailed rules and technical standards required 
for the 
implementation of treaties. Such decisions, 
81 operational directives of the multilateral 
development institutions, and technical and legal standards developed by legal and 
technical bodies frequently function in giving hard content to the overly-general and 
open-textured terms of especially framework environmental treaties. 
Decisions of COPS 
under various environmental treaties and technical standards adopted 
by various legal 
and technical commissions established within a treaty framework, as 
in the example of 
Legal and Technical Commissions established by Article 165 of the Convention on the 
Law and the Sea can exemplify this role. The rational behind adopting such non-binding 
rules and standards through various organs and bodies established under various 
institutions of multilateral regimes is the possibility to easily change or strength as 
scientific understanding or as political priorities change. 
2.5 Gradual continuum between hardness and softness of norms 
All things considered, it is possible to conclude that the "treaty" and "non-binding" soft 
law categorisation is neither absolute nor exempt from objections. Nor does this 
categorisation intend to draw a sharp distinction between those soft law instruments that 
create legal rights (and/or obligation) and those, which do not create any legal rights 
and/or obligations. Rather it lays its emphasis on the often-present gradual continuum 
between lesser and higher degree of normative specificity. In sum, the criteria used to 
identify "soft law" cannot solely be based on the formal character of a legal instrument 
80 At the invitation of the UN Economic and Social Council, this Committee, which is a treaty body, has 
adopted general comments on various issues to assist states in fulfilling their treaty obligations. Although 
these comments and recommendations adopted by various UN treaty bodies are not legally binding on the 
parties, it is nonetheless difficult to ignore them due to their often precise and detailed contents. 
BI It is nonetheless important to note that certain decisions of international organisations are legally 
binding upon state members. For instance, Article 25 of the UN Charter states that the Members of the 
UN "agree to accept and carry out" the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the UN 
Charter. Likewise, the decisions of the IMF on the maintenance or alteration of exchange rate or 
depreciation of currency and the authority of the International Civil Aviation Authority to adopt binding 
standards for navigation or qualifications of flight personnel also exemplify the binding character of the 
decisions that international organisations can have. 
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in which the norm at issue is integrated, but on the nature and specificity of the 
obligation that state parties undertake. 
Figure 1 gives an overview of the most frequent set of characteristics of this gradual 
continuum. The three arrows illustrate that several factors play a role as determinants 
in 
defining the degree of the legal obligation (as well as compliance pull). The top placed 
arrow illustrates form as being one of the most defining factors as regard to the degree 
of hardness of an instrument. Accordingly, if the norm is included in a non-binding 
instrument, it should be considered presumptive evidence of the `soft' nature of the 
norm. On the other hand, the form should not be the only criterion used to identify soft 
law, but the content of the norm, i. e., the nature and specificity of the obligation 
whether or not it is included in a treaty, should also be taken into consideration. Hence, 
the arrow placed in the middle depicts the factors related to the content of the norm at 
issue. It shows that the existence or absence of a concrete and explicit legal intention is 
a determining element on the legal nature of the concerned norm. The intention of the 
parties related to the degree of bindingness may be inferred from, among others, the 
wording of the norm (i. e., precise rules that define the conduct they require, authorise, 
or prescribe often indicate the existence of hard law) and the existence of certain 
mechanisms, such as "escape clause" that enable state parties to decide over the content 
of the legal obligation. Yet, as Dupuy observes, it should be recalled that there are 
examples where the content of a non-binding instrument has been precisely defined and 
formulated that, aside from the precaution of using `should' instead of `shall' to 
determine the obligation of the parties, some of its provisions could be easily integrated 
into a treaty. 82 The lowermost arrow indicates the degree of compliance; whether a 
norm has self-executing effect in domestic system and whether it set up mechanisms for 
monitoring, dispute settlement and enforcement. As a result, these observations suggest 
that the identification of soft law often requires a case-by-case examination in which a 
variety of factors are to be carefully considered. This is especially true for treaties that 
contain provisions with evasive prescriptions. And also, in some cases there can be 
made no clear-cut distinction between hard and soft law, but accept a degree and 
gradation. 
82 Dupuy (1990-1999) p. 429 
44 
FORM 









Voting, Consensus procedures 















Area of discretion 
Margin of appreciation 
Reservations on obligations 
Vague 













Rare or unmandatory 
Weak 
Figure 1. Gradual continuum between hardness and softness of norms 
Source Author's original formulation 
2.6 Reasons for adopting soft law 
Soft law is often explained on the basis of' the shortcoming the "traditional" sources of' 
international law to respond to the needs of' a rapidly changing world, which requires 
fast, flexible, adaptable/effective, and participatory "nonnative" solutions. It is obvious 
that, formal international instruments, such as treaties, are often more detailed and time- 
consuming due to the could-be problems in (i) defining legal obligations, (ii) 
monitoring, and (iii) non-compliance procedures, which demand a long, slow and costly 
process. This complexity of a formal international instrument is sometimes named as 
the contracting cost. 
83 Moreover, after the final approval of' a treaty, there is often 
8l For an overview of different types of "contracting costs", in both 'pre' (such as negotiation) and 'post' 
(such as managing and enforcing commitments) agreement processes, see Abbott and Snidal (2000) p. 434 
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additional procedure of incorporating the treaty into the national legal system, as 
national constitutions often require the ratification of the treaty by parliament if not by 
the complicated process of referendum. This phase is also often a slow and complex 
process. Besides, if the government cannot obtain the necessary majority, this would 
prevent the state concerned from becoming a party to the treaty completely. On the 
other hand, it is rare that the domestic legal systems require non-legal international 
agreements to be submitted for parliamentary approval. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
whenever it suits, the governments prefer legally non-binding soft law instruments, over 
which they have a conclusive control without the risk of domestic legislative 
involvement, and which does not need a lengthy process of approval. The responsibility 
of the implementation for such non-binding instruments is political rather than legal. 84 
The slow-down `deficiency' of democracy is hardly a new issue. Already in 1748, 
Montesquieu, in his celebrated On the Spirit of Laws, drew attention to the fact that 
decisions in democracies are often time-consuming compared to, what he then called, 
`monarchical' and `despotic' forms of government. However, as Montesquieu did not 
fail to add, the `practicality' of by-passing the democratic control mechanisms set up 
within a national legal system comes with a price. The other side of the coin is weak 
legitimacy. For, in modern international life, international regulations have increasingly 
become influential on domestic law and consequently on the daily life of people. 
Therefore, the avoidance from the liability of domestic control can be proved to be more 
costly, not only in terms of accountability/legitimacy deficit, but also in terms of the 
"depoliticisation" effect in the long run. 
In certain new policy areas, such as environmental protection, states may be in a 
"learning" phase, during which they may not be yet prepared to bind themselves legally 
nonetheless are willing to adopt and test certain rules and principles, as in the example 
of "The Forest Declaration" adopted in at the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and 
Development, entitled "A Non-legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for 
a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of 
All Types of Forest". 85 
ae Bothe (1980) p. 90 
as For the Rio documents in general, see International Legal Material, 31 (1992) p. 8 18 et seq. 
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Soft law has relative advantages over hard law in the cases of re-negotiation and 
elaboration by being comparatively less costly. Due to the uncertainty of the 
future in 
issue areas such as economy and environments, states may be reluctant to make long- 
term and inflexible bargains. The changing political, economical or technological 
circumstances may oblige for flexible solutions. In such cases, states may use 
both 
forms of soft law (i. e. "treaty" and "non-binding") to capture the potential gains from 
co-operation and limit the possible losses. Different techniques may be used to create 
treaties, which are able to cope with uncertainty such as: limited duration, imprecise 
formulation of legal obligations, complete or partial withdrawal provisions, exceptions, 
and escape clauses. Another technique to capture potential gains from co-operation and 
limit the possible losses is to use non-legal soft law agreements. These agreements may 
be precise but since they are legally non-binding, they are more easily renegotiable and 
less costly to abandon than treaties. 86 
"Soft provisions/clauses" in a treaty may also exist in order to leave the state parties 
room to decide how to interpret and implement the treaty provisions. 
87 According to 
Gruchalla-Wesierski, the possibility to retain discretion over the content of obligation 
constitutes the subjective aspect of soft law. Thus, vagueness leaves to each state to 
define the content of the legal obligation. 88 For instance, treaty provisions involving 
"For a detailed account of 'uncertainty' cause, see Lipson (1991) p. 518 et seq. and Abbott and Snidal 
(2000) p. 441 et seq. 
87 The "margin of appreciation" doctrine can be seen as another device serving for the same purpose. The 
doctrine is based on the idea that each country has the right to decide how to apply international treaties 
obligations to make them suitable for each State's own circumstances and societal constrains and 
expectations. The doctrine "initially responded to concerns of national governments that international 
policies could jeopardize their national security" (Benvenitsi, Eva, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus 
And Universal Standards, 31 International Law and Politics, 1999, p. 845) while it has nowadays been 
used in non-security areas such as human rights, allocation and management of national resources etc. For 
a detailed analysis of the use of the doctrine in the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, see 
Brems, Eva, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of fluman 
Rights, 56 Heidelberg Journal of International Law [ZaÖRV], (1996) p. 240 and Arai-Takahashi, Yutaka, 
The margin of appreciation doctrine and the principle of proportionality in the jurisprudence of the 
ECHR, Intersentia: Antwerp; Oxford, 2002 
88 Gruchalla-Wesierski, Tadeusz, A Framework for Understanding "Soft Law", 30 McGill Law Journal, 
(1984) p. 49. Soft law obligation also has an objective aspect named by the author as the 'exigibility', 
which means that compliance may be required with the objective part of the obligation, which is 
enforceable. Logically, of course, the sanctions available to enforce the objective element will depend on 
whether the soft law is legal or non-legal (Ibid. p. 40). The author also adds that the State parties may have 
an escape clause (or opting-out provisions) which allow the bound party to determine when the obligation 
is exigible (Ibid. p. 49). For example, the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty contains such a clause. 
Accordingly, "Each Party shall in exercising its nationals sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the 
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economic and social rights, such as the "International Convenant on Economic, 
Social 
and Cultural Rights" and the "European Social Charter", do often not lay 
down what 
legal responsibilities state parties precisely undertake. According to Alston, the 
indeterminacy as to their normative implications is a major shortcoming of the existing 
international arrangements for the promotion of respect for economic rights is the 
vagueness of many of the rights as formulated in the Convenant. 
89 On the other hand, it 
can be argued that the legal nature of rights does not indicate their validity but their 
applicability. Several rights embodied in the International Convenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights for instance, cannot be invoked in courts because of their 
programmatory or political nature. However, they may still be deemed legally binding if 
they create legal obligations to their state parties. 
90 For, the validity of law does not 
necessarily imply its `completeness' in the meaning that the rules of law provide a 
solution to any given problem in any given situation. Needless to say, this point is far 
from being settled. While for instance Georgiev maintains that the general and 
indeterminate nature of rules do not influence their validity even though they may 
permit different and contradictory interpretations and, political arbitrariness, 
91 
Morgenthau argues that if rules are not enforced in case of violation the validity of the 
rules in question are highly doubtful. 92 
In a similar way, in a world of sovereign states with divergent interests, as often pointed 
out, it may be difficult to agree on legal rules. The divergence between states in terms of 
legal/cultural tradition, economic development level, ideology, and readiness for a 
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized 
the supreme interests of its country" (14 U. S. T. 1313, T. I. A. S. No. 5433,480 U. N. T. S. 43). 
89 Alston, P., "No Right No Complain About Being Poor" in Eide, Asbjorn and Helgesen, Jan (eds. ), The 
Future of Human Rights Protection in a Changing World: essays in honour of Torkel Opsahl, Oslo: 
Norwegian University Press, 1991, p. 86. Koskenniemi defines normativity of international rules as 
follows: "rules can be opposed to and applied against the subjective political will and behaviour of 
states. " (1990), p. 8. 
90 Scheinin, Martin, "Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights" in, Asbjorn, Eide, Krause, Catarina 
and Rosas, Allan (eds. ), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Netherlands, 
1995, p. 41. Yet some scholars claim that if lack of precision, and generality of the terms of the 
agreements are too indefinite to create enforceable obligations, these agreements should be presumed to 
be non-binding (See, Schachter, 1977, p. 297). 
91 Georgiev (1993) p. 9. However, some scholars claim that if lack of precision and generality of the 
terms of the agreements are too indefinite to create enforceable obligations, these agreements should be 
presumed to be non-binding (See, Schachter, 1977, p. 297). 
92 Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations, Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 1985, p. 299 
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specific legal commitment make in many cases soft law more attractive than hard 
commitment. Use of soft law instruments enables states to agree to more detailed and 
precise provisions because their legal commitments and the consequences of any non- 
compliance are more limited. The main techniques to bridge over these differences are 
to retain discretion over the content of the obligations, or to preserve an emergency exit 
when needed and to secure flexibility in implementation. According to Bothe, states are 
generally prepared to accept a legal commitment only if they in a reasonable way can 
foresee that they will be in a position to comply with it. 93 Thus, if a situation is 
unsettled, states usually prefer not to be bound legally. Yet, states may wish to reach an 
agreement if it is considered useful, i. e. there is a "certainty of mutual expectations". 94 
According to Shelton, the choice of soft law may also reflect respect for hard law. States 
may use the soft law form when they have concerns about the possibility of non- 
compliance, either because of domestic political opposition, lack of ability or capacity 
to comply with a norm. 95 
Abbot and Snidal explain the recent interest in soft law within the wider context of an 
increasing "legalisation" of international relations in the post Cold-War era. According 
to the writers, contemporary international relations have a tendency to "move to law" 
even though this legalisation displays great variety both in degree and form. As 
maintained by the writers, international actors choose to regulate their relations through 
international law and design treaties and other `softer' legal arrangements to solve 
specific substantive and political problems. They further argue that international actors 
choose softer forms of legalised governance when those forms offer superior 
institutional solutions mainly due to the advantages soft law may have including lower 
transaction cost. 96 
As already pointed out, the argument for using soft law is often sustained on the ground 
of flexibility. It is for instance said that being flexible soft law instruments can be 
adapted to the needs of specific situations. They can also more easily adapt to 
93 Bothe, Michael, Legal and Non-Legal Norms -A Meaningful Distinction in International Relations?, 
11 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (1980) p. 91 
94 Ibid. Klabbers considers this motive 'pessimist' and names these types of agreement as "the semblance 
of agreement" (Klabbers, 1998, p. 184). 
95 Shelton (2003) p. 12 
96 Abbott and Snidal (2000) p. 421 
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suggestion of improvements are either arising out of institutional experience or new 
scientific evidence. 97 However, it is important to note that soft 
law is not the only 
means of creating flexibility; there are other devices that enable states to respond to the 
demand for flexibility. One way of creating flexibility, especially in regard to the rapid 
progress in scientific knowledge is the adoption of technical norms and specifications 
in 
the form of annexes of the main treaty and of special procedures for modifying such 
annexes without being obliged to the slow procedure for the modification of treaties. 
Another and relatively new technique in this regard is the so-called "relative standards", 
which entails differentiated obligations on the contracting states, either 
because of the 
recognition of the difference between their level of development or the difference 
in 
responsibility between developed and developing countries for the historically larger 
contribution to a problem area of developed countries, especially to global 
environmental degradation, as in the case of climate change. 
98 
Needless to say, the drawback of these `advantages' of soft law over hard obligation is 
the conceivable weaker engagement to live up to these soft commitments. Therefore, the 
use of soft law is sometimes labelled delegalisation of international law. 
99 Yet, even in 
such cases, where a soft law arrangement is used as "window-dressing", the subject- 
matter that soft law instrument in question embodies may at a later stage become 
`legalised' or `internationalised'. This development may, in turn, serve as a valuable 
tool for international actors, not least for NGOs, to promote a normative discourse in the 
issue-area and stimulate accountability politics especially when soft law instruments 
9' Yet some writers consider soft law rules and flexible rules as two different phenomena. Carlson, for 
instance, contends that flexibility and softness are not synonymous or analogous concepts. The writer 
argues that flexible rules that permit temporary and limited deviations from important norms may 
contribute to respect for those norms, by permitting gradual compliance with the norms. By doing so, the 
perceived harmful impact of the norms may be limited. Moreover, within clearly defined boundaries, 
flexible rules that cause non-uniform obligation can contribute to the application of the terms more fairly. 
In contrast, according to Carlson, soft law creates national freedom without possessing most of the virtues 
flexible norms have. The ambiguity and weakness that soft law often displays foster derogation from and 
disrespect for the goals that soft law norms seek to achieve (Carlson, Jonathan, Hunger, Agricultural 
Trade Liberalization, and Soft International Law: Addressing the Legal Dimension of a Political 
Problem, 70 Iowa Law Review [1984-1985] p. 1270). 
98 Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC sets out the principle of "common but differentiated responsibility", which 
refers to the fact that certain problems affect and are affected by all nations in common, if not to the same 
degree, and that the resulting responsibilities ought to be differentiated because not all nations should 
contribute equally to alleviate the problem (Yamin and Depledge, 2004, p. 69). 
99 For the use of the term "delegalisation" in the context of sustainable development, see Barral, Virginie, 
Johannesburg 2002: Quoi de neuf pour le devdloppement durable, 107 -Revue Gdndrale De Droit 
International Public (2003) 2, p. 41 5. 
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contain normative commitments. This is a point that can sometimes be important 
especially in the areas such as human rights and environment. 
As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the development of soft law could, at least 
partly, be explained by the increasing gap between the "traditional sources" of 
international law and international reality. It is held that the fundamental role of soft law 
is to create a compromise between sovereignty and order. Accordingly, in the areas of 
international economy, technology, environment and more recently "international 
terror", states are willing (or even often obliged) to address issue areas collectively but 
at the same time they do not want to be subject to any constrain, which may arise from 
such `collective actions'. States mainly use two techniques in order to bridge over these 
apparently conflicting goals. The first technique is that when signing a treaty, states 
retain discretion over the definition of the obligations they undertake. Secondly, they 
simply avoid undertaking precise legal obligations. Sometimes states use a combination 
of both methods. According to Gruchalla-Wesierski, those provisions, which use one of 
the above-described techniques, or both, can be defined as soft law. 100 
The conciliatory role of soft law between sovereignty and order becomes more apparent 
when states make international treaties, which contain legal obligations and are binding 
upon state parties. Such a legal obligation always entails what is called "sovereignty 
costs". Abbot and Snidal argue that states attempt to overcome or at least to limit 
sovereignty cost arisen from treaty obligations by using either legally binding 
nonetheless enforceable or legally non-binding legal arrangements. The writers identify 
three different types of sovereignty cost. 101 The first type concerns the limitation of 
sovereignty over particular policy issues, such as allowing the free movement of capital, 
goods and labours within the borders of the states parties to an agreement. In these cases 
the sovereignty cost is relatively low. States usually accept this type of cost when they 
seek to attain more important collective results. The second type of sovereignty cost 
100 Gruchalla-Wesierski, Tadeusz, A Framework for Understanding "Soft Law", 30 McGill Law Journal 
(1984) p. 39 
'°' Abbot and Snidal (2000) p. 436-441. On the other hand, however, this function of soft law would 
evidently not be applicable to the regulations issued by non-state actors, such as MNEs and NGOs even if 
these regulations were accepted as soft 'law'. For, while soft law issued by states and international 
organisations could be considered as a 'compromise' between sovereignty and order, regulations issued 
by non-state actors, if considered soft 'law', would indicate a new structure in the international legal 
order. 
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occurs when states are obliged to accept international authority over important domestic 
decision areas, as it is the case within the WTO framework. Within this type of 
framework, states' ability to govern important domestic policy issues, such as industrial 
policy, is considerably reduced. Thus, "the sovereignty costs are relatively high. The 
sovereignty cost is the highest in the third category. This type of cost refers to when an 
international agreement interferes in the relations between the state and its citizens or 
territory as in the example of the rules of the International Criminal Court. 
According to this reasoning, the very existence of the concept of soft law is a side- 
production of the incompatibility of the legal sovereignty of the nation-states (in the 
meaning that they are not subject to any higher authority) with the minimum needs for 
an international legal order, a phenomenon that weakens the structure of international 
law. It is hence not unexpected that Klabbers links the soft law approach to the 
criticisms against international law. Accordingly (and sarcastically), the soft law thesis 
is prepared for both prongs of attack (i. e. positivism and political realism). First it pays 
tribute to positivism that "we actually talk about law, that it actually, just like real law, 
creates commitments and gives rise to expectations but that it is also capable of 
accurately reflecting politics; soft law can bow gracefully to overriding political 
demands". 102 
To summarise, one of the most striking features of the international legislation in the 
post-war period is the increasing use of soft law. However this development has also 
caused tension between two conflicting strands of argument. On one hand, soft law 
instruments and the hortatory and good-will language of soft law clauses in 
international treaties are welcomed on the ground of flexibility, widespread 
participation, speed, adaptability, and effective implementation, not least by using 
purposive interpretation of soft law instruments and treaty principles. On the other hand, 
soft law instruments and soft law clauses in international treaties can be understood as 
proof of the unwillingness of treaty-makers to create effective law or of the inability of 
the state parties to reach a clear conclusion on a specific and formally binding and, 
thereby, effective obligation. Moreover, it can be said that arguments such as, "states' 
wish" and "the advantages of reaching some form of agreement" in relation to the 
`facilitatory' function of soft law should be approached with prudence. The "states' 
102 Klabbers, Jan, The Redundancy of Soft Law, 65 Nordic Journal of International Law (1996) 2, p. 170 
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wish" approach embodies a certain degree of subjectivism, which presumes that "states 
can conclude whatever they wish to conclude, and if they wish to conclude a soft law 
instrument, then a soft law instrument it will be. "103 It is important to bear in mind that 
the notion that states "choose" soft law (states' wish) formulations may be deceptive. 
As Finnemore argues, soft law, like customary law, is not always deliberately created 
by states as a result of their strategic purpose. Soft law "is not simply out there to be 
chosen". 104 The root of the premise that states are able to "choose "may be found in the 
understanding that equal, independent and sovereign states are empowered to act in 
ways that have been decided among them. From this assumption it follows that 
international law is the "universalising will"105 of sovereign states. However, taking 
states as sole "international reality maker" does not take into consideration several other 
aspects of the dynamic and complex social process in which international law is formed. 
As to the latter approach, which suggests that soft law enables states to reach an 
agreement in those situations where the treaty form might be too hard and therefore out 
of political reach, might at first sight appear realistic. However, the "some agreement 
better than no agreement" approach is, as Klabbers contends, rather a simplistic 
assessment of international relations. The understanding that `norms are better than 
chaos' also reveals the apologetic tendency of the use of soft law, which gives "the 
politicians the possibility to be released from their responsibility to take necessary 
measures to achieve a given effect. 106 
2.7 Soft law: a challenge to the normative structure of international 
law? 
The widening and intensification of the scope and function of international law both 
horizontally and vertically and the inclusion of new actors in the international arena 
have raised doubts about whether the so-called "traditional sources" of international law 
103 Klabbers (1996) p. 169 
104 Finnemore, Martha and Toope, Stephen, J., Alternatives to "Legalization ": Richer Views of Law and Politics, 55 International Organization (2001) 3, p. 748. 
'0' Alloff (2001) p. 300 
106 Klabbers (1998), p. 383 
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might still be sufficient to meet the demands international life asks. However, 
despite 
the apparent insufficiency of the "traditional sources" of international law, the notion of 
soft law was not readily recognised in the beginning. Soft law was rejected either 
categorically or partially on the basis of lack of legality and has for a long time not 
been 
attributed neither the status of a source of law nor considered having a "self-contained 
regime" 107 though some writers have claimed that it has or should have such a status. 
108 
Instead, the "traditional sources" are regarded to be capable to meet the new 
phenomena, which have occurred at the international arena. 
In point of fact, customary international law and treaties, the "traditional sources" of 
international law, have to some extent been adapted to these changes. The common 
occurrence of adaptation is to assimilate the norms and instruments, which do not fall in 
either category of the traditional sources within the framework of the established law 
making process, in particular, international customary law. The most controversy in this 
respect emerged out of the question of the legal character of the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) resolutions. It is fairly evident from the text of the UN Charter that the UN 
General Assembly does, with some exceptions, 109 not have the legal power of taking 
binding decisions upon its member states. As discussed in Chapter 5, related to the 
efforts by the so-called Third World countries to establish new legal frameworks for the. 
107 A "self-contained" regime is generally understood as a subsystem of international law that contains all 
necessary secondary norms and that significantly limits the application of secondary norms of general 
international law. A "self-contained" regime provides for remedies in case of breaches of the obligations 
under the regime. In other words, a self-contained regime does not include only the rules for conduct of 
states, but also rules on the consequences of non-compliance with such rules. The prime examples of 
"self-contained" regimes are the WTO legal system and European Community Law (Marschik, Axel, Too 
Much Order? The Impact of Special Secondary Norms on the Unity and Efficacy of the International 
Legal System, 9 European Journal of International Law [1998] 1, p. 220). See also, Simma, Bruno and 
Pulkowski, Dirk, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law, 17 European 
Journal of International Law (2006) 3 
108 Discussing on "non-treaty agreement", Hillgenberg, for instance, argues that it is not possible to 
ascertain from the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties whether non-treaty agreements are 
excluded from the application of international law. While the writer acknowledged that if the parties 
expressly or implicitly do not want a treaty, the provisions of the Vienna Convention will not apply. 
However, the writer adds, "this does not necessarily mean that all non-treaty agreements only follow 
political or moral rules. There is no provision of international law which prohibits such agreement as 
sources of law, unless -obviously- they violate jus cogens" (Hillgenberg, Hartmut, A Fresh Look at Soft 
Law, 10 European Journal of International Law [1999] p. 503). 
109 According to Article 18(2) of the UN Charter, the following decisions of the General Assembly are 
binding: the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the 
Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 10 of Article 86, the admission of new Members to 
the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, 
questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary question. 
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New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1960s and 1970s, some adherents of 
the NIEO argued for the bindingness of UNGA resolutions on the ground that 
customary international law has changed the hortatory character of the UN Charter and 
consequently UNGA resolutions have become mandatory. 
110 However, there is no 
evidence supporting the development of such a new customary rule. The fact 
is that 
state consent is essential for new rule development in international law and no one can 
expect the US and other major economic powers to consent to such a rule development 
that would reduce their economical and political power considerably. 
As a matter of fact, UNGA resolutions can be linked to customary international law at 
least in three distinctive ways: (i) depending on the "circumstances of adoption" (i. e. 
adoption by majority vote, unanimous vote, consensus, reservations expressed by 
particular states), some resolutions may serve as evidence of existing customary 
international law, as in the example of The "Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States". 111 They may also 
record the content of existing customary international law on particular matters or they 
may articulate the substance of existing legal norms. Some resolutions may also 
constitute opiniojuris in the forming of a customary law when they are not authoritative 
themselves. 112 It is important to remember, however, that to be the `evidence' of a 
customary law is not the same as constituting customary law itself. (ii) The UNGA 
resolutions can even create a new rule as in the example of the "Declaration of Legal 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space", which led to the adoption of four major multilateral treaties. '13 (iii) Some 
resolutions may promote new rules in certain areas. The "Universal Declaration of 
10 Another far-reaching argument regarding customary law character of UNGA resolutions is made on 
the basis of the so-called "instant customary law", which refers to the assertion, according to which 
customary law requires only opinio juris and not necessarily together with `practice'. On the subject, see 
Mendelson, Maurice, "The Legal Character of General Assembly Resolutions: Some Considerations of 
Principle" in Hossain Kamal (ed. ), Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order, Nichlos 
Publishing Company: New York, 1980, p. 99; and Seidl-Hohenveldern, Ignaz, International Economic 
Law, Kluwer Law International: Dordrecht, 1999, p. 35 
"l Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970. According to Brownlie, among others, it provides 
evidence of consensus among Member States of the UN on the meaning and elaboration of the principles 
of the Charter (Brownlie, Ian, Basic Documents in International Law, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1995, p. 
36). 
112 Castaneda, Jorge, Legal Effects of UN Resolutions, Colombia University Press: New York, 1969, p. 2- 
21 
113 Resolution 1962 (XVIII) of 13 December 1963 
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Human Rights" (UDHR), 114 for instance, intended to be an authoritative guide of the 
UN Charter has consequently become, at least partly, a new customary international 
law. This is so, at least due to the fact that the UDHR has to a large extent been 
embodied in the subsequent UN Human Rights Covenants as positive international 
law. 115 
It can further be said on the association between resolutions and customary international 
law that even when resolutions do not gain full normative quality, they may still 
constitute "embryonic norms of nascent legal force or quasi-legal rules". 
' 16 It should 
also be recalled that non-binding soft law instruments might possess variable regulatory 
forces and in certain cases this may be judicially relevant 117, not least in the application 
of -law through serving as an interpretative guide for the courts, as Fastenraht 
suggests. ' 18 On the other hand, the threshold of legal normativity should not be 
undermined despite the complexity of the matter to determine what may be called the 
normativity threshold. ' 19 It is also important to be aware of the fact that at some stage of 
development of rules towards customary law, the normativity threshold may be further 
blurred. Indeed, Dupuy, for instance, defines soft law as the "transitional phase in the 
development of norms where their content is vague and scope imprecise. '20 
Some scholars have tried to explain the legal character of UNGA resolutions within the 
framework of the "traditional sources" of international law in association with 
international treaties. It has been argued for instance that the expression of consent or 
114 Resolution 217 (III) of 10 December 1948 
115 The "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" and the "International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights", both are adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1976. See also 
page 70 in this study. 
116 Weil (1983) p. 416, footnote 10 
117 For instance, in Grimaldi case, the European Court of Justice held that Article 189 of the EC Treaty 
recommendations must be taken into account when interpreting national legislation despite the fact that 
these recommendations are legally non-binding (Case C-322/88, Salvatore Grimaldi v. Fonds des 
Maladies Professionelles, [1989] ECR 4407, cited in Klabbers, 1998, p. 388). 
118 Fastenraht, Ulrich, Relative normativity in international law, 4 European Journal of International Law 
(1993) p. 305-340. 
119 Weil (1983, p. 415). In Weil's understanding, the legal threshold is important to limit gradualness and 
see whether a legal norm was actually born (become hard ̀ enough! '). 
120 Dupuy, Rend, Jean, "Declaratory Law and Programmatory Law: From Revolutionary Custom to "Soft 
Law" in Akkerman, Robert, J. (ed. ), Declarations on Principles. A Quest for Universal Peace, Sijthoff: 
Leyden, 1977, p. 252 
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acceptance through recommendations constitutes a modern extension of the 
law of 
treaties. As Van Hoof points out, this line of reasoning has proved particularly attractive 
with respect to resolutions, which have been adopted unanimously. 
121 According to this 
approach, unanimously adopted resolutions can be deemed as an extension of treaty 
law 
depending on the extent and quality of the consensus. Or, when they do not create 
enforceable rights and duties they can still be used to interpret or legitimate a treaty. 
122 
However, it would be very difficult to reach a general consensus on this ground. For, 
the consent that a state express for a recommendation may be qualitatively different 
from the consent a state expresses in the case of a treaty. It should be remembered that 
states vote or express views more `freely' in the UN General Assembly. States know 
that these views or votes are not legally binding upon them. For, according to Chapter 
IV of the UN Charter on the "Functions and Powers of the General Assembly, this 
organ may in principle make only "recommendation", whose legal character is non- 
binding. 123 
The "general principles of the law recognised by civilised nations" is also suggested by 
scholars to explain the legal nature of UNGA resolutions within the realm of the 
"traditional sources" of international law. 124 Since this subsidiary source exists to fill in 
gaps between treaty law and customary law some scholars have argued that general 
121 Van Hoof (1983) p. 181 
"2 See among others, Asamoah, Obed, Y., The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, Nijhoff: The Hague, 1966. It can also be said that resolutions of 
international organisations are viewed as a source of international law in Soviet international law 
tradition. However, this recognition was strictly conditioned to the existence of a concordance of the wills 
of states relating to recognition of a particular rule as a norm of international law (See Tunkin, 1974). 
12' Article 10 of the UN Charter reads as follows: "The General Assembly may discuss any questions or 
any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs 
provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to 
the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or 
matters". 
124 General principles are a secondary source of'international law, embodied in Article 38(1) 0 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice. The idea is that some rules of law may not have had 
sufficient application in practice to be accepted as a rule of customary law. Nonetheless, it may be 
invoked as a rule of international law, at least in claims based on injury to persons, because it is a general 
principle common to the major legal systems of the world and is not inappropriate for international 
claims. For example, rules relating to the administration of justice, such as the rule that no one may be 
judge in his own cause and rule. General principles may also provide `rules of reason' of a general 
character, such as the principle that rights must not be abused, and the right to compensation to repair a 
wrong. International practice may sometimes convert such a principle into a rule of customary law. On 
the subject, among others, see Cheng, Bin, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts 
and Tribunals, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1987. 
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principles must/can be the basis of the development of new rules in international law. 125 
Even though this subsidiary source can be useful to make sure that international law 
covers most aspects of international life, it is highly questionable whether this function 
of the subsidiary sources can be stretched out to cover every aspect of international legal 
theory. Above all, there would not be a wide consensus on what these general principles 
might be as the legal traditions vary considerably in the world. In the case of UNGA 
resolutions, there is little ground to claim that states voting for a resolution each time 
rely on a `general principle'. In addition, soft law has today become a much larger issue 
than only resolutions of international organisations. It would therefore not be 
satisfactory to maintain that all these soft norms and instruments issued by manifold 
international authorities covering countless areas, can adequately be explained by 
general principles. 
The non or limited recognition of soft law within the realm of the "traditional sources" 
of international law has not been found satisfactory by many scholars considering that 
an increasing body of international soft norms and instruments regulate the conduct of 
states, international organisations and even private entities. It is claimed that attempts to 
explain the increased use of soft norms and instruments within the scope of the 
traditional sources of international law are almost bound to result in stretching the 
concept of these sources beyond what would seem to be warranted in view of the clarity 
and certainty the sources have to provide. 126 It is indeed important to elaborate 
theoretical boundaries, which permit us to understand the nature and functions of legal 
norms. Van Hoof explains the limitation in the adaptation of custom and treaties partly 
by the need for clarity and certainty that law and in particular its sources have to 
provide. "If the concept of each of these sources is stretched beyond a certain point, in 
an effort to have them encompass phenomena resulting from new developments, the 
results become counter-productive". 127 This argument forwards the idea that the 
established sources of international law would face the risk of failing to function as a 
regulator of distinguishing legal norms from other types of norms and rules. 
125 See for instance, Laing, Edward, A., International Economic Law and Public Order in the Age of Equality, 12 Law and Policy in International Business (1980) 3, p. 746 and Asamoah (1966, p. 61-62). 
126 Ibid. p. 184 
127 Van Hoof (1983) p. 179 
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Some scholars have suggested that UNGA resolutions should be recognised as an 
`independent' source of international law, with its own. According to this "new source" 
approach, such recognition would enhance the ability of the UN to respond more 
dynamically to new developments of international life. Criticising "a sovereignty- 
centred conception of obligation", which assumes that all obligations in international 
law can be traced directly or indirectly to the consent of the sovereign state, Falk, for 
instance, suggested that the resolutions of the General Assembly can be placed in the 
quasi-legislative process of customary law formation. For, according to this writer, 
`consent' as the basis of obligation, does not account for the growth of interdependence 
and participation as salient aspects of community at the world level. Instead, "there is a 
discernible trend from consent to consensus as the basis of international legal 
obligations". 128 In a similar vein, Abi-Saab considers UN resolutions as ̀ new custom'; a 
complex legislative mechanism without formal legislative effects but nonetheless 
authoritative because of their relevance, ascertainable content and democratic 
legitimacy. 129 Gathii has also suggested that `general principles of law' listed in Article 
38 (1) (c) of the Statute of the ICJ can be accepted as the legal basis for admitting 
UNGA resolutions as sources of international law. 130 Indeed, there is no doubt that a 
new source of international law can be created through existing sources. A custom could 
grow up, say for instance, out of a unanimous UNGA resolution. Or such an approach 
might also be justified on the assumption of the emergence of completely new ways of 
law-making, as in the example of new lex mercatoria, as suggested by some scholars. 
As a matter of fact, the search for "new sources" is by no means limited by UNGA 
resolutions: the contractual activities of MNEs, practices of legal or non-legal 
professionals, such as bankers and tax specialists, shortly "transnational business 
practices" are increasingly deemed as "new sources of law". Among many, Cutler holds 
that these new sources of law do not emanate from the authority of the public state but 
from the authority of non-state actors. 131 
128 Falk, Richard, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 American Journal of International Law (1966) p. 785 
129 Cited in Koskenniemi (1998) p. 405 
130 Gathii (2000) p. 2031. On the legal statues of UNGA resolutions inter alia, see Higgins, Rosalyn, The United Nations and Law Making, 64 American Journal of International Law (1970). 
131 Cutler (2003) p. 22 
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Some scholars, who agree on the shortcomings of the "traditional sources", nevertheless 
do not adhere to the idea of the "new source approach", have suggested that the concept 
of soft law can bridge the widening gap between traditional sources and the new 
changes that have occurred in international rule-making. Van Hoof holds that this "soft 
law approach" has to a large extent succeeded in explaining the traditional sources of 
international law without attributing to soft law a status of a new source of international 
law. According to the writer, the "soft law" approach most of all, identifies and 
recognises the existence of a "grey area". For, as discussed in this section, some 
international rules and instruments cannot be understood and classified by using the 
criteria of the traditional sources. They do not fulfil the formal requirements for rules of 
international law. Nevertheless, they meet at least certain criteria and cannot therefore 
be considered entirely legally insignificant. ' 32 Besides, as will be discussed below, 
some soft law instruments are legally binding and some others have legal effects. Yet, it 
should be remembered that soft law is often unenforceable "because the parties retain 
discretion over the content of the obligation or its exigibility", 133 a characteristic, which 
is frequently its raison d'etre. 
To sum up, it can be said that international law produces many examples of soft law. 
Nevertheless, the "soft law" approach demands great prudence in order to avoid an 
oversimplified understanding of international law- making. For instance, as Klabbers 
rightly points out, the understanding that "the General Assembly is not empowered to 
make hard law, so consequently, whatever it makes must be soft law" would be default 
reasoning. 134 The result of such an over-inclusive use of soft law would blur the 
normative characteristics of international legal norms and undermine the authority of 
established legal norms. 
2.8 Soft law as "law" 
As viewed in the present chapter, there are various sources, from which "softness" of a 
norm or instrument may be originated. For instance, norms or instruments can be "soft", 
132 Ibid. p. 187-191 
133 Gruchalla-Wesierski (1984) p. 40 
134 Klabbers (1996) p. 169. 
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because they may be not among the three "traditional sources" of international law 
due 
to manifold reasons, such as they may emanate from bodies that lack international 
law- 
making authority or are based upon voluntary adherence. Norms and instruments can 
also be "soft" because of the "soft", i. e., non-binding or non-compulsory, nature of the 
obligation that they articulate. In the latter case, we are to some extent talking about a 
limited normative force of certain norms due to the fact that those norms would not be 
enforceable by an international court or other international organ. However, any attempt 
to conceptualise the boundaries of the norms of international law on the basis of 
"bindingness" or "enforceability" is inherently controversial in that the international 
law-making process itself is usually informal and essentially decentralised. Thus, to 
reject the concept of soft law on the ground of a rigid understanding of law that a norm 
is either obligatory, i. e., "binding" or legally irrelevant is normatively untenable, 
considering that there is often no clear answer as to what make the binding character of 
international `legal' norms. Nor is it possible to draw a rigorous line between legal 
norms and non-legal norms on the ground of enforceability given that international law 
in itself lacks both a sovereign (command) and a centrally organised sanction system. 135 
As often pointed out, the United Nations is not a world government, its General 
Assembly is not a world parliament, the Security Council is not a world government nor 
world police and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which lacks the authority of 
135 Of course this does not imply that international law completely lacks any sanction. Quite contrary, 
sanction has always existed in international law in the form of diplomatic, economical or military action. 
In the Westphalian era of international law, obligations were largely bilateral and reciprocal, enforced by 
self-help (not least by war) and counter-measure while in the ̀ modern era' new enforcement mechanisms 
have been developed. For instance, within the UN system, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the UN 
Security Council may take enforcement measures where it is determined the existence of a threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. In addition, the decisions of ad hoc tribunals as well as 
those of International Court of Justice are also binding. 
There are also non-legal enforcement mechanisms that may function as sanction. For example, economic 
coercion, which refers to "efforts to project influence across frontiers by denying or conditioning access 
to a country's resources, raw materials, semi-or finished products, capital, technology, services or 
consumers" (Farer, Tom, Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law, 79 
American Journal of International Law [1985] p. 408 in "Editorial Comments"). For further reading, see 
Orford, Anne, Locating the International: Military and Monetary Intervention after the Cold War, 38 
Harvard International Law Journal (1997) 2; Bowett, Derek. W., International Law and Economic 
Coercion, 16 Virginia Journal of International Law (1976); Chimni, Bhupinder, Towards A Third World 
Approach to Non-intervention, 20 Indian Journal of international law (1980); and Wallensteen, Peter, A 
Century of Economic Sanctions, Uppsala University: Sweden, 2000. For a general account of sanction, 
see also Wallensteen, Peter an Staibano, Carina (Eds. ), International Sanctions: between words and wars 
in the global system, Frank Cass: New York, 2005. 
61 
compulsory jurisdiction, is not a world court. 
136 When there is an alleged breach of 
international obligation in the absence of a centralised authoritative decision-maker 
there may consequently be disagreement between states even about what constitutes a 
breach and what rule to be applied in a given case. In addition, even if the state parties 
to a dispute agree on the authority of the ICJ for the case in question, there 
is no 
authority, which can adequately force the state to comply with the ICJ's 
decision. 137 In 
the words of Cassese, it is still for individual states to decide how to settle 
disputes or to 
impel compliance with law. ' 
38 Hence, if law is essentially considered a matter of 
commanded rules backed by sanction, 
139 then the whole international law can be seen as 
"soft" and "little more than a euphemism for international morality". 
140 
In order to appreciate the relative normative force of international "soft" norms may 
have, that is also to ask, whether there is a "soft law", it is important to examine the 
concept of obligation, which corresponds to the following two questions: (i) Why 
is 
international law binding? (ii) What normative authority may international law claim? 
Since softness appears as a graduation of normativity and refers to the content of 
obligation especially in the case of "treaty soft law", Sub-section 2.7.1 investigates the 
"normal normativity", which it is presumed that "hard obligation" incorporates while 
Sub-section 2.7.2 reviews the notion of "soft obligation", which implies relative 
normativity. 
1)6 The ICJ is one of the six principal organs of the UN. Jurisdiction in contentious proceedings is 
dependent on the consent of states. According to Article 36(1) of its Statute, all the (state) parties to a 
dispute must agree that the case should be referred to the Court. In other words, there is no compulsory 
jurisdiction. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 36 provide an optional clause, which make it possible to accept 
the jurisdiction of the Court beforehand. 
137Judgements of the Court are binding. Article 94 of the UN Charter authorises the Security Council to 
`make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgement. However, 
these powers have not yet been used to enforce a judgement. A request by Nicaragua to the Security 
Council to enforce the Court's decision in the Nicaragua case was vetoed by the United States. For more 
details on the subject, see Tanzi, A., Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the International Court of 
Justice and the Law of the United Nations, 6 European Journal of International Law (1995), p. 539-572 
138 Cassese, Antonio, International Law, Oxford University Press: Oxford, (2001) p. 6 
139 Austin famously argued that "Laws properly so called are a species of commands (... ) And hence it 
inevitably follows, that the law obtaining between nations is not positive law: for every positive law is set 
by a given sovereign-to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author" Austin, John, The 
province ofjurisprudence determined, Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1954, p. 133 
140 D'Amato, Anthony, International Law And World Order, West Publishers: St. Paul, 1990, p. 11 
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2.8.1 Hard law obligation 
Why to obey law? The answer of this question may vary depending on how law is 
defined. The positivist school has defined law as the command of a sovereign. 
Therefore the answer of the adherents of this school is basically: the law has to be 
observed, because a sovereign, a supreme legislator commands it, and sanctions will be 
applied for non-observance. Then, according to the positivist understanding in its pure 
form, international legal system does not have the necessary conditions for genuine 
obligation, because it lacks a body of rules enforceable by external (sovereign) power. 
Yet, despite the non-existence of a sovereign and lack of organised sanction, "almost all 
nations observe almost all principles of international law, all of their obligations almost 
all of the time". 141 
1 
Sanction, as the basis of international legal obligation, has not been very convincing for 
the majority of international lawyers. It is for instance said that whether there is 
enforcement or not, legal subjects have an obligation to obey the rule in question, thus 
sanction is little more than a factor for compliance but is not the source of obligation. In 
other words, "law is enforced because it is binding" 142 and not vice versa. Furthermore, 
as a matter of fact, many existing international rules do not have any sanction attached 
to them nonetheless they exist and states (and other subjects of international law) are 
under an obligation to obey them. 
One problem with the argument that international law is no more than "positive 
morality" is that it fails to appreciate the crucial difference between `obligation' and 
`sanction'. As Reus-Smit remarks, the nature and roots of legal obligation-is not the 
same thing as compliance. "Obligation is a reason for rule observance, compliance is 
the fact of such observance". 143 Thus, obligation is one reason, among others. The 
motives for complying with the rules (`feeling' bound) even when they are not equipped 
with sanctions can be varied. It is said that notions such as `rightness', `justice', 
`appropriateness', `self-interest', `social disapproval', or `common interest' play an 
101 Henkin, Louis, How Nations Behave, Colombia University Press: New York, 1979, p. 47. Of course, 
this hypothesis should not be understood as an empirically verified fact but an assumption. 
142 Reus-Smit, Christian, Politics and International Legal Obligation, 9 European Journal of International 
Relations (2003) 4, p. 597 
143 Ibid. p. 595 
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important role in observing the norms even in domestic law where there 
is an organised 
sanction. No sovereign of any domestic legal system is able to compel people 
to obey 
all rules only because of (existing or potential) sanctions or other 
forms of (physical or 
social) coercion even though the potentiality of enforcement may 
in some cases be 
responsible for the compliance with certain rules. 
144 Friedmann also observes that the 
sense of obligation has become the prevailing criterion for the `reality' of 
international 
law. According to the writer, the general legal philosophy underlying this approach is 
that obedience to law does not necessarily rest upon the command of the threat of 
sanction but on the acceptance of a norm as binding. 
145 
Scholars have offered various explanations for the basis of international legal 
obligation. Historically, the period between 1648 and 1900 has witnessed an oscillation 
between two competing approaches, namely idealism and realism regarding the 
-comparative relation between law and sovereignty. According to the 
idealist approach, 
states should obey international law because it resonates some higher conceptions such 
as natural law, universal moral or justice, which exist independent from sovereign will 
or interest. Conversely, the realist (and legal positivist) approach146 explained the 
144 It is also important to pay attention to the distinction between treaty compliance and regime 
effectiveness as Young suggests (Young, Oran, "The Effectiveness of International Institutions" in 
Rosenau, James, N. and Czempiel, Ernst-Otto (eds. ), Governance Without Government: order and 
change in world politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambride, 1992). Chayes and Chayes introduce 
another concept to the discussion on compliance: "acceptable level". According to the writers, treaty 
compliance should be measured by using "acceptable level" compliance instead of `strict compliance' "in 
the light of the interests and concerns the treaty is designed to safeguard" (Chayes, Abram and Chayes, 
Antonia, Handler, On compliance, 47 International Organization (1993) 2, p. 176. In this article, they also 
develop the criteria to determine and adjust the `acceptable level'. ). 
145 Friedmann (1964) p. 85. Purvis argued that in the occurrence of voluntary compliance, in the absence 
of coherence, the authority of international law operates on two levels. First, when states seek to resolve 
issues among them they firstly and essentially engage in the international legal discourse and they 
consequently behave as if international law makes a difference. Second, states seem in general to have 
accepted the rule of law as the appropriate mechanism for structuring international life, which enhance 
the normative authority of international law (Purvis, Nigel, Critical Legal Studies in Public International 
Law, 32 Harvard International Law Journal [1991] 1 p. 110). Attributing to Franck's legitimacy theory, 
Purvis calls this mechanism "the internal coercion of sovereign psychology" (i. e. rules themselves 
pressure states towards compliance). Then again, this view can also be challenged on the "realist" ground 
that states "give lip service to international law because they find it in their interest to engage in legal 
discourse about international life" due to its usefulness as a tool of propaganda (ibid. ). 
146 It can sometimes be observed some confusion between "legal realism" and "legal positivism". They 
are not the same theories even though they share some common features that make it possible to classify 
them here under the same category. For instance, both focus on power and sovereignty, in both theories 
states are main actors, and both have "consent" (or state will) based system regarding the basis of 
obligation. Nonetheless they have important dissimilarities. For instance, unlike positivism, legal realism 
holds the indeterminacy of law; belief in the importance of interdisciplinary approaches to law and view 
about instrumentality of law in either balancing competing interests or achieving social purposes. For a 
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bindingness of international law by the will or practices of states. In this account, the 
status of international law as law was dependent on its ability to reflect the actual reality 
of international order. 147 
Morgenthau, the `founder' of the traditional realist school, even claimed the existence of 
not one but two different types of international law. Accordingly, states generally 
observe the rules of "non-political international law" that codify states' mutual and 
permanent self-interests whereas the rules of the "political international law", which are 
based on the temporary and fluctuating interests of states, such as political agreements, 
especially treaties of general alliance and their modern substitutes are not as frequently 
observed as previous ones. 
148 
To escape the idealist/realist opposition, legal theorists have tried to find a middle 
ground. 149 In such an attempt, normativist school suggested the universalised will of 
sovereign states and their consent as the basis of the binding nature of international law. 
According to Kelsen, the state authority, whether parliament or any other organ of a 
state with power to make laws, can create legal rules because of already existing 
constitutional norm (Grundnorm), which empowers the state authority in question. 
150 In 
the Lotus case (1927), the permanent Court of International Justice sees ̀ consent' as a 
central feature of international law. The Court argued, "international law governs 
relations between independent states. The rules of law binding upon states therefore 
emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally 
more detailed description of legal realism and different types of legal realism, such as "American Legal 
Realism" and "Scandinavian Legal Realism", see Green, Steven Michael, Legal Realism as Theory of 
Law 46 William&Mary Law Review (2005). 
147 Kennedy classifies the sources of Article 38 as two mutually exclusive categories to illustrate how 
"sources doctrine" works regarding the authority or binding nature of various legal instruments. 
Accordingly, treaties are characteristically hard, the ultimate expression of sovereign consent whereas 
custom and general principles are soft sources (Kennedy, David, The Sources of International Law, 2 
American University Journal of International Law and Policy, 1987, p. 24). In other words, hard sources 
are grounded in consent whereas soft sources not, though they are authoritative in the meaning that they 
are considered as binding on the state, which does even not consent. 
148 Morgenthau, Hans, J., Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34, American Journal of 
International Law (1940) p. 279 
149 For an overview of the modern "conceptual pragmatism" emerged to mediate between naturalism and 
positivism, see Koskenniemi, Martti, From Apology to Utopia, Cambridge University Press: New York, 
2005, especially pages between 182-223. In these pages, Koskenniemi examines four most important 
"reconciliatory doctrines": "Rule-approach", "Policy-approach", "Scepticism" and "Idealism". 
lso Kelsen, H. The Essence ofInternational Law (1968), cited in Casanovas, Oriol, Unity and Pluralism in 
Public International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: The Hague, 2001, p. 7 
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accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the 
relations between these co-existing independent communities or- with a view to the 
achievement of common aims. "151 According to this conclusion, international law- 
making is not in conflict with the concept of sovereignty. To the contrary, the constraint 
that may arise from the making of international law is an important characteristic of 
sovereignty (auto-limitation). In a similar attempt to explain the basis of obligation, 
Bedjaoui maintains: "If one postulates at the outset that there is no higher authority than 
the state, how can the norm of international law be produced for and applied by such a 
sovereign state? As might be expected, there is only one possible answer to this 
question, namely that, historically, it has not been possible for international law to be 
anything other than a law resting largely on the consent" (of states). 152 
Likewise, socialist scholars argued that the `mandatory legal rules' of international law 
come into existence as a result of being made by the concordance of the wills of 
states. 153 It is nonetheless interesting to note that the "consent approach" has gained a 
nonnative quality as the signifier of legal obligation within the historical tradition of the 
liberal political philosophy. The emergent ideal of the legitimate statehood in the period 
between 1776 and 1848 was that of democratic, rule of law polity that law was only 
legitimate if it was authored by those who were subject to it. 154 The liberal theory of 
social contract considered men as free, equal and independent and to hold natural, 
inalienable rights. Nonetheless, it is argued, men need a government based on the will of 
the collective (political society) in order to overcome the practical problems through 
instituting and upholding civil laws. The price of this `way out', it is furthermore 
argued, is that individuals have to accept to change their natural rights for civil rights in 
151 [1927] P. C. I. J., ser. A, No. 10, at 18. 
132 Bedjaoui, Mohammed (ed. ), International Law: Achievements and Prospects, UNESCO: Paris, 1991, 
p. 2. In defence of the consent approach against criticism that states are bound to observe rules that they have never explicitly consented to, such as the rules of customary law, Higgins maintains that in the 
absence of an explicit consent norms may still emerge through "tacit consent" in case there is no a 
consistent opposition to the emerging rule in question (Higgins, Rosalyn, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 2001, p. 14). 
's' Tunkin (1974) p. 251 
154 Reus-Smit (2003) p. 595 
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favour of collective legislative and executive power of the political society. 155 As Reus- 
Smit points out, rationalists, and in particular liberal institutionalists, bring these 
contractarian ideas into international relations. By analogy, they consider states as free, 
consisting of equal and autonomous individuals that rationally pursue their own 
interests. According to this understanding, world order is basically a social contract 
among sovereign states, which can be-characterised as rational egoists that are mainly 
concerned with their self-interests and "seek to maximise their preferences within 
prevailing environmental constraints and incentives". 156 
Hart, among many others, scholars, considers the `consent' or `auto-limitation' 
approaches, according to which international law is binding because states have decided 
to be bound by it, as an attempt to reconcile the (absolute) sovereignty of states (which 
is inconsistent with obligation of any kind) with the existence of binding rules of 
international law. 157 On the other hand, the theory of `will' as the basis of obligation is 
criticised for being "apologetic" in the meaning that in this understanding international 
law would be too political as it is vulnerable to states' political powers. From this 
perspective, if "legal rules whose content or application depends on the will of the legal 
subject for whom they are valid are not proper legal rules at all but apologies for the 
legal subject's political interest". 158 As argued by Friedmann, "the `self-limitation' 
theory is weak because what states can consent to they can also revoke". 159 
To summarise, the dichotomy between the concept of sovereignty and world order 
makes it impossible to find a conclusive explanation as to why the rules of international 
'55 For the basic themes of this approach, see Social Contract: essays by Locke, flume and Rousseau, 
Ernest Barker (ed. ), Greenwood Press: London, 1980; Locke, John, Two Treaties of Government, 
McMaster University: Hamilton, Ont., 2000, prepared by Hay, Rod. 'S6 Reus-Smit (2003) p. 599 
157 Hart (1994) p. 224-225. Hart nonetheless criticises these theories for failing to explain for instance 
`how it is known that states ̀can' only be bound by self-imposed obligations, or to explain those rules 
which are binding independently of the choice of the party bound by them. Friedmann argues that "the 
self-limitation of states can drive normative character only from an already existing rule that a state is bound to keep its promises. In other words, this theory postulates that the pacta sunt servanda principle, in order to constitute an effective basis of international law, must stand above the revocable consent of 
states" (Friedmann, 1964, p. 85). However, not all scholars, who consider `consent' as the basis of binding character of international law, agree with this understanding. Tunkin for instance, rejects the idea 
according to which a basic norm such as pacta sunt servanda reflects the fusion of the wills of individual 
states and therefore constitutes a final criterion (Tunkin, 1974, p. 209). 
158 Lauterpatcht, Hersch, The Function of Law in the International Community, Union, N. J.: Lawbook Exchange 2000 (Originally published: Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1933, p. 189) 
"Friedmann (1964), "Preface" 
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law are binding upon states. Therefore legal theories explaining the basis of obligation 
in international law become vulnerable to the criticism that each of them in the final 
analysis rests on the presumptions of either idealist or realist arguments. 
2.8.2 Soft law obligation 
As viewed above, the legal effect is traditionally considered decisive to separate hard 
obligation (law) from other norms, such as moral and political. In international law, the 
legal effect means that the non-compliance has a certain effect that manifests itself in 
the law of "state responsibility". In this sense, the very wording of the term soft law can 
be considered as paradoxical: the word "law" in soft law suggests an obligation that is 
legal in form while the word "soft" indicates the existence of a norm, which is `below' 
the normativity threshold. 160 Indeed, to name an instrument or norm as soft law 
demands to resolve two definitional questions. First, what normative qualities do these 
norms and instruments have that may justify the label of `law'? Second, if these norms 
and instruments hold the necessary minimum normative qualities that make the label 
`law' appropriate, why are they `soft'? 161 Moreover, this definitional problem is not 
only limited to the so-called `non-binding' soft law, but also includes the so-called 
`treaty' soft law. For, as discussed earlier, `treaty' soft law does not necessarily indicate 
the existence of a legal obligation. In other words, it cannot automatically be presumed 
that if there is a treaty there must be a legal obligation too. The reason is that the 
binding quality of a legal norm or instrument and the existence of a legal obligation are 
not one and the same thing. To put it differently, state parties to a treaty, which 
embodies soft provisions, are not by definition under a legal obligation even though 
treaties are by definition legally binding. In such cases, it is indispensable to scrutinise, 
among other things, the wording of treaties to find out whether there was an intention of 
state parties to assume a legal obligation within the treaty provision(s). On the other 
hand, to say "soft law does not imply obligation and therefore possible breach and 
responsibility for breach" 162 can be seen as a far-fetched generalisation. However, as 
160 Gruchalla-Wesierski (1984) p. 30 
161 Carlson (1984-1985) p. 1202 
162 Lichtenstein, Cynthia, Crawford, Hard Law v. Soft Law: Unnecessary Dichotomy?, 35 The 
International Lawyer (2001) 4, p. 1433. 
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seen in the previous section, even when the obligation of soft law is merely political 
in 
its nature they may still create both direct and indirect legal effects or grow into legal 
obligations. 
Yet, one could rightly ask oneself what might distinguish a non-binding soft law from 
other types of norms, particularly social, moral or professional ones when considering 
the fact that even these norms can have impacts on states or other international 
actors? 163 This is obviously a complex issue and there is no all-embracing satisfactory 
answer. One important reason for this complexity is that many of these rules have 
comparatively similar features. This difficulty hence exists not only for international 
law but for domestic law as well. It is for instance not easy to explain the differences 
between the characteristics of a domestic legal rule and say a moral one, especially if 
one puts aside the centralised coercive power of the state. And so, the degree of 
complication to distinguish between different categories of norms further increases in 
the case of international law due to the lack of a centralised system of sanction at the 
international level. 164 
On the other hand, the understanding that in the absence of a customary or treaty law 
there can only be a `non-legal obligation' draws its inspiration from the strict legal/non- 
legal division of domestic law. Moreover, it can also be maintained that to look for a 
legal basis for non-legal soft law obligation would in many cases be in contradiction 
with the very raison d'etre of these instruments. For, when governments or international 
organisations intend to be legally bound by an international instrument they would 
163 Finnemore even goes one step further saying that before starting any debate about the nature of the 
obligations of soft law it should be established whether legal norms (hard law) have any distinctive 
effects from other types of norms. (Finnemore, Martha, Are Legal Norms Distinctive?, 32 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics [2000] p. 2) 
164 In an attempt to explain the differences between legal and moral/social norms, Hart identifies four 
essential features: i. importance (any moral rule has to be regarded as something of a great importance to 
maintain whereas a legal rule has not to be), ii. that a moral rule is immune from deliberate change, iii. 
that moral offences have a voluntary character and finally iv. the form of moral pressure (Hart, 1994, p. 
173-181). In a similar vein, Tamanaha holds that there is an ontological distinction between "state law 
norms" and non-state norms" (other forms of normative social ordering), which make it possible to 
reserve the term `law' for state law norms. Accordingly, non-state normative orderings primarily consist 
of "concrete patterns of social order" even though they also sometimes have enforcement mechanisms. In 
other words, social norms exist as a part of social group(s) rather than part of institutional recognition 
(Tamanaha, Brian, Z., The folly of the "social scientific concept" of legal pluralism, 20 Journal of Law & 
Society, 1993). 
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likely choose first and foremost a formally concluded treaty thereby their rights and 
duties would be governed under international law. 
In his seminal study on whether international law is capable of preventing ethnic 
conflicts, Ratner investigates whether international norms matter in international 
relations. In this study, the writer borrows the label of "normative optic" from 
Keohane165 to classify theories, which basically hold that norms by definition have the 
capacity to influence state behaviour because of their internal normative nature. 166 What 
is interesting in Ratner's study is that in the case of the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities (HCNM), which has been set up by a `soft law organisation', namely the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) there is no difference 
between hard and soft law (in either form -'legal' or `non-legal') as to how key 
decision-makers respond to the norms. On the High Commissioner's invocation of 
norms of varying legal characters ranked from hard and legal soft law (for instance, the 
European Convention on Human Rights and ICCPR) to non-legal soft law (for instance, 
OSCE documents or recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe), the key decision-makers do not react differently according to the degree of 
hardness of the invoked international standards. When they accept international norms, 
they see no reason to delve into the details of their legal status. According to the case 
studies on which Ratner's arguments base, the distinction between norms of different 
normative quality is significant only among small groups of bureaucrats, who 
overwhelmingly have legal training. He finally concludes that the relevance of the 
hardness or softness of a norm for the behaviour of different group of actors largely 
depends on the forum in which the norm is invoked. 167 Hence, in terms of compliance, 
do the results of the study of Ratner suggest that discussions on various normative 
qualities of international norms interest only a group of legal professionals and therefore 
the issue of normative quality of international rules is just a "legal creed"? 
165 Keohane, Robert, O., International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 Harvard 
International Law Journal (1997) p. 487 
166 Ratner, Steven, R., Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?, 32 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics (2000), p. 649. The writer also perceives 
constructivists within the normative optic Ibid. p. 650). In that sense, it would be possible to examine Hart's definition about the "internal aspect" of a legal norm under the "normative optic" classification. 
167 Ibid. p . 659-65 
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It should however be remembered that despite the lack of a legal 
basis for obligation, 
non-legal soft law might still acquire compliance due to various reasons. 
Finnemore's 
suggestion about the distinctive effectiveness of law could also 
be applied to non-legal 
soft law. According to this writer, "the contemporary world is permeated 
by a culture 
that invests authority in impersonal rules, procedures, and legalities". In other words, 
the rules of international law have distinctive power over other norms "because the 
world culture supports and values them". 
168 Legitimacy has been offered as another 
explanation for the observance of non-legal soft law. Nevertheless, as Finnemore 
maintains, the quality of "oughtness" in the meaning that a non-legal soft law 
is viewed 
as binding due to its legitimacy and therefore observed is not a feature that non-legal 
soft law exclusively has vis-ä-vis other non-legal norms such as moral and social 
ones. 169 Since the present study is not about compliance, this question will not be 
addressed here further even though to analyse the issue of compliance with soft law is 
certainly relevant to the questions whether and how and to what extent soft law, in 
particular non-legal soft law, enhance and promote the compliance with international 
norms. 
According to Franck, there are four factors, which produce the legitimacy of a norm: the 
norm's historical pedigree, its determinacy; its coherence with related norms; and its 
adherence with constitutive norms of international law. 
170 Within this approach, legal 
legitimacy appears to be a fundamental source of obligation. Accordingly, `legitimate' 
law generates obligation both in a formal and informal way. If a norm possesses 
characteristics, such as general applicability, clarity and determinacy, coherency (with 
other rules), transparency, non-retroactivity, constancy and finally participation (in 
168 Finnemore (2000) p. 3. Another reason Finnemore gives for the law's distinctive power is that the 
staffs of foreign ministries are increasingly chosen among lawyers, who would likely find legal norms 
more persuasive than other kind of norms. 'Professional training and norms' tend to shape organisational 
behaviour. Thus, "as lawyers increasingly staff state bureaucracies dealing with foreign affairs" it would 
not be surprising that legal norms are to have a distinctive role in shaping political behaviour (Ibid. p. 2). 
169 Finnemore (2000) p. 2 
10 Franck, Thomas, M., The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Oxford University Press: New York, 
1990, p. 184. Nonetheless, it can be claimed that Franck's legitimacy theory becomes unsafe when facing 
the criticism of being a dress for morality. As Koskenniemi reminds, if law is about formal validity, then 
"legitimacy is its opposite, the setting aside of validity to make room for something grander" 
(Koskenniemi, Martti, Legal Cosmopolitanism: Tom Franck's messianic World, 35 International Law and 
Politics, 2003, p. 480). Koskenniemi adds that in order to avoid being seen as a 'preacher of natural law', 
Franck used the concept of legitimacy to cover up the morality that his theory contains in the form of 
"common sense of values"(Ibid. ). 
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constructing the norm), then, it is said, this norm has legitimacy, which is more likely to 
generate obligation. 171 In the case of soft law, two sources of legitimacy can be 
identified. First, `consent', which gives soft law an authoritative base, and secondly, 
`expectation' that soft law create about the adherence to the behavioural values or 
policies that soft law embodies. 
172 No matter how vague the obligation that soft law 
enters upon can be, or, no matter how weak the command that soft law imposes can be, 
if the intention (consent) of the parties to a soft norm/instrument generates an 
expectation about its seriousness, then it can be assumed that soft law possesses 
legitimacy. 
In the beginning of this section, a conceptual paradox was mentioned and two questions. 
were posed concerning what might justify certain norms and instruments to be classified 
as both "soft" and "law". To end with an answer, it can be said that the element of 
`consent' that soft law may convey and `expectation' that it may create gives a reason 
for the wording "law" in soft law formulation. While the vagueness of the obligation 
and/or the weakness of the command that soft law typically displays is the most 
convincing justification of the characterisation of "soft" in soft law conceptualisation. 
2.9 Soft law in a hardening process 
Categories of hard and soft law do often not indicate two diametrically opposite and 
frozen polarities. There is in many cases a continuum from `soft' to `hard' law. In other 
words, soft law may undergo a hardening process, in which soft law norms may 
transform into binding (and enforceable) norms. 
Obviously, to talk about a hardening process of a particular soft law instrument is 
essentially different from claiming that soft law has now become a new source of 
international law. An assertion that a soft law norm is hardening is often to argue that 
"' Finnemore and Toope (2001) p. 749. According to Franck, legitimacy in turn also creates an 
independent "compliance-pull" effect that may result in compliance with the rule in question (Franck, 
1990, p. 184). 
172 Carlson (1985) p. 1202. In addition to the elements of consent and expectation, Gold gives four further 
'complementary' elements. Accordingly, (i) a clear common intent to respect soft law, (ii) its legitimacy 
"as promulgated" is not challenged, (iii) the parties to a soft law should not fail to observe it. simply 
because such a failure would not amount to a breach of `legal' obligation, (iv) conduct that respects soft law cannot be deemed invalid (Gold, 1983, p. 443). 
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the subsequent state practice has elevated the status of a (previously) legally non- 
binding rule to customary law. That is to say, two fundamental elements of customary 
international law (subjective criterion, the so-called opinio juris -"accepted as law" and 
objective criterion -"general practice of states") have been fulfilled. To claim that soft 
law has become a new source of international law is a more controversial nonetheless 
more interesting one. For, a `hardening process' does not necessarily imply any change 
in the setting of `traditional' international law making. On the other hand, to affirm that 
soft law has become a source of international law is inherently to proclaim a change in 
the sources of international law. 
The hardening of soft law can to a certain extent be considered as an early stage of a 
process within which a customary rule emerges. In this sense, every rule of customary 
international law has to pass through this `soft law' stage before it is considered as a 
legally binding rule. According to Meijers, it is possible to identify three stages in the 
process when a rule becomes a rule of customary law. In the first `formative' stage, the 
content of the rule is being defined. In this early stage, there is no certainty whether this 
`practice' will acquire a binding character, though the content is more or less distinct. 
During the second stage, the `will' of the relevant states has to be formed and the rule 
becomes law. This stage is concerned with the development of the will to make a rule 
into law. To put it differently, this is an accomplishing stage, in which "the subjective 
element" in the formation of customary law is full-fledged. The third stage concerns the 
number of states that consider themselves as being bound by a rule and the sufficiency 
of use of this rule in practise. These two factors require the element of evidence of a 
"general practice accepted as law". This is the stage in which the rules formed by 
custom in the first stage are to be divided into legal and non-legal rules depending on 
whether the above mentioned objective and subjective elements of customary law have 
been fulfilled. 173 
Eide also formulates a similar phase description to illustrate the development of non- 
binding rules into binding ones though exclusively in human rights domain. The writer 
distinguishes between three different stages in the hardening process that certain 
international human rights have experienced: "idealisation", "positivisation" and 
173 Meijers, H. Now is international law made?, Vol. 9 Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, 
Netherlands (1978) p. 5-18. 
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"realisation". The "idealisation" stage includes the emergence and dissemination of 
ideas on human freedom articulated by philosophers, other publicists, and political 
actors. This stage could also be called the `discourse process, ' for the reason that its 
prevailing feature is "the appeal to build a broad consensus based on values essential to 
the full and equal dignity of all human beings". 174 The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) can be said as the declaration of such a discursive consensus and can 
therefore be seen as the first idealisation stage. The `positivisation' stage, which refers 
to the transformation of ideals into normative standards, is a stage, which includes a 
transition from morality to law. Two international Convenants adopted in 1966,175 
followed by numerous more specific conventions constituted further steps towards 
positivisation. This has also meant an obligation for state parties to implement the 
norms embodied in the Convenants at the national level. The third stage called 
`Realisation' indicates the effective enjoyment of standards and rights in practice. This 
stage also requires appropriate economic and social policies and the establishment of 
relevant institutions, such as health service, welfare agencies and others. 176 
Some scholars hold that those soft law norms, which lack the psychological element 
(i. e. opino juris) can still fulfil a function as the material element (i. e. state practice) in 
the creation of customary law. However, it is highly doubtful whether soft law may be 
evidence of state practice. For, it could be argued that since the form of soft law is not 
legally binding, the parties' intention is not to be bound by a conforming practice. 177 On 
the other hand, by raising the expectations tacitly or explicitly, it can be argued, soft law 
may provide the psychological element of custom. However, that is not to say that the 
adoption of a soft law norm does always reveal the presence of opinio juris. It is 
important not to confuse two different functions that soft law fulfils. When soft law 
174 Eide, Asbjörn, Article 28 in "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a Commentary", Eide, A. 
and Alfredsson, G. (eds. ), Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 1999, p. 603. 
175 "International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" and " International Convenant on 
Civil and Political Rights" 
176 Ibid. See also, Eide, Asbjern, "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights" in Eide, A., 
Krause, C. And Rosas, A. (eds. ), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: the 
Netherlands, 1995, p. 30 
177 Gruchalla-Wesierski (1984) p. 53-54. Discussing about the so-called ̀ qualifying effect' of soft law, the 
writer argues, soft law may give acts subsequent to its adoption a quality, which results in the acts having 
effects on international law. For example, acts may be given a quality, which shows them to be part of the 
process of law formation, state practice that is creating custom. However, the writer underlines once more 
that this is not to say that the soft law itself is the state practice (Ibid. p. 60). 
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functions as opinio juris, it would qualify the practice as being binding as law. When 
soft law does not reflect opinio juris, it may create subsequent acts, which in turn may 
form international law. In the latter case, soft law norm does not provide the 
psychological element of custom. 
Georges Abi-Saab identifies three significant interdependent criteria for determining 
whether a soft law instrument has crystallised into customary international law: the 
circumstances of the adoption of the instrument, including voting patterns and 
expressed reservations; the concreteness of the document; and the existence of follow 
up procedures. 178 There is no reason why at least some of the existing non-legal soft law 
instruments may not have been transformed into customary international law. The 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, for instance, may at least partly be 
taken as a suitable example for this development, given that the OECD members 
represent a significant group of state whose practice carry a considerable weight in 
terms of state practice. Moreover, Abi-Saab suggested that these Guidelines are 
considered containing three important elements. First, they possess internationally 
agreed standards and norms; secondly, they are supported by an international 
institutional mechanism, which have adopted procedures for the interpretation and 
application of the standards; thirdly, there is a close interaction between national and 
international norms and actions. 179 
Yet, even though the OECD Guidelines accommodate most features that have been 
described as features characterising a hardening process, no one has claimed that such a 
process has occurred in the case of the OECD Guidelines, mainly due to the preference 
of the OECD Members. Taking into account the fact that the OECD countries have 
fervently supported liberalism and deregulation, Muchlinski regards it unlikely that the 
OECD Guidelines could harden into rules of positive international law if they are 
accepted and frequently applied by governments. 180 A similar remark is also made by 
Fatouros. According to this writer, the alleged inability of international law to issue 
binding rules for private actors is hardly an explanation for the voluntary character of 
178 Ali-Saab, G., Cours general de droit international public, 207 Recueil des Cours (1987) 
19 Ibid. p. 10 
180 Muchlinski (1999) p. 580. 
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the OECD Guidelines. Rather, the collective unwillingness of the states concerned to 
adopt binding standards is the real reason for such a result. 181 
As a last remark on the subject, it is important to note that the desirability of a 
hardening process should not be taken for granted in every case. Even though the 
existence of soft law may in some cases promote a trend towards the `hardening', there 
is no an automatic continuum from `soft' to `hard' law. It should also be recalled that 
the non-binding character may sometimes be the very reason d'etre of a soft law 
instrument. Otherwise, in many cases, there would not exist an international instrument 
or agreement at all. 
2.10 Concluding remarks 
It has, in this chapter, been argued that a considerable amount of principles rules or 
instruments of international law cannot be easily explained within the concept of 
`traditional sources'. These rules and instruments, which are more and more frequently 
named soft law, can be found both in treaties, which are legally binding, and in legally 
non-binding instruments such as resolutions of UN General Assembly. It has also been 
discussed in this chapter that it would be misleading to classify all treaties and treaty 
provisions as hard whereas resolutions, declarations, codes of conduct, etc as soft. For, 
some treaties may entirely or partly be soft and unenforceable due to being vague, too 
general, non-self-executing, hortatory or political in nature whereas some non-binding 
instruments, such as certain UN General Assembly resolutions, can be legally 
binding. 182 Likewise, certain provisions of essentially non-binding international 
instruments may be considered obligatory. 183 There are indeed cases where the content 
of a formally binding instrument has been so precisely defined and formulated that 
some of its provisions could be integrated into a treaty. 
This chapter has also argued that the expectation (of compliance) that soft law creates 
regardless of whether it is legal or non-legal, may be a valuable characteristic. However, 
181 Fatouros (1999) p. 7 
182 Such as the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
183 Such as the provisions of Helsinki Final Act of 1975 which regulate military manoeuvres 
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this point requires a considerable prudence. For, under certain circumstances soft law 
may also create false expectations toward resolving an international problem. In such 
cases, soft law may rather become the source of increased conflicts. 
184 It has been 
viewed that expectation that soft law creates may differ in degree of certainty depending 
on its form. 185 Nonetheless, the form of soft law (i. e. `treaty' and `non-binding') is not 
the only determinant if a state will observe an international soft rule. The precision of 
the norms and the context in which the norm is invoked are equally important. 
According to Bothe, the expectation of compliance is only marginally dependent on the 
existence of a legal obligation to comply. 
186 As it has been discussed, the decision- 
makers within states often respond, to a considerable extent, the same to claims about 
the requirements of legal rules and claims about the requirements of non-legal norms. 
187 
By the same token, the legal value of a norm depends on the nature of the norm rather 
than on its form. Especially when it comes to UN resolutions, a number of other factors 
determine what sort of obligation a resolution will engender. These factors could for 
instance be the circumstances, which have led to its adoption, the degree of agreement 
on which it is based, and implementation procedures. 188 
It is certain that `treaty' and `non-binding' soft law entail different consequences. Since 
only violation of formally binding rules entail responsibility under international law, a 
`treaty' soft law may serve as the basis of a legal decision delivered by an international 
court. Although non-legal obligation can also be relevant in a legal dispute for instance 
as a proof of customary law, it cannot constitute the basis of a legal judgement. 
However, the practical effects are not as far reaching as they might seem at first sight, 
considering the fact that comparatively few disputes have been brought before 
184 For a detailed analysis of such a 'false expectation' in the case of GATT, see Carlson (1984-1985). 
185 Bothe (1980) p. 85. The writer also adds that the existence implementation procedures show that 
compliance with the norm in question is expected (Ibid. p. 78). 
"' Ibid. p. 86 
187 Ratner (2000) p. 666 
188 Gruchalla-Wesierski (1984) p. 47 According to the writer, implementation procedures are not only a 
proof that compliance is expected, they are also a means of exerting pressure to secure compliance, even 
where a state objects (Ibid. ). 
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international courts: Between 1946 and 31 July 2004, the International Court of Justice 
dealt with 106 contentious cases between states in which it delivered 80 Judgements. 189 
According to a common but nevertheless misleading understanding, soft law is argued 
to create only moral and/or political obligation but no legal obligations. This 
understanding of soft law fails to consider the obvious fact that soft law may also 
generate direct as well as indirect legal effects alongside with political and moral ones. 
As it has been pointed out in the chapter, one of the most important features of soft law 
is that it can start a rule of customary international law or serve as an evidence of it. 
Moreover, in certain cases soft law may `de-legitimise' the legal status or binding nature 
of an existing norm through adopting a soft law norm, which is opposite to an existing, 
say, customary norm. Thus, in these cases, it may be possible to claim that there is no 
longer opinio juris for the rule of custom. 190 Another important effect soft law may 
create is the internationalisation of a subject area. Once a matter has become the subject 
of a soft law, it would hardly be possible for a state party to claim that the matter in 
question still falls into domestic jurisdiction of the state. This point is especially 
relevant for the areas of human rights and environment. 
Arguably, soft law may älso make state behaviour more predictable and thereby inter- 
state relations more stable. In addition, soft law may promote a more democratic 
international law, as it more immediately reflects `general tendencies of change of 
beliefs and opinions' in the "international community". 191 However, it should be 
remembered that, the concept of soft law is a double-edged tool. As pointed out above, 
soft law may also serve as a strategy to a few powerful states to strengthen their position 
and undermine the will of the remainder i. e. whenever a few powerful states do not 
agree with the will of the rest; they may seek ̀non binding soft law' as a refuge. Or soft 
law may give an excuse to states, which are unwilling to comply with their international 
169 http: //www. icj-cij. org/icjwww/igeneralinformation'/ibleubook. pdf 
190 Gruchalla-Wesierski (1984) p. 56 
191 "Soft law is the bearer of the hopes of the damned of the earth in a society that they wish to turn into a better world. This is also one of the functions of Law" (Pellet, Allen, Contre la tyrannie de la ligne droite, 
Thesaurus Acroasium, Vol. XIX, 1992, p. 354, cited in Casanovas (2001) p. 83 
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commitments as in the case of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. 192 
Soft law may also promote more participatory international law permitting the 
participation of non-state actors in the law-making process. States are seemingly more 
inclined to accept the participation of non-state actors in norm creating activities when 
instruments are expressly legally non-binding and when the outcome is either 
declaratory or programmatic. Non-binding international instruments, such as 
declarations, agenda, and programs, increased in number during the 1990s and can be 
exemplified by the results from the global summit conferences. 
' 93 This interesting 
though limited development has occurred notably in the domains, which are, as argued 
by Chinkin, "inherently soft, or perhaps too intrusive into domestic jurisdiction to be 
subject of binding obligation" such as human rights, environment, population, poverty, 
economic and social development, human habitation, women, children. 194 These global 
summit conferences have been brought into being with the active participation of 
individuals, NGOs, and business organisations though having only observer status and 
not as a part of the formal conference negotiations. It is not surprising that the high level 
activities of non-state entities in the creation of legally non-binding rules in such global 
summits is welcomed by many scholars as the democratisation of international law. It is 
true that these summits at least lead to new international legal discourses and create 
expectations, which may function as an authoritative guidance encouraging states to 
comply with the rules in question. However, it is hardly possible to regard this 
development as the beginning of a new institutional international law making. It is also 
192 The Convenant has a reporting system and no provision for inter-state complains or individual 
petitions. However, the Committee established 1987, prepares ̀General Comments' on particular rights in 
order to hinder States from evading their responsibilities under the pretext of that rights that the Covenant 
contains are rather programmatory and their realisation depend much on resources (and the ̀ goodwill') of 
States parties. 
193 To give a few examples: 1992, Rio de Janeiro "The World Conference on the Environment and 
Development"; 1993, Vienna "The World Conference on Human Rights"; 1995, Beijing "The Fourth 
World Conference on Women"; and 1996, Istanbul "Habitat 11". 
194 Chinkin (2003) p. 28. Indeed, the criticism of feminist scholars' regarding soft law is essentially 
centred around subject-matters that states use soft instruments for matters that are not regarded as 
essential to their interests (soft issues of international law) or where they are reluctant to incur binding 
obligations. It is argued that "many of the issues that concern women thus suffer a double marginalisation 
in terms of traditional international law making: they are seen as the `soft issues of human rights and are 
developed through ̀ soft' modalities of law-making that allows states to appear to accept such principles 
while minimising their legal commitments" (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2003, p. 66). 
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highly questionable whether the participation of non-state entities in the creation of non- 
binding rules should be accepted as the democratisation of international law. The 
`democratisation' claim based on an increased participation of non-state actors demands 
great prudence. Because, it may be deceptive to consider international NGOs as the true 
representatives of "international society" even if it is accepted such a concept exists. 
First of all, to affirm that all NGOs are democratic (and monolithic) is an ungrounded 
assertion. Second, this understanding underestimates the risk of over-representation in 
the meaning that NGOs with greater resources and support would have more chance to 
be heard in such international institutional activities. Hence, it is hardly surprising that 
there is an increasing interest in this issue focusing on democratic deficiency or a 
legitimacy crisis of global governance. 
Lastly, soft law, may represent opportunities for promotion of international norms and 
further legalisation of international relations. It is therefore important to understand the 
relations between hard and soft law as well as formal and informal norms to appreciate 
their joint contribution to efforts to improve world order instead of insisting upon a rigid 
dichotomy between what is legal and what is not. As Chinkin suggests, hard and soft 
law should be seen as part of a continuum of international legal mechanisms. Both may 
contribute to the development of international law, to the creation of stability and 
expectation in international relations and both facilitate international co-operation. 195 
Yet, the need for a more complete and larger spectrum of understanding of international 
norms and the need to answer to the ever-increasing complexity of international affairs 
should not increase further the structural weakness of international law neglecting the 
necessary minimum requirement of the normative threshold between what is legal and 
what is not. Although "the forces that converge to impinge upon and constrain states to 
behave one way or another are broader than the narrow consideration of legality", 196 the 
aptness of a norm to affect state practice is not conclusive reason for its legal validity. 
Otherwise, there would hardly be left any meaningful criterion to differ legal norms 
from moral, political or social norms. 
19s Chinkin (2003) p. 42 
196 Tiewal, S., The United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 10 Journal of International Law and Economics (1975) p. 687 
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3 A" PARADIGM SHIFT IN INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC SOFT LAW AND REGULATION 
3.1 Introduction 
The possible effects of the increased use of soft law in international economic 
law have 
become an important issue as economic relations affect international relations. 
International economic soft law has emerged frequently from the normative activities of 
international organisations, centred on the United Nations system, as a result of the 
differences in economic structures and interests of the member states. In the post-1989 
period, the concept of soft law has increasingly been used to define norm-like activities 
of non-state actors as well as the acts of informal international institutions. It is today 
widely held that the relevancy of non-state actors in explaining and analysing recent 
developments in the field of international economic law has dramatically increased. It is 
however not always acknowledged that the growing role of non-state actors nor 
informal soft law development describes the whole picture. On the shadowy side of this 
rhetoric, there has been a simultaneous re-regulation and hard law development in the 
form of the institutionalisation of neo-liberal ideas associated with globalisation through 
the rules and practices of multilateral rule-based frameworks. 
This chapter sets up two alternative paradigms in international economic soft law and 
sketches out the paradigm shift from state-centric to a dual globalist paradigm. Its focus 
is on the key features of each paradigm. The chapter begins with a conceptual 
discussion of the terms of international economic `law' and `regulation' in order to 
show how the use and content of these terms resonates with the paradigm shift this 
study examines. It then outlines the basic components of the two paradigms. Thereafter 
it portrays the paradigm shift taking place in the post-1989 period, by describing the 
changing nature, role and actors of international economic soft law. Although a short 
description of the economic and ideological circumstances, which precipitate such a 
shift, is provided in this chapter, these circumstances will be analysed at length in the 
following chapter. The issue of how this shift may affect the development of 
international economic soft law is addressed in chapter 9. 
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The paradigm shift examined in this study involves in the first place the erosion of the 
principle of sovereign equality and the demise of state sovereignty as well as the 
corresponding rise of non-state actors. The chapter therefore investigates lastly these 
key concepts and the issue of international legal personality of MNEs and NGOs, the 
two most significant non-state actors of international economic law. 
3.2 The definition of economic `law', `regulation' and `self-regulation' 
As noted earlier, in the post Second World period, the scope and participants of 
international law have been extended and diversified. International law in this period 
has reached into many fields formerly outside its preoccupation, such as economy, 
human rights and environment. As stated in the introductory chapter, due to the growing 
economic interdependence, the law governing international economic relations has since 
the Second World War become one of the most important areas where international law 
and institutions operate in practice. 
Since international economic law cuts across most of the subjects embraced by 
international law, it is not surprising that there is no agreement on what the term 
"international economic law" exactly includes. However, the broadness of the inventory 
of subjects of international economic law, which contains, among others, the law of 
economic relations, the law of economic institutions, the law of foreign investment, the 
regulation of international trade and the law of regional economic integration, is not the 
only difficulty that one may face. Another important difficulty in defining international 
economic law arises from whether international economic law, as a branch of 
international law, should deal with the transactional and regulatory economic activities 
carried out between actors other than states and international organisations. Thus, the 
definition and scope of international economic law principally depends on how one 
defines international law. For instance, extending the categories of subjects of 
international law to individuals as traders and MNEs, Seidl-Hohenveldern maintains 
that international economic law refers to "those rules of public international law, which 
directly concern economic exchanges between the subjects of international law". 197 
197 Seidl-Hohenveldern (1999) p. 1 
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To define the concept of `regulation', which has been used widely in recent years, is 
certainly not less problematic. If one reason of this difficulty lies in the ambiguous 
relation between `law' and `regulation', the other lies in the fact that within the context 
of globalisation, the concept of regulation is being increasingly seen as ̀ decentred' from 
the state. 198 Correspondingly, as a result of the diminishing role of the state in the 
globalisation process, the state has lost the capacity to command and control, especially 
in the domain of economic activities. Consequently, the relation between governments 
and other actors are not any longer a unilateral or linear. Regulation, just as law, does 
not solely emanate from the state. According to Black, when law is defined as the 
`monist', `statist, and `positivist' tradition of law, regulation is less than law. From this 
point of view, regulation is part of law that is "instrumentalist in orientation, and 
contained in the mass of technical statutes, and other secondary rules that set out 
standards of conduct to be followed". 199 In functional terms, thus, regulation performs 
only one of the many functions of law, such as stabilising and adapting expectations, 
allocating authority, and dispute resolution. 200 On the other hand, if law is defined from 
an instrumentalist point of view that "the main value of a particular legal precept is in 
its usefulness for the specific goal or goals it is thought to serve", 201 then there would be 
no significant difference between law and regulation. In a similar way, Picciotto 
explains the increasing popularity of the concept of regulation with its ambiguous 
nature which arises from its widening scope, embracing almost any kind of regular 
behaviour. Besides, this concept now includes "all kinds of rules, not only formal state 
law" 202 
For Haufler, on the other hand, regulation is action or behaviour that is required by 
governments -it is not voluntary, and the regulators are public authority. In other words, 
the term regulation embraces only formal rules and standards. Attributing to the 
definition in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Haufler contends 
198 Black, Julia, Critical Reflections on Regulation, 27 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy (2002), p. 
1 
199 Ibid. p. 23 
200 Ibid. 
201 Cotterrell, Roger, Law's Community: legal theory in sociological perspective, Clarendon: Oxford 
(1995)p. 282 
202 Picciotto, Sol, Reconceptualizing Regulation in the Era of Globalization, 29 Journal of Law and 
Society (2002) 1, p. 1 
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that when it is not formal and voluntary, then it is labelled "standards" or better said, 
"voluntary standards". 203 
"Self-regulation", as the other type of the so-called "next generation" of regulatory 
techniques, like co-regulation, voluntary agreements, regulatory flexibility, negotiated 
agreements, environmental partnerships, informational regulation, and economic 
instruments, has often been claimed to be more advantageous for business over state- 
based legislation, particularly in terms of its flexibility and cost effectiveness. The term 
self-regulation refers to a form of decentred regulation that is not exclusively dependent 
on the state, where a group organises itself in order to control the conduct of its 
members and it is considered to constitute a new form of soft law: "informal soft 
law". 204 The liberal rationality behind this development characteristically argues that 
because of the complexity of post-industrial and globalised economies external control- 
oriented regulation cannot work alone. New generation of regulation, it is claimed, has 
to go beyond the state and must not only affect but, in many cases, be administered by 
business itself and civil society. 205 
Such self-regulatory informal soft law instruments are characterised by their extreme 
diversity. They typically include voluntary codes of conduct, internal rules of business, 
instruments that are supervised or monitored by government agencies, and instruments 
that are provided for by the statues or that are laid down by state law. A self-regulation 
process can entail one or more of the following four stages: standard setting, 
monitoring, enforcement, and adjudication. 206 Some have argued that self-regulation 
essentially occurs outside a legislative framework, where there is deemed to be no need, 
at least yet, for legislation or where a legal basis for legislation is lacking. Therefore, 
according to this understanding, when a legislative act involves in one or some of the 
above-given stage(s), the instrument at issue should rather be considered as a form of 
203 Haufler, Virginia, A Public Role for the Private Sector, Carnegie Endowment for International peace: 
Washington, D. C. (2001) p. 8 
204 Barton, Barry, "The Theoretical Context of Regulation" in Barton, Barry; Barrera-Hernandez, Lila; 
Lucas, Alastair; and Ronne, Anita (eds. ), Regulating Energy and Natural Resources, Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 2006, p. 29 
205 For an overview of the "new generation" of regulatory activities in the field of environment, see' 
Milani, Brian, Designing the Green Economy, Rowman & Littlefield: Canada (2000). 
206 Scott, Colin, Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet of Contemporary 
Governance, 29 Journal of Law and Society (2002) 1, p. 56 
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"co-regulation", which refers to the regulatory activities where the state and the private 
regulators co-operate in joint institutions. 
207 
In sum, closely related to the restructuring of the relation between the public and private 
spheres in the globalisation process, the widened scope of regulation has created an 
ambiguity over its boundaries and its relationship with law. Furthermore, even in the 
`conventional' forms of regulation, this concept is increasingly used to promote a 
pluralistic, decentralised, and deformalised understanding of international law, not only 
in terms of who makes law, but also in terms of what role law plays. 
3.3 A paradigm shift in international economic soft law 
This section depicts a shift between two paradigms of international economic soft law, 
The first paradigm, labelled the "state-centric" paradigm in this study, occurred in the 
post-World War 11 period, it reached its highest point in the 1970s and were related to 
the concern for the welfare of developing countries but withered away in the 1980s. In 
the recent expansion of economic liberalisation, it is argued in this thesis. that, the state- 
centric paradigm has been replaced by a dual "globalist" paradigm. To describe this 
paradigm shift, the section begins by outlining the central features of the two stylised 
paradigms. It then explains how and to what extent these paradigms can apply the 
examples that this study has chosen to illustrate the occurrence of such a paradigm shift. 
Some preliminary remarks are called for before starting to explain the paradigms. In the 
first place, the objective of conceptualising and `stylising' them as ideal-types is to 
show how each of them captures the central aspects of a particular understanding of 
societal development such as the role of the state. Otherwise, none of these paradigms is 
meant to be conceived in unitary terms; although they display distinctive and often 
contrasting characteristics, in many instances there is no absolute dichotomy between 
state-centric and globalist approaches. Moreover these paradigms are not necessarily 
successive stages of an ahistorical and straight-forward societal development. 
207 Senden, Linda, Soft Law, self-regulation and co-regulation in European Law, 9 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law (2005) 1, p. 11, available at http: //www. ejcl. org/91/art9l-3. html 
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3.4 The "state-centric" paradigm 
It is commonplace to say that modern international law has been a state-centric system. 
It can be said that state-centrism, is a key concept in understanding not only the basic 
characteristics of international legal and political order, but also to understand the recent 
changes within that order. State-centrism may mean many different and sometimes 
contrasting things. Susan Marks remarks that state-centrism has generally a descriptive 
and a normative dimension. Counterpoising the "state" to "non-state", the descriptive 
dimension refers to "a preoccupation with states to the exclusion of non-state actors" 
while its normative dimension claims that "international law is too preoccupied with 
states, and should pay more attention to non-state actors". 208 Sure enough however, 
whatever meaning might be, state-centrism is increasingly used as a derogatory concept 
either to express disapproval and/or too often to naturalise the emerging new neo-liberal 
world order and delegitimise its legal/political alternatives. 
State-centrism in international law basically refers to the understanding that 
international law is a set of rules created by states, and that principally governs inter- 
state relations for the benefits of states themselves. It is premised on the concept of 
sovereignty and the principles of the sovereign equality of states, a duty of non- 
intervention on the part of states in the internal affairs of other states. The concept of 
state centrism is often associated with positivism, which has promoted the dominant 
view that international law is based on sovereign consent, manifesting itself in the forms 
of treaty and customary law. States within this approach are regarded as the sole 
legitimate subjects. 
There can be found two specific sources for the establishment of the state-centrism as a 
leading paradigm in international economic law in general and international economic 
soft law in particular. These are (i) the creation of an ̀ international' economy among the 
members of the Western alliance under the US leadership in the aftermath of World 
War 11 based on the free market and free trade philosophy. (ii) The international 
bargaining process between developing and industrialised countries involving the re- 
208 Marks, Susan, Stale-centrism, International Law, and the Anxieties of Influence, 19 Leiden Journal of International Law (2006) p. 341 
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distribution of international economic power and resources during a period starting with 
the decolonisation process to the 1980s. 
No doubt, the centrality of the state and international organisations was the main 
common feature of both sources. Yet, in the former occurrence, the state and 
international organisations assumed a role of rebuilding devastated national economies 
of mainly industrialised capitalist European countries and creating a compatible 
`embedded' liberal economic order209 in the context of the Cold War. Whereas in the 
latter, the role of the state was to lead to the development of Third World countries 
through restructuring of international economic and legal order as well as acquiring 
financial and technological transfer by intermediary of international organisations, 
likewise, in the surrounding of the Cold War. , 
Until the end of the Second World War, economic issues were essentially seen as a 
matter of domestic regulation. The bilateral trade agreements between states were 
virtually the only basis for the regulation of international economy. In the immediate 
post-war period, however, the involvement in the restructuring of the ruined national 
economies of "free", i. e., non-communist European countries as well as that of Japan 
was a vitally important for the US both politically and economically. The aim was 
twofold: (i) to increase the American power by allowing its capital to be invested 
abroad, expanding its economy on a world wide scale, which necessitated the 
dismantlement of the barriers that had been erected during the long history of 
protectionism. 210 (ii) To create a post-war consensus on international economic 
liberalism by linking it with the restructuring of `West' European countries through 
Keynesian macroeconomic policies and the welfare state. The multilateral Bretton 
Woods system, set up in 1944, has been the institutional outcome of this process, 
established on three pillars: the IMF, the World Bank and later the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 211 
209 Ruggie coined the concept of "embedded liberalism" to refer to the post-war Keynesian consensus of welfare state. See, Ruggie, John Gerard, "International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, " 36 International Organization (1982). 
210 Cassese (2001) p. 398 
211 Unlike the IMF and the WB, which were established in the end of the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, the GATT was not founded as an organisation, nonetheless over the years an organisational structure evolved. On the subject, see for instance, Jackson, John, H., The World Trading System: Law 
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The major economic powers, especially the US and the UK agreed that trade and other 
economic activities should be regulated by binding rules and that states were not to 
interfere in the determination of international economic outcomes. 212 However, as 
Bothe observes, the `par value' system of Bretton Woods was only in part based on 
legal obligations. For instance, in international monetary relations the non-legal 
approach to regulation has been widely used. 
213 Likewise, it soon proved that it was not 
easy to agree on acceptable common international economic legal rules even among 
those states with a shared economic ideology and relatively comparable level of 
development. As Gruchalla-Wesierski argues, the failure to obtain unanimous support 
for the GATT illustrates the fact that even the widest of legal principles has difficulty 
receiving general acceptance. 214 Although the GATT put forward a set of obligation on 
the contracting states, such as the "most favoured-nation treatment", which provides for 
non-discrimination among partners, the rules of the GATT displayed essentially a soft 
character in so far as the GATT provisions contained a set of exceptions and escape 
clauses. 215 In the same vein, the GATT panel procedure within the framework of the 
dispute settlement provisions was merely a quasi-legal form of adjudication. 216 
Of course, all these arguments do not necessarily imply the ineffectiveness of the `soft 
law' approach. On the contrary, the GATT for instance played an important role in 
reducing barriers to international trade, partly due to "its flexible semi-legal/semi- 
political nature of application". 21 Then, this is another matter of discussion, essentially 
and Policy of International Economic Relations, MIT Press: Cambridge, 1997,2d ed., in particular 
chapter 2. 
212 Gilpin, Robert, The Challenge of Global Capitalism, Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 2000, p. 
57 
213 Bothe (1982) p. 82 
214 Gruchalla-Wesierski (1984) p. 41. The purpose of the GATT was to establish general principles and 
rules for the liberalisation of international trade by reducing customs and other barriers to trade and by 
eliminating discriminatory treatment between states in international commerce (Malanczuk, 1997, p. 
228). 
215 For instance, Article XIX of the GATT covered safeguards, which permit post hoc protection of 
endangered industries. It permitted the contracting parties to offer emergency protection to industries by 
imports. For an overview of Article XIX, see Kleen, Peter, The safeguard issue in the Uruguay Round, 25 
Journal of World Trade (1989). 
216 Picciotto, Sol, The WTO 's Appellate Body: Legal Formalism as a Legitimation of Global Governance, 
18 Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and institutions (2005) 3, p. 484 
217 Malanczuk (1997) p. 230 
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involving the effectiveness of soft law. 
218 However, what is important for the purpose 
of this section is that the institutions of the Bretton Woods were part of "a planned 
global regulatory system for trade and finance"219 and soft (and of course hard) law was 
formed in this multilateral system by states and international organisations. 
The second main source of the state-centric paradigm in international economic soft law 
is shaped both by the context of the historical moment, i. e. decolonisation process and 
the Cold War, and by the discrepancy between economic power and voting power in the 
UN General Assembly. The emergence of new nations, mostly former colonies -a 
heterogeneous and impoverished group of nations, rendered the composition of 
international relations more complex. Although Western states retained their dominant 
position in the Security Council due to the veto power, the majority in the UN General 
Assembly shifted from the Westerns states to an alliance between the bloc of socialist 
and the newly independent countries (NICs). 
22° 
This "Third Worldism" emerged in the post-1945 conjuncture of decolonisation, 
national liberalisation and the Cold War and reached its peak during first half of the 
1970s centring on the call for the NIEO. 221 As a newly independent and/or developing 
country ideology, Third Worldism can be defined as a mixture of socialism, explicitly 
state-led developmental ism through import substitute industrialisation strategies and 
218 As an early example on the issue of "effectiveness" in the context of international organisations and 
informal rules, see Schwebel, Stephen, M. (ed. ), The Effectiveness of International Decisions, Oceana 
Publications: New York, 1971. For a recent study in the context of the World Bank, see, Sureda, Anders, 
R., Informality and Effectiveness in the Operation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, 6 Journal of International Economic Law (2003) 3 
21° Braithwaite and Drahos (2001) p. 98 
220 Admittedly, the terms of newly independent countries", "developing countries" and the "Third World 
countries" do not always include the same countries. Nor is there a consensus on the definition of these 
terms. Still, all these three terms are in this study used interchangeably, for the reason that likewise the 
South-North division, all three terms sufficiently indicate the uneven power relations between countries 
and the concentration of economic, political and military power in the so-called industrialised "Western" 
states. 
221 The term "Third World" has been used in the context of international law to conceptualise at least four 
different phenomena: first, as an ideological category (non-alignment during the Cold War); second, to 
describe a political/geographical content (relatively distinctive demographic, economic and political 
characteristics); third, ex-colonial countries; and forth, a set of associations which describes 
`backwardness'. According to Rajogopal, the first three conceptions of the term Third World are 
premised on the idea of national sovereignty whereas the fourth one is essentially unconnected to the idea 
of 'nation-state' and 'independence'. This concept in the fourth meaning allows us to critique the 
hierarchical ordering of globalisation on both state and non-state levels even under the conditions of late 
capitalism and rapid globalisation (For more details, see Rajogopal, Balakrishnan, International Law 
From Below, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge/New York, 2003). 
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anti-Western nationalism in the wider context of decolonisation and the Cold War. 
222 
One of the major features of this approach was the exclusion of non-state entities from 
the ongoing international bargaining process. MNEs, for instance, were viewed 
exclusively as agents of their home state, and even worse, they were seen as the prime 
vehicle of maintaining developing countries in a subordinate stage of 
underdevelopment. 223 The emphasis was clearly on state and state sovereignty. On the 
domestic arena, a strong and centralised nation-state was considered as a necessary 
vehicle for the achievement of industrialisation. Likewise, in international economic 
relations and law states were seen as the prime and only legitimate actors. Nonetheless, 
Third Worldism also attached great importance to form alliance, which would make it 
possible to act collectively under the umbrella of various regional and international 
forms of political and economic co-operation, such as the non-alignment movement and 
the United Nations. 224 The central idea was that the process of a true independence 
would only be achieved when the Third World countries attain economic independence, 
which could be more effectively carried out on a regional and transnational level. 225 In 
other words, in the Third Worldist approach, the emphasis was both on sovereign 
territorial nation-states that guided the national development and on 
international/transnational cooperation in order to transform the centre-periphery 
relations to reach an equitable sharing of global resources. 226 
As might be readily seen, the `traditional' international law making techniques, namely 
customary and treaty law were not suitable in attaining the objectives of a fundamental 
restructuring of the institutional and legal economic order governing economic 
222 Rist, Gilbert, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith, Zed Press: London, 
2002, p. 140 
223 Waelde, Thomas, W., A Requiem for the 'New International Economic Order', I The Internet Journal 
of the Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy (1995), p. 11, available at 
http: //www. dundee. ac. uk/cepmlp/J*oumallhtmINoll/voll-2. html 
224 Berger, Mark, T., After the Third World? History, Destiny and the Fate of Third Worldism, 25 Third 
World Quarterly (2004) 1, p. 11 
225 Nkrumah, the Ghanaian President,, who was overthrown by the army in 1966, developed these ideas in 
the African context. See, Nkrumah, Kwame, Neo-Colonialism; The Last Stage of Imperialism, Nelson: 
London, 1965 
226 For the concept of "international resource planning and management" and "common heritage of 
mankind", both of which assumed central a role in the `transnationalism' that the Third Worldism 
embraced, see Mann-Borgese, Elisabeth, "The International Seabed Authority as Prototype for Future 
International Resource Management Institutions" in The New International Economic Order, The Hague 
Workshop 1980, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: The Hague, 1981 
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interaction. For, treaty law requires that states reach an agreement. Obviously, to 
persuade developed capitalist countries to undertake treaty obligations, which to a 
certain extent would damage their own interests and advantageous position, was not a 
realistic option. Nor could developing countries count on the formation of customary 
law endorsing their expectations. First of all, the formation of customary law is 
normally a slow process; a customary rule must be based on a constant and uniform 
usage, which entails the consistent practices of a large amount of countries. 
227 Besides, 
since international law is essentially based on consent, a state cannot be bound against 
its wish if the state in question is a `persistent objector'. 228 Consequently, the newly 
independent countries could not rely on the formation of new customary law to redress 
economical, cultural and social injustice they encountered in the past and to attain their 
goal of economic development and independence. 
Thus, in consideration of strong opposition from the industrialised capitalist countries to 
a substantial change in international economic order, which would put their vital 
interests at stake, developing countries had to invent new legal strategies other than the 
`traditional' law making methods in order to impose obligations on the developed 
countries. Since the United Nations principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
members entails the acceptance of the one state-one vote principle, the so-called Third 
World countries tried to use the majority's voting power in the UN General Assembly 
to create a new law-making mechanism. According to this approach, the concept of 
consensus rather than the traditional concept of consent would be the basis of 
international obligation, which would empower the UN General Assembly with a quasi- 
legislative competence. The adoption of the "Declaration 'on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order", 229 "Programme of Action on the Establishment of a 
New International Economic Order" 230 , the subsequent "Charter of Economic Rights 
227 In the Asylum Case (Colombia versus Peru), the International Court of Justice suggested that a 
customary rule should be based on a "constant and uniform usage, accepted as law" (Asylum Case, I. C. J 
Rep. 1950, p. 277) 
228 In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, The Court held that Norway was not bound by the rule, since it had continuously opposed any attempt to apply the rule to the Norwegian coastline (Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries Case, I. C. J. 1951, p. 116). 
229 UNGA Res. 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974 
230 UNGA Res. 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974 
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and Duties", 231 and the "Declaration on the Right of Development"232 are the most 
important examples of such attempts that aimed to change the asymmetrical 
international economic power relations between `North' and `South'. 
To sum up, the key elements of the state-centrism in international economic soft law, 
which are particular to a historical momentum, can be listed as follows: (i) The actors 
are states and international organisations. This has been the case not only in the `Third 
World' approach but even in the Bretton Woods system. In both examples, international 
economic soft law is formed by either international organisations or the agreements 
between states. (ii) The concepts of state sovereignty and sovereign equality are the 
basis of international economic relations. In the Third World model, the right of states' 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and economic activities constitutes the 
inalienable part of sovereignty. (iii) State centrism grew as a part of Keynesian global 
planning and welfare state example of the industrialised countries whereas state- 
centrism established itself in the Third World model as a part of the state-led 
developmental ideology and economic nationalism. This model also favoured a national 
and jointly formed and equally represented regional and transnational economic 
planning and highly regulated international economic system. (iv) Non-state entities, 
especially MNEs were merely seen as the subjects of the regulatory rules that sovereign 
states lay down and supervise the compliance with these rules. (v) Lastly, the `softness' 
of the set of principles and rules in state-centric international economic law resulted 
partly from the difficulty in agreeing on detailed binding obligations where vague or 
general principles were seen as the best way to reach an agreement. This was the case, 
especially in the example of the development of the Bretton Woods system. On the 
other hand, an important body of soft law did not result from such preference of states 
concerned. Because within the developing country context, the norms applicable to 
international economic relations set forth were intended to be binding in order not to 
leave the matter of putting the rules into effect to the discretion of the industrialised 
states. Nor occurred the softness as a result of an `inescapable compromise' reached in 
the end of a global bargaining process between developing and developed countries. As 
will be exemplified by NIEO in the following chapter, the `non-bindingness' in such 
231 UNGA Res. 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974 
232 UNGA Res. 41/128 of December 1986 
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cases resulted essentially from the "discrepancy between economic power and voting 
power in most world-wide organisations". 
233 
3.5 The dual "Globalist" paradigm 
The present study holds that this emerging "post-state centric legal order", which is 
perceived as reflecting social and economic changes more accurately, displays in fact a 
dual character. On the one hand, the `emerging' non-state legal order seeks to overcome 
the limits of national sovereignty over the international rule-making. Currently, we are 
witnessing an institutional divorce of the nation-state from economic sphere due to the 
neo-liberal separation of politics and economics, which has led to a decrease in the 
economic and political autonomy of nation states through policies of liberalisation, 
deregulation and privatisation. Simultaneously, on the other hand, we are witnessing an 
opposite nonetheless complementary tendency of the re-regulation and 
institutionalisation of international economy through multilateral and bilateral 
investment agreements as well as the rules and practices of multilateral institutions to 
render a constitutional status to the power of capital on a world scale. 
The dual "globalist" paradigm is based upon two assertions. On the one hand, the 
recognition of the rise of non-state actors in international law, policy and decision- 
making and implementation processes. On the other hand, the increasing 
institutionalisation of neo-liberal ideas associated with globalisation through a 
multilateral rule-based framework that has substantial authority over national 
governments of developing countries. 234 The basic premises of the former assertion, 
which this study refers to as "non-state actor" paradigm, are: (i) the decline of 
sovereignty; (ii) the growing authority of private entities as a result of deregulation, 
economic liberalisation and privatisation; (iii) the increasing normative impact of non- 
state actors on formal international law-making; and (iv) the emergence of informal 
233 Seidl-Hohenveldem (1999) p. 40 
234 "Neo-liberalism" as is understood in this study, basically refers to a particular ideology which asserts 
that the market is the core institution of modern societies and that both domestic and international politics 
and policy-making are (and should be) primarily concerned with making markets work well (Soedeberg, 
Susanne; Menz, Georg; and Cerny, Philip, G. (eds. ), Internalizing Globalization: The Rise of Neoliberalizm and The Decline of National Varieties of Capitalism, Palgrave MacMillan: Basingstoke, 
2006, p. 12). 
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normative structures. The non-state normative developments, like the so-called private 
or mixed "soft law regimes", entail both the concepts of the multiplicity of law-making 
(legal pluralism) and self-regulation. As illustrated in this study, self-regulation as 
opposed to centralised law, which is imposed from states and or international 
organisations, can take place mainly in two distinctive ways. First, in the so-called 
"bottom-up" model, self-regulation develops as a spontaneous and gradual process. As 
in the example of lex mercatoria, the repetition of the business procedure and 
commercial practices of traders may develop into trade usage or custom. Second, in the 
so-called "top-down" model, self-regulation results from a deliberate enterprise or 
regulatory impulse. As the development of the international principles of corporate 
social responsibility exemplifies, self-regulation may be the outcome of public pressure, 
societal expectation or self-interest. 
On the other hand, the "hegemonic state" paradigm entails seemingly an opposite, 
nonetheless complementary direction: a greater legalisation and institutionalisation in 
international economy to regulate the behaviour of actors more deeply through 
institutional rules, often in the `hard' form, as the evolution of GATT/WTO dispute 
settlement procedures exemplifies. The hegemonic state paradigm refers to (i) the 
restructuring of Third World states to ensure that they operate under the discipline of 
international capital to deliver the tasks such as an improved long-term investment 
climate and better protection of private property rights235 and (ii) the diminishing of the 
political influence on the outcome of the proceedings by disciplining the international 
liberal trade market in the interests of not only the most powerful states, but the global 
capitalist market as a whole. 
The "non-state actor" and "hegemonic state" paradigms compose the "dual-globalist" 
paradigm, which has been the leading model of the recent process of the neo-liberal 
restructuring of international economy and politics, commonly referred as globalisation. 
Its central claim is the necessity of the recognition of this paradigm shift in the name of 
the continuing relevancy of international law, which should reflect the dynamic nature 
of international relations. Therefore, this study interprets the paradigm shift from state- 
235 Gill, Stephan, The Constitution of global capitalism, paper presented at the Panel: "The Capitalist 
World, Past and Present" at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Los Angels, 2000, 
p. 9 (Available at http: //www. theglobalste. ac. ukp). 
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centric to globalist as a power shift in the sense of the enhanced bargaining power on 
part of the industrialised countries. 
While more will be said in the following chapter, the factors that have led to a shift 
from the state-centric to the dual global paradigm can briefly be listed here as follows: 
(i) the collapse of the socialist bloc, which diminished the bargaining power of 
developing countries; they could no longer rely on diplomatic manoeuvres by playing 
off East against West, (ii) technological progress, (iii) the withdrawal of some state 
apparatus from previously deemed public activities, (iv) the opening of national markets 
to international investors (deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation of national 
economies), and finally (v) the inadequacy of formal law-making bodies to regulate all 
new spheres as well as trans-sovereign problems, such as refugee flows, terrorism, 
disease, and environmental degradation, which demand both flexibility and speed. 
3.5.1 The "non-state actor" paradigm 
Recently, scholars on international economic soft law have sought to examine not only 
the normative value and role of soft law in a state centred international normative order, 
but also focused on the normative instruments of non-state actors in association with 
their increasing role in the process of globalisation. It is a widely shared perception that 
contemporary international society is not comprised exclusively of nation states. Indeed, 
it has long been recognised that a broad range of significant entities is involved in 
international affairs, such as international and regional organisations as well as non-state 
actors. 236 Today, the voices announcing the significantly reduced policy-making 
capacity of national governments in many areas not least in international economy and 
the rise of non-state actors are being heard even more forcefully. However, unlike the 
relatively limited implications of the call for the recognition of the `new actors' on 
international scene in the Cold War period, the dominant discourse of the post-Cold 
War period is an indication of a more substantial shift a paradigm shift in international 
law making, from state-centric to non-state actors. 
236 Already in the beginning of the 1960s, Wolfgang Friedmann, the widely influential writer of his time, 
for instance, held that "while states remain the basic unit of international relations it can no longer be 
regarded as the exclusive subject of international law". According to this writer, along with international 
organisations and "public international corporations", private corporations, especially MNEs had become 
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It is increasingly claimed that our world has now become globalised. According to this 
perception, a revolutionary shift is taking place from a state-dominated to a market- 
dominated international economy, which inevitably will lead to a re-definition of 
international public sphere. The latter is also often conceived as signalling a paradigm 
shift in international law making from a sovereignty-based international legal system to 
an `informal', `transnational' and `non-state' legal order. According to this line of 
understanding, the decline of the state has led to an open and truly global economy 
characterised by unrestricted trade, financial flows, and international activities of 
multinational enterprises. It is further argued that the integration of the world economy 
has unavoidably shifted the balance of power away from states towards markets, and 
non-state actors have taken on authoritative roles and functions in this emerging new 
order. In a similar vein, it is said that the globalisation of liberalism and privatisation of 
government activities have increased the reliance on market mechanisms, which has 
resulted in the relocation of regulatory functions from public to private authority. As a 
consequence, it is argued, the distinction between international public and private 
sphere, national and international, and local and global has blurred. 237 
It can indeed be observed an increasing tendency among scholars to extend the use of 
soft law instruments and institutions as something that can and should reside outside the 
`traditional' international public sphere. Cutlet, for instance, holds that state-based, 
positivist international law and 'public' notions of authority are being combined with or, 
in some cases, superseded by non-state law, informal normative structures, and `private' 
economic. power and authority as a new transnational legal order takes shape. 238 It is 
also asserted that MNEs and global business associations have alone assumed the roles 
that traditionally belonged to the international public authority. These developments 
have been conceptualised with the term of "global private governance", which basically 
refers to commercial arbitration, rating agencies, and other types of private regimes. 239 
the new subjects of international law even though the latter, in Friedmann's view, should not be granted international legal status "equal to that of public international organization" (Friedmann, 1964, p. 223). 
237 See for instance, Cutler, Claire, A., "Private international regimes and interfirm cooperation" in Hall, Rodney, Bruce and Biersteker, Thomas, J. (eds. ), The emergence of Private Authority in Global 
Governance, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2002, p. 23. See also Strange, Susan, The Retreat 
of the State: the diffusion of power in the world economy, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1966 
238 Cutler, Claire, A., Private Power and Global Authority, Cambridge University Press: UK, 2003, p. 1 
239 Ruggie (2004) p. 502 
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The recurring reason offered for this modification is the changing international reality, 
which has created a disjunction between "formalistic and legalistic" structures of 
international law combined with the new world that has developed in the globalisation 
process in which state and law has become detached and the public/private distinction 
has eroded. 240 Questioning the basic premises of `traditional' international law, which is 
a system based on sovereign states, many writers conclude that there is a need to 
recognise that the basic rules and rule makers of "the game" have changed. In the words 
of Flood, in this `new age', which demands fast, flexible and often unaccustomed 
solutions, soft law has become the law of globalisation. 
241 As may be expected, in this 
emerging legal order the concept of soft law is also to be redefined. Accordingly, soft 
law now does not refer to the rules with vague obligation that governs inter-state 
relations, but to, "regimes that rely primarily on the participation and resources of 
nongovernmental actors in the construction, operation, and implementation of a 
governance arrangement". 242 
Even though there is no uniformity in the definition of `informal' soft law and soft law 
regimes, the exclusion of state authority from the norm creating and implementation 
processes appears to be the common characteristic. These emerging sources of law "do 
not emanate from public, state authority, but rather from privatized, non-state 
authority". 243 It is said that the private international regimes, which are created by 
enterprises and business associations in the interactions among themselves as well as 
between their customers, is the most important example of these emerging non-state 
authorities. In this study such developments are scrutinised and assessed in the 
examples of the so-called `new' lex mercatoria and the international standards of 
"corporate social responsibility" (CSR). The `new' lex mercatoria refers to "customary 
practices of merchants that transcended local custom or law and which came to be 
240 In the words of Lipschutz and Fogel, "Today, the state monopoly over regulation is well past its 
twentieth-century apogee. The "fluidization" of regulatory space is a feature arising from globalization, 
the declining authority of the state, and the growing tendency of individuals and organizations to act 
outside traditional rules and frameworks" (Lipschutz, Ronnie, D. and Fogel, Cathleen, "Regulation for 
the rest of us? " Global civil society and the privatization of transnational regulation in Hall and 
Biersteker, 2002, p. 122). See also Cutler, Clair, A., Public Meets Private 13 Global Society (1999) 1 
241 Flood, J., "Capital markets, globalization and global elites" in Likosky, Michael (ed. ), Transnational 
Legal Process, Butterworths: UK, 2002, p. 116. 
242 Kirton and Trebilcock (2004) p. 4 
243 Cutler (2003) p. 22, 
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recognized by national courts". 244 Lex mercatoria is generally considered as 
representing the so-called "bottom-up" informal soft law, for the reason that commercial 
actors formulate rules, set standards and create monitoring and compliance procedures 
in the voluntary and non-binding form to govern their own activities. 45 While the 
international standards of CSR refers to the voluntary ethical behaviour of a company 
towards society, human and workers' rights, environmental protection, community 
involvement, and supplier relations. Unlike, lex mercatoria, the CSR is mainly driven 
by a regulatory impulse, heightened by increasing public pressure, consumer awareness 
and other dynamics, which force companies to self-regulate in the absence of external 
international norms to deal with the `backlash of globalisation' in the above mentioned 













To sum up, the "non-state actor" paradigm, as it is understood here, mainly refers to a 
perception of `global' situation, which assumes: (i) the decline of the nation-state, (ii) 
the rise of non-state actors as a new source of authority, (iii) the multiplicity of 
international norm making, (iv) formal/informal soft law and (self-) regulation, and 
finally, (iv) the belief in the supremacy of free-market and the transforming power of 
market forces (and technology). 
3.5.2 The "hegemonic state" paradigm 
As outlined in the previous section, in the post-Cold War period, we have been 
witnessing a turn from government, formal international legislation, legal rules, public 
authority and institutions to governance, "open-ended" legalisation with a 
"differentiated obligation", informal norm-like acts of private entities, private authority, 
and private or hybrid regimes. However, this period has also witnessed a parallel and 
complementary tendency of re-forming, which consists of policies such as regulation 
and re-regulation as well as of a hardening process of already existing soft law and soft 
law institutions in different areas of law. Today, there are more multilateral agreements 
244 Braithwaite and Drahos (200)1 p. 46 
245 Cutler, Claire, A., Haufler, Virginia, and Porter, Tony (eds. ), Private Authority and International Affairs, State University of New York Press: New York, 1999, p. 14 
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and multilateral institutions addressing more areas of policy than ever before". 
246 
Indeed some writers even remark the "rejuvenation of international law"247 and observe 
"a move to law in international relations". 
248 This continued "legalisation", 
characterised primarily a proliferation of bilateral trade and investment treaties as well 
as the so-called international regimes dealing with particular issue areas - especially the 
WTO system -, can be understood as incorporating strategies, which seek to "expand 
the power of capital in the long term through bilateral and multilateral and quasi-legal 
agreements, and the constitutionalisation of neo-liberal policies, rules and standards by 
international economic institutions", in brief, the strategies that seek to establish a 
framework for a "new constitutionalism" and create a "disciplinary neoliberalism". 249 
Bilateral trade and investment agreements have indeed been a widely used method in 
this process to ensure that developing countries do not fail on the liberalisation, 
privatisation and deregulation measures dictated by World Bank/IMF structural 
adjustment programs or domestic free market policies imposed by the North. 250 
Especially in the last two decades, the US, one of the key actors of the paradigm shift, 
has showed a strong commitment to bilateralism in the areas of investment, trade and 
competition. 
Likewise, multilateral institutions, especially the WTO, the IMF and the WB have 
promoted a framework for global capitalism and sustained the process of creating a 
market discipline. On the one hand they endorse globalisation process by making rules, 
which national governments have to comply with. The WTO agreements, for instance, 
place extensive legal obligations on states to ensure that their national economic 
246 Raustiala, Kai, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, I Chicago Journal of international law (2000) 2, p. 
401 
247 Simpson, Gerry, The Situation on the International Legal Theory Front: The Power of Rules and the 
Rule of Power, 11 European Journal of International Law (2000) 2, p. 439 
248 Goldstein, Judith; Kahler, Miles, Keohane, Robert, 0., and Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Introduction: 
Legalization and World Politics, 54 International Organization (2000) 3 
249 Gill, Stephen, The constitution of global capitalism, paper presented to a Panel: "The Capitalist World, 
Past and Present" at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Los Angeles, 2000, 
available at http: //www. theglobalsite. ac. uk 
211 A bilateral treaty in the area of the promotion and protection of foreign investment is defined by 
Muchlinski as follows: "legally binding international instrument between two states, whereby each states 
promises, on a reciprocal basis, to observe the standards of treatment laid down by the treaty in its 
dealings with investors from the other contracting state" (Muchlinski, 1999, p. 617). 
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regulations conform to WTO standards, covering matters ranging from intellectual 
property rights, treatment of foreign investors to corporate taxation. 251 On the other 
hand, international financial organisations oblige developing country governments to 
adopt the policies of neo-liberal macroeconomic management in return for financial aid. 
The latter is also known as 'conditionality', which is often criticised for undermining 
the government authorities' ownership of policies. 
It is a common knowledge that the decision-making authority in the most prominent and 
powerful institutions of "global economic governance", in particular in the IMF, the 
World Bank, the WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) and the WTO, 
continues to be disproportionately accorded to the United States, the EU and Japan. 
Whereas developing countries have had comparatively little influence on the outcomes 
in the standard-setting process of these institutions mainly due to the continued use of 
webs of economic coercion and incentives by the US, EU and Japan. However, this 
should not be understood as if these institutions are merely tools that powerful states to 
impose rules on `peripheral' states and co-ordinate inter-'central' state bargains. As 
Cammack holds, these organisations are seeking to define and exercise a relatively 
autonomous role in order to be able to deal with the contradictions that a global 
capitalist system generates and which cannot be addressed at national level alone, not 
even by the most powerful states. 252 
It is important to note that the concepts of "hegemonic international law" (HIL) and 
"hegemonic state paradigm", as is understood and used here, are not one and the same 
thing. HIL refers to a more comprehensive and fundamental restructuring of 
international law and relations, which also incorporates most aspects of the "hegemonic 
state paradigm". The contemporary HIL refers to the US disengagement from 
international law in many issue areas either in the form of unilateralism and withdrawal 
from multilateral ism, as in the cases of International Criminal Court, the Kyoto 
Protocol, and the "war against terrorism" in Afghanistan and Iraq. HIL therefore entails 
policies, which undermine the role of international law as a regulatory (thus, restrictive) 
apparatus for the hegemonic power(s). Nonetheless, HIL does not involve a total 
251 Picciotto (2005) p. 477 
252 Cammack, Paul, The Governance of Global Capitalism: A New Materialist Perspective in Wilkinson, 
Rorden (ed. ), "the Global Governance Reader", Routledge: London & New York, 2005, p. 157. 
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disengagement from law. Because international law and its institutions do not only 
constrain power, but also magnify it. The HIL model therefore also aims at "designing a 
new generation of international institutions and redesigning old ones, "253 as in the cases 
of the acceptance and enforcement of WTO-based Agreements on TRIMs and TRIPS, 
near-defining power on the terms of the IMF conditionality. This is where the concept 
of "hegemonic state paradigm" comes into view. However, as pointed out above, it is 
important to note that although both HIL and "hegemonic state paradigm" assault the 
principle of sovereign equality and envisage the recognition of an asymmetrical power 
relation, the latter should not be reduced simply to one state's policy preference but 
should be seen as the restructuring of international economy in the interest of the global 
capitalist system as a whole. 
All things considered, the "hegemonic state" paradigm in this study basically refers to 
the institutionalisation of neo-liberal economic ideas through both (i) bilateral and 
multilateral treaties backed by a few powerful states, notably the US, and (ii) the rules 
and practices of multilateral institutions controlled essentially by the same powerful 
states. It is important however to note that the concept of `hegemony' here does not 
simply 'indicate the dominant position of one or a few powerful states due to their 
economic and military supremacy. Broader than state dominance; it refers to a 
consensual order rather than merely a form of dominance. As Cox remarks, a 
hegemonic system is "based on a coherent conjunction or fit between a configuration of 
material power, the prevalent collective image of world order (including certain norms) 
and a set of institutions which administer the order with a certain semblance of 
universality". 254 
Lastly, this "hegemonic state paradigm" shows a "quasi-unembedded" neo-liberal 
character. It is neo-liberal, because it lays a greater emphasis on the primacy of global 
market forces. It is quasi-unembedded, because, unlike the regime of "embedded 
liberalism", it states the necessity of divorcing market from the post-war domestic 
institutions. Finally it is "quasi-unembedded", because it partly recognises the social, 
economic and human cost of laissez-faire, as the diverse policies launched by the World 
... Slaughter (2000) p. 224 
254 Cox, Robert, W., Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory, 10 11.1711.. ««... «.. T.......... I .. F T«ae...... aL. «.. 1 11n01\ n -- - lvlumuululu. JVullull Vl 111LGIIRLLIVII4I JLUUICS k 170IJ Lq p. 1sy 
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Bank and the IMF involving "Poverty Reduction Strategies" and " Comprehensive 
Development Framework/Growth Facility" in 1998 respectively 1999, timidly 
demonstrate. 
For example, there are many instances where states are actively involved in a `non- 
state' norm creation process, as in the case of "The Forest Stewardship Council" and 
"International Organization for Standadization". Moreover, some of the characteristics 
provided here are relevant rather to some particular issue-areas and do not represent a 
general attitude. For instance, it would be wrong to assume that weaker states do always 
and in every issue-area seek for hard law whereas powerful states always prefer soft 
law. As Cutler observes, hard law instruments are favoured by weaker states on the 
periphery because it provides a greater transparency, predictability, stability, and 
enables to lock-in the commitments that become more difficult for powerful states to 
renege upon, especially in areas such as international aid and transfer of technology. 255 
On the other hand, developing countries have generally been less willing to undertake 
legal obligations in areas, where their sovereign rights are considered constrained. By 
the same token, powerful states are less willing to undertake hard law whose rules lay 
down obligations on the basis of the equality of sovereign states whereas these countries 
are much more for hard law in areas such as trade, intellectual property rights and the 
protection of foreign investment. Moreover, the difference between paradigms does not 
always indicate an absolute dichotomy. Soft law and hard law complement each other 
rather than compete against each other, in many issue-areas. These two `methods' of 
regulation may operate in the same issue-areas separately or in a combined manner, as 
in the type of the so-called "elaborative" soft law. 256 
Below, the main characteristics of the "state-centric" and the "globalist" paradigms are 
illustrated by Table 1. These stylistic comparisons do however not include every aspect 
that one could find in each model. 
ass Cutler (2003) p. 23 
zss For "elaborative" soft law, see section 2.3 in this study. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of the state-centric and globalist paradigms 
Source: Original formulation based on the analysis in chapter 3 
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On the other hand, some of the characteristics are diametrically opposite, such as 
sovereignty and sovereign equality. Because, one of the constitutive premises of the 
`globalist' paradigm is based on the understanding that the concept of sovereignty is 
now obsolete while the principle of sovereign equality is rather a formal, i. e. an empty, 
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concept. In the words of Vagts, a hegemonic international law most specially requires 
discarding the idea of the equality of states on the ground that norms cannot stray too 
far from reality and must therefore recognise inequalities of power. 257 
3.6 The concept of "sovereignty" and the principle of "sovereign 
equality" 
International public law is traditionally the law concerned exclusively with `sovereign' 
states. Accordingly, states are the only legitimate or original, i. e. as opposed to 
`derivative', subjects of international law, therefore only states can create and employ 
international law. It is premised on the principle of the "sovereign equality of states" 
and their formal equality in law that is based on the non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of other states and state consent as the source of international obligations. 258 
Sovereignty as a legal concept established itself as a supreme power over a certain 
territory (the substantive realm of sovereign) following the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, 
which ended the Thirty-Year's War. 259 Territorial Rights of a sovereign, based on the 
new phenomenon of the territorial state, embodied rights such as to make, interpret and 
enforce laws, declare wars, impose taxes, and form alliances. 260 Later on, the 1713 
Peace of Utrecht, which ended an I1-year war between France and Grand Alliance, 
resulted in defining sovereignty geographically; that is to say, sovereign rights were to 
be bound territorially and not according to dynastic entitlements. 261 In other words, 
since the latter part of the sixteenth century, the concept of sovereignty has included 
both internal and external dimensions of power. The former has referred to the position 
257 Vagts, Detlev, F., Ilegemonic International Law, 95 the American Journal of International Law (2001) 
4, p. 845 
2sa Cassese (2001) p. 88 
259 Nonetheless, although the doctrine of sovereignty is overwhelmingly seen as an outcome of the Peace 
of Westphalia Kresner argues that the Westpahalian sovereignty in the meaning of non-intervention norm in internal affairs had vitually nothing to do with the treaties signed in 1648. This principle was first 
explicitly articulated in the 1760s by Wolff and Vattel (Krasner, Stephen, D., Sovereignty: Organized 
Hypocrisy, Princton University Press: New Jersey, 1999, p. 21). 
260 Reus-Smit (2003) p. 619) 
261 Article 6 of Treaty of Utrecht declared the establishment an equilibrium, and political boundaries between the Kingdoms (Ibid. p. 620) 
104 
of a sovereign to his inferior within a state; that 
is to say, there is no other power 
superior to it internally while the latter has referred to the position of a sovereign 
(state) 
vis-ä-vis other sovereigns (states) in the meaning that a power 
is sovereign because it is 
not subject to another foreign power in its external relations. 
The idea that sovereign states cannot be bound by, or have an obligation under, 
international law only reflects the understanding of sovereignty in its absolute terms, 
according to which the sovereign, possessing supreme power, is not 
himself bound by 
these laws, which he himself made. 
262 However, it would be wrong to assume that state 
sovereignty and international law that imposes restraints on this sovereign are two 
incompatible concepts that exclude each other by definition. No modern state has ever 
been sovereign if this term is to be understood as `unlimited power'. There have always 
been internal challenges, which have led to "institutionalizing legal limitations on 
internal sovereignty in the form, among others, of constitutional law". 
263 Moreover, the 
acceptance of notions such as Natural Law, a theory, which reached almost a universal 
acceptance in the 16`h and 17`h centuries264 and the principle of pacta sunt servanda, 
265 
demonstrates that the concept of sovereignty was conceived as limited as a legal 
concept from its early stage of development. More important proof for the compatibility 
of the concept of sovereignty with international law is the nascent of sovereignty as a 
legal concept. In Morgenthau's words, without mutual respect for the territorial 
jurisdiction of the individual nations, and without the legal enforcement of that respect, 
262 This approach recognises the precedence and priority of sovereignty as a 'real life fact' over the law. 
In what Koskenniemi calls it as "pure fact view", "sovereignty and together with a set of territorial rights 
and duties are something external to the law, something the law must recognize but which it cannot 
control" (Koskenniemi, 1990, p. 15). 
263 Wallerstein, Immanuel, States? Sovereignty? in Smith, Solinger and Topik (1999) p. 20 
264 The theory of natural law is formulated by Cicero as "right reason in agreement with Nature; it is of 
universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from 
wrong-doing by its prohibitions (... ) It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor it is allowable to attempt to 
repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely" (Cited in Legal Philosophies, Harris, J. W., 
Butterworths: London, 1997, p. 7). Although the theory of natural law has its origin in Roman law, it is 
adopted by the Roman Catholic Church as the official philosophy of law. Later on, however, natural law 
was increasingly secularised. "Even if God did not exist" said Hugo Grotius (1583.1645), "natural law 
would have the same content, and just as God cannot cause that two times two shall not be four, so he 
cannot cause the intrinsically evil to be not evil" (cited in Harris, 1997, p. 12). In other words, "the 
existence of natural law was the automatic consequence of the fact that men lived together in society and 
were capable of understanding that certain rules were necessary for the preservation of society" 
(Malanczuk, 1997, p. 16). 
265 As a priori basis of obligation, as the "highest, irreducible, final criterium", as a "fundamental norm". 
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international law and a state system based on it could not exist. 266 Likewise, Hart 
argued that sovereignty means no more than `independent' labelling the `absolutist 
view' as "unreasoned dogma", i. e. states ought to be free of all or at most be limited 
only by certain types of restraints. 267 
Many studies on the post Cold War international order trace the weakening of state 
sovereignty, from the classic Westphalian model, through the establishment of the 
United Nations to the current trend of globalisation. Today, it has become commonplace 
to refer to the growing interdependence in the post-1945 period and to conclude that the 
concept of sovereignty is inadequate to capture the complexity of contemporary 
international relations. 268 However, a mere reference to the growing interdependence is 
not enough to capture reality in all its complexity either. It is likewise important to 
examine the nature and consequences of this interdependence, which displays an 
asymmetrical character between industrialised and developing countries. As Chimni 
points out, the phrase neo-colonialism was coined precisely to sum up the essential 
character of the present phase of interdependence. 269 Bull also observes that many 
developing countries have long insisted on the preservation of state sovereignty due to 
the fact that they have regarded the institution of sovereignty as one which provides 
safeguard against the attempts of more powerful states to wrest from them control of the 
economic resources. 270 
The principle of sovereign equality has become an integral part of the doctrine of state 
sovereignty in the post-1945 period. Article 2(1) of the UN Charter recognised all its 
... Morgenthau (1985) p. 330 
267 Hart (1994) p. 223 
268 Among many, see Slaughter, Anne-Marie, A New World Order, Princeton University Press: Princeton 
and Oxford, 2004 and Malanczuk (1997). Besides, according to many writers, in the globalisation process 
not only has the concept of sovereignty lost its explanatory force and function, but also the nation-state itself has ceased to exist. Yet, some scholars differ the diminishing role of sovereignty as a legal concept from the issue of "the fate of the nation-state". Malanczuk, for instance, argues that even if sovereignty as 
a legal doctrine may be viewed as outdated in the light of modern realities, this still does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that also state has become obsolete (Malanczuk, Peter, "Globalization and the future role of sovereign states" in Weiss, F.; Denters, E. and de Waart, P. (eds. ), International Economic 
Law with a Human Face, Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 1998, p. 48). 
269 Chimni, B. S., International Law and World Order, Sage Publications: New Delhi/Newbury 
Park/London, (1993) p. 109 
270 Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Palgrave: New 
YorkBasingstoke (2002), p. 291 
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members as equal while both Article 1(2) and Article 
55 emphasised `respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples'. 
271 It is generally 
acknowledged that the principle of sovereign equality also 
includes the principles of 
non-intervention in the internal and external affairs of other states, prohibition of the 
threat or use of force, and permanent sovereignty over the natural wealth and resources. 
Differences in power are of course undeniable, as can easily be exemplified by the 
structure of the Security Council of the UN, in which five members permanently seated 
with the power of veto. 
272 Sovereign states were clearly unequal in terms of power, 
wealth and resources. Considering this relative asymmetrical power relations among 
states, a number of writers tend to understand the principle of sovereign equality as 
either "legal fiction" or merely as "formal equality" under the "one state, one vote rule" 
in the General Assembly of the UN and nothing more. 
273 However, as Cassese 
contends, the principle of sovereign equality constitutes "the linchpin of the whole body 
of international legal standards, the fundamental. premise on which all international 
relations rest", 274 not least the necessity of each state's `consent' with respect to the 
formation of customary international law and international . 
treaties. Thus, the principle 
of sovereign equality does not imply the actual equality of law creating power of states 
but rather a special aspect of the concept of sovereignty. But more than that, as will be 
seen in chapter 5, developing countries have considered the concept of international law 
271 Article 2, paragraph I of the UN Charter declares that "the Organization is based on the principle of 
sovereign equality of all its members". Sovereign equality was confirmed in many subsequent UN 
resolutions, notably the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of 
States and Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty of 21 December 1965 (Resolution 2131 
[XX]) and the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co- 
operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations of 24 October 1970 
(Resolution 2625 [XXV]). 
272 Yet, even this `institutional design' could be seen as a compromise between sovereign equality, great 
power primacy and institutional efficacy. 
273 International organisations use one or a combination of three types of decision making rules for most 
non judicial decisions: (i) majority voting, where each member has one vote and decision are taken by 
majority; (ii) weighted voting, where member states have differentiated vote power based on different 
criteria, such as financial contribution (as is the case with the IMF and the World Bank) or population (as 
is the case in certain institutions of the EU) and decision taken by a majority of this differentiated votes; 
(iii) sovereign equality voting, where equal representation is offered and decisions are taken by consensus 
or unanimity of the members (as is the case in the NATO, the GATT/WTO, the OECD, the UN 
Development Program -UNDP, and some other specialised agencies of the UN). For a detailed analysis of 
the effects of the different types of voting systems on the outcomes, especially in the case of the 
GATT/WTO, see Steinberg, Richard, H., In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining 
and Outcomes in the GA 7T/WTO, 56 International Organization (2002) 2 
274 Cassese (2001) p. 88 
107 
based on sovereign equality as a new form of global 
justice and the denial of which as a 
major setback for both the form and content of international 
law. 
However it is important to note that the existence of the principle of sovereign equality 
within the institutional framework of an 
international organisation does not 
automatically guarantee that this principle always 
delivers what it promises. It is 
generally recognised that the principle of sovereign equality 
is more likely ' than 
weighted voting, as in the case of the IMF and the World Bank, to confer 
legitimacy on. 
the outcomes of the activities of international organisations. However, as shown 
in 
chapter 8, the legitimising generation effect of this principle may 
be manipulated 
through the so-called "invisible weight" as in the case of the WTO, which 
formally 
takes its decision on the basis of sovereign equality though the asymmetrical nature of 
the outcomes of this organisation in favour of the powerful advanced capitalist countries 
is widely acknowledged. 
3.7 The subjects theory and "non-state actors" of international 
economic law 
It has become a truism to say that despite the changing international reality, the classical 
"state-centric" view, which recognises states as the only subjects and Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice as the exhaustive list of sources of 
international law, still endures and continues to predominate. 275 Associated to this 
unconformity with the circumstance of the day, international law, it is said, runs the risk 
275 It must be recalled that the nature of the sources listed in Article 38(1) indicates a contested terrain. 
Objections against especially ̀ international custom" are manifold. One of the most established criticisms 
is based on the fact that many rules of customary international law have been developed without 
participation of non-European states and therefore it is doubtful whether these rules could be considered 
reflecting a common practice of `international community' (For a detailed discussion, see Snyder, 
Frederic E. and Sathirathai, Surakiat (eds. ), Third World Attitudes Towards International Law, Martinus 
Nijhoff: Dordrecht, 1986). See also Anghie, Antony, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law, Cambridge University Press: UK, 2005; Third World and International Order: law, 
politics and globalization, Anghie, Antony (ed. ), Brill Publisher, 2003; and Gong, Gerrit, W., The 
Standard of "Civilization" in International Society, Clarendon: Oxford, 1984. " Likewise, socialist scholars 
have also claimed that rules of international law especially up to 1917 were the main result of a consensus 
between the Christian, colonialist, capitalist European nations. Therefore, socialist countries favoured a 
treaty-based international law. For more details, see, among others, Tunkin, G., Is General International 
Law Customary Law Only?, 4 European Journal of International Law (1993) 4; Tunkin, International 
Law: The Contemporary and Classic in "Essays on International Law", Nawaz, M. K. (ed. ), Sijthoff. 
Leyden, 1976; Higgins, Rosalyn, Conflict of Interests, The Bodley Head: London, 1965). 
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of losing its relevancy. Hence, according to the "necessity argument", as called by 
Klabbers, 276 it is essential to recognise non-state entities as legitimate participants in 
international law and policy making, and therewith the expansion of the accepted modes 
of international norm creation by embracing the new "hybrid" and "private" regulations, 
formal and non-formal methods and "hard" and "soft" legal standard-setting techniques 
that generate the rules of the contemporary international law. 
Not surprisingly therefore, the prescription to surmount the "state-centric nature of 
international law" uniformly combines two interrelated solutions: (i) to reassess the 
state-centric modalities for the creation of international legal rules, that is to say, to re- 
evaluate the doctrine of sources, codified in Article 38 and, (ii) to incorporate non-state 
actors into the framework of international law through elevating them to the status of 
subject of international law. 
A subject of international law27 can be defined as; "an entity capable of possessing 
international rights and duties and having the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing 
international claims". 278 Despite the fact that there are various actors participating in 
contemporary international relations, according to the established legal practices on the 
subjects and sources of international law, only states and, to a limited degree, 
international organisations are the subjects of international law. In other words, 
`traditional' international law differentiates between "international legal personality" 
and "participants in international relations". However, states' long-established 
monopoly in this field has nowadays increasingly been challenged. Even though it is 
276 Klabbers, Jan, "(I Can't Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the Emergence of Non-State 
Actors" in Petman, Jarna & Klabbers, Jan (eds. ), Nordic Cosmopolitanism, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 
Leiden/Boston, 2003, p. 364 
27 The concepts of 'subject of international law' and' international legal personality' are often used interchangeably. Malanczuk, for instance, states that "when lawyers say that an entity is a legal person, or 
that is a subject of the law -these two terms are interchangeable- they mean that it has a capacity to enter into legal relations and to have legal rights and duties (Malanczuk, 1997, p. 91). However, as Malanczuk 
points out, in certain examples, some differences between these two concepts are recognised. For instances, The Restatement (Third) Vol. 1, part II rejects the term `subjects' on the ground that the term 
may have more limited implications meaning (/bid. p . 91 footnote 1). Likewise, according to Oppenheim 
the concept 'international personality' has larger implication than the concept `subject'. Therefore for 
instance, "non- full" sovereign states can be 'only' subjects of law, hence, 'imperfect international 
person' (Oppenheim, International Law. A Treatise, 7`h ed., edited by Lauterpacht, Hersch, Longmans, 
Green: London, New York, 1948, p. 134). 
278 Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press: New York, 2003, p. 57. 
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overwhelmingly recognised among scholars that states remain the principal actors 
on 
the international scene, to argue for the importance of the recognition of non-state 
actors' participation in international law-making have gained a widespread acceptance. 
This section first gives an overview on the `traditional' subjects and sources theory of 
international law, and then, by presenting arguments for and against, discusses whether 
non-state actors have obtained the status of the subject of 
international law. 
Regardless of whether it is national or international any legal system requires `legal 
personality' for the capacity to bear rights and duties. An entity that 
does not have legal 
personality can not enter into legal relations, or present claims against other 
legal 
personalities. 279 Nevertheless there is a crucial difference 
between national and 
international law on this matter: unlike national law, the subjects of the international 
law (participants in legal-relations) are also the authors of the law. In other words, 
unlike national law, legal rules of international law consist of the practices of 
its 
subjects (i. e. those entities, which have international legal personality). One important 
consequence of this peculiar feature regarding the issue of international legal 
personality of non-state actors is that when non-state actors are considered as the 
subjects of international law, then this may imply that the practices of non-state actors 
should also be considered as `sources' of international law. That is to say, non-state 
actors might create international law. Such recognition would, in turn, suggest a radical 
change in normative structure of international law in terms of both its sources and 
authors. 
Of course, the definition of subjects of international law is closely related to how one 
defines international law. If international law is defined as the law regulating only (or 
primarily) interstate relations, then international law is to be applied to states, which at 
279 There is an important difference between benefit and right. This is especially important when 
discussing the position of individuals, enterprises and NGOs before international tribunals. Malanczuk for 
instance argues that the existence of various rules of international law for the benefits of individuals and 
companies does not necessarily mean that the rules create rights for the individuals and companies, "any 
more than municipal rules prohibiting cruelty to animals confer right on animals" Malanczuk (1997, 
p. 100). The writer furthermore holds that even when a treaty expressly says that individuals and 
companies shall enjoy certain rights, one has to read the treaty very carefully to ascertain whether the 
rights exist under international law, or whether the states party to the treaty are merely under an 
obligation to grant municipal law rights to the individuals or companies concerned (Ibid. p. 100). 
According to O'Connell, "the beneficiary theory is a midway position between the object and the subject 
theorists, proposing that the law treats human beings neither as things nor as actors, but as beneficiaries of 
its rules" (O'Connell, D. P., "International Law", 1970 cited in Meijknecht, 2001, footnote 108). 
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the same time appear as the sole law-makers. Listing the main legal characteristics of 
the international community, Cassese maintains that "the first salient feature of 
international law is that it aims at regulating the behaviour of states, not that of 
individuals" and therefore states are "the principal dramatis personea (the characters of 
the play) on the international scene". 
280 Malanczuk also argues that "the problem of 
including new actors in the international system is reflected in the very concept of legal 
personality, the central issues of which have been primarily related to. the capacity to 
bring claims arising from the violation of international law, to conclude valid 
international agreements, and enjoy privileges and immunities from national 
jurisdictions" . 
281 Likewise, according to Brownlie, states and international 
organisations, on condition that states have provided them with international 
personality, represent the normal types of legal personality on the international level. 
282 
This understanding, whose origin can be found in the positivist school, is also 
compatible with the theory of state sovereignty, which suggests that sovereign states 
cannot be bound by the practices of individuals and organisations over which they have 
exclusive jurisdiction. Otherwise, a theoretical inconsistency would appear: if, say, 
individuals, municipal organisations and enterprises are accepted as the subjects of 
international law, a legal system whose rules are essentially made up by the practices of 
its subjects, then sovereign states were to be bound by the practices of these subjects 
over which states have virtually absolute jurisdiction! In other words, there would be 
no logic if states were to be bound by the practices of individuals, enterprises, 
280 Cassese, A. International Law in a Divided World, Clarendon: Oxford 1989, p. 9. Later on Cassese 
seems to preserve the same position on the matter: In his book International Law dated 2001, he upholds 
the idea that States are the primary or fundamental subjects of international law while insurgents, 
international organisations, individuals and national liberation movements are named as relatively new 
subjects with a "limited legal capacity" (Cassese, 2001, p. 46). 
281 Malanczuk (1997) p. 91. The question whether international organisations possess international 
personality was indeed settled by the International Court of Justice in Reparations for Injuries Suffered in 
the Service of the United Nations case. The Court stated that the UN possessed international rights and 
duties and it had the legal capacity to bring its claims before international tribunals. The decision of the 
Court suggested that international organisations have a limited degree of international personality that is 
functionally necessary to enable them to fulfil the tasks they assumed (Reparations for Injuries Case 
(1949) ICJ Rep., note 178-179). As opposed to the "original" subject (i. e. states), this type of international 
personality is sometimes named "derivative subject" in view that the entities other than states derive their 
legal status from states (Jägers, Nicola, Multinational Corporation Under International Law in Addo, M. 
"Human Rights Standards and The Responsibility of transnational Corporations", Kluwer Law 
International: The Hague/London/Boston, 1999, p. 263). 
282 Brownlie (2003) p. 57.. 
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organisations, etc on the international level whereas they have jurisdiction over them on 
the national level. 283 
On the other hand, states are obviously not the only participants of international scene. 
In addition to international organisations, non-state entities have increasingly involved 
in international affairs. As opposed to the "recognition" requirement of state-centric 
approach", according to which international legal personality requires acceptance by 
international community of state, the increasing number of scholars subscribe to, what 
might be called the "necessity" (or "sociological") approach. Dupuy indeed ingeniously 
notes that the concept "non-state actors" was first introduced by "sociology-oriented 
American authors", 284 such as Michael Reisman and Anne-Marie Slaughter, both of 
whom are among the most enthusiastic proponents of a legal thought with multiple legal 
forms and sources -public and private, formal and informal. This tendency bolsters a 
cognitive rather than normative vocabulary, based on a perceived empirical factual 
knowledge, i. e., states are not any longer the only participants in the normative process, 
which is created outside traditional public international law. 
The proponents of an expansion of international legal personality to non-state entities 
through granting them rights and obligations under international law often endorse this 
idea on the ground of the significance of international law's being closer to the reality as 
such realism would secure international law's continuing relevancy. According to this 
"necessity" approach, when considering the factual power and functions of non-state 
entities in international policy and law making as well as implementation/enforcement 
processes, a necessity of accommodating non-state entities under international law, 
hence, a need of a paradigm shift in the `subjects theory' becomes obvious. 
281 When 'natural law' philosophy was the dominant theory, in other words while there was not a clear 
distinction between national and international law, the individual (it should nonetheless be recalled that to 
be individual did always not include all human beings! ) was recognised as the bearer of certain 
inalienable `natural' rights. For further discussions on the position of individual in the history of 
international law, see inter alia Malanczuk (1997) p. 100 and Higgins (2001) p. 49 
284 Dupuy, Pierre-Marie, "Proliferation of Actors" in Developments of International Law in Treaty 
Making, Wofrum, Rüdiger and Volker, RtSben (eds. ), Springer: Berlin (2005) p. 539 
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On account of such need, notions such as "relative legal personality"285, "limited legal 
personality"286 or "implicit legal personality"287 have been suggested as intermediaries 
between the changing international reality and state-centric theories. Yet, even such 
middle-ground approaches can be seen as the indications of the states' persistent power 
in international scene as the most important actor. Meijknecht, for instance, explains the 
expression "subjects to a lesser extent" with the apparent "unwillingness" and 
"hesitancy" of states to admit new actors such as individuals and indigenous people to 
the international sphere. According to the writer, the reason for this reluctance is that the 
acceptance of new international personalities would weaken state sovereignty. 
288 
Instead of trying to interpret the legal status of non-state actors within the established 
limit of the concept `subject of international law', Higgins suggests the complete 
abandonment of the concept and proposes the use of a new concept, namely 
`participants'. Defining the subject-object dichotomy as an "intellectual prison", 
Higgins maintains that if international law is to be understood as a particular law 
making process (i. e. not just `rules' in the meaning of "accumulated past decisions") 
within which there are "variety of participants, making claims across state lines, with 
the object of maximizing various values" no "objects" and "subjects" are needed but 
participants. 289 Lindblom has also suggested the employment of the concept 
`participants' but with some differences. Lindblom holds that there is no association 
between having "international legal personality" (or to be "subject") and to be 
285 Citing from Friedmann, who states that "there is no reason why there should not be different degrees 
of subjectivity in international law" (Friedmann, Wolfgang, The Changing Structure of International 
Law, Stevens: London, 1964, p. 218), Ijalaye maintains that "states and these non-states entities are all 
subjects of international law but that the extent of their subjectivity in the international legal order varies 
mutatis mutandis with the quantum of attributes they enjoy". Ijalaye, David Adedayo, The Extension of 
Corporate Personality in International Law, Oceana Publications, New York, 1978, p. 3. 
286 According to Meijknecht, the notion "limited subjectivity" means in practice two different things: i. an 
indirect attribution of rights to entities and leaving to States a considerable measure of discretion 
concerning the implementation ii. a direct attribution of rights or duties to the new entities, while denying 
effective means of remedy (Meijknecht, Anna, Towards International Personality: The Position of 
Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in International Law, Intersentia: Antwerpen-Groningen-Oxford, 
2001, Chapter 11) 
28' See, for instance, Maragia, Bosire, Almost There: Another way of conceptualizing and explaining 
NGOs' quest for legitimacy in global politics, 2 "Non-State Actors and International Law (2002) p. 332 
288 Meijknecht, (2001) Chapter II 
289 Higgins (2001) p. 50 
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"participant" of international law-making. 
290 The writer further maintains that the 
concepts ̀ international legal personality' or `subjects of 
international law' are imprecise 
and therefore impractical as tools. Instead, the concept `international 
legal status' is 
suggested. Accordingly, the specific content of this international legal status 
"may vary 
according to the circumstances. It is a neutral concept, meaning only that an entity 
has 
some sort of status in some respect, which needs to be specified 
for each particular 
entity". 291 
All things considered, it is important to remember that the legal status of non-state 
entities in international law must be based on defined legal capacity 
deriving from 
customary law and international treaty, two principle sources of international 
law. 
Moreover, all legal rights and obligations under international law must directly be 
addressed to a particular actor with some form of enforcement mechanism. NGOs and 
MNEs are doubtless the most important non-state entities related to the issue of "new 
participants" in international law. Section 3.7.1 investigates the legal status of NGOs as 
law-makers within the framework of the state-centric sources of international law and 
then overviews their rights and duties under international law by surveying the existing 
international regulations regarding NGOs' participation in international affairs. Section 
3.7.2 also follows a similar path to examine the legal status of MNEs scrutinising the 
arguments of both state-centric `recognition approach' and sociological `necessity 
approach'. 
3.7.1 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
Although NGOs involvement in international law and policy is not a new phenomenon 
and has occurred for over 200 years, a growing role for NGOs especially since the end 
290 Lindblom suggests four alternate views on the relationship between personality and law-making. The 
denial of any relationship between personality and law-making in the meaning that no matter if non-state 
entities are or become subjects of international law, States will continue to be the only law-makers is the 
first approach. Second possible attitude is that some non-state entities may have personality and some of 
them may participate in law-making without any connection of one to the other. Third view is the 
`classical understanding'. Accordingly, having full legal personality means an entitlement to participate in 
the process of law creation. Lastly, the participation in the creation of international customary law is an 
indica of personality (Lindblom, Anna-Karin, The Legal Status of Non-Governmental Organisations in 
International Law, Uppsala Universitet: Sweden, 2001, p. 81). On the same issue, see Nijman, J. E., The 
concept of international personality, T. M. C. Asser Press: The Hague, 2004 
291 Lindblom (2001) chapter 3.2.5 
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of the Cold War, in particular in the areas of human rights and the environment can be 
observed. 292 NGOs have for example taken part in international conferences, monitor 
the implementation of treaties, provide expert advice to the UN commissions and 
committees, bring knowledge and information into the decision making process, raise 
new issues and concerns and contribute to a broad consensus-process. It can also be 
added that NGOs have obtained "consultative" and "observer" status not only within the 
UN system but also within the institutional framework of other international 
organisations, such as the EU, the OECD and the Atomic Energy Agency. 
Despite their expending participation in international affairs, however, the legal status 
of NGOs in international law is far from being established. 
293 This section first 
examines the capacity of NGOs as "law makers" in the process of creating 
`international treaty' and `custom', two principal sources of international law. It then 
discusses whether their increasing involvement in the policy, decision and law making 
and implementation processes has improved the international legal status of NGOs 
significantly. 
An international treaty (or conventions, as worded in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
ICJ294) is defined "for the purposes of the Convention" by Article 2(1) of the 1969 
Vienna Convention, as "an international agreement concluded between States in written 
form and governed by international law (... )". This definition, without doubt, excludes 
292 Charnovitz, Steve, Two centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 Michigan 
Journal of International Law (1997) p. 185 
293 In fact, not only their legal status, but the definition and functions of NGOs are also contradictory. For 
some writers, the term NGO describes most organisations, which are not governmental including lobby 
organisations, trade unions and MNEs. For some others, the term only includes private non-profit 
organisations with societal concerns. According to Malanczuk, for instance, the International Chamber of 
Commerce is a NGO. He even goes further claiming that MNEs can under certain aspects be seen as 
NGOs (Malanczuk, 1997, p. 97). Unlike Malanczuk, Santos recognises a contrariety between NGOs and 
MNEs. According to Santos, "there is some evidence that transnational NGOs represent for the agendas 
of subaltern cosmopolitanism and common heritage of humankind what the TNCs represent for the 
agendas of localized globalism and globalized localism" (Santos, 2002, p. 186). Santos furthermore 
observes that "the new prominence of transnational advocacy NGOs is connected with recent trends in the 
world system and in particular with the collapse of Communist regimes, the exhaustion of command- 
economy development models, the antistatist ideology associated with neo-liberal economic policy and 
crisis of the public sector in many states, the globalization of the economy, the political culture of neo- 
communitarianism and the new communication and information system" (ibid. p. 185). For further 
discussions on NGOs, see, among others, Cohen, Robin and Rai Shirin (eds. ), Global Social Movements, 
The Athlone Press: London, 2000; Dunne, Tim and Nicholas Wheeler (eds. ), human Rights in Global 
Politics, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1999. 
294 Article 38(a) provides: "international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states" 
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all entities but states. 
295 Hence, NGOs do not have the capacity to enter international 
treaties with states, nor can agreements made by NGOs be governed 
by international 
law. The only exception of this is "the International Committee of the 
Red Cross 
(ICRC)", which is a sui generis entity rather than a NGO. ICRC has been entitled to the 
legal status to be a party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 
its Additional 






On the other hand, agreements between inter-governmental and non-governmental 
organisations, which may sometimes be named "memoranda of understanding" or 
"partnership of agreements", or "letters of understanding" seem to be more favourable 
regarding the question of the recognition of NGOs as possessing some 
degree of 
international legal personality. In parallel with the increasing role of international 
organisations and their co-operations with NGOs especially within the framework of the 
UN, a need to regulate this relationship has emerged. 
296 Nevertheless, at this stage it 
would go too far to claim that these agreements, which sometimes may refer to 
`international law' or `general principles of law' as the applicable law in case of 
disagreement, elevate the NGOs in question to the status of international legal person. 
297 
The position of NGOs in contributing to the creation of customary international law is 
more complicated, mainly due to the inherently indefinite nature of custom. Article 
38(b) provides "(The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply) international custom, 
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law". Thus, the constitutive elements of 
international customary law are (i) general practice (a material element), (ii) "accepted 
295 Yet, despite the restricted wording of the Article 2(l) of the Convention, there is no doubt that 
international organisations have the capacity to enter into international treaties. The "Convention on the 
Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations" 
makes this point clear even though the convention has not yet entered into force as of 2003 (The 
Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between 
International Organizations -The text is reproduced in International Legal Material, 25,1986, p. 543. 
592). Besides, the advisory opinion given by the ICJ in the Reparation for Injures case also endorses the 
legal capacity of international organisations to enter into international treaties (Reparation for Injures 
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (1949) ICJ, Rep. 174). 
296 For more details on different kinds of agreements concluded between international organisations and 
NGOs, see Lindblom (2001) chapter 9.3 
297 For a somewhat different view, see Van Iiecke, G. "Contracts between International Organizations and 
Private Law Persons" in Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Vol. 1,1992, p. 812 
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as law" (a psychological element - opinio juris). Although the article does not explicitly 
say state practice, there is no room to doubt that the article refers exclusively to the 
practices of `states and not any other entities'. For, when Article 38 was formulated (the 
Court began work in 1946, when it replaced the "Permanent Court of International 
Justice", which was founded in 1922) only states, were recognised as subjects of 
international law (and to a far limited extent the UN). Thus, customary international law 
develops from the practice of states and not to the practice of non-state entities. 98 
Indeed, in the Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta) case, the ICJ clearly stated that "the 
substance of customary international law must be looked for primarily in the actual 




On the other hand, it can be said that the practice of non-state entities may be used as 
evidence of an existing customary law. However, this point should not be exaggerated 
in favour of the possible involvement of NGOs informing customary international law. 
Because what is searched is the evidence of actual state practice and it can be found in a 
variety of primary and secondary source materials: records of a state's foreign relations 
and diplomatic practices; legislation concerning a country's international obligations; 
resolutions, declarations, and legislative acts of intergovernmental organisations; 
yearbooks of states and of intergovernmental organisations; or even opinion published 
in a newspaper. 300 
Of course, pointing out the increasing level of institutional involvement of NGOs in the 
formulation and implementation of international legal norms and policy, it might be 
claimed that international law is not static but a dynamic process and the "sources 
approach" does not reflect the reality of today. Within the institutional framework of the 
UN, based on Article 71 of the UN Charter and ECOSOC resolution 1996/31, NGOs 
29s To international lawyers, ̀ the practice of states' means official governmental conduct reflected in a 
variety of acts, including official statements at international conferences and in diplomatic exchanges, 
formal instructions to diplomatic agents, national court decisions, legislative measures or other actions 
taken by governments to deal with matters of international concern. " (Murphy, Tom Buergenthal, Public 
International Law in a Nutshell, Sweet & Maxwell: UK, 2002, p. 22) 
299 ICJ Rep. 1985,29 
300 Higgins (2001) p. 22. See also Malanczuk (1997) p. 39-41 and Van Hoof (1983). By the same token, 
the votes and views of states in international organisations may have a legal significance as evidence of 
customary law. The International Law Commission stated, "Record of the cumulative practice of 
international organisations may be regarded as evidence of customary international law with reference to 
states' relations to the organisations". International organisations may even be the cause of the creation of 
a new customary law (Yearbook of the ILC, 1950, Vol. 11, p. 368). 
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are allowed to participate in international affairs mainly in the following four ways: a 
NGO (i) may request accreditation for a special UN conference, 
30' (ii) establish 
working relations with special bodies of the UN, 
302 (iii) associate itself with the UN 
Department of Information, (iv) lastly and arguably most importantly, a NGO can ask 
for consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC). 
303 
Yet, as Aston holds, even the `general consultative status', which is the most privileged 
among three different types of status, allows a limited NGO participation. 
304 Besides, 
within the UN framework, as Charnovitz observes, NGO involvement is uneven. NGOs 
have no established role in some of the most influential special international financial 
301 The UN Conference on Environment and Development held in 1992 is a well-known example for such 
participation. The "non-binding action plan on environment and development", also known as Agenda 21, 
proclaimed the "partnership role" of NGOs, which have subsequently been given a place in the UN 
Commission on Sustainable Development. 
302 For instance, NGOs have access as petitioners or counsel to petitioners to six human rights 
committees, which have been established to monitor the implementation of the principal human right 
treaties within the UN context. These six committees and the status of NGOs are as follows: 
The Human Rights Committee: there is no provision on the NGO participation but only an established 
practice. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which is a subsidiary body of 
ECOSOC: the Committee adopted a procedure regarding the NGO participation in 1993, which was 
supplemented in 2000 (E/1994123, Report of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
1993, para. 354, E/C. 12/1993/WP. 14, NGO Participation in activities of the Committee on ESCR, 12 May 
1993, and E/C. 12/2000/6, Substantive issues, 7 July 2000). Accordingly, NGOs are allowed to be a part 
of general discussion on a State report and draft general comment on it. The Committee against Torture: 
According to Rule 62(1) of the Committee's Rules of Procedure, the Committee may invite a relevant 
NGO in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council to submit to it information, 
documentation and written statements (CAT/C/3/Rev. 3, Rules of Procedure, 13 July 1998). The 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: The Rules of Procedure of the 
Committee provides a general provision on the NGO participation. Accordingly, representatives of NGOs 
may be invited by the Committee to make oral or written statements and to provide information or 
documentation. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Although there is no specific 
provision on the NGO participation, in 1991 the Committee decided to receive information from all 
available sources including NGOs (Decision 1 (XL) of 13 August 1991, A/46/18, Report of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 1992, p. 104). The Committee on the Rights of the 
Child: Despite the lack of a complain mechanism in or connected to the Convention, the Committee has 
the right to use NGOs as technical or expert adviser on the basis of Article 45 of the international 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. For a complete account for the NGO participation in the UN treaty 
bodies, see Lindblom (2001) p. 366-376. 
303 Since 1946, where the consultative status for NGOs was first introduced, the number of accredited 
NGOs has increased from 41 to 2719. The consultative relationship with ECOSOC is governed today by 
ECOSOC resolution 1996/31. The resolution outlines the eligibility requirements for consultative status, 
rights and obligations of NGOs in consultative status, procedures for the withdrawal or suspension of 
consultative status, the role and functions of the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs, and the responsibilities 
of the UN Secretariat in supporting the consultative relationship. Consultative status is granted by 
ECOSOC upon recommendation of the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs, which is comprised of 19 
Member States (http: //www. un. or¬, /esalcoordination/ngo) 
304 Aston, Daniel, Jurij, The United Nations Committee on Non-governmental Organizations, 12 
European Journal of International Law (2001) 5 
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and trade organisations, such as the IMF and the WTO. 
305 It can be said that this is 
mainly due to fact that the involvement of NGOs strictly depends upon the needs and 
policy preferences of states in any given area. 
306 
To be sure, outside the institutional framework of the UN, there are `regional' 
progresses, though comparatively more limited, in the codification of the legal 
personality of NGOs. The noteworthy developments are: guidelines, adopted by the 
Permanent Council of the Charter of the Organisation of American States (OAS) in 
1999 to set up a framework for the participation of civil society organizations within 
OAS activities. 307 Similarly, Chapter XIII of the Rules of Procedure of the African 
Commission, dated 1995, contains rules to regulate relations between the African 
Commission and NGOs. Accordingly, NGOs can be granted observer status under the 
Rule 75. 
The most far-reaching development in this regard is the "European Convention on the 
Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental 
Organizations", which is the only international agreement on NGOs to date. 308 It is 
signed by eight countries and has been in force since 1991. The Convention is open 
only to those `international' NGOs, which have been established under the national law 
of one of the state parties to the convention. They must have their statutory office and 
central headquarters in the territory of one of the state party and operate in at least two 
states. But this is, hardly a convention that enables NGOs to have an international 
personality in that the convention places NGOs on the same basis as national 
associations in their host country. 309 In other words, NGOs are essentially governed by 
the law of the state in which they are incorporated even though the convention provides 
some reciprocal recognition of the legal personality of such NGOs between state parties. 
305 Charnovitz (1997) p. 279 
306 The WTO Agreement can be given as an example of such subjection: Article (V)2 of the Agreement 
Establishing the WTO (15 April 1994) states that the WTO General Council "may make appropriate 
arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with 
matters related to those of the WTO". 
307 CPIRES. 759 (December, 1999) 
308 Convention 124. http: //www. coe. int/T/E/NGO/public/Convention_ 124 
309 Merle, Marcel, International Non-governmental Organizations and Their Legal Status, report 
presented to the "Colloquy on the role of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 
contemporary society" (Strasbourg, February 1983), available at http: //www. uia. org/legal/app35. php. 
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NGOs have gained some legal recognition at the international level. However, the 
existing international regulations regarding NGOs participation mostly 
involve NGOs 
relationship with international organisations rather than setting standards 
for, rights and 
duties of NGOs under international law. To put it differently, despite the fact that 
NGOs 
increasingly co-operate and participate in the policy, decision and law making process 
in international arena, NGO participation is essentially informal and derivative. 
Especially their direct participation is mostly within the framework of soft law 
development and their involvement depends on governmental preference and 
disposition. In conclusion, there is no general recognition by the international 
community of states that de facto participation of NGOs in international affairs conveys 
NGOs the status of international legal personality. 
3.7.2 Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) 
The international legal status of MNEs310 has doubtless been a subject of much more 
ardent debates than that of NGOs, due to their important role in the globalisation 
process. 311 Moreover, it is said, in addition to their growing influence on international 
310 A MNE can be defined as "an enterprise that engages in foreign direct investment (FDI) and that owns 
or controls value-added activities in more than one country" (Spero, J. E. And Hart, J. A.; The Politics of 
International Economic Relations, Routledge: New York, 2000, p. 96). Multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
are also named as `multinational corporations' (MNCs), 'transnational corporations' (TNCs), and 
`transnational enterprises' (TNEs). The UN favours the term TNC making a distinction between 
"enterprises owned and controlled by entities or persons from one country but operating across national 
borders -the transnational and those owned and controlled by entities or persons from more than one 
country -the multinational- (Muchlinski, 1999, p. 13). In the present study, however, the term enterprise 
is preferred to corporation given that "it avoids restricting the object of study to incorporated business 
entities and to corporate groups based on parent-subsidiary relations alone" (Muchlinski, 1999, p. 12). 
Unlike many other scholars, Hirst and Thompson do not use the terms MNC and TNC interchangeably 
nor attribute they a difference to these two terms in line with the UN. Objecting to globalisation as a 
`new' phenomenon, they argue that genuine TNCs appear to be relatively rare. "Most companies are 
nationally based and trade multinationally on the strength of a major national location of production and 
sales". According to the writers, TNCs are genuine footloose capital, "without specific national 
identification and with internationalized management, and at least potentially willing to locate and 
relocate anywhere in the globe to obtain either the most secure or the highest returns. Thus the TNCs, 
unlike the MNCs, could no longer be controlled or even constrained by the policies of particular national 
states. " (Hirst, P. And Thompson, G., Globalization in Question, Polity Press: Cambridge, 1999, p. 11) 
Interesting to note, while the UN still used the term MNC, before changing it to `TNC', Aron Broches, 
"the founding father of International Center for Investment Disputes ( ICSID)" disapproved the term 
MNCs on the ground that the term `multinational corporations' was used "almost interchangeably with 
large U. S. corporations" (Broches, Aron, Selected Essays, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 1995, 
p. 517). 
311 1999 World Investment Report of UNCTD depicts this role as following: "TNCs are one of the 
principle drivers of globalization. They are also seen to be most important beneficiaries of the 
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economy, MNEs have become active participants in international law making and 
implementation processes. Accordingly, in view of the need of a close conformity of 
international law to the changing realities in the international system, MNEs should be 
integrated into the international normative order. 
Although recent discussions on the international legal personality of MNEs are mostly 
related to their "driving" role in the globalisation process, the issue of the international 
legal status of MNEs is hardly new. Historically, aiming to find a legal basis to 
guarantee the flow of natural resources to the former colonial powers during the early 
post-colonial period, it is claimed that public international law should govern the so- 
called internationalised contracts. 312 Despite the decision of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ), which states that "Any contract, which is not a contract 
between states (... ) is based on the municipal law of some country", 313 and several UN 
General Assembly resolutions, 314 some scholars and arbitrators argued that MNEs had 
rights under international law arising out of such contracts. The purpose of making 
international law (instead of `national' law) the basis of "internationalised contracts" 
("international state contracts") was to elevate the legal status of these contracts to 
international treaties made between states. Indeed, Professor Dupuy, the arbitrator in the 
Texaco case, claimed that "it does not seem that one can establish a distinction between 
liberalization of investment and trade regimes, with rising influence on the development of the world 
economy and its constituent parts" (p. 345). 
312 An "internationalised contract' is defined as "an agreement made between a state and a foreign 
corporation which has been placed under international law, general principles of law or only under the 
provision of the contract itself aiming to protect foreign investment, mainly against nationalisation" 
(Leboulanger, Philippe, Les Contrats Entre Etats Et Entreprises ttrangdres, Economia: Paris, 1985, p. 
206). This type of contracts is sometimes named transnational investment agreement. It refers to "legal 
relationships, whereby a state, generally a Third World Country (Italic added), or a state enterprise enter 
into an agreement with a foreign investor, usually a transnational company for the purpose of an 
investment project" (Wolfgang, Peter, Arbitration and Renegotiation of International Investment 
Agreements, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 1995, p. 5). For a detailed review on 
"internationalised contracts" see also Muchlinski (1999) especially pages between 494-501 and two 
outstanding works of Sornarajah: (Sornarajah, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004; and International Commercial Arbitration, Longman: 
Singapore, 1990). 
313 Ruled by the Permanent Court of International Justice, the precursor of the current International Court 
of Justice, in the Serbian and Brazilian Loans Case (1929) PCIJ Rep. Series A, No. 20/21, cited in 
Muchlinski, 1999, p. 493). 
314 To mention a few: resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources of 14 
December 1962; Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 12 December 1974 
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a treaty and an international contract". 315 By equating an international contract with an 
international treaty it is intended to provide increased security for foreign investment, 
making the state party to an internationalised contract responsible under public 
international law. 
According to Friedmann, MNEs should acquire "a limited ad hoc subjectivity to the 
extent that their transactions are controlled by the norms of public rather than private 
international law". 316 In other words, at least a `limited subjectivity' is necessary for 
MNEs so that state contracts can be treated under international law. It is nonetheless 
highly questionable whether the so-called "internationalised contracts" give MNEs 
rights and/or duties under international law, which is a pre-condition to determine 
whether an entity has international personality. Even in cases, where the state party to 
an "international state contract" intends to recognise the rights of MNEs under 
international law, there is little support endorsing the idea that such an intention might 
be sufficient to create such a result. As Abi-Saab observes; "The intention to submit a 
contract to international law is not sufficient by itself to produce this result if one of the 
parties is not subject to this legal system and consequently cannot reach or act on the 
international legal level". 317 In any case, arbitral awards should be considered as 
carrying little weight as a proof for the argument that MNEs are granted international 
personality. Considering that even the decisions of the International Court of Justice 
constitute only "subsidiary means" of public international law, it would hardly be 
possible to attribute to arbitral awards an authority to create new norms or 
personalities. 318 
There are more recent developments in the field of international investment that 
challenge "states only approach" of the state-centric paradigm. Unlike the previous 
international legal rules concerning the protection of foreign investment, according to 
which only host and home states had legal standing and not the investor (i. e., MNEs), 
315 Texaco Case (1977) 53 ILR, para. 66 
316 Friedmann, 1964, p. 223 
317 Abi-Saab, The International Law of Multinational Corporations: A Critique of American Legal Doctrines, Annals of International Studies, 1971, p. 97 
318 Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states that "the decision of the Court has 
no binding force except between the parties and in respect of particular case". On the other hand, judicial decisions and arbitral decisions can be evidence of customary law. On the subject, see Malanczuk (1997) 
p. 51; Shaw (1997) p. 86; Cassese (2001) p. 152 
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related to the efforts to promote free markets and protect the rights of capital 
in the 
globalisation process, investors have gained new legal grounds through multilateral and 
bilateral investment agreements. In addition to the contributions of diverse international 
organisations in the field of investment protection, such as the World Bank's 
"Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency" (MIGA), 319 the WTO's "Trade-related 
Aspects of Investment Measures" (TRIMs), and the IMF's "conditionality", 
320 MNEs 
have also obtained the status of international locus standi before international tribunals 
"(through) the extension of direct treaty-based dispute settlement rights to investors, 
allowing them to use international dispute settlement, procedures against the host 
State". 321 Indeed, over 900 of the currently existing 1100 bilateral treaties on investment 
provide for disputes to be settled by the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), established by an international convention. 322 As 
Braithwaite and Drahos point out, the ICSID has an increasing influence on the 
development of a globalised international investment law "through a degree of 
institutional centralization of the case law". 323 
319 MIGA is "a multilateral risk mitigator, promoting foreign direct investment into developing countries" 
through protecting foreign investors by issuing guarantees, including co-insurance and re-insurance 
against non-commercial risks (http: //www. miga. org). 
320 As Alvarez notes, Although the IMF is not often recognised as part of the more formal treaty regimes 
governing foreign investment, IMF conditionality may function as another mechanism intended to ensure 
that foreign investors are compensated if expropriated, face no discrimination relative to national 
investors, enjoy rights to fair and equitable treatment, etc. (International Organizations as Law-makers, 
Alvarez, Jose, E., Oxford University Press: New York, 2005, p. 243). 
321 "First Report" of International Law Association (ILA) on International Law on Foreign Investment, 
Toronto Conference (2006), available at http: //www. ila- 
j örg/pdf/Foreign%20lnvestment/Draft%20Report%202006. pdf 
322 http: //www. worldbank. orgJicsid/treaties/intro. htni. ICSID was established in 1966 as an autonomous 
international organisation under the auspicious of the World Bank group on the basis of The Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States and signed up by 
155 states and, as of January 25,2006, ratified by 143 states (http: //www. worldbank. org/icsid/constate/c- 
states-en. htm). The main purpose of the ICSID is to resolve investment disputes arising from contracts 
between States and MNEs bearing the nationality of another country than the state party to an 
international contract. On the ICSID, among others, see Broches, Aron, Selected Essays, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers: Dordrecht, 1995; Baker, James, Foreign Direct Investment in Less Developed Countries: The 
Role of ICSID and MIGA, Quorum Books: London, 1999, and Muchlinski (1999) 
323 Braithwaite, John and Drahos, Peter, Global Business Regulation, Cambridge University Press: the 
UK, 2001, p. 183. 
The Treaty of the European Economic Community could be another example for the locus standi status of 
MNEs. According to Articles 173(2) and 175(3) of this Treaty, enterprises, likewise individuals can bring 
claims before the Court of Justice of the European Union. However, some scholars question the 
appropriateness of this example. Malanczuk, for instance, holds that the EU is "almost a hybrid between 
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There can be found several objections to the argument that MNEs may acquire some 
degree of international personality as holders of rights under investment treaties. First of 
all, in such treaty-based investment agreements, the nature of the host state's obligation 
is ambiguous. 324 For, the contracting party to an international treaty is not MNEs but the 
home state(s) of the MNEs. Thus, it can be maintained that the host country is under a 
treaty obligation to the home state and not to MNEs. 325 Besides, even such treaties are 
at the discretion of the host state, they do not confer international personality on the 
foreign enterprises. Since the status of international personality requires the general 
acceptance of the community of states, a bilateral elevation of the status of a MNE only 
by the host and home states would interfere with the rights of other states, not least 
because bilateral treaties are the outcome of bargaining capacity of individual state. 
A further area to be discussed relates to the issue of international legal personality of 
MNEs is whether MNEs may acquire a degree of international personality as holders of 
obligations under international standards. As it is a well-known fact, there are no many 
international instruments, which impose obligations directly on MNEs. The 
international instruments that set standards for MNEs' conduct, such as the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, are legally non binding. 326 There are also those 
instruments embodying the so-called corporate social responsibility standards adopted 
by various public, public-private hybrid or private organisations, including MNEs 
themselves. However they may be deemed significant and efficient, there is no general 
consensus on whether these corporate codes of conduct should be classified even as soft 
law. Hence, it would hardly be convincing to claim that international personality may 
emanate from the voluntary/non-binding obligations of MNEs, embodied in soft law 
instruments or `soft' standards whose legal nature is itself far from being established. 
international law and federal law" and therefore is not an appropriate example for the progress made in 
this area (Malanczuk, 1997, p. 101). 
324 ILA report (2006), p. 5 
325 For a contrasting view on the subject, see Douglas, Zachary, The Ilybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 The British Yearbook of International Law (2004). 
326 The now abandoned "Draft UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporation" was the one of the 
earliest examples of `non-binding' public international instruments on the issue of MNEs responsibility. 
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The increasing participation of MNEs in international policy making is another 
commonly invoked evidence to demonstrate why MNEs should be regarded as new 
subjects of international law. If policy is defined as "the substance of political 
programmes which different groups put forward to shape the social environment"327 
and then no one can doubt that MNEs actively involve in shaping the "substance of 
political programmes" in many policy issue areas. The form of their influence and 
participation may vary. They can be direct participants of a policy- making process, 
such as being part of national delegations, or they may exercise indirect influence on 
policy makers, as in the examples of lobbying activities at national and international 
level328 and awarding research grants within universities and other public institutions. 
329 
The negotiation process of the Multilateral Investment Agreement (MAI) is perhaps one 
of the best present-day indications of the increasing direct influence of MNEs on the 
international policy-making process. Fuelled by "shifts. towards liberalization, 
privatization and the recognition of the utility of inward direct investment by TNCs as a 
source of capital and technology", 330 the MAI agenda was initially shaped by American 
327 Coker, Christopher, Outsourcing War in "Non-State Actors in World Politics", Josselin, Daphnd and 
Wallace, William (eds. ), Palgrave: UK, 2001, p. 192. 
On the other hand, compared to business' privileged position, which is a lasting consequence of liberal 
ideology about business-state partnership at the national level, NGOs have limited possibility to access to 
the agenda setting process. Furthermore, it can be said that many NGOs are depended at least in part on 
the state for funding their activities. Nonetheless, NGOs may have been successfully influential on 
negotiations, as the MAI process has proved, at international level and (mainly thanks to electoral 
pressure) on ratification process at national level of international agreements. 
328 According to Rowlands, in the field of environment, MNEs often lobby policy makers in their `home 
country' in order to increase the chance that their preferences will be reflected in international 
environmental agreements. "Having the 'home government' as a focus of lobbying attention often makes 
good sense: access to policy makers (e. g., regular private meetings, conversations at clubs, personal 
contacts afforded by former employees, etc) may already exist from other issues; and policy makers may 
well want to 'please' the TNCs" (Rowlands, Ian, H. Transnational Corporations and Global 
Environmental Politics in Josselin and Wallace (2001) p. 138. Muchlinski also examines the role of 
MNEs as lobbyist as a part of his empirical enquiry in the generation of national and multilateral 
regulatory regimes (Muchlinski, Peter, 'Global Bukowina' Examined: Viewing the Multinational 
Enterprises as a Transnational Law-Making Community in Teubner, Gunther (ed. ), "Global Law Without 
a State", Dartmouth: Aldershot: 1997). 
329 By way of research grants, MNEs may create a policy agenda or shape a ongoing policy discourse 
through "directing research within universities and other public institutions into areas that serve best its 
own ends" (Rowlands, 2001, p. 137). See also, Miller, M. A. I., The Third World in Global 
Environmental Politics, Open University Press: Buckingham, 1995 
330 Muchlinski, Peter, "A Brief History of Business Regulation" in Regulating International Business: 
Beyond Liberalizm, Picciotto, Sol and Mayne, Ruth (eds. ), Macmillan Press Ltd.: New York, 1999, p. 55 
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business to obtain a "charter for global business. "331 Through the Advisory Committee 
on Trade Policy Negotiations, the policy making institution in this area, in which 
US 
business was directly represented and the US Council for International Business, the 
MAI was put on the agenda of the OECD in order to make it multilateral. 
332 
The degree of business influence on and participation in , 
international policy making 
depends on several factors. According to Levy and Egan, enterprises are in general 
more influential at the domestic level than at the international level. This is the case in 
almost every country but it is even stronger in the United States. 
333 It is also argued that 
the degree of technical detail associated with the international negotiations is often 
correlated with the level of the MNEs influence. Indeed, the development of the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14000 family of environmental 
standards seems to support this explanation. During the lead-up to the 1992 Earth 
Summit, only 25 per cent of working group chairs of the so-called Technical Committee 
207, which was set up by the ISO, one of the participatory organisations of the summit, 
occupied by national standard-setting bodies. As Krut, R. and Gleckman observe, "Over 
half of the chairs are employees of transnational corporations (... ) Since these positions 
do not rotate, working groups chair may have the power to influence the outcome of the 
331 Walter, Andrew, Unravelling the Faustian Bargain: Non-State Actors and the Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment in Josselin and Wallace, 2001, p. 150. The US Council for International Business (USCIB) 
and the American affiliate of the International Chamber and Commerce, two leading business lobbies, 
urged for a new forum to start a `high standard' international investment regime (Ibid. p. 159) 
332 Walter (2001) p. 159. For further reading on the subject of MAI, see, among others, The Rise and Fall 
of the multilateral agreement on investment: Where Now?, Muchlinski, Peter, 2000 "The International 
Lawyer 34, p. 1033-1052; MAI: multilateral agreement on investment : national sovereignty for sale?, 
Kaur Plahe, Jagjit (ed. ), Forsyth, Jessie Wanyeki (co. ed. ), EcoNews Africa: Nairobi, 1999; "The 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the Review of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises", Huner, Jan, in Kamminga and Zia-Zarifi (2000); OECD's Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment: a Chinese perspective, Huiping, Chen, Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2001; 
Dismantling Democracy: the MAI and its impact, Jackson, A. and Sanger, M. (eds. ), Ottawa: Co- 
published by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and James Lorimer, 1998; The Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment: the MAI negotiation text, OECD: Paris, 1998; Fighting the Wrong Enemy: 
antiglobal activists and multinational, enterprises, Graham, M. Edward, Institute for International 
Economics: Washington, 2000 
333 Levy, D. L., and Egan, D., Capital Contests: national and transnational channels of corporate 
influence on the climate change negotiations, 26/3 "Politics & Society" 1998, p. 337-361. According to 
the writers, the reason for this different degree of influence in the USA lies in the tools: funding by 
political action committee, claiming the interests of `American competitiveness', etc. As Walter observes, 
the USA, having less complex institutional structure of policy making in the meaning that the key 
political institutions for agenda-setting, negotiation and ratification are based in Washington may further 
foster this difference (Walter, 2001, p. 156) 
126 
ISO standards in a way that could have competitive advantage for their firm or their 
country". 334 
The degree of formality and the intention of `binding' output of international 
negotiations are also consequential on the possibility of enterprises to influence 
international policy making: "Corporations have their greatest political influence on 
global environmental issues when there are no negotiations on a formal, binding 
international regime governing the issue. Under those circumstances, they are able to 
use their economic and political clout with individual governments and international 
organizations to protect their freedom to carry out economic activities damaging to the 
environment. " 335 
Yet, despite the above-given examples and possible many others, it can be claimed that 
MNEs are not even the most important determinant factor in international agenda 
setting. This is the case even in the fields such as economy and environment where they 
are `natural' partners of liberal state policies. It is a matter of fact that non-state 
participation in international policy making is still largely dependent on traditional 
interstate bargaining of multilateral, regional or bilateral treaties. As Josselin and 
Wallace conclude, states are still central in international policy making: "Global 
campaigning is unlikely to bring positive results unless at least some state actors (and 
preferably those' in the West) endorse the agenda of private organizations. The same 
state actors continue to formulate the policies (and often set the agenda) of international 
institutions". 336 
And perhaps more importantly, law-making process is not the same as public policy- 
making process even though they are closely related. Law- making is about setting out 
standards, procedures and principles, which must be followed. (Public) policy-making, 
on the other hand, refers to a venue in which the substance of a political programme and 
the goal that is intended to be achieved is outlined either through, institutionalised or 
non- institutionalised interaction between decision-makers and interest groups. It also 
includes the methods and principles that the policy-makers will use to achieve it. 
334 Krut, R. and Gleckman, H., ISO 14001: a Missed Opportunity for Sustainable Industrial Development, 
Earthscan: London, 1998, p. 55 
335 Porter, G. And Brown, J. W., Global Environmental Politics, Westview Press: Boulder, 1996, p. 63 
336 Josseline and Wallace (2001) p. 257 
127 
Another important difference is accountability. Law-making bodies, which rest on the 
constitutional power, are accountable to the public not only for the 
laws that are passed 
and but also how these laws are implemented while policy-making 
does not imply such 
accountability on all participants. 
337 
The discussion whether MNEs should be granted international personality and, if so, to 
what extent, displays highly ideological characteristics and therefore causes 
deep 
controversy. As noted earlier, the adherents of the "necessity" (or "sociological) 
approach argue for the recognition of non-state actors on the basis of the factual reality. 
According to this line of understanding, since MNEs have become most powerful actors 
on the international arena alongside states, and even more powerful than many states 
it 
would be unrealistic not to recognise this power in the legal domain as well. 
338 
Otherwise, it is argued, the continued viability of the international legal system, which 
depends upon the close conformity of public international law to international reality, 
would be put at stake. 339 
In fact, Friedmann used the `reality' argument already in the 1960s. He maintained that 
international law address itself to the realities of international life and, when 
appropriate, treat entities other than states as having rights and obligations under 
international law. 34° Likewise Ijalaye claims that "the international life now demand 
that private corporations should be accorded at least a partial subjectivity to 
337 For a more detailed description of policy-making process, see Kelly, Rita Mae, and Dennis J. 
Palumbo, "Theories of Policy Making", in Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, Hawkeworth, Mary 
and Maurice Kogan (eds)., Routledge: London, 1992 
338 This claim has been put forward by many scholars. Among others see, Korten, David, C., When 
Corporations Rule the World, Earthscan: London, 1997; Malanczuk (1997) p. 102; Spero and Hart (2000) 
p. 98. However, there are some others that regard this claim as "myth". Chandler, for instance, maintains 
that "the globalisation of the economy has shifted the relationship between governments and companies. 
But the myth that companies are more powerful than governments is still a myth and it is something that 
we should ensure remains a myth if we believe in democracy" (Chandler, Geoffrey, "Keynote Adress: 
Crafting a Human Rights Agenda for Business" in Addo, 1999, p. 40). 
339 Charney, Jonathan, I., Transnational Corporations and Developing Public International Law, Duke 
Law Journal, 1983: 748. 
Sao Friedmann (1964) p. 213-245. He also wrote elsewhere that "the evolution of international law has 
been overwhelmingly dependent upon the progressive adoption and modification of rules in response to 
changes international conditions (... ) corporations play an increasingly important and frequent part in 
international transactions to which states are parties, it is for the science of international law to interpret 
this phenomenon against the broader background of modem international economic activities" 
(Friedmann, The Changing Dimensions of International Law, 62 Columbia. Law Review (1962) cited in 
Charney 1983, p. 759). Nonetheless, Friedmann stressed that MNEs should not be endowed with 
international personality to the extent that international organisations have (Friedmann, 1964, p. 223). 
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international law in their effort to contribute to the most needed expansion or extension 
of the international economic law". 
341 More recently Cutler also argued that MNEs are 
"significant de facto subjects of law, notwithstanding their analytical status as `objects' 
and not `subjects' of law and their theoretical insignificance or `invisibility' under 
international law". 342 The writer further claims that de jure insignificance of MNEs and 
their de facto significance cause the growing disjunction between theory and practice, 
between international law and society to the extent that international law has ceased to 
mirror the changing reality and social forces. 
343 
Another explanation as to why MNEs should be given some degree of international 
personality is offered on the basis that MNEs actually benefit from their international 
non-status. According to this argument, the non-status "immunizes them from direct 
accountability to international legal norms and permits them to use sympathetic national 
governments to parry outside efforts to mould their behaviour". 344 Moreover, it is also 
said that the international legal personality of MNEs is important in terms of an 
effective human rights protection. "Just as individuals can be seen as legal subjects, and 
therefore can be held accountable for violation of certain human rights, MNEs should be 
able to". 345 
Of course, there are also arguments against the greater participation of MNEs in 
international law making. Accordingly, in the absence of a binding international 
341 Ijalaye, David Adedayo, The Extension of Corporate Personality in International Law, Oceana 
Publications: New York, 1978, p. 245 
342 Cutler, Claire, A., Private Power and Global Authority, Cambridge University Press: New York, 2003, 
p" 21 
343 Ibid. p. 249. As a first objection to Cutler's approach, it can be said that this issue should be understood 
within a wider context and not only on the ground of MNEs' being `most significant economic players' 
and `the dominant private institutions of the world economy' but also on the ground of what one 
understands of the, meaning, utility and distinction of public-private spheres. It is true that law is not a 
self-sustaining and autonomous system and independent force from economic, political and social life. 
However, law creation process and forces are not only about a plain reflection of `reality' either. If it was 
so, what are the differences between law and other types of social, moral and political rules? And then 
again, what is the reality and why is it so? 
344 Charney (1983) p. 767 
345 Jägers (1999) p. 269. However, it should be recalled that individuals were seen capable of being guilty 
of crimes against international law, as the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals showed after the Second 
World war, but this did not inherently mean that individuals obtained a certain degree of international 
personality whereby they had any rights under international law. On the subject, see Human rights and 
multinationals: is there a problem?, Muchlinski, Peter, "International Affairs" 77,1 (2001) p. 31-47 and 
Malanczuk (1997) p. 100 
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business regulation and other necessary international mechanisms to cope with 
problems MNEs may cause, a greater participation of MNEs would only give them a 
further expended political influence, which would basically be disproportional to the 
power they have already obtained. 
In the end, regardless of what view might be held concerning the international 
personality of MNEs, the discussion is also about an ideological standing and not purely 
technical or theoretical. Muchlinski observes, "No account of concern over MNEs 
would be complete without an awareness of ideological positions in the field of political 
economy". 346 As Cox states, "all theories are for someone and for some purpose". 347 
In conclusion, it is true that MNEs have become major actors in many issue areas, from 
international economy to human rights and environment. It is also true that the role of 
MNEs cannot be considered as limited to only policy making and the capacity of 
making legal claims before international arbitration tribunals. Evidently they exercise 
considerable influence on even law creation process. However, international legal 
personality is more than barely participation in law making process; 348 it is also the 
acceptance of international legal order, which today still means the law creating 
practices of sovereign states. There is not sufficient evidence supporting the view that 
non-state entities have obtained an autonomous participation in international law 
making. MNEs and all other non-state entities as the bearers of international rights and 
obligations and their role within the process of international rule making is not 
autonomous but through state consent, which is still explicable within the framework of 
the `traditional paradigm' of international law making. 
3.8 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has argued that the state-centrism was the leading paradigm in international 
economic law in the post-war period until the end of the 1980s. It has also been 
346 Muchlinski (1999) p. 8 
3" Cox, Robert, Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory in 
"Approaches to World Order", Cox, Robert and Sinclair, Timothy, J. (eds. ), Cambridge University Press: 
New York, 1996, p. 87 
348 Van Hoof, G. J. H., Rethinking the Sources of International Law, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers: Deventer, 1983, p . 63 
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demonstrated that international economic soft law in this period had two main sources: 
the process of the restructuring of the post-war national economy through the 
institutions of the Bretton Woods and the discrepancy between economic power and the 
majority's voting power within the framework of international organisations centred on 
the UN system. 
It is further argued in this chapter that the state-centric paradigm has been replaced in 
the globalisation process by a dual `globalist' paradigm as a result of a global power 
shift that has taken place particularly since the end of the Cold War. This currently 
dominant globalist paradigm is mainly associated with a retreat of the state from the 
economy -deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation of both domestic and 
international economy as well as the rise of non-state actors and transnational market 
forces with the globalisation of liberalism. However, as been demonstrated in this 
chapter, the constitutional foundations of this informal non-state legal order have been 
dictated and governed by international economic institutions mainly controlled by 
powerful states. Therefore, the chapter concludes that the globalist paradigm displays a 
dual character. On the one hand, the globalist paradigm embraces the deformalisation of 
international law, which refers to the increasing management of the world's affairs by 
formal/informal, legal/non-legal soft law and standards, private dispute-settlement as 
well as flexible and informal non-territorial networks. On the other hand, it entails a re- 
forming (or `legalisation') process, which mainly takes the form of institutionalisation 
of neo-liberal principles associated with globalisation through bilateral and multilateral 
agreements and institutions. 
Lastly, it has been argued in the chapter that although non-state actors have increasingly 
been influential on international law making multiple platforms and obtaining different 
status, it can hardly be maintained that these activities have elevated non-state actors to 
the status of new subjects of international law. It has also been shown that in those 
examples, where non-state actors have obtained a limited degree of the status of subject 
of international law, they have been derivative subjects. 
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4 GLOBALISATION AND PARADIGM SHIFT: A NEW 
CONTEXT FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
SOFT LAW 
4.1 Introduction 
In recent years debates surrounding soft law have intensified and gained new 
dimensions. It is increasingly held that although international law is traditionally 
defined as the law governing states, in the process of globalisation, the nation state has 
lost its exclusive position on international scene. On the other hand this process has 
endorsed the rise of non-state actors and increased their impact on the definition, nature 
and function of international law. Therefore, according to this understanding, one of the 
most significant consequences of the proliferation of the non-state actors has been the 
reassessment of the traditional sources of international law including the challenge to 
accepted modes of international norm creation. 349 It is said, in certain areas of 
international law, most notably, international economy, environment and human rights, 
this traditional state-centred international law and public notions of authority are being 
combined with or, in some cases, superseded by non-state law, informal normative 
structures, and private economic power and authority. 350 As this storyline goes, 
globalisation has created gaps in the formally valid legal order through detaching state 
and law and eroding the public/private distinction. In response to the needs of the new 
social, economic and legal formations emerged as a result of globalisation, there is, it is 
claimed, an apparent need for international law to accommodate itself to the 
increasingly heterogeneous nature and pluralist character of subjects and sources of law. 
Correspondingly, it is maintained that international law should reflect the changing 
nature of state-private (market) relations through recognising non-state actors as the 
749 Redgwell, Catherine, "International Soft law and Globalization" in Regulating Energy and Natural 
Resources, Barton, Barry; Barrera-Hernandez, Lila; Lucas, Alastair; and Ronne, Anita (eds. ), Oxford 
University Press: Oxford (2006) p. 89 
350 Cutler (2003) p. 1 
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new participants (subjects) in law making and to interpret their acts as displaying 
highly 
`public' character as the new sources of international law. 
The purpose of this chapter is dual: (i) to identify social, technological and ideological 
circumstances that precipitate the examined paradigm shift that has changed our way of 
understanding and perception of `reality' and (ii) to examine our responses to that 
perception. The chapter describes the nature and roles of these circumstances within the 
context of the historical moment of the end of Cold War. 
Globalisation has generally been pointed out as the principal cause for the proliferation 
of formal, informal and hybrid soft law and institutionalisation, voluntary and self- 
regulatory codes of conduct and non-state dispute settlement, which are regarded to 
correspond with privatisation and deregulation and liberalisation of business activities. 
According to this account, it is argued that to meet the challenges of globalisation, 
international law needs more flexible, speedy, and pluralistic, i. e., public, non-state and 
hybrid, rule setting, dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms, including sub- 
states, supra-state, and transnational. Accordingly, only such a development could 
ensure the continuing relevancy of international law to the rapidly changing structure of 
international reality. Section 4.2 analyses the concept of `globalisation' as both a 
descriptive and prescriptive discourse that aims to map out the direction of societal 
developments towards the integration of international economy and establishment of 
free markets, which would allegedly lead the world to prosperity, liberal democracy and 
(perpetual) peace. Section 4.3 looks at the `inevitability' discourses in the context of 
technological and economic determinism that contributed to the advance of the 
legitimating rhetoric of the globalist paradigm. Section 4.4 examines the nature of the 
changes in state-market relations that have characterised globalisation and economic 
liberalism. Section 4.5 critically assesses the concept of global governance describing it 
as an integral part of the dominant neo-liberal discourse that "provides a guide for 
action" to both deregulate and re-regulate international politics through decentralising 
and de-legitimising `government' and promoting a new "global public policy network" 
consists of MNEs, NGOs and international organisations. 
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4.2 Globalisation 
Nowadays, it has virtually become a truism to say that globalisation is a heavily loaded 
and vague concept. 
351 When the word is used descriptively, it often refers to "the rapid 
integration of economies worldwide through trade, financial flows, technology 
spillovers, information networks, and cross-cultural currents". 
352 It is mostly associated 
with recent changes in international as well as domestic life, such as the demise of 
nation-state, liberalisation of trade and capital movements, technological developments, 
the introduction of the "information age", and the emergence of "network society". For 
some, on the other hand, the word globalisation means a euphemism for Western 
imperialism. Similarly, many consider globalisation as a qualitatively new and 
inevitable process while some others see nothing substantially new in globalisation but 
a further stage of capitalism in which nation-states still are the vital agents of world 
economy/politics. 
It is fairly common to examine these competing interpretations of globalisation in three 
broad categories: (i) strong globalisation, (ii) weak globalisation, and (iii) globalisation 
scepticism. 353 The interpretations that can be considered in the first category generally 
35' Many consider the concept of globalisation as ideological, catchword or buzzword and therefore do 
not see it as very useful for analytic purposes. On the other hand, writers such as Therborn and Giddens 
assert that the concept meets the necessary criteria to be considered as a functional concept of social 
theory. Therborn lists his three criteria as follows: It should have a precise meaning, preferably not a 
semantically arbitrary one; it should be useable in empirical investigations, and it should have a wide 
range of possible applications in the meaning that the concept should be abstract. On this basis, Therborn 
defines globalisation as "referring to tendencies towards a worldwide reach, impact, or coherence, of 
social phenomena, including a world-encompassing awareness among social actors" (Therborn, Göran, 
Introduction: The Atlantic Diagonal in the Labyrinths of Modernities and Globalizations in Globalization 
and Modernities, Therborn, Göran (ed. ), ForskningsrAdsnämnden: Stockholm, 1999, p. 31). In Giddens' 
definition, globalisation is virtually equated to the modernisation on a global scale. See The 
Consequences of Modernity (Giddens, Anthony, Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1990, p. 64). For 
further discussions on the value of globalisation as a theoretical concept, see Clark, Ian, Globalization 
and Fragmentation, Oxford University Press: New York, 1998, p. 16). 
352 See, http: //www. imf. org/extemal/pubs/weomay/OIoverv. htm. 
953 For similar categorisations, see, among others, Marks, Susan, The Riddle of all Constitutions, Oxford 
University Press: New York, 2003; Sutcliffe, Bob, "The Place of Development in Theories of Imperialism 
and Globalization" in Munck, Ronaldo & O'Hearn, Denis (eds. ), Critical Development Theory, Zed 
Books: London and New York, 1999; Gray, John, False Dawn: The Delusion of Global Capitalism, 
Granta Books: London, 2002. For another yet similar version of tripartite division ("hypergiobalists", 
"sceptics" and "transformationalists"), see Held, David; Goldblatt, Peter and Perraton, Jonathan (eds. ) 
Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Polity Press: London, 1999. Muchlinski 
makes another possible version of tripartite grouping: the globalists, the anti-globalists and the prophets 
of post-globalisation. The last group is further divided into two sub-groups. Accordingly, these two 
'protagonist' sub-groups, both, conceive globalisation as a reversible process, their explanations as to 
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hold that "the power of individual states has been reduced to be replaced by an 
overweening growth in the power of multinational companies and some international 
organizations, which form a proto-state at the international level". 
354 Keep in mind 
however that there are also different degrees to which adherents of this category see 
globalisation as an all-encompassing system. In its strongest version, globalisation 
represents a world system where capital is completely de-nationalised and 
differentiations such as ̀ centre' and `periphery' have become history. As a consequence 
any division based on the concept of nations is outmoded. Hence, as Marks remarks, in 
the liberal interpretation of strong globalisation, the ideas about "the end of the nation- 
state" and "the end of history" become one and the same thing. 
355 
In the so-called `weak globalisation', it is maintained that in the last three decades 
international economic transactions in the forms of investment and trade have 
accelerated to the extent that countries have become deeply interdependent. As a result, 
national governments have largely lost their power to control financial flows and it has 
increasingly become difficult, even impossible, to form economic policy on the national 
level. In this understanding of globalisation, the nation-state has indeed been weakened, 
fragmented, and sometimes even restructured but not disappeared or replaced by any 
other transnational political order. 356 
The arguments adhering to the global sceptic category have different forms and sources. 
Some scholars understand the recent changes commonly referred to as globalisation 
barely a new phase in the capitalist development, which embraces some new elements 
what may be the cause of the possible reversibility differs. Authors in the first group, like Samuel 
Huntington, stresses "clash of civilisations" while authors in the second group, like Lester Thurow, put 
forward regional economic and political blocs as the likely cause for such reversal (Muchlinski, Peter, 
Globalisation and Legal Research, 37 The International Lawyer [200311. p. 224). 
Keep in mind however that this very brief account of the threefold categorisation does not cover all 
nuances each category in fact displays. Nor is this categorisation the only possible analytical method of 
perceptions of globalisation. Scholte, for instance, distinguishes at least five different ways of conceiving 
of globalisation. They are ̀ internationalisation', ̀ liberalisation', `universalisation', `Westernisation', and 
finally 'deterritorilasation' (Scholte, Jan Aart, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, Palgrave: New 
York, 2000, p. 15). 
354 Sutcliffe (1999) p. 146. 
ass Marks, Susan, The Riddle of all Constitutions, Oxford University Press: New York (2003) p. 79 
356 Among numerous scholars and writers supporting the idea of weak globalisation from both liberal and 
left wings, see Snyder, Francis, Governing Economic Globalisation: Global Legal Pluralism and 
European Law, 5 European Law Journal (1999) 4; and Gilpin, Robert, Global Political Economy: 
Understanding International Economic Order, Princeton University Press: New Jersey (2001). 
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such as novelties in communication and transportation technologies, homogenisation 
("macdonalisation") of the world culture and the creation of a universal capitalist 
space. 357 According to this line of reasoning, globalisation basically means an increase 
in the power of Western (the North) capitalist countries through MNEs and international 
financial organisations. 358 Some other globalisation sceptics consider globalisation and 
especially globalisation of the world economy as mythical. Accordingly, transnational 
corporations, which are considered as the most salient and driven features of 
globalisation, are rare and the so-called global enterprises are still seen as deeply 
embedded in their respective countries. 
359 It is also said that while there has been a fast 
expansion of international economic transactions especially after the mid- I970s this has 
not yet reached unprecedented proportions relative to the overall size of the world 
economy. 360 
The periodisation and degree of globalisation is also much disputed. Many scholars, in 
particular those who show some degree of scepticism, tend to consider `present day 
globalisation' as a new phase of a long-term -historical process starting as early as 4`h 
century C. E. with the diffusion of world religions and the establishment of 
transcontinental civilisation 361 or late 15 ̀h century with European colonial conquests. 362 
3s' Boron, Atilio, A., "Globalization: A Latin American Perspective" in Therborn, Göran (ed. ), 
Globalizations and Modernilies, Forskningsradsnämnden: Stockholm, 1999. For a more hard-line 
approach, see Petras and Veltmeyer (2001). 
358 It is interesting to note that from left ideological spectrum the proponents of the 'strong globalisation' 
have often refused to regard the globalisation process as imperialism. As Sutcliffe points out one of the 
earliest formulations of strong globalisation labelled the process as "post-imperialism" (The term was 
used by Sklar, Richard, Postimperialism, a class analysis of multinational corporate expansions, 
Comparative Politics, 1976, October cited in Sutcliffe, 1999, p. 148). 
359 Zysman, John, The Myth of a "Global" Economy: Enduring National Foundations and Emerging 
Regional Realities, 1 New Political Economy (1996) 2; Doremus, Paul, N., Keller, W., Pauly, Louis and 
Reich, Simon, The Myth of the Global Corporation, Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1998; Hirst, 
Paul and Thompson, Grahame, Globalization in Question, Polity Press: UK, 1996. Hirst and Thompson 
are often considered as globalisation sceptics in view that they hold that enterprises are not of 
transnational character and nation-states play important roles in international economy. However, they 
explain their position in the introduction of their frequently cited book as challenging the strong version 
of the thesis of economic globalisation; but they do not see themselves as globalisation sceptic in every 
aspect of this concept. 
36° Sutcliffe (1999 p. 148). In the same vein, for a recent account of the relative comparison of world 
economy since the 1870s, see Hirst, Paul and Thompson, Grahame, The Limits to Economic 
Globalization, http: //www. polity. co. uk/global/pdf/GTReader2etirstThompson. pdf . For a general account of discussions on globalisation, see Scholte (2000). 
361 Therborn (1999) p. 33 
362 Waters, Malcom, Globalization, Routledge: London and New York (2001) 
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While according to some others, the last decades of the 19`h century with the growth of 
corporate monopolies, the territorial division of the world into colonies, the export of 
capital, 363 or after the World War 11 with economical, technological and political 
developments, associated with the Cold War. 364 On the other hand, most liberal writers 
(but not all) suggest that globalisation is essentially and qualitatively new phenomenon. 
According to this understanding, in the last decades a new world economy has emerged. 
The production of goods and services and especially financial markets have become 
transnationalised mainly due to technological developments, which have been either a 
determinant or facilitating factor (The role of technology in. globalisation is discussed in 
detail in the following section). While the views over the `periodisation' of globalisation 
are diverse, there seems to be a consensus on the fact that globalisation as a term has 
emerged only recently. According to Waters, the word was first used by The Economist 
in 1959 and entered into academic circulation in the end of the 1980s. 365 Scholars such 
as Holmen and Gilpin explicitly underline the fact that the term came into popular usage 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall and related to the significant increase in foreign direct 
investment by MNEs. 366 Friedman, on the other hand, contends that globalisation is the 
international system that has replaced the Cold-War system. 367 As Berndtson says, this 
approach makes globalisation a general metaphor that describes a new international 
system replacing the `old' world order existed till the end of the Cold War. 368 
Yet, no matter what view can be upheld on the genesis or novelty of globalisation, there 
is little room to doubt about the prescriptive and programmatic character of the "modern 
form" of globalisation. Its key features echo distinctly the neo-liberal view of societal 
development that prescribes maintaining fiscal discipline, liberalising finance and trade, 
363 Petras and Veltmeyer (2001) 
3' Bretherton, Charlotte and Ponton, Geoffery (eds. ), Global Politics: An Introduction, Oxford: USA 
(1996) 
365 Waters (2001) p. 2 
366 Holmen, Hans, Limits to Globalization, 5 European Review (1997) 1, p. 76; and Gilpin (2001) p. 6. 
Gilpin explained globalisation as a result of combination of the end of the Cold War (politics), novel 
technologies especially in transportation, computer and telecommunications and the shift from a state- 
dominated to a market-dominated international economy (Ibid. p. 8). 
36' Friedman, Thomas, L., The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Anchor Books: New York (2000) p. 42 
368 Bemdtson, Erkki, "Globalization as Americanization" in Goverde, H., Cerny, P. Haugaard, M. and 
Lentner, H (eds. ), Power in Contemporary Politics, Saga: London (2000) p. IS 8 
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abolishing barriers to foreign direct investment, privatising state-owned enterprises, 
reducing regulatory restrains on business and establishing a clear regime of property 
rights through international norm setting. Certainly all these may gain an `objective' 
dimension when taken together with the `historical fact' that Marx formulated some 150 
years ago as follows: "The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising 
the instrument of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the 
whole relations of society (... ) The need of a constantly expanding market for its 
products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle 
everywhere, settle everywhere, and establish connection everywhere. The bourgeoisie 
has, through its exploitation of the world market, given a cosmopolitan character to 
production and consumption in every country". 369 Thus, according to Marx, capitalism 
inherently tends to expand and internationalise. However, doest it imply that this 
expansive tendency of capital towards endless accumulation would validate the claim 
about the inevitability of liberal globalisation that we are witnessing today? This is the 
question the following section deals with. 
4.3 Technology and economy as the determinants of change 
`The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord, the steam-mill, society with the 
industrial capitalist ""0 
The notion of determinism refers to an understanding, according to which all aspects of 
society are dependent on a single set of factors that are responsible for all qualitative 
changes. The scholars that regard globalisation as an inevitable, irreversible and 
autonomous process that is beyond the control of public policy and which is the result 
of technological revolution or economic development can be labelled as determinist. In 
this understanding, globalisation is considered to be "represented as a finality, as the 
logical and inevitable culmination of the powerful tendencies of the market at work". 371 
369 Marx Karl and Engels, Frederic, Communist Manifesto in "Marx & Engels Selected Works", Preface, 
Lawrence and Wishart: London, 1973 
370 Marx, Karl, The Poverty of Philosophy, Lawrence & Wishart: London, 1973 
371 Cox, Robert, W., "A Perspective on Globalization" in Mittelman, James, E. (ed. ), Globalization: 
Critical Reflections, Lynne Rienner Publishers: US (1997) p. 21 
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Today, unlike in the 1980s and 1990s, technological progress is less enthusiastically 
argued to be the determinant of globalisation though its key importance continues to 
be 
stressed without exception. However, earlier, when the word globalisation was still new, 
many theorists held the idea that unprecedented progress of technology especially 
in 
domains of the communication and transportation was the major driving force behind 
globalisation. 372 This approach that can be labelled technological determinist basically 
considers technology as an autonomous force. 
373 Over time, however, this approach has 
somewhat softened. Nowadays, recognising the multi-faceted character of the process of 
globalisation, an increasing number of scholars that adhere to some form of 
deterministic approach on globalisation seem to combine technological determinism 
with economic determinism, which refers to "the tendencies, forces, and outcomes of 
economic process exert an independent, determining influence on other aspects of social 
development, such as political organisations and cultural beliefs". 374 It is for instance 
argued that globalization patently could not have occurred in the absence of extensive 
innovations in respect of transport, communications and data processing. 375 According 
to this view, technological revolution has boosted international economic activity. In the 
words of Clark, "technology (was) necessary but not sufficient for globalisation to take 
place". 376 
372 Among many, see Wriston, W. B., The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution Is 
Transforming Our World, Charles Scribner's Sons: New York, 1992. It can also be noted that 
technological determinists often use the discourse of post-industrial, (post-Fordist) post-modern society 
seeing a sharp contrast between the `old society' characterised by heavy industry, mass production and 
consumption, bureaucratic organisations whereas the `new post-modern/industrial society by "flexible 
production", where technology, knowledge, and information are the axial or organising principles" 
(Kellner, Douglas, Theorizing Globalization, 
http: //www. gseis. ucla. edu/faculty/kellner/papers/theroyglob. htm. See also Best, Steven and Kellner, 
Douglas, Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations, Guilford Press: New York, 1991; Bell, Daniel, The 
Coming of Post-Industrial Society, Basic Books: New York, 1976; Baudrillard, Jean, Symbolic Exchange 
and Death, Sage: London, 1993; and Harvey, David, The Condition of Postmodernity, Blackwell: 
Cambridge, 1989). 
373 Although Castells maintained that technology does not determine society, but embraces it, he has 
nonetheless developed an instrumental view on the autonomous character of technology. For instance, 
Castells argued that the IT revolution is partly responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union together 
with statism and a more effective capitalism (See his trilogy: The Information Age: Economy, Society and 
Culture; Vol. 1: "The Rise of the Network Society" [1996]; Vol. 2: "The Power of Identity" [1997]; Vol. 
3: "End of Millennium [1998]). 
374 Bimber, Bruce, "Three Faces of Technological Determinism" in Smith, Merritt Roe and Marx, Leo 
(eds. ), Does Technology Drive History?, The MIT Press: Massachusetts, 1995, p. 91 
375 Scholte (2000) p. 99 
376 Clark (1998) p. 20 
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However, to regard technology and/or economic development as the determinant(s) of 
historical discontinuities or paradigm shifts is hardly new: the belief in technology as a 
key governing force in society dates back to the Industrial Revolution, during which the 
society was transformed (modernised) enormously. 
377 Indeed, the intellectual 
forerunners of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment considered technology (and 
science in general) as a liberating force with an almost unreserved optimism. By the 
same token, it is interesting to note that in certain instances Marx's historical 
materialism was not completely free from one or another form of determinism. Indeed, 
according to Fischer, Marx, has on some occasions provided future Marxists with an 
excuse for viewing history as an automatically functioning mechanism who's most 
important components are not living men but dead objects -instruments of labour, 
machines and relations between objects. 
378 
Regardless of whether it was steam, navigation, train, telegraph and telephone as in the 
18th and 19th centuries, or it is computer, telecommunication, aircraft, banking, stock 
markets, biogenetic engineering, etc. as in the present days, the transforming power of 
technological developments in our daily life is always mind-boggling. It is therefore 
reasonable, at least to so extent, that witnessing such innovations that transform our 
daily life may create a popular narrative about technology's being the driving agent of 
social changes. It is also understandable, again to certain extent, that technological (or 
economic) developments are put forward as the determinant of globalisation. 
Nevertheless, the `direct' translation of the transformed texture of our daily life into a 
377 Smith, Roe, Merritt, Technological Determinism in American Culture in Smith, Roe, Merritt and 
Marx, Leo (eds. ), "Does Technology Drive History? ", The MIT Press: USA, 1995, p. 2 
378 Fischer, Ernst, Marx in His Own Words, Penguin Books: Middlesex, 1981, p. 82. To give a few 
examples of arguments that provides an excuse for viewing history in a deterministic manner: "In the 
social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of 
their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material 
productive forces" (Marx, Karl, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy in Preface in "Marx 
& Engels Selected Works" Preface, Lawrence and Wishart: London, 1973, p. 181). The perhaps most 
well known aphorism of Marx, which is greatly used as proof of Marx's technological determinism, is as 
follows: "Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces 
men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in changing the way of 
earning their living, they change all their social relations. The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal 
lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist". (Marx, Karl, Poverty of Philosophy, Lawrence 
& Wishart: UK, 1973, p. 122). Fischer explains Marx's occasional "over-emphasis" regarding the 
primacy of technology and/or productive forces over other factors in the course of social development 
with the influence of Darwin's evolution theory as well as Hegel (Ibid. p. 85). For counter-arguments 
about Marx's being technological and/or economic determinist, see among others, Bimber (1995), Miller, 
Richard, Analyzing Marx, Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1984. 
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social theory can function as an ideological shortcut as it is the case when explaining 
globalisation with uncontrolled and autonomous market forces or a technological 
revolution. As Boron maintains, the claim about the objectivity of globalisation 
generates a false realism, which in turn facilitates to the ideological success of neo- 
liberalism converting it into the "common sense" of our time. 
379 In the words of Grass, 
the consequences of privatisation, destruction of thousands of job, mass unemployment, 
poverty, etc. disguised as globalisation. "All this now is accepted as if divinely ordained 
accompanied at most by the customary national grumbles". 
380 
4.4 Changes in state-market relations 
As viewed earlier, globalisation has often been associated with the diminishing role of 
the nation-state and the growing influence of market forces. It is claimed that states' 
capacity to control international/transnational economic transactions and information 
flows has considerably eroded (or even vanished) due to the following developments: 
(i) market friendly policy changes since the 1980s, such as liberalisation, deregulation 
and privatisation that have diminished the possibility for states to make and manage 
national macroeconomic programmes (which also meant the end of Keynesianism); (ii) 
the internationalisation of capital, production and financial transactions organised by 
MNEs381; (iii) the technological advances in communication and transportation have 
decreased the possibility for states to control "the flow of ideas" making internal 
policies in many domains infeasible; (iv) the increasing and intensifying 
interconnectedness between states, which has led to the escalating importance of 
international and transnational organisations causing a growing power and function 
379 Ibid. p. 135. 
380 Grass, Günter, The High Price of Freedom, published in "The Guardian", Saturday, May 7,2005. 
381 In Schachter's words: "The role of the state has also been reduced by the explosive growth of foreign 
direct investment by transnational corporations and portfolio investment by pension and mutual funds. 
Much of such foreign investment takes place without regard to the source state or its control. The old- 
style 'imperialism' of capital-exporting countries has no role in these cases and their state power is 
diminished" (Schachter, Oscar, "The erosion of state authority and its implications for equitable 
development" in Weiss, Friedl; Denters, Erik; and de Waart, Paul (eds. ), International Economic Law 
with a Human Face, Kluwer Law International: The Hague/Dordrecht%London, 1998, p. 33). 
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transfer; and also (v) the end of the Cold war, which has lessened the need 
for nation- 
states. 382 
To a considerable degree, there is a historical kinship and continuity 
between the 
conviction that states have lost power to markets in the globalisation process and the 
classical liberal thinking of free market as the natural form of economic life. 
Both ideas 
are closely linked to the vision of retirement of the state in society. However, unlike the 
utopia of laissez-faire, which predicts a self-adjusting, deregulated market 
beyond the 
possibility of political and social control and a minimum state power, the development 
of the free market that took place in Great Britain in the mid-nineteenth century 
("the 
Great Transformation") did not come into being merely by allowing things to take their 
course. As Karl Polanyi argued, it was "naively imagined" that creation of a self- 
regulating market economy was to be the natural outcome of the spreading of 
markets. 383 In the 1930s, objecting to the liberal perception that laissez-faire was the 
spontaneous, automatic expression of economic facts and not a deliberate policy, 
Antonio Gramsci also contended that the laissez-faire liberalism was a form of state 
regulation, introduced and maintained by legislative and coercive means. In other 
words, "the road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase 
in continuous, centrally organized and controlled interventionism"384 concluding that 
laissez-faire was a political programme to change the economic programme involving 
the distribution of the national income. 385 Gray argues that the "Great Transformation" 
of England during the mid-Victorian times was an "artefact of power and statecraft; it 
was created by state coercion, and depended at every point in its workings on the power 
382 Among vast literature dealing with some of these arguments, see, Held, David, Democracy, the 
Nation-State and the Global System in Held, David (ed. ), "Political Theory Today", Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 1991; Waters (2001); Hirst and Thompson (1996) in particular Chapter 8; Burnham, Peter, 
"The Recomposition of National States in the Global Economy" in Edwards, Paul and Elger, Tony (eds. ), 
The Global Economy, National States and The Regulation of Labour, Mansell: London and New York, 
1999; and Keohane, Robert, 0., "Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: 
Sovereignty in International Society" in Keohane, Robert, 0., Power and Governance in a Partially 
Globalized World, Routledge: London and New York, 2002. 
383 Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Beacon 
Press: Boston, 1957, p. 57. 
384 Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, Hoare, Quintin and Nowell-Smith, 
Geoffrey (eds. ) Lawrence and Wishart: London, 1973, p. 140 
38s Gramsci (1973) p. 60 
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of government. 386 According to Gramsci, the practical origin of this "theoretical error" 
of liberal approach, which presupposes the separation of political society from civil 
society, lies in the assertion that economic activity belongs to civil society and therefore 
the state must not intervene to regulate it. 
387 
Like its antecedent, the present version of the (global) free market is also claimed to be 
a natural consequence of an uncontrollable, technologically/economically 
predetermined process (i. e. globalisation). 
388 However, even though they have gained 
enormous popularity, the claims about the nation-state's declining capacity in the face 
of globalisation's "anonymous forces" and the emerging "stateless capitalism" have not 
gone unchallenged. It is argued that globalisation is not faceless and is authored by 
powerful states and primarily consists of re-organising, rather than bypassing states. 
Keohane for instance, holds that the decision of the United States in 1945 to maintain a 
capitalist economy with increasing openness has been an important basis for the further 
developments of globalisation. 389 In a similar way, Gilpin maintains that globalisation 
rests on a political foundation that could disintegrate if the major powers fail to 
strengthen their economic and political ties. 390 Petras and Veltmeyer also maintained 
that the new era should be named as the "New Statism" rather than the era of the free 
market considering that the scale and scope of the states' activities in military as well as 
economic areas, especially those of the USA, has grown exceptionally. The authors 
further argued that globalisation is primarily a product of the New Statism, which is 
386 Gray (2002) p. 5-7 
387 Gramsci (1973) p. 60. Both Gramsci and Gay name "the Enclosures", whereby common right was 
extinguished and commoners lost common right at enclosure, as the first crucial step towards a free 
British market economy. By using its power the state transformed common land into private property. 
Moreoer, both note that the Enclosures had a paramount importance. in forming of the nineteenth-century 
agrarian capitalist economy of large landed estates. Second and arguably most important measure aiming 
at creating the free market was the "repeal of "the Corn Laws" of 1846, thereby an agricultural free trade 
was established. Another critical step was taken by adopting "Poor Law Amendment" in 1834 thereby the 
responsibility for protection against insecurity and misfortune has been transformed from communities to 
individuals (For different steps of engineering free market in 18'h andl9th centuries of England, see also 
Taylor, Arthur, J., Laissez-faire and State Intervention in Nineteenth Century Britain, Palgrave 
Macmilllan: London, 1972). 
388 In the words of Bauman "All this surrounds the ongoing process of the 'withering away' of nation- 
states with an aura of a natural catastrophe. Its causes are not fully understood; it cannot be exactly 
predicted even if the causes are known; and it certainly cannot be prevented from happening even if 
predicted" (2000, p. 56). 
389 Keohane (1995) p. 166. 
390 Gilpin (2000) p. 294 
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sustained by direct state intervention. 391 In a similar vein, Hirst and Thompson hold that 
states continue to play a central role in international economy. Although the writers 
acknowledge the changing role of nation-states in the `post' Keynesian era and states' 
diminishing power as administrative and policy-making agencies, they nevertheless 
maintain that the function of the nation-state in the integration of different levels of 
governing powers (i. e. international, national, regional), is irreplaceable by any other 
agencies. Nor can markets alone provide the interconnection and co-ordination that 
today's high level of division of labour and economic interdependence requires. 392 The 
writers conclude that markets and companies cannot exist without a public power to 
protect them on both national and international level. 393 
It can. be argued that the liberal assertion that the nation-state is "withering away" in 
favour of the market is suffering from a threefold deficiency. First, it deceptively 
counterpoises state and market as two opposing institutions and sees their multifaceted 
relationship as isolated and external. As Burnham puts it, this understanding fails to see 
states and markets as being differentiated aspects of the same set of social relations and 
the development of nation-state as an integral "part of the antagonistic and crisis-ridden 
development of capitalist society. 394 
Second, arguments about the nation-state's having yielded substantial amount of 
domestic regulatory authority to the transnational regimes and organisations, in 
particular international financial institutions (IFI), such as the IMF and the World Bank 
as well as to treaty regimes, such as the WTO/GAT"TT as a response to the imperatives of 
globalisation, understand the concept of `sovereignty' in its very abstract form and 
generalise it in isolation from asymmetric power relationship and hierarchical structure 
of international order. 395 It is hard to ignore the fact that most powerful international 
economic institutions (lEls), which have actively promoted economic and financial 
policies, such as liberalisation, de-regulation and privatisation, are effectively controlled 
391 Petras and Veltmeyer (2001) p. 55 
392 Hirst and Thompson (1996) p. 184., 
393 Ibid. p. 188 
394 Burnham (1995) p. 44 
395 See for instance Strange, Susan, The Retreat of the Slate: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge University Press: New York, 1996. 
144 
by the advanced capitalist countries. 
396 However, this influence should not be 
understood in such a way that all activities of lEls can be reduced to a direct policy 
choice of individual powerful states. As Cammack argues, the IEIs continually seek to 
define and exercise a relatively autonomous role to promote and sustain a framework 
for global capitalism. For, such an autonomous role is indispensable to deal with the 
shortcomings and setbacks that cannot be addressed at national level alone, not even by 
the most powerful states. 397 
Third, the perception of sovereignty (or national autonomy) in the "nation state's 
withering away" approach is based on an absolutist form of the concept of sovereignty 
and therefore exaggerates the nation-state's ability to control economy prior to 
globalisation. 398 There is no evidence in history that nation-states have ever enjoyed 
unlimited economic sovereignty and determined their economic policy in complete 
freedom. 
Until World War I, under the classical gold standards of fixed exchanges rates, national 
governments had very little effective control over their economies. The economic 
agenda of governments was at that time only a little more than maintaining the par value 
of their currencies through central banks. 399 It was the combined and cumulative effects 
of events and developments such as the Great Depression, the influence of the socialist 
ideals and system, the Cold War and the rise of the labour movements that led 
developed capitalist countries to adopt welfare policies and to involve more actively in 
396 For an overview on the subject, see Anghie, Antony, Time present and time past: globalization, 
international financial institutions, and the third world, 32 New York University Journal of International 
Law and Politics (2000). 
397 Cammack,, Paul, "The Governance of Global Capitalism: A New Materialist Perspective" in 
Wilkinson, Rorden (ed. ), The Global Governance Reader, Routledge: London & New York, 2005, p. 157. 
398 It can also be observed that most writers claiming the demise of nation-state use the concept of 
sovereignty loosely without any precision that such complex concept arguably requires. Often, a 
relatively limited possibility to exercise one type of sovereignty may mean the exercise another type of 
sovereignty. It is true that the "new" developments such as transboundary air pollution or the transborder 
movements of capital may indicate a loss of interdependence sovereignty (For different types of 
sovereignty, see the second chapter of this study section 2.5 "state sovereignty in international law"). 
Still, this does not automatically suggest that state sovereignty has been undermined as a whole and states 
are not any longer able to provide solutions to changed face of international life. As Krasner holds, as a 
response, in most cases states adopt international agreements or create international organisations, which 
in turn may lead states to reconcile their Westphalian sovereignty with the changing international reality 
(Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, 1999, p. 13). 
399 Gilpin (2000) p. 317 
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economic life. Yet, as Gilpin reminds us, "the role of Western governments in economy 
remained fairly limited" even in the post World War II period. 
400 
Stressing the continuing importance of the state, however, is not the same as saying that 
the nation-state remains unchanged. Probably the state will not even endure forever as a 
political/social structure and form. With the end of the Cold War and the triumph of the 
market economy, the functioning of the nation-state has been restructured through 
financial markets (increased capital mobility), economic integration and inter- 
governmental organisations. This can be regarded as the structural changes of nation 
states as the transition of state management from a politicised (the welfare state model) 
to a depoliticised. In this current form state activities are marketised (privatisation of 
state functions) and responsibilities for management (the regulatory and economic 
policy making capacity of states) have been shifted onto international regimes (usually 
an international monetary mechanism, which sets rules) and independent organisations 
(the independence of central banks). According to Burnham, this policy, which can be 
called the "rule-based" strategy, aims to depoliticise the government's economic policy 
thereby protecting the government from the political consequences of pursuing 
deflationary policies. 40' 
There is little doubt that in the last three decades or so, national economies have become 
internationally more integrated, and as a result, national governments have lost 
significant power of economic policy-making to MNEs and international organisations. 
It is important to bear in mind, however, that this process has not developed uniformly. 
Firstly, the biggest MNEs, "the most important actors" of economic globalisation are 
based in advanced capitalist countries402 and backed up by these "home states". 403 
400 Ibid. p. 318 
401 Burnham (1995, p. 45-46). Hirst and Thompson also define the new political rhetoric as "anti-political 
liberalism" (1996, p. 176). The elimination of the welfare state alongside with diminishing regulation on 
overseas flows and demolishing political and economic constraints in overseas markets are given as the 
`centrepiece' of globalisation by Petras and Veltmeyer (2001, p. 54). 
402 According to the UNCTAD's "World Investment Report", only 3 of the world biggest 100 MNEs are 
not based on the most advanced capitalist countries. These 'exceptions' are Hong Kong (China), 
Singapore and Republic of Korea (http: //www. unctad. org/sections/dite dir/docs/wir2005topl00 en. pdf). 
403 In the words of Spero and Hart, "Some governments - particularly powerful governments like that of 
the United States- actively encouraged multinational expansion. The progressive elimination of restraints 
on capital flows made expansion of direct investment possible. The reduction of tariffs made direct 
investment more attractive. Governments directly subsidized FDI outflows by providing various forms of 
insurance for international investments (2000, p. 109). Nonetheless, the writers also point out that however 
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Moreover, as discussed above, the same developed countries have the greatest influence 
over IEIs, which is generally regarded as governing economic globalisation and 
functioning virtually as political institutions. Chimni contends that the claim that not 
only developing countries but also all states have lost certain degree of sovereignty to 
IEIs, fails to make a distinction between what is formal and what is substantial. It is the 
exercise of their sovereign power that continuously shapes the objectives of IEIs and the 
rules these countries enforce. 404 Thus a decline in state power seems more tangible for 
the so-called Southern states for which globalisation has meant an imposed 
liberalisation by lEls, through fiscal austerity, tariff reductions, privatisations, de- 
regulation and an often desperate quest for FDI. In the words of Therborn, 
"globalization to the Third World is irreducible to economic objectification, be it from 
imposed liberalism, indebtedness, or dependence on aid or capital inflow". 405 In the 
globalisation process, "the Third World state is diminished, and more subordinate than 
at any time since the colonial era. Its elites are more externalized, and its hold on 
national sovereignty more tenuous than ever". 406 
To sum up, it is held in this section that the liberal and state-centric approaches to recent 
changes in state/market relations, share a similar weakness. Both approaches understand 
these relations, as "isolated, fragmented aspects of social reality existing in a purely 
external and contingent manner". 407 The liberal approach reduces states to a simple 
instrument determined by the hegemonic classes while the state-centric approach 
reasserts the continuing importance of states and sees globalisation essentially as a 
matter of a policy choice of powerful states. The latter approach understands 
international life essentially in terms of the behaviour of the autonomous states by 
important they could be government policies cannot be the only explanation of the MNEs increasing 
activities (Ibid. ). Braithwaite and Drahos also explain the varied and uneven influence of MNEs over the 
regulatory activities by the power of their host states. According to the writers, US corporations exert 
more power in the world system than corporations of other states because they can enrol the support of 
the most powerful state in the world. (Braithwaite, John and Drahos, Peter, Global Business Regulation, 
Cambridge University Press: UK, 2001, p. 490). 
404Chimni, B. S., International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 European 
Journal of International law (2004) p. 25 
"os Therborn (1999) p. 38. 
406 Graf, William, The State in the Third World, in "Socialist Register 1995" Merlin Press: London, 1995, 
p. 159. It is then of course important not to consider the "Third World" as a homogenous entity. 
407 Burnham (1995) p. 43 
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reducing recent changes to simply Western imperialism or 
Western states' activities. 
The state-centric approach also fails to take into consideration the impacts of new 
developments, such as new communication technologies, cheaper and more reliable 
transportation networks, and organisational sophistication. 
408 
To be sure, advanced capitalist countries have been an integral part of the liberal 
globalisation. They have accommodated to and in certain areas accelerated the process. 
On the other hand, there can be found counter-evidence for the diminishing possibility 
to manage their economies by. means of fiscal and monetary policies, labour and welfare 
legislation, and a manifold regulatory regimes targeting business even for powerful 
states. 409 Therefore, avoiding a deceptive state/market binary, it can be concluded that 
the globalisation process accommodates both the hegemonic/hierarchical re-ordering of 
inter-state relations while it restructures the functions of the nation-state around a 
capitalist project in which production, markets and finance are highly integrated. In this 
408 Cox captures the 'non-political' character of globalisation with the term of "global perestroika" 
making an allusion to Gorbachev's perestroika, which was initiated as an economic reorganisation, 
nonetheless soon got out of control. Calling the term globalisation as a euphemism for "global 
perestroika", he argues that this "global perestroika" has essentially not been the consequence of a 
conscious decision of political leadership but a result of structural changes in capitalism (Cox, Robert, W. 
"Global Perestroika" in Wilkinson, Rorden, (ed. ), The Global Governance Reader, 2005, p. 140). 
However, it should be remembered that Cox forcefully underlines the role of state power in globalisation. 
Calling the claim about the free market as being self-regulating a myth, he elsewhere argues that 
globalisation of our time, like its predecessors, also depends upon the military-territorial power of an 
enforcer (ibid. p. 149). 
4°9 It is possible and necessary to examine and analyse the development of the European Union (EU) from 
a diverse aspects considering its peculiar and hybrid nature. Not surprisingly, the question of 'the fate of 
nation-state' has been important to the discussions surrounding the European integration. The EU has not 
developed according to a master plan in the sense that the ongoing process lacks a completed, coherent 
blue-print. Still, the EU owes its birth and current state of existence to a strong political will and 
resolution. Therefore, the history of the EU feeds both state-centric and 'post state-centric' accounts 
abundantly. The diversity of the theories of European integration reflects this complexity. Theories such 
as 'functionalism', 'neo-functionalism' and 'federalism' have developed different degrees of 
supranational paradigm whereas theories such as 'confederalism', and 'cooperative federalism' more 
state-centric paradigms. Yes, the members have in many areas pooled their sovereignty into the EU in the 
sense that the member states have agreed to transfer their decision-making power to a supranational 
political entity. Power is transferred to the Council, or to the Commission of the European Communities. 
Yet the EU can also be seen as an example for how states use international institutions created by 
themselves to achieve their own interests. There are many elements in the European integration that have 
been the products of interstate interactions. In the words of O'Neill, "Project 1992 (The Maastricht Treaty 
on European Union -I. A. O. ) was not about a Federal Europe -at least not for majority of the participants. 
It was primarily about the survival of Europe's nation states by ensuring their continuing capacity to 
compete in a highly competitive world economy. Survival demanded, of course, mutual adjustments, 
common strategies and even a degree of pooled sovereignty" (O'Neill, Michael. The Politics of European 
Integration: A Reader, Routledge: London, 1996, p. 46). Among countless books on the European 
integration, see Rosamond, Ben, Theories of European Integration, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 
2000; and Gillingham, John, European Integration, 1950-2003: Superstate or New Market Economy?, 
Cambridge University Press: New York, 2003. 
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sense, as Saul points out, `Empire' (the world of capitalist globalisation) and `empire' 
(the world of western imperialism) co-exist though their extents and effects are neither 
identical nor invariable. 410 
4.5 Global Governance: re-drawing boundaries or the Emperor's 
new clothes? 
As viewed in the previous chapter, it is clamed that in the process of globalisation of the 
economy state boundaries have gradually become less important as the rapidly growing 
flows of trade, investment, technology, finance capital, labour and ideas create an 
integrated world economy. According to this account, however, the ill-fitting traditional 
sovereign state-based political institutions have lagged behind this transformation and 
therefore the ability to govern the market and other world affairs has stayed 
comparatively weak. In other words, the economy has been globalised, but the polity 
has not. Moreover, this old political structure has, it is maintained, not only been 
challenged by the forces of economic globalisation, but also, following the collapse of 
socialist system in 1989, by the emergence of "a third image of international law of 
transnational society". In this third image sources of governance has become 
heterogeneous and multiple and boundaries between public and private authority has 
been re-drawn. 41 
410 Saul (2004) p. 261 
411 Hurrell, Andrew, International Law and the Changing Constitution of International Society in Byers 
(2002) p. 337. It is commonplace to examine the evolution of the `modern' international legal order by 
dividing it into two distinctive phases until the end of the Cold War. The first phase called the law of co- 
existence and lasted until the World War II, was one of the inevitable consequences of a world of plurality 
of sovereign states. Yet, it is true that even during this period there were some significant steps towards 
creating some degree of international regimes as a result of the concern for survival (for instance, the 
creation of League of Nations in 1919) as well as with human welfare (for instance, the constitutions of 
the International Labour Organisations -ILO in 1919). 
The second phase, which is commonly named as the law of co-operation, emerged as a result of the 
extensive devastation of World War 11 and proceeded on different levels depending on the nature of 
subject-matters. The ideological rivalry of capitalist and socialist blocks and the bipolar structure of the 
Cold War doubtlessly gave its colour to this period and effectively shaped the character and scope of 
international law. This period has resulted in the construction of a multifaceted range of 
institutionalisation of which the UN system is in the centre to address, above all, the security but also 
economic and political challenges and changes that this new era created. 
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The term global governance has become an attractive discourse in social science and 
gained worldwide currency in describing societal transformation within a `new era' 
marked by the end of the Cold War, globalisation, the growth of private authority, and 
the alleged erosion of territorial sovereignty as the primary organisational principle of 
world politics. 
Yet, there is no consensus over what the term of global governance exactly means. The 
term is often used to describe different and sometimes opposing trends. For some, 
global governance is an instrument to enhance the power of the US and global capital 
through international financial and economic organisations. To some others, it indicates 
one of the most serious threats to the sovereignty of the US. 412 Likewise to some others, 
the term global governance is argued to symbolise the increasing inequality and 
unfairness in international relations and to some it is seen as the embryonic phase of the 
emerging cosmopolitan democracy. Yet again, for some, global governance indicates 
the crises of democratic accountability whereas some others welcome it as the de- 
centralisation of power and the possibility for a more participatory democracy. 413 Thus, 
Finkelstein is probably not too sarcastic asserting that "global governance appears to be 
virtually everything". 414 
From a Foucauldian perspective, the ambiguity surrounding the nature of global 
governance can be interpreted as one of those concepts that is important to look at not 
just as to how it is defined but also how it is not defined. Like the concept of 
globalisation, the concept of global governance is also both a description and a 
prescription. When the concept is understood as a response to the increased complexity 
of human condition that globalisation lays down, it describes the shift from government 
to governance, from political organisations to policy networks, from political realm to 
economic and social realms, and from command to state-market coordination. 415 As a 
prescription, global governance involves the consensus-formation around the needs of 
412 Bolton for instance understands global governance as one of the most serious threats to the sovereignty 
of the US (Bolton, John, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 Chicago Journal of International Law 2000, p. 207). 
413 "The creation of adequate governance mechanisms will be complicated because these must be more inclusive and participatory -that is, more democratic (... )" (The Commission on Global Governance, Ibid. ). 
414 Finkelstein, Lawrence, S., What is Global Governance?, I Global Governance, 1995, p. 368. 
415 Rosenau, James, N., Governance in the Twenty-First Century in Wilkinson (2000) p. so 
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the world market416 and the legitimising discourses on and ideological persuasion 
around the liberal democracy and market economy as being-the only acceptable 
political/economical form. 417 Thus, as a prescriptive concept, global governance is a 
demos developing, "a shared sense of community" creation project, 418 that aims to 
provide a basis of legitimacy for the market economy and liberal democracy. The main 
facilitator of this project is the hierarchical structure of international relations: "Once the 
ideas of the centre have been recognized as valid by the periphery, the impression of 
domination disappears entirely" as in the example of "the internationalisation of ideas of 
`good governance' by elites of developing countries". 
419 
Global governance is sometimes put forward to proclaim the end of anarchical nature of 
international relations ('Grotian paradigm', according to which states act in their 
interests). 420 It is argued that even though there seem to be a paradox between the 
fragmentation of pluralistic models of global governance and the idea of `order', the 
416 Cox (2005) p. 144. Cox further states that there is no explicit political or authority structure for the 
global economy still there is something that can be described by the French word nebuleuse or by the 
notion of "governance without government". Accordingly, the consensus-formation process takes place 
through both inter-state (official) such as the G7 and the OECD and informal forums, such as the 
Bilderberg Conference. These forums also tighten the transnational networks that link policy making 
from'country to country (Ibid. ). 
417 Callinicos (2005) p. 263. 
418 Bodansky, Daniel, The Legitimacy of International Governance, 93 American Journal of International 
Law (1999) p. 615 
419 Krisch (2005) p. 404. Anghie also holds that "governance is now designed to provide the political 
institutions that will enable the furtherance of globalization. Specifically, this has to be achieved through 
the international human rights norms that are seen as prescribing universally accepted international 
standards and which are used as a basis to further governance" (Anghie, Antony, Imperialism, 
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2005, p. 253- 
54). Anghie further explores convincingly the resemblances between the term of 'good governance' in the 
Third World related to the promotion of liberal democracy and free markets, and the 'civilization 
mission' of Western colonialism (Ibid. In particular in Chapter 5). 
420 According to the most common categorization, those, who define international politics as the struggle 
of sovereign states for power, are `realists'. The competing 'idealist' model, which also can be named as 
'Kantian paradigm', envisages the possibility of a world order, in which peaceful and democratic states 
co-operate promoted by shared human/community values (Of course, there are many other paradigms that 
differ one way or another from idealist and realist schools. However, none of them keep entirely out the 
constitutive elements of these two paradigms from their approach. ). It can be added that some sort of 
world government has often been included in the latter paradigm. According to Lauterpacht, for instance, 
the function of law is to open the way for "the gradual integration of international society in the direction 
of a supra-national Federation of the World" (Lauterpacht, Hersch, International Law and lluman Rights, 
Praeger: New York, 1950, p. 46). Nonetheless, even the realists do not categorically rule out the 
possibility of the creation of a world state. Yet, according to Morgenthau, the way of succeeding in this is 
not to weaken sovereignty but create an international community (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 559). Then the 
question is whether it is possible to 'create' an international society without reducing national states to 
some form of polity? 
I 
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numerically and qualitatively growing importance of international institutions, 
interdependence as well as the emerging of complementary (or sometimes even 
alternative) private regimes have brought a degree of order in the international arena. 
421 
In this sense, global governance has been intended to function as the political re- 
regulation of world affairs through a multi-centred global public policy network that 
consists of states, non-state actors and regional/international organisations. 
422 However, 
the suggestion as to the ability of global governance to overcome the current 
fragmentation problems, which arise from nation-states' diminished ability to regulate 
central areas of international life, provide a unity and to satisfy the need for some sense 
of order/centralism through a system of co-ordination between multiple legal regimes is 
not very convincing. The boundaries of different regimes are open-ended, imprecise and 
their principles often contradict each other. To give only a few examples: trade regime 
with human rights or environmental regimes, economic development regime with the 
environmental regime, intellectual property rights regime with human rights regime, 
international security regime with human rights or humanitarian law regimes, and so 
forth. 
Moreover, the ideological consensus over the concept of global governance, which is 
imperative to establish some sort of `sense of order', seem to have weakened in parallel 
to the worldwide decline of the post-Cold War optimism. It is still a fresh memory that 
in the early post-Cold War period there was an unprecedented hope about the possibility 
of achieving the "perpetual peace" and democracy throughout the world. It was hoped 
that in this period, the principle of rule of law would finally reign in our globe. As 
remembered, the Security Council of the UN started indeed to work effectively and 
extended its power to other domains than only peace and security, such as democracy, 
economic development and human rights. Furthermore, the UN organised a series of 
world conferences, such as the Environment (Rio 1992), Human Rights (Vienna 1993), 
Women (Beijing 1995) and, Human Settlement (Istanbul 1997) with an increasing non- 
state participation. As Koskenniemi observes, "This was a true governmentality: world 
421 Arguably, the concept of ndbuleuse ("governance without government"), which Cox introduced, also 
envisages the existence of a centralised supranational management structure. Cox describes it as "global 
centralization of influence" (Cox, 2005, p. 144). 
422 Brand, Ulrich, Order and Regulation: Global Governance as a hegemonic discourse of international 
politics?, 12 "Review of International Political Economy" (2005) 1, p. 155 
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government by world conferences adopting universal standards". This has reached 
its 
highest point by the establishment of the WTO in 1995 with, above all, a unified dispute 
settlement mechanism -a constitution for international trade law. 
423 As might be 
expected, these developments created much positive enthusiasm about an emerging and 
certainly better form of world order. Such hopeful anticipations ranged from prophecies 
of "the end of history", "Kantian liberal internationalism", or the neo-realist version of 
"transgovernmental ism" to "cosmopolitan federalism" and "human governance". 
Proposed `new' rights, such as "the right to globalisation"424 and "the right to 
democratic governance"425 reflect perfectly the spirit of the period. The air was full of 
hope and promises and they have mostly been articulated around diverse versions of the 
idea of cosmopolitanism referring to an idea of world government and corresponding 
citizenship. 426 
Alas, unlike all enthusiastic anticipations, however, the Security Council did not enact 
the rule of law and remained, as always, selective; the world conferences did not create 
law and their `wish-lists' have remained largely unfulfilled. 
427 And the goals of the 
UN's Millennium Declaration of 2000, which included the `eradication of extreme 
poverty and hunger', `achieving universal primary education' and `reducing child 
mortality', are already seen as daydream rather than programmatic. 428 This picture is no 
423 Koskenniemi, Martti, Global Governance And Public International Law, 2004, available at 
http //www. valt. helsink. fi/blocs/eci/Frankfurt. pdf. 
424 Pendleton, Michael, D., A New Human Rights -The Right to Globalization, 22 Fordham International 
Law Journal (1998-1999) 
425 Franck, Thomas, M., The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 American Journal of 
International Law, 1992 
426 On the various variations of cosmopolitanism, among many, see McGrew, Anthony, Liberal 
Internationalism: Between Realism and Cosmopolitanism in Held and McGrew, 2003; Paul, T. V. and 
Hall, John, A. (eds. ), International Order and the Future of World Politics, Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2000; and Doyle, Michael, Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, Summer/Fall, 1983; Archibugi, Danielle, Held, David, and Kohler, Martin (eds. ), Re- 
imaging Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy, Polity Press: Cambridge, 1998; Falk, 
Richard, On Human Governance: Toward a New Global Politics, Polity Press: Cambridge, 1995; Marks, 
Susan, The Riddle of all Constitutions, Oxford University Press: New York, 2003; Held, David, 
Democracy and Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Polity Press: 
Cambridge, 2004. 
427 Koskenniemi, 2004, Frankfurt speech: Global Governance And Public International Law 
428 United Nations Millennium Declaration, G. A. Res. 55/2, U. N. GAOR, 55`h Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 4, 
U. N. Doc. A/55/49 (2000) available at http: //www. un. orz/millennium. According to the Human 
Development Report of 2000 of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), more than 30.000 
children die every day from mainly preventable causes, such as malnutrition (UNDP Human 
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doubt frustrating. It is hence not surprising that many feel global governance as 
distorted and understand it as promoting the interests of the most powerful states and 
`global' capital while holding back an enhanced social justice and greater human 
security. It can be claimed that the disappointment resulting from the direction of the 
development of world affairs can be observed in different forms and in different parts of 
the world. To give but a few examples: the electoral success of left-wing political 
parties, especially in South American countries such as Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia and 
Chile, the extra-parliamentary movements (often described as "anti-globalists"), the 
increasing interest in political interpretation of religions as well as the so-called "global 
terrorism" can be read as the signs of this frustration regarding the new world order that 
the post-Cold War period and globalisation process have brought about 
429 
It should also be added that the decreasing popularity of the concept of global 
governance has partly arisen from the lack of accountability, transparency, and 
democratic deficiency of the institutions that have assumed a constitutive role in the 
advancement of the concept of global governance. 430 There is not much evidence 
supporting the view that formal or informal inter-state agencies of global governance 
are there to pursue the mutual benefits of all countries. The weighted voting system as 
in the case of the IMF and the WB, the veto power in the UN Security Council and the 
Development Report (2000), available at 
http: //hdr undp org/reports/global/2000/en/pdf/hdr 2000 ch4 pdf). In a similar vein, Human 
Development Report of 2005 of the UNDP informed the world that the "Millennium Development Goals" 
targeting for child mortality would be missed. Accordingly, in the coming 10 years, 41 million children 
will die from poverty related diseases. And another 50 million will be even then out of school in 2015. It 
is also remarked that despite some progress, still 2.5 billion people, nearly half of the world population, 
live on $2 or less a day (UNDP Human Development Report (2005), available at 
http: //hdr. undp. ore/reports/global/2005/pdf/IIDR05 chapter 1.1)df) 
429 To such an `opposition list', it might easily be added countries, such as Peru, where left leaning 
parties/movements have not seized the power but made considerable progress in elections. Furthermore, 
many other countries whose peoples are mostly Muslim, such as Turkey, Indonesia, and the Philippines, 
increasingly tend to show interest in Islamist political parties that embody a strong anti- 
American/Western view. For an interesting account of political development in Latin America, see 
Mattei, Ugo, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U. S Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10 Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies (2003). 
430 Yet, `state transparency' is another subject matter to be scrutinised. It is often claimed that states have 
become more transparent, at any rate, in the economical and financial areas. Nonetheless, it would be 
wise not to jump to the conclusion that this development is related to the democratisation of the state. As 
Gill remarks, increasing state transparency and, credibility requirement imposed by the "global 
supervisor", such as the IMF and World Bank, has a result that private investors more easily can access to 
information, which in turn increases the structural power of capital (Gill, Stephan, "New 
Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political Economy" in Wilkinson, Rorden (ed. ), The 
Global Governance Reader, Routledge: London and New York, 2005, p. 176). 
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informal consensual processes as in the case of the WTO (the so-called `Green 
Room' 
process, which is dominated by the US, the EU, Japan, and Canada 
431) raise criticism 
about democratic deficiency of the inter-state governance. 
432 Likewise, NGOs have also 
been criticised of serving as a legitimatisation tool for neo-liberal agenda to "privatise" 
the risk and to supply the necessary consent for social order. 
433 
The legitimacy of global governance indicates a contested terrain. There are no easy 
answers; each answer produces new questions. For example, it can be said that people 
should be given the opportunity to participate in the decision-making mechanisms 
(participatory legitimacy), because public participation is an important source of 
legitimacy by given stakeholders a sense of ownership in the process. 
434 Then another 
question arises; to what extent the participation of NGOs may satisfy this requirement? 
Who decide what NGOs are to be chosen as representing the public? 
435 And then again, 
to what extent these NGOs should be accorded access? Would it mean the transfer, at 
least partly, of actual decision-making power? And so forth. 
436 
41 Woods, Ngaire, "Global Governance and the Role of Institutions" in Held and McGrew (2003) p. 31. 
Although sympathetic to the decision-making process in lEls on the ground of 'efficiency', Keohane and 
Nye nonetheless recognise the 'legitimacy' problem in it and therefore point out the necessity of 
developing "new strategies to resolve the dilemma of efficacy versus legitimacy" (Keohane, Robert, O. 
and Nye Jr., Joseph, S., "Governance in A Globalizing World in Keohane, Robert, 0., Power and 
Governance in a Partially Globalized World, Routledge: London & New York, 2002, p. 214). 
432 There is an increasing recognition among scholars that "mostly by improper and unfair use of the 
weighted majority voting system which often forced Members to implement decisions to which they are 
strongly opposed" is one of the important causes of the growing legitimacy problem and the decreasing 
popularity of the IMF and the World Bank (Van den Bossche, Peter and Alexovicovä, Iveta, Effective 
Global Economic Governance By The World Trade Organization, 8 Journal of international Economic 
Law [2005] 3, p. 676). 
433 Gill explains the insistence of the World Bank on NGO participation in certain decision-making 
processes as "a tactic to legitimate the attenuation of democracy in economic policy by increasing 
participation in safely channelled areas" (Gill, 2005, p. 183). 
434 Bodansky (1999) p. 617 
435 Charnovitz explains the strategies for how the WTO chooses which NGO would involve. Accordingly, 
"the WTO can 'marginalise' the NGOs by not allowing them to do anything more than attend symposia, 
or can 'mainstream' them" (Charnovitz, Steve, UVTO Cosmopolitics, 34 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics, 2001-2002, p. 343). 
436 A growing interest in the concept of legitimacy can be observed. This is partly due to the preference to 
promote a new vocabulary to replace the language of the state-centric era. For instance, in the 'post-state 
era' discourse, the concepts legitimacy, informal regulation and regimes have replaced 'law' and the 
concept governance has replaced government. However, in addition, related to this deformalisation 
tendency, the growing importance of international organisations has also boosted the interest in 
legitimacy discourse. Among numerous articles and books dealing with the legitimacy issue, see 
Keohane, Robert, 0., Power and Governance in a partially Globalized World, Routledge: London and 
New York, 2002 (in particular Part III); Scholte, Jan, Aart, Civil Society and Democracy In Global 
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To sum up, these structural weaknesses are articulated in a number of critical deficits in 
the institutional capacity of global governance, especially in generating welfare, 
providing security and achieving poverty reduction. These governance deficits have 
resulted in a legitimacy crisis, which has in turn considerably reduced its capacity to 
deliver effective, responsive and accountable governance. 
4.6 Concluding remarks 
It has been argued in this chapter that contemporary globalisation is the restructured 
global form of capitalism that has gained worldwide dominance. In the past two 
decades, globalisation has been facilitated by neo-liberal ideas and powerful states' 
controlled international economic institutions promoting a reduced role for the state and 
an increased role for the market, which has resulted in the expanding reach, influence 
and power of multinational enterprises. In other words, globalisation and the 
development of its institutions are shaped by a neo-liberal global constitution that 
structurally privileges the interests and agenda of global capital and hegemonic 
countries. It is nonetheless contended in the chapter that this is not to argue that 
globalisation and its institutional frameworks can simply be explained adequately as a 
new stage of imperialism. 
It has been shown that the emphasis on the pluralism in the norm-creating processes and 
the varieties of sources and institutions in the globalisation process has created space for 
the expansion of non-state `law'. However, the articulated values and norms of non- 
state actors are frequently assimilated in inter-state institutions; and increased range of 
informal, yet norm-governed, governance mechanisms often built around complex 
networks of both public power and private authority. The evolution of this 
institutionalised form of complex multilateralism, labelled global governance, has 
practically meant a further step towards the deformalisation of the law, which involves 
transferring decision-making power from the governments to the non-territorial 
networks in which decisions are shaped in the interests of dominant actors under no 
democratic account. 
Governance, 8 "Global Governance" (2002); Colas, Alejandro, International Civil Society, Polity Press: 
Cambridge, 2002; Bodansky, Daniel, "The Legitimacy of International Governance", 93 American 
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In some aspects, the entire chapter could be read as the diverse segments of the 
deformalisation chart of public international law in the neo-liberal globalisation process, 
in which a whole range of new vocabulary has been developed, such as `regimes', 
`regulation', `governance' and `actors' to replace the `traditional' concepts of 
international law, such as `institutions', `rule', `government' and international legal 
subjects". 437 Weiss observes that the term globalisation is akin to `post-cold war' and 
analysts are "understandably uncomfortable with" the traditional frameworks and 
vocabulary used to describe old world system. 438 Thus in order to appreciate the role of 
this new vocabulary more fully, it is important to deconstruct the structure of the 
storylines that this new vocabulary communicates and its implication on "informal/non- 
legal" soft law development as a tool for developing a pluralistic model, which entails 
informal rule-setting, rule administration and conflict-settlement. In this sense this 
chapter has argued that in the `post-state' era, soft law, as the "language of governance", 
has grown to be the language of the dominant neo-liberal ideology and used to facilitate 
and legitimate a decentred and deformalised normative development. 
The basic characteristics of (informal) soft law within the process of globalisation can 
be framed as follows: First, even though it is widely recognised that soft law has long 
existed in different forms in international life, non-state or `informal' soft law and 
institutions are essentially developments that have occurred in the globalisation process. 
Second, the increasing use of soft law and the tendency to soft institutionalisations is 
closely related to the circumstances in which state power and state law are de-centred. 
In other words, the proliferation of (informal) soft law and institutional isation in this 
process is primarily related to the declining state power and the rise of non-state actors. 
Therefore, soft law has become a key concept for the development of an informal or 
hybrid legal pluralism. Third, the development of informal soft law and institutions has 
essentially taken place in market economies (or "market civilisation" as named by 
Journal of International Law (1999). 
437 Koskenniemi maps out six different steps towards this end (Koskenniemi, Frankfurt speech, 2005, http: //www. valt. helsinki. fi/blow/eci/Frankfurt-Formalism-05h(11 pdf). 
438 Weiss, Thomas, G., "Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges" in Wilkinson, Rorden (ed. ), The Global Governance Reader, Routledge: London and New York, 2005, p. 78-79 
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Gil1439). The last feature also entails the re-articulation and reinforcement of private 
authority as well as the re-location of power relations in the globalisation process. 
Fourth, as a part of the "order-creating" function of global governance, soft law seems 
to have been assumed a role in establishing public-private partnerships to facilitate the 
establishment of an unwritten neo-liberal global constitution. In the words of Mörth: "In 
systems of government the law (was) hard; in systems of governance the law is soft". 440 
439 Gill, Stephan, Power and Resistance in the New World Order, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 
2003. Kirton and Trebilcock even associated soft law with 'open democratic society' (Kirton and Trebilcock (2004) p. 11). 
440 1 . r-i- t tl_: L_ i_A 'k r_n r _.. , -- .+ -- . .... -- 
p. 1 
1V1un11,1J1I1KQ Cu. ) tJU, /[ iuw in VOV2PnQY)CQ QnU K2gu(QIIOn, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, UK (2004) 
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5 THE STATE-CENTRIC PARADIGM: THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide a tangible example of the principal characteristics of the 
state-centric paradigm by accounting for the historical experience of the so-called 
New 
International Economic Order (NIEO), which is generally seen as the most important, 
comprehensive and controversial example of the state-centric paradigm. The chapter 
first depicts with bolder strokes the economic and ideological conditions that prepared 
the birth of the NIEO in the "UN Charter era". This first section also considers the main 
sources of the NIEO focusing on the principles that are particularly relevant to the 
understanding of the state-centric paradigm rather than on a detailed survey of the 
whole scope that the NIEO covers. The next section concentrates on the normative 
quality of the principles that the NIEO lays down. 
Thereafter, the chapter examines briefly the evolution and subsequent regulatory 
activities, which either originated from the NIEO, as in the example of the 
"international code on technology transfer" or were produced as a counter to it, as in the 
case of the "OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises". Thereafter the factors that caused the NIEO to fade away in the early 
1980s are reviewed to provide an overview of the conditions out of which an alternative 
paradigm emerged. Lastly, before the conclusion, the section 4.6 assesses the lasting 
effects as well as the adequacy and effectiveness of the premises on which the NIEO 
developed as a historical model of the state-centric paradigm. 
5.2 Economic and ideological conditions and perceptions 
underlying the NIEO 
The UN was founded by 51 states. The number of the UN member states increased 
almost threefold reaching 160, two thirds of which were developing countries when the 
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UN General Assembly adopted the NIEO and the subsequent Charter in 1974. Hence, 
the profile of the organised international community of states had fundamentally 
changed. The majority in the General Assembly and the assemblies of other 
international organisations shifted to an alliance between the socialist bloc and the so- 
called Third World, which was composed of the formerly colonies of Asia and Africa, 
formerly mandate states of the Middle East and states from Latin America. 
441 
The initiative to establish a new international economic order was launched in 1973 
during the Algiers conference of the Non-Aligned countries, which decided to ask the 
UN to hold a special session relating to raw materials and development problems. 
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Shortly after, the UN General Assembly, without a vote, adopted the resolutions on the 
NIEO "Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" and 
"Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" 
in May 1974. These two resolutions, together with the subsequent "Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States" (hereinafter "the Charter") in December 
1974,443 were built on earlier efforts to address the structural inequalities of the 
international economic order. 
At the organisational/institutional level, these previous efforts included the 
establishment of the "Group 77" at the 1962 Economic Conference of Developing 
Countries in Cairo and the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964.444 At the legal level, the earlier efforts include 
General Assembly Resolution 626 (VII) entitled "Right to Exploit Freely Natural 
Wealth and Resources" in 1952 and the principle of "permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources" advanced by Chile, also in 1952 in the UN Commission on Human 
Rights. 445 The latter also adopted as a UN General Assembly resolution in 1962 entitled 
41 Malanczuk (1997) p. 28 
442 Gilpin, Robert, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton University Press: New 
Jersey, 1987, p. 275 
43 UNGA Res. 3281 (XXIX). The "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties" was adopted on 12 
December 1974 by a roll-call vote of 120 in favour, six against and ten abstentions. Six countries that 
voted against the resolution were the USA, the UK, Germany, Belgium, Denmark and Luxembourg. The 
countries that were abstaining: France, Japan, the Netherlands, Austria, Canada, Norway, Spain, Italy, 
Ireland and Israel. 
444 Berger (2004) p. 24 
"'UN Doc. E/CN. 4/L. 24 (1952) 
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"Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 
446 which basically emphasised the 
priority of state sovereignty over the right of foreign ownership of the means of 
production. 
The ideological inspiration of Third Worldism displays a rather eclectic nature. It is a 
combination of national liberalisation, anti-Western nationalism, the 
`spirit' of the 
Calvo Doctrine, 447 and a centrally planned and state-led economic development model, 
as well as, though to some extent, a "neo-mercantilism". 
448 As examined in the 
following section, the NIEO provided a profound and relevant criticism of the existing 
unequal structure of international economic relations and demand 
for justice and 
welfare. Still, despite the fact that the implementation of the reforms that the 
NIEO's 
call urged would have necessitated a radical transformation of the 
legal and economic 
international order, the economic programme in itself was hardly revolutionary. Even 
though the NIEO can to some extent be interpreted as an attempt to replace liberal 
market-oriented international regimes with a socialist-inspired centrally planned 
economic alternative, it did nonetheless not reject the integration of the Third World 
into the capitalist system. Similar to social Keynesianism, the NIEO called essentially 
for "the extension to the international economic system of the redistribute framework 
that had been consolidated in the social democracies of Western Europe after World 
War II"449 so that the weaker members of the community of states would obtain a larger 
446 UNGA Res. 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 
447 The doctrine is named after the Argentinean diplomat and jurist Carlos Calvo. The Calvo Doctrine can 
be seen as a rejection of the "minimum international standard" principle", which allowed powerful 
Western countries to interfere in the internal affairs of developing countries in the name of "the right of 
diplomatic protection". According to Calvo, it was acceptable that aliens who established themselves in a 
foreign country have the same rights to protection as nationals, but nothing more: "An exorbitant and fatal 
privilege, essentially favourable to the powerful states and injurious to the weaker nations, establishing an 
unjustifiable inequality between nationals and foreigners" (Calvo, Carlos, Le Droit International 
theorique et pratique -5th ed. 1896 in I Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, 1995, p. 521). See 
also, Sornarajah, M. International Commercial Arbitration, Longman: Singapore, 1990; Calvo Doctrine, 
Calvo Clause, I Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (1992) p. 521-523; Muchlinski (1999) p. 626. 
448 Lake, for instance, argues that the NIEO can be interpreted as a mercantilist strategy, which is 
essentially concerned with how the economic power positions of subordinate countries could be improved 
relative to dominant powers by manipulating international markets. According to this writer, mercantilist 
patterns are represented in the NIEO, but in disguise. Accordingly, the developing countries aimed with 
the NIEO to mandate unrequited capital transfer through increased foreign and development aid, the 
expropriation of foreign investment, and reduction of Third World debt (Lake, David, A., Review Essay: 
Power and the Third World: Toward a Realist Political Economy of North-South Relations, 31 
International Studies Quarterly [1987] 2, p. 231). 
aa9 Berger (2004) p. 24 
161 
share. Indeed, it was generally recognised by developed and developing countries alike 
that the NIEO reflected the need for an urgent `co-operation' within the `international 
community' for the development purpose. 450 As Lake puts it, the uniqueness of the 
NIEO lies not in its goals, but primarily in its multilateral nature. Going beyond mere 
complaints, the NIEO attempted to "mobilise the collective power of the weak" that 
constitute a large majority of UN membership. 451 In the words of Krasner, due to the 
acceptance of the claim that all sovereign states are equal, the institutional structure of 
the UN has become the most important determinant of the magnified international 
power of otherwise weak Third World. 452 
5.3 The scope and legal nature of the NIEO 
The basic underlying perception pervaded in the NIEO was that industrialised countries, 
mostly former colonial powers, were responsible for the poverty and developmental 
problems of Third World countries. Therefore, the establishment of a new international 
economic order was proclaimed, based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, 
common interest and co-operation among all states. The idea was that this new order 
would correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, eliminate the widening gap 
between the developed and developing countries. 
In addition to reaffirming the principle of sovereign equality of states, permanent 
sovereignty of states over its-natural resources and all economic activities, self- 
determination and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, 
the programme of the NIEO and the subsequent Charter include the following 
proposals: 
(i) favourable conditions for the transfer of financial resources to developing 
countries; 
(ii) debt renegotiation (i. e., reduction); 
450 Malanczuk (1997) p. 233 
451 Lake (1987) p. 232 
452 Krasner, Stephen, D., Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism, University of California Press: Berkeley, 1985, p. 59 
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(iii) the transfer of technology on favourable terms; 
(iv) strengthening the role of the UN system in the field of international economic 
cooperation, mainly on a preferential basis to provide greater assistance to 
developing countries; 
(v) the amelioration of terms of trade of developing countries; 
(vi) full and effective participation of developing countries in all phases of decision- 
making in international economic institutions; 
(vii) regulation and control over the activities of transnational corporations by taking 
measures in the interest of the national economies. 
Even a brief survey of the NIEO reveals the state-centric nature of its programme. 
Several proposals required greater governmental intervention in international markets, 
as in the example of the proposal of the creation of a generalised system of preferences 
for Third World products and the reduction of Northern trade barriers on a non- 
reciprocal basis. The programme also required a highly regulated international system 
of economic order, as in the example of setting up prices for export of developing 
countries commodities. Just as importantly, some of the provisions of the NIEO 
required the expansion of capital transfer from developed to developing countries both 
public and private in accordance with the needs and requirements as determined by the 
recipient developing countries. Moreover, the demands formulated in the NIEO were 
inherently multilateral in nature and required political concessions by the developed 
countries, which could only be obtained through collective Third World pressure on the 
453 North. 
There is no doubt that the establishment of the NIEO required fundamental changes in 
the notion of international law and law making process, necessitating a new approach to 
the theory of obligation in international law. In the words of Bulajic, the NIEO 
demanded not only new international economic law but a new method of its codification 
too. Instead of the `traditional' concept of consent as the basis of legal obligation, the 
NIEO entailed the concept of consensus, which was claimed to translate an overriding 
consensus among the states into rules of order and norms of obligation despite the 
453 Lake(1987)p. 221 
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possible opposition of the minority of sovereign states. 
454 Taking into account its 
institutional structure, it is hence not astonishing that resolutions of the UN General 
Assembly were seen as the most accessible mechanism for the establishment of a new 
understanding of international legal obligations on which the `centre-periphery' 
relations could be transformed in favour of developing countries. 
There can be pointed out a number of reasons that foreclosed the possibility for the 
NIEO of growing to be `hard' law. For instance, some legal/technical characteristics 
that the NIEO displays distinctly undermine its claim to be considered as hard law. As 
Chinkin indicates, for instance, the NIEO as well as the subsequent Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States set the agenda and established an overall political 
framework for the proposed new international economic order in general language. 455 
In other words, the provisions contained in these resolutions provided general goals and 
programmed action rather than precisely worded obligations and exactly specified 
rights. A further factor impairing the claim of the NIEO to binding authority is 
inconsistency: On the one hand it is stated that "every state has the sovereign and 
inalienable right to choose its economic system as well as its political, social and 
cultural system in accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference, 
coercion or threat in any form whatsoever". On the other hand, the NIEO envisaged the 
establishment of a world-wide planned welfare economy and for this purpose the co- 
operation of developed countries. 456 
Finally and importantly, as viewed earlier in section 2.6, the legal status and effects of 
the UN General Assembly are highly complex and controversial. From a `formalistic' 
point of view, the UN General Assembly does not possess a legislative power. Article 
10 of the UN Charter clearly states that a resolution adopted by the General Assembly is 
merely recommendation (of course, unless its content is declaratory of rules of 
customary international law). In other words, the majority of the UN General Assembly 
cannot impose its will on a dissenting minority. 
454 Bulajic, Milan, "General Principles and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States" in Legal 
Aspects of the NIEO, Hossain, Kamal (ed. ), Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order, 
Nichlos Publishing Company: New York, 1980, p. 60 
455 Chinkin (1989) p. 852 
456 For a detailed overview of such contradictory provisions, see Seidl-Ilohenveldem, Ignaz, International 
Economic "Soft Law" in 163 Recueil Des Cours (1979), especially chapter VI. 
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Yet, as Falk recalled long ago, the absence of a formal competence of the UN General 
Assembly to legislate is not a primary reason for the limit of its law-creating role. 
Perhaps before everything else, the political constraints arising from the necessity to 
converge the competing interests of state members to support legislative claims on a 
particular issue-area set the real limits upon the claim of the quasi-legislative 
competence of the General Assembly. 
457 For, if a rule is to be effective, its growth must 
be conjoined with the distribution of effective power, especially to the extent that a 
legislative claim is posited. Thus, if a voting majority in the General Assembly does not 
represent the actual power distribution, then, there is a risk of engendering scepticism 
about the authority of the General Assembly as law maker. Therefore, it can be said that 
declarations of rights and obligations on economic matters are not likely to have 
practical effects unless they are accepted by states that have the resources. Indeed, as 
will be discussed in detail in the following section, to seek to transfer economic wealth 
and technology to developing countries by using the mechanism of majority vote in UN 
General Assembly was soon proved to be operationally ineffective. As Schachter 
maintains, the concurrence of governments with economic power and resources will 
have decisive importance in the formation and adoption of soft law in international 
economic matters. 458 
Beyond what have been said, it is also highly questionable whether the mere adoption of 
UNGA resolutions should be considered enough to classify these instruments as soft 
law irrespective of whether they are formulated in `soft' or `hard' law terminology. For, 
as it has been argued by Seidl-Hohenveldern, any possible legal effect of such rules 
arises only between states having accepted the rule concerned. 459 From Gathii's point of 
view, on the other hand, the classification of UNGA resolutions as merely soft law, on 
the ground that they fail to command a sufficient level of legality is a "liberal strategy" 
developed by Western countries. 460 According to this writer, the "soft law" 
classification serves to perpetuate an unjust status quo by adopting the political posture 
that opposing claims (i. e. the bifurcation of legal claims: representing the status quo on 
45' Falk (1966) p. 788 
458 Schachter, Oscar, Recent Trends in International 'Law Making, 12 Australian Year Book of 
International Law (1988-1989) p. 13 
... Seidl-Hohenveldern (1979) p. 196 
460 Gathii (2000) p. 2032 
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the one hand and soft law in the meaning of deviations from the status quo on the other) 
"may in time become legal principles when they attain or command a sufficient level of 
legality". 461 
Recalling what has been stated above; it is possible to conclude that the NIEO was 
designed as a multilateral strategy and a global bargaining forum in an attempt to 
increase the economic and politic power of the Third World countries at a particular 
moment in history. The combination of the post-conjuncture of decolonisation, the 
institutional structure of the UN, the Cold War, and the 1973 oil crisis marked this 
moment. Its overall aim was to restructure international economic legal order to redress 
economic imbalances. However, despite the determination of developing countries, the 
NIEO did not become legally binding on UN member countries, mainly due to the 
disparity between economic and voting power in the UN General Assembly. 
5.4 The evolution of the NIEO and subsequent regulatory activities 
This section examines resolutions and codes of conduct that have been adopted or 
negotiated as a follow-up of the NIEO to give substantive content to its framework over 
the ensuing years. The section also investigates two further regulatory activities, namely 
the "ILO Declaration" and the "OECD Guidelines" both of which have been adopted 
either under the influence of the NIEO or as a reaction to it in the mid- I970s. 
The "Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order" contained a programme of action for the adaptation and implementation of the 
principles laid down in the "Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order". Indeed, efforts towards a more specialised and detailed codification 
of these issues had been successively taken up in the framework of the UN. These 
efforts included (i) the adoption and implementation of an international code of conduct 
for transnational corporations, and (ii) the formulation of an international code of 
conduct for the transfer of technology corresponding to needs and conditions prevalent 
in developing countries. 
461 Ibid. Footnote 117 
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Developing countries were long concerned about the dominance of MNEs, the "new 
imperialist agents" of the West, on their national economies including interference in 
the domestic politics. Traditional international law was considered by developing 
countries as essentially being preoccupied with the protection of foreign investment 
against nationalisation. Within the framework of the NIEO, developing countries 
therefore sought to build a new international legal regime regarding the practices of 
MNEs based on planning and restriction of business activities and to strength state 
authority. For this purpose, backed by the socialist countries, "Group 77" succeeded to 
set up a "Commission on Transnational Corporations" in 1974.462 The expectation was 
that a binding "Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations" would provide 
developing countries with the power of exercising their `sovereign right' to regulate and 
supervise MNEs and oblige them to conform to the country's economic and social 
policies. The latter purpose also involved the measures of ensuring that MNEs would 
bring more capital into the country than they take out. 
Developed capitalist countries, on the other hand, were concerned to use the Code 
"primarily as a means of protecting TNCs against discriminatory treatment contrary to 
the international minimum standards accepted by these states". 463 These two 
fundamentally opposite approaches to the role of the Codes of Conduct constituted a 
major obstacle in reaching an agreement on a UN Code of Conduct for Transnational 
Corporation. Eventually, under the US pressure, negotiations over the Code were 
abandoned in July 1992.464 
462 The Commission was established by the Economic and Social Council under resolution 1913 (LVII) 
of 5 December 1974. The preparation of the text of the Draft Code was entrusted first to an Ad Hoc Inter- 
Governmental Working Group. 
463 Muchlinski (1999) p. 593 
4' Braithwaite and Drahos (2001) p. 192. For a detailed review of the Draft UN Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations, see Muchlinski (1999) p. 592-597; Muchlinski, Peter, "Attempts to Extend 
the Accountability of Transnational Corporations: The Role of UNCTAD" in Kamminga and Zia-Zarifi 
(2000); Braithwaite, John and Drahos, Peter, Global Business Regulation, Cambridge University Press: 
the UK, 2001; Asante, S. K. B., United Nations: International Regulation of Transnational Corporations, 
13 Journal of World Trade Law, 1979 (From 1988, the title changed to "Journal of World Trade") and Vagts, Detlev, F., "The Question of a Reference to International Obligations" in the United Nations Code 
of Conduct on Transnational Corporations: A Different View, United Nations: New York, 1986; Faturos, 
A. A., "The UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations" in Horn, Norbert (cd. ), Legal Problems 
of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, Kluwer Law and Taxation: Deventer, 1980. 
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The transfer of technology was an integral part of the NIEO programme. In 1977 the 
General Assembly decided to convene a Conference on the Code to negotiate "all 
measures necessary for its adoption. °465 Under the auspices of the UNCTAD, six 
conferences were held between 1978 and 1985 with the aim to adopt a legally binding 
code on technology transfer. For this purpose, an International Code of Conduct on the 
Transfer of Technology (usually called the "TOT-Code") was drafted. As should be 
expected, however, the United Nations failed to reach agreement on a number of key 
provisions of the TOT-Code. In particular, issues such as the regulation of restrictive 
business practises in technology transfer agreements embodied in chapter IV of the 
TOT-Code and the `choice of law' governing technology transfer agreements and the 
settlement of disputes arising from them were major challenges and proved to be 
irreconcilable. These conferences therefore did not give any result and no conference 
466 has therefore been held since 1985. 
Relatedly, the International Labour Organisations (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy of 1977, also known 
as "the ILO Declaration" has also been the product of the conditions that prepared the 
NIEO. 467 The ILO has since 1919 assumed the responsibility to induce countries to 
accept and secure minimum labour standards. As Muchlinski notes, in the 1960s and 
early 1970s, labour representatives and developing countries urged the ILO to adopt a 
binding international code for MNEs. 468 The demand for the adoption of an 
international code of a binding nature was opposed by employer organisations, which 
were also represented in the tripartite institutional structure of the ILO together with 
representatives of governments and labour. The outcome of these tripartite meetings that 
took place between 1972 and 1976 was the non-binding ILO Declaration. 469 
465 UNGA Res. 32/188 (1977) 
466 For more details on the TOT Code, see Chapter 12 in Muchlinski (1999); Blakeney, Michael, Legal 
Aspects of the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, ESC Publishing: Oxford, 1989; Wilner, 
Gabriel, M., "Transfer of Technology: The UNCTAD Code of Conduct" in Horn, Norbert (ed. ), Legal 
Problems of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, Kluwer Law and Taxation: Deventer, 1980. 
467 "Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy" adopted 
by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office at its 204th Session (Geneva, November 1977). 
468 Muchlinski (1999) p. 458 
469 See further, Hepple, Bob, "Labour Regulation in Internationalized Markets" in Picciotto, Sol and 
Mayne, Ruth (eds. ), Regulating International Business: Beyond Liberalizm, Macmillan Press Ltd.: New 
York, 1999; Bratton, W., McCahery, Picciotto, S. and Scott, C. (eds. ), International Regulatory 
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The "OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises", 
adopted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 
1976,470 can be interpreted as a counter reaction of the developed capitalist countries to 
limit the possible outcome of the developing countries' efforts to regulate the activities 
of MNEs. In the words of Muchlinski, "To counter these developments, the OECD 
ministers, urged on by the US government, decided to adopt their own policy on MNEs, 
which it was hoped would influence the UN's attempts at `codification' to move away 
from a highly regulatory position of MNEs control" . 
47t Not surprisingly, the OECD 
Guidelines proved to be influential on the debates within the framework of the UN, 
considering the fact that most MNEs were based in the OECD member countries. 
Unlike the ILO Declaration, which covers only labour issues, the OECD Guidelines are 
today the only existing international tool that has set up a code of conduct for MNEs. 
However, the OECD Guidelines do not have a general applicability; they apply only to 
MNEs operating in or from the territories of the member and the other adhering states. 
The Guidelines are recommendations jointly addressed by governments to multinational 
enterprises. They provide principles and standards of good practice consistent with 
applicable laws. Observance of the Guidelines by enterprises is voluntary and not 
legally enforceable". 472 Thus, for at least three reasons the OECD Guidelines can be 
classified as soft-law: First, the Guidelines are not adopted in a legally binding form. 
Second, Guidelines are not addressed to the adhering, governments but to the MNEs. 
Third, these guidelines are only recommendation for MNEs, thus not obligatory. It is 
Competition and Co-ordination, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1996; Gunter, Hans, "The Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles (ILO)" in Horn, Norbert (ed. ), Legal Problems of Codes of Conduct for 
Multinational Enterprises, Kluwer Law and Taxation: Deventer, 1980; Blanpain, Roger (ed. ), 
Multinational Enterprises and the Social Challenges of the XXIst Century, Kluwer Law International: The 
Hague/London/Boston, 2000 
470 The OECD Guidelines were adopted as an Annex to the 'OECD Declaration on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises', which also includes 'the principle of national treatment', 
'international investment incentives and disincentives' and 'inter-govern mental consultation procedures 
on the guidelines for multinational enterprises'. The Guidelines were revised and adopted by the 
governments of the 30 member countries of the OECD and Argentina, Brazil and Chile on 27 June 2000 
(http: //www. oecd. org/dataoecd/56/36/ 1922428. pdf). 
47' Muchlinski (1999) p. 578. The writer gives the waves of nationalisation in the 1960s and 1970s, and 
the oil crisis in 1973 as other alarming reasons for OECD members to initiate their own policy on MNEs 
(Ibid). 
472 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
http: //www. oecd. org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428. pdf). 
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however important to note that the voluntary, i. e. non-binding, nature of the OECD 
Guidelines does not necessarily indicate that such rules cannot be applied effectively. 
For, as viewed in the chapter 2 in this study, the observance of soft law is primarily 
related to the content of the rules, that is to say, whether the rules at issue are acceptable 
to all parties, rather than the legal form of the instrument. 
It is also interesting to note that the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
endorsed the NIEO principles of "non-reciprocal"473 and "preferential treatment" (i. e., 
reduction of barriers) to developing countries. Although developing countries succeeded 
in pushing developed countries to adopt these principles, these endorsements were 
formulated in the form of soft law. For instance, the legal impact of the principle of 
"non-reciprocal" embodied in Article XXXVI(8) was reduced by the final paragraph of 
this Article, which provided that "the adoption of measures to give effect to these 
principles and objectives shall be a matter of conscious and purposeful effort", thus not 
a matter of obligation. 474 Similarly, the principle of "preferential treatment" in the 
GATT, negotiated during the "Tokyo Round", was authorised with `soft' wording: 
"Contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to 
developing countries". 475 
In sum, the NIEO caused considerable legal activism in the 1970s. Several resolutions, 
declarations, guidelines and codes of conduct adopted during this decade have their 
origin in the ideas proposed by the NIEO. Developing countries hoped that UN 
resolutions would lead to new and binding rules as a follow-up on the NIEO through 
majority voting in the UN committees and in the General Assembly. However, the 
search for an effective restructuring of North-South economic relations through a new 
and effective law of economic development ultimately became a `soft' and fragmented 
version of the initially desired law. 
47 This principle implies that developing countries may receive trade concessions without being required 
themselves to grant concessions. 
494 Protocol Amending the GATT to Introduce a Part IV on Trade and Development, February 8,1965, 
cited in Carlson (1984-1985) p. 1273, footnote 387 
473 Agreement Concerning A Framework for the Conduct of World Trade, reprinted in the House of Representatives Document, No: 96-153,96`h Cong., 1" Sess. 619 (1979), cited in Carlson (1984.1985) p. 1273, footnote 387. 
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5.5 The decay of the NIEO 
This section reviews the factors that have been influential on the rapid disappearance of 
the NIEO from the international agenda by the beginning of the 1980s. Since the 
conditions that gave rise to the NIEO continued to be the same, if not worse, the factors 
that have caused the disappearance of the NIEO bear closer examination. Such a 
retrospect is important not least because the same factors lie behind the dynamics that 
smoothed the path of a paradigm change in the international economic and legal order. 
As viewed earlier, the political independence of the colonial world put the issue of 
development in the centre of North-South relations. The emphasis in the 1960s and 
1970s was predominantly on economic development in national contexts, which 
required the restructuring the world economy and legal order to address the inequalities 
between developed and developing countries. In the beginning of the 1980s, this 
perspective was increasingly challenged by the emergent of the US-led globalisation 
project, which also represented a shift away from the territorially constituted state-guided 
development approach that the NIEO projected. 476 Under the Reagan administration 
(1981-1988) and Thatcher governments in Britain (1979-1990), the 1980s witnessed a 
new rhetoric of globalisation predicting a greater reliance on the market in the 
management of economic affairs and the integration of national economies into a 
`global' economy of expanding trade and financial flows. During this period, 
deregulation became a key policy measure, which also entailed privatisation for major 
state-owned industries that obviously runs counter to the fundamental idea of the NIEO 
-a state-led industrialisation. 
In addition to the spread of the neo-liberal economic policies and practices under the 
auspices of the IMF and the World Bank supported by the US and its alliance, the 
structure of private financial flow to developing countries also experienced major 
changes in the 1980s. The rise in the price of oil, combined with restrictive monetary 
policies in the major industrial countries, led to record-high real interest rates and world 
recession. The increase in interest rates generated dramatic effects in the budgetary 
allocation of developing countries. Since foreign commercial bank flows and domestic 
476 McMichael, Philip, Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective, Thousands Oak: 
California, 2004, p. 147 
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sources of capital were channelled to service debt, under pressure of the international 
financial institutions, the economic growth in highly indebted countries collapsed. 477 
The debt crisis was managed through an economic stabilisation agreement between the 
indebted countries and the IMF. Restructuring of bank debt was linked with 
macroeconomic stabilisation and broad structural reform in debtor countries. The IMF 
and the World Bank, strongly supported by the United States and other bilateral lenders, 
conditioned their lending on adoption of sound macroeconomic policies such as deficit 
reduction and on economic restructuring programs including domestic deregulation, 
privatisation, trade liberalisation, and more open investment policies. 478 As Spero and 
Hart emphasise, the critical importance of the IMF did not result from the fact that its 
loans were immense, but that the IMF provided a vehicle for imposing and surveying 
national economic policies deemed necessary for the debt repayment. "The IMF could 
hold up its lending and all rescheduling if a debtor did not agree to certain policies. It 
could also hold up disbursements of monies if a country did not meet agreed-upon 
economic commitments". 472 Under these circumstances, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
emerged as the only available source of much needed foreign capital and foreign 
exchange for the debt service and development targets. It is also claimed that the 
increasing awareness of the need for technology made by the North made developing 
countries more pragmatic vis-ä-vis MNEs and FDI. 480 
Also, the structural adjustment loan programme of the World Bank and the 
conditionality of the IMF accelerated the re-orientation of Third World country 
government policy towards liberalisation and privatisation as well as an investor- 
friendly international economic law. This development reinforced the process further, 
during which the initiative with respect to international economic law moved from the 
UN to international economic institutions, over which developed countries exercised 
comfortable control. As pointed out earlier, the UN General Assembly, with its one 
477 Spero and Hart (2000) p. 186 
478 Ibid. p. 202. 
4'9 Ibid. P. 189. For the widespread adverse effects of the domestic austerity programme of the IMF on human rights, see Chossudovsky, Michel, The Globalization of Poverty: Impacts of IAIF and World Bank Reforms, Quorum Books: London, 1997 
480 Comeaux, P. E. and Kinsella, S. N., Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law, Oceana 
Publication Inc.: New York, 1997 in 'Introduction'. 
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country-one vote rule has been the most convenient platform for developing countries to 
put the NIEO on the international agenda. On the other hand, the institutions like the 
World Bank and the IMF do not grant similar access having weighted voting systems, 
which favour developed countries. 
However, the shift from a state-led to a market-led world economy and the subsequent 
collapse of the NIEO cannot be understood and explained solely in terms of economic 
change. As Gilpin notes, "the evolution of the post-World War II international economy 
and the Cold war were intimately joined in every particular". 481 The NIEO rose on the 
historical context of the Cold War as a multilateral bargaining project and its specific 
power relations shaped to a considerable extent the perception, power and demands of 
the developing countries. Therefore, the decline of the NIEO should be placed in a 
larger context of a power shift that took place during the renewal of the Cold War in the 
early 1980s, resulting in the demise of the socialist system in 1989. This meant for 
developing countries to be deprived of the strategically valuable support especially 
within the institutional framework of the UN. In addition, on a psychological level, the 
triumph of the Western liberal idea as the basis for a political and economic system 
imposed the perception that there could be found no other way than accept the 
dominance of liberalism. 
Lastly, it should be added that the eagerness of developing countries to use their 
numerical superiority in the UN General Assembly as a tool to adopt legally binding 
rules to some extent focused on seeking redresses for what they believed to have had 
been deprived of by ex-colonial powers. Otherwise, Third World countries displayed a 
great diversity in respect to their ideological, political, social, religious, economical 
foundation and preferences. For instance, as the oil crisis in 1973 showed clearly, there 
were fundamental differences of interest between the oil exporters and non-oil producer 
Third World countries. The fragility of the Third World coalition became further 
obvious when some developing countries, especially the so-called "Asian Tigers" 
adapted themselves rather well to the conditions that the market economy required. 
In sum, as a result of the geopolitical changes and the cumulative result of the above- 
described economical and political circumstances, above all the end of the Cold War, 
481 Gilpin 2000) p. 53 
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the world-wide spread of the market economy and the increasing diversity between the 
developing countries, the NIEO has lost its significance. 
5.6 The legacy of the NIEO 
The rise and decline of the NIEO within the space of twenty years allows us to reach 
some tentative conclusions about the weakness and attractiveness of the NIEO as the 
prominent example of the state-centric paradigm, which appeared in the 1960s. In the 
light of the above considerations; it seems possible to draw the following conclusions 
regarding the legacy of the NIEO. First, the role of international law is much more 
limited in restructuring international economic order than the NIEO presumed. The 
emphasis placed on the potential of international law fundamentally to transform 
international economic relations failed to realise that the relationship of socio-economic 
forces and their underlying legal and institutional systems involve more complex 
mechanisms than merely changing or choosing the law. Although law can play an 
important role either as a facilitator or hindrance, it cannot shape and restructure the 
nature of economic relations and systems. Second, to restructure international economic 
relations requires more than the majority vote in international organisations (again the 
role of law). Third, law as a solely inter state action is not able to restructure the 
international economic legal order as the international economy consists of different 
countries with different economic regimes, businesses and legal cultures. In most 
countries, private companies are among the most important actors in shaping economic 
decisions. The total exclusion of MNEs and other non-state entities from the 
international economic decision making mechanisms combined with the understanding 
of the international economy solely as a matter of inter-state bargaining is not realistic. 
MNEs are not only and exclusively the agents of their home state but they exist to a 
large extent with their own agenda aiming to maximise their profit. To consider MNEs 
only as the subject to regulatory activities of states was consequently an illusionary 
understanding of the role of law in international economy. Ironically enough, the OECD 
Guidelines produced by developed countries to counter UN Codes of conduct are the 
only remaining legal effect of the NIEO to the present. Fourth, an important negative 
aspect of the state-centric model ä la NIEO was the rapid formation of the 
"nomenklatura" in many domestically weak countries and gave rise to the related 
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problems of corruption. Despite the nationalist discourse of the NIEO, the borrowed 
money or development aid went partly to the state-led administration and/or military 
consumption. Besides, the high level of regulation and the related bureaucratic approach 
to economic administration, as well as the regulatory procedures within the state 
apparatus, generated significant transaction costs to cover the preparation, adoption and 
dealing with regulations and governmental intervention. 482 Fifth and more importantly, 
the NIEO programme was contradictory in itself. On the one hand, the NIEO 
emphasised territorially grounded national economic development, which was inward 
orientated; its main strategy was based on the import-substituted industrialisation and 
investment of borrowed capital through state enterprises. On the other hand, the- 
international economy of the Cold War era had already displayed the characteristics of 
an increasingly globalised economic order. The degree of economic interdependence 
that the international economy had reached in the post-war period would not tolerate 
policies with such an exclusively territorially grounded notion of economic 
development. Lastly, and a more positive legacy of the NIEO is that although attempts 
to create an alternative international economic order were largely unsuccessful at UN 
level, its programme significantly raised the consciousness of the unequal structure of 
international economic and legal order. Since the demands embodied in the NIEO, 
which in due course made their way onto the development agenda in subsequent years, 
are not less relevant today than two decades ago due to the structural conditions inherent 
in international relations, the NIEO can serve as a tool of a better understanding of 
international relations. 
5.7 Concluding remarks 
It has been seen in this chapter that the basic characteristics of the NIEO can be 
examined in a number of ways. At an initial level, the NIEO was an attempt to 
fundamentally restructure international economic and legal order through international 
law in the context of the Cold War. At another level, the NIEO was an amalgamation of 
anti-colonial economic nationalism, state-led industrialisation and a highly regulated 
international economy. Its programme did not amount to a revolutionary break with the 
482 Waelde (1995) p. 21 
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existing capitalist economic relations but was an attempt to replace market-orientated 
order with a centrally planned developmental ism by using their collective power in a 
global bargaining process. Paradoxically, however, although the issues, which underlay 
the NIEO have kept their relevance, the NIEO itself was largely overtaken in the 1980s, 
as a result of the changing international economic and power relations as well as 
because of the contradictions inherent in its programme. It was eventually displaced by 
the globalist paradigm without leaving much legal trace behind it. 
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6 THE NON STATE ACTOR SUB-PARADIGM: THE 
"NEW LEX MERCATORIA" 
6.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, state-centrism, the dominant paradigm of 
international economic relations in the post-war period, was in the beginning of the 
1980s replaced by the so-called globalist paradigm. Since the 1980s, we have witnessed 
a near-complete reversal in many fields of international economy: from a state-led 
developmentalism to an increased reliance on market forces, from nationalisation to 
large-scale privatization of state-owned enterprises, from restrictions of foreign 
investment to deregulation of national economies. 
One of the most frequently occurring themes of the post- I980s has been that the non- 
state actors have acquired a legitimate authority without relying on the explicit support 
of states. Moreover these non-state actors have also assumed the roles that traditionally 
belonged to the international public authority. According to some scholars, this 
development corresponds mainly with the globalisation of international economy and 
the increasing foreign direct investments made by MNEs, bolstered by the 
developments in införmation and communication technologies, as well as the 
improvements in transport that have facilitated border-crossing exchange of goods and 
service. 
It is also said that the `old' international legal system, with its numerous nation-states, 
each having its own legal order was not suitable to respond to the increased extent, 
intensity, and speed of international transactions. Collisions of norms and gaps between 
different systems originate from the incompatibility of the transnational nature of 
modern international business and the monopoly of power claimed by states. The 
dynamic character of transnational commercial transactions is seen, in this 
understanding, as creating a need for flexible legal instruments and institutions in order 
to reduce the transaction costs and satisfy the simplicity and certainty required by the 
business community. As a consequence, commercial actors have, spontaneously and 
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gradually, adopted their own solutions directing to facilitate the drafting of contracts 
and the creation of a reliable institutional and regulatory framework for international 
transactions, the so-called `new' lex mercatoria. 483 
This chapter examines lex mercatoria as an example of bottom-up self-regulation and 
an emerging form of non-state ordering. The purpose of the chapter is to analyse in what 
respects and to what extent the `new' lex mercatoria bears the characteristics of the 
"non-state actor" paradigm. This will be done by outlining the key elements of lex 
mercatoria, which makes it `'the most successful example of global law without a state" 
at least in the eyes of some scholars. 484 Section 6.2 briefly defines the `new' lex 
mercatoria as an example of "bottom-up" regulation emanating from the commercial 
actors themselves. Moreover, this section discusses the argument forwarded by some 
scholars that this new law merchant has medieval roots. The purpose of this discussion 
is to shed light on the reasons for the recently growing interest in a claimed 
revitalisation of the old law merchant. Section 6.3 describes the institutional 
components of the `new' lex mercatoria to provide a closer look at its basic elements. 
Section 6.4 critically assesses the `new' lex mercatoria as an independent (autonomous) 
non-state legal system linking it with the discussions surrounding the concept of legal 
pluralism. This section also includes an overview of other occurrences of private 
international regimes, which occurs in the international legal debate, with the purpose of 
establishing the main characteristics of the new lex mercatoria in the larger context of 
the so-called "private global governance". Section 6.5 reassesses the significance of lex 
mercatoria in relation to the state-centric paradigm to illustrate the possible effects of 
this pluralistic and non-state law development on the traditional international law. 
483 Volckart, Oliver and Mangels, Antje, Are the Roots of the Modern Lex Mercatoria Really Medieval?, 
65 Southern Economic Journal (1999) 3, p. 429 
484 The quoted assessment belongs to Teubner in Teubner, Gunther, "Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society in Teubner, Gunther (ed. ) Global Law Without a Slate, Dartmouth: UK&USA, 
1997, p. 7 
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6.2 The definition of lex mercatoria and its historical roots: the 
"rebirth of Venus" 
Lex mercatoria or `Law Merchant' is commonly defined as transnational legal 
principles, rules and standards derived gradually from the trade usage, customs and 
practice of international commerce, formed by the commercial actors independently of 
any political authority and applied by arbitrators in case of trade disputes. 485 Thus, 
according to its proponents, lex mercatoria is (i) transnational, (ii) spontaneous, (iii) 
created by the trade community without reference to a particular national system of law 
(self-regulation), and (iv) a self-applying legal system beyond national laws 
(autonomous). 
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the last few decades have seen an explosion 
of interest in the origin of the so-called `new' lex mercatoria. Some writers confidently 
assume that the historical origins of the `new' lex mercatoria can be traced back to the 
need of merchants in the medieval feudal societies to have a common law regulating the 
trade as they belonged to different cities, ethnic groups with different trading cultures, 
rules and commercial practices. It is claimed that a body of law directed to create a 
common trade and conflict resolution rules in order to secure and improve inter-societal 
trade environment emerged sometime during the Middle Age. 486 We are solemnly 
assured by these scholars that by the end of the 11th century, the Law Merchant, much 
of which derived from the Roman law of sale, came to govern most commercial 
transaction in Europe, providing a uniform set of standards across large number of 
locations. 481 
According to the most common argument, the time between the tenth and thirteenth 
century transnational economic relations in Western Europe flourished thanks to the 
ass Berman, Harold, J. and Dasser, Felix, J., "The 'New' Law merchant and the 'Old' Sources, Content, 
and Legitimacy" in Carbonneau, Thomas, E. (ed. ), Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration, Transnational Juris 
Publications: New York, 1990, p. 21. Similar definition of the 'new' Lex Atercatoria can be found, for 
example, in Flood, J., "Capital Markets, Globalisation and Global Elites" in Transnational Legal Process, 
Likosky, Michael (ed. ), Butterworths: UK, 2002 and Teubner (1997). 
486 See for instance, Epstein, Richard, A., Reflection on the historical Origins and Economic Structure of the Law Merchant, 5 Chicago Journal of International Law (2004-2005) 2 
487 Milgrom, Paul, R.; North, Douglass, C; and Weingats, Barry, R., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade, 2 Economics and Politics (1990) 1, p. 5 
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development of a law merchant similar to the system which today is called the `new' lex 
mercatoria. 488 As claimed by these "genesis theorists", this mediaeval law merchant 
was an integrated legal system, a body of law, formed and applied by traders themselves 
to regulate their border-crossing transactions independently of any political authority. 489 
Within this story line it is also argued that, with the rise of the nation-state and the 
establishment of the Westphalian system, nation-states gained control over their borders 
and did not want to recognise any source of legitimation for rules applicable within its 
own territories other than its own. As a consequence, the mediaeval law merchant was 
first suppressed and then gradually incorporated into the national laws. 
However, there is no agreement on the existence and the nature of such a law. As 
Fassberg remarks, the question of whether lex mercatoria exists as an autonomous body 
of law has from the beginning been rather a question of belief. 490 With such doubts 
about the legal status of this mediaeval `law', it has for instance been argued that the 
law merchant is nothing but a heterogeneous lot of loose undigested customs, which it is 
impossible to dignify with the name of law". 491 Mann considered the use of commercial 
usage as the legal base (substantive law) of any decision as `undesirable' and even 
`dangerous', for the reason that such "rules of conduct of variable" would deny any 
measure of predictability and certainty. 492 Nor could it be said that the medieval law 
merchant was `transnational' due to fact that even as a body of customs it was local and 
varied. 493 However, even if such an autonomous body of law ever existed it should have 
lost much its applicability with the development of capitalism. It can be asserted that 
with the expansion of trade due to technological developments, navigation, discovery of 
new places, the East-Indian and Chinese markets, the colonisation of America, trade 
488 Foster, Nicholas, H. D., Foundation Myth as legal formant, Forum Historiae luris (18th March, 2005), 
p. 3 available at http: //www. rewi. hu-berlin. de/online/fhi/articles/0503foster. htm 
489 Donahue, Charles Jr., Medieval and Early Modern Lex Mercatoria, 5 Chicago Journal of International 
Law (2004-2005) 2, p. 22 
49° Fassberg, Celia Wasserstein, Lex Mercatoria -Hoist with Its Own Petard?, 5 Chicago Journal of International Law (2004-2005) 1, p. 67 
491 Ewart, J., An Exposition of the Principles of Estoppel by Representation, Chicago, 1900, quoted in Foster, (2005) p. 3 
492 Mann, F. A., England Rejects Delocalised Contracts and Arbitration, 33 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1984) p. 197 
493 Foster (2005) p. 4 
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with the colonies, etc. made ̀ trade customs' less uniform and less obvious as a result of 
the diversified customs. 
But, the purpose of this section is not to analyse at length whether and to what extent 
the mediaeval law merchant existed or whether the `new' lex mercatoria has its origin 
in the Middle Ages. What is interesting here are the reasons why the medieval lex 
mercatoria has become such a source of inspiration for those, who predict the 
emergence of a new global law developed outside the realm of the public sphere. To put 
it differently, why do the proponents of the `new' lex mercatoria often invoke it as a 
revival of the `old' law merchant? Is it possible that the claims involving medieval roots 
of the `new' lex mercatoria are put forward only because it provides the legitimacy and 
respectability of ancient heritage and carries with it the implication of efficiency and 
therefore strengthens the authority of the `new' lex mercatoria? 
494 
Surely, a mythical foundation for the autonomous and transnational past of lex 
mercatoria, how inconsistent and unhistorical it may be, is of course very useful as to 
provide the psychological basis of a rhetoric discourse the "re-emergence" of a "global 
private legal order in its own right". 
495 Nevertheless, there can be found at least one 
additional and possibly more important explanation for this `romance' involving the 
history of trade. 496 By having `old' law merchant as its historical reference the `new' lex 
mercatoria "conjures up an idyllic image of an international community of merchants 
interacting on the basis of shared values and customs, independent of local borders and 
law -a kind of self-governing transnational community". 
497 As Fassberg points out, it 
is this model of medieval self-governance that several proponents of the `new' lex 
mercatoria seek to reinvent. It is the possibility of the existence of a self-governing 
supranational body of legal principles developed and enforced independently from the 
national and international power and law structure that is sought after by the proponents 
49° Foster (2005) p. 8-9 
491 Teubner (1997) p. 4 
496 Donahue (2004-2005) p. 37 
497 Fassberg (2004-2005) p. 67 
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of this modern non-state body of law. In other words, the medieval lex mercatoria is 
regarded to be the archetype of the "transnational private order". 
498 
As viewed, most supporters define lex mercatoria as a spontaneous emanation of 
customs and principles arising purely out of professional mercantile circles and through 
mercantile activity and dispute resolution. 
499 It is therefore hardly surprising that the 
reference to the alleged medieval law merchant gives rise to a number of interpretations 
of this law. It is for example seen as "a coherent body of law" and "transcend 
territoriality" (Santos, for instance, defines lex mercatoria as the "oldest form of 
globalization of the legal field"). 
50° The most important one, for the purpose of this 
study, is the association of the supposedly `autonomous' `old' law merchant with the 
asserted autonomy of the so-called modem `private regimes' and other types of "private 
government" from the state as well as public international law. These "private 
governments", including the `new' lex mercatoria, are claimed to be created through 
negotiation and interaction among firms within a particular industry sector or issue area 
and incorporating a number of national and international business associations, 
producing mainly informal rules to govern their activities. 501 
As is well known, the Goddess Venus is usually known for her beauty, love and grace. 
Yet ironically, she was born of violence and chaos. In the Greek mythology, Venus was 
conceived when Kronos (Saturn in the Roman mythology) castrated his father, whose 
semen fell into the ocean. They mixed with the foam of the ocean and from this Venus 
(Aphrodite -hence her name came from the word `aphros', meaning `foam') instantly 
rose full-grown from the sea. The Mayans and Aztecs of Central America saw the 
planet Venus as connected to violence. They believed that when Venus returns back, 
she morphs from a woman into a man, gets seduced by the goddess of love into 
498 Some writers find similarities between the Middle Ages, where the co-existence of the competing and 
overlapping authorities was possible, and today's multiple and multilayered sources of authority and 
therefore call this development as the new Middle Age. For a criticism of this approach, see Hirst and 
Thompson (1996) p. 184. 
499 It is however important to note that some scholars consider /ex mercatoria as a creation of mixture of 
public and private authority and recognise the participation of governmental institutions and officials (see 
for instance Cutler, 2003, p. 5). 
S0° Santos (2002) p. 209 
so' Cutler, Haufler and Porter (1999) p. 14 
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tarnishing "his" purity, and fathers a sea monster child. Then in a ritual game of ball, 
"he" loses and must be sacrificed by the Sun, after which "he" is reborn as a "she". 502 
According to the rhetoric described above, the medieval law merchant was formed and 
developed in the circumstances of medieval political and legal fragmentation; it 
emerged from the chaos of the "Dark Age". But it gradually lost its independence when 
the nation-state had grown to its full strength at this point it became incorporated into 
the municipal law of each state. So, the most fundamental difference between the 
modern world and medieval Europe was the lack of states. 503 Yet, as it is stated by its 
proponents, today, in connection with the nation-state's retreat due to the unstoppable 
forces of globalisation, the `old' merchant law has been reincarnated; in a modem form, 
as the `new' lex mercatoria. 
The similarities between the rebirth of Venus out of the chaos and that of lex mercaloria 
out of the `darkness' of the interventionist nation-state allow drawing an analogy. If it is 
possible to label the explanation of the `birth' of this autonomous legal system as the 
creation myth that explains the cosmology of the `new' lex mercaloria, we could then 
perhaps label the second coming of lex mercatoria "the rebirth of Venus", just in 
disguise. 
6.3 A brief description of the institutional components of the 'new' 
lex mercatoria 
The notion of lex mercatoria is not new. As viewed in the previous section, it is claimed 
by its proponents that the historical roots of this law can be found in the Middle Ages. 
However, `time' is not the only factor that separates the `new' law merchant (lex 
mercatoria) from its alleged forerunner. The ̀ old' law merchant was supposedly a body 
of trader customs, practice and behaviour. On the other hand, the new law merchant, 
along with the practices of traders, is mostly made by professional lawyers, accountants, 
business associations, and technical experts, international arbitrators and legal 
academics. 
502 http: //www. britannica. com/eb/article-9075054Nenus. Depending on the source, Venus can be the daughter of Zeus and Diana as well. 
183 
The new lex mercatoria can more precisely be defined as an institutional set consisting 
of (i) "trade usage" (or custom), (ii) "model contracts", (iii) "standard clauses", (iv) 
"general legal principles" and (v) "international commercial arbitration". It can be 
argued that these components are primarily about defining the legal character, sources 
and its applicability of the `new' lex mercatoria, thus its existence as an independent 
non-state legal order. The content of these components can be outlined as follows: 
First component is trade usage (or custom) that is the central element of the new lex 
mercatoria; it is about whether lex mercatoria is a distinctive body of substantive law or 
at least a complete and coherent set of principles and rules. "Trade usage" refers to the 
commonly accepted spontaneous and autonomous trading practices of the international 
business community. 504 Since the custom regulating the business community is claimed 
to have evolved spontaneously, out of a long experience with trading practice of the 
commercial actors themselves, lex mercatoria can therefore be regarded as an example 
of a "bottom-up" regulation. 
Second is "model contracts" (or standard form contracts), which refers to a text 
formulated in advance that intends to regulate specific parts of the contract. Its purpose 
is to replace the dispositive rules of national law by proposing its own solutions usually 
including arbitration clauses. In practical terms, they facilitate the drafting of contracts 
by helping traders to formulate their obligations and rights under the contract more 
precisely and to calculate their cost more clearly. 505 There are different type of standard 
contract forms drafted by individual enterprises, standard conditions issued by trade 
associations (for example, General Trade and Conditions for the Sale of Goods and for 
Machines FIDIC), and general conditions and standard form contracts drowned by 
international organisations (ICC, UNCITRAL). The use of standard contracts dominates 
the practice of the commodity trade and plays in important role in trade sectors such as 
503 Volckart and Mangels (2001) p. 435 
504 It is commonplace to make a distinction between custom and trade usage. Custom is regarded as a 
source of law, with general validity. On the other hand, trade usage has is considered as mere contractual 
practices generally observed, which are used as proof of the will of the parties and they do not have an 
obligatory character because the parties may contract them out (Baronova, Veronika, Lex Afercatoria and 
World Trade Organisation Law In Relation To International Commercial Contracts, Interleges, 2006, 
available at http: //www. interleges. com/htmUcontents/articles/veronika0l. pdf). 
... Volckart and Mangels (1999) p. 431 
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sea and air transport, banking, construction of industrial works and international 
sob finance. 
The third component consists of "standard clauses", which refers to general terms and 
conditions for trade, as in the example of the "International Commercial Terms" 
(Incoterms). 507 
The internationally accepted norm-like "legal principles" governing contractual 
relations, such as pacta sunt servanda (contracts should be enforced according to their 
terms) and rebus sic stantibus (substantially changed circumstances can entail a revision 
of contract terms) are the fourth component of the new lex mercatoria and refer to the 
principles common to several legal systems. They are referred to when no applicable 
international trade usages exist in cases of arbitral awards, hence they function as a 
possible source of lex mercatoria. 508 Despite the fact that at a first glance, these 
principles seem not to have developed independently of the legislature of nation-states, 
Volckart and Mangels argue that the origin of these principles goes back to ancient 
times when nation-states did not exist. Therefore, according to these writers, such 
principles should be considered as the "results of private autonomous action with legal 
implication". 509 
The last component is "international commercial arbitration", which refers to the 
process of resolving business disputes between or among business parties through the 
use of one or more arbitrators rather than through courts. It requires the agreement of 
the parties, which is usually given via an arbitration clause that is inserted into the 
contract or business agreement. The decision is usually binding. Arbitration institutions 
generally restrict access to information on arbitration proceedings because of the private 
nature of the arbitration; therefore published sources of data on international arbitration 
506 Baronova (2006) p. 4 
507 The Incoterm (International Commercial Terms) is a universally recognised set of definitions of 
international trade terms, such as FOB, CFR and CIF, developed by the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC). It defines the trade contract responsibilities and liabilities between buyer and seller. For 
further information, see http: //www. iccwbo. org/policy/law/id315/index. html. 
508 Lord Justice Mustill enumerated the general principles of international contract law, as applied by 
arbitrators. His list contains twenty general principles (Lord Justice Mustill, "The New Lex Mercatoria: 
The First Twenty-five Years" in Bos, Maarten and Brownlie, Ian, Liber Amicorum for the Rt. lion. Lord 
Wilberforce, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1987, 'p. 174-177). ' 
509 Volckart and Mangels (1999) p. 431 
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are limited. 510 Still, it is generally recognised that arbitration 
has become the most 
prevalent means of dispute resolution in international commerce mainly 
due to the 
following two reasons: (i) to avoid the other parties' home court system and (ii) to take 
advantage of the international legal framework governing the enforceability of 
arbitration awards . 
511 According to Teubner, arbitration, as a self-created external 
institution, is very important for the "externalisation of the self-referential contract. "512 
Lex mercatoria, as the substantive rules applicable to `transnational' state contracts 
(or 
the so-called "internationalised contracts") and the role of international arbitration 
in the 
development of such contracts, indicates rather a peculiar aspect of the use of lex 
mercatoria. The idea that 'transnational' state contracts involving 
foreign private party 
may be governed by anational law was developed in a series of arbitral awards to 
remove investment agreements from the law of the host state mainly through 'choice of 
law' and `arbitration' clauses. The origin of the discussions concerning lex mercatoria 
(or general principles of international law) as the substantive law in regard to 
internationalised contracts can be traced back to the petroleum concession disputes. 
During the early post-colonial period, aiming to find a legitimate international basis for 
guaranteeing the flow of natural resources to the former colonial powers, some scholars 
and arbitrators argued that contracts between states and foreign private parties can be 
governed by general principles of law (or public international law). Accordingly, 
Middle Eastern petroleum concession agreements did not usually contain any provision 
5 
regarding the applicable law in order to leave this point to be decided by arbitrators. 
13 
510 Drahozal, Christopher R., Arbitration by the Number, 22 Arbitration International (2006) 2, p. 299. 
The writer nonetheless adds that Published reports highlight some basic facts about the use of 
international arbitration and its growth over time. From 1993 to 2001, annual case filings with I1 leading 
international arbitration institutions almost doubled, from 1,392 cases per year to 2,628 cases per year 
(Ibid. ). 
51 Biihring-Uhle, Christian, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 1996, p. 135 
512 Teubner, Gunther, Breaking Frames: Economic Globalization and the emergence of lex mercatoria, 5 
European Journal of Social Theory (2002) 2, p. 212 
513 The Sapphire Petroleum Arbitration is an outstanding example to demonstrate how much freedom of 
interpretation arbitrators had to determine applicable law especially in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 
Sapphire case, the arbitrator refused to apply Iranian law on the ground that "It was unlikely, in view of 
the enormous capital risk involved in the project, that Sapphire could have accepted Iranian law as the 
law applicable to the contract as such law could be changed at will by Iran". Consequently, the arbitrator 
held that the law applicable to the agreement was the "general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations" (Sapphire International Petroleum v. National Iranian Oil Company, 35 I. L. R. 136 [1963]). 
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The rationale for such `anationalisation' has been to ensure the satisfaction of foreign 
investment for its maximum possible protection in developing countries. From the point 
of view of the capital-exporting countries, the law of the (developing) state party does 
not secure enough protection as the state party may amend its law governing the 
investment agreement at will. Consequently, internationalisation appeared as the best 
solution, relocating the agreement beyond the reach of the sovereign power of the state 
party. 514 
6.4 The `new' lex mercatoria as an `autonomous', non-state legal 
order 
This section examines the asserted autonomous nature of lex mercatoria and its 
theoretical implication on the traditional doctrine of sources and subject theory of 
international law as well as on the theory of legal pluralism. Furthermore, since lex 
mercatoria is not the only occurrence of the so-called private international regimes, the 
section also gives a brief account of some other examples of these "new forms of 
governance" in order to establish the significance of lex mercatoria within the larger 
context of the "non-state actor" paradigm. 
When the `new' lex mercatoria (or the modern law merchant) is defined as a private 
transnational legal order which has emerged out of the practices of international 
business community, it goes without saying that such a definition implies a fundamental 
transformation in international law-making. For, such characteristics contrast sharply 
with both the traditional doctrines of the legal `sources' and subjects of international 
law implying the emergence of the new sources of law which do not emanate from state, 
but from non-state authority. Obviously, it can be easily inferred from such a definition 
that law is not any longer confined to the political process, but also seen as a production 
of multiple unofficial socialand economic processes, in which non-state actors stand on 
equal footing with states. As claimed by Teubner, "lex mercatoria breaks a double 
taboo about the necessary connections between law and state" by suggesting that it is 
sia On the subject of "internationalised contracts", see section 3.7.2 in this study. See also Delaume, 
Georges, R., "The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria and State Contracts" in Carbonneau, Thomas, E. (ed. ), Lex 
Mercatoria and Arbitration, transnational Juris Publications: New York, 1990; and Sornarajah, M. 
International Commercial Arbitration, Longman: Singapore, 1990. 
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law without state and it has emerged spontaneously and that is valid on a transnational 
scale without the sanctioning power of the state. 
515 
However, the interpretation of lex mercatoria is highly controversial. The above-stated 
views hardly reflect the common understanding on the subject. Even a quick inquiry 
suffices to reveal the existence of a broad spectrum of opposing views ranging from the 
total denial of the existence of such a law, to arguments against its lack of generality 
and predictability as well as arguments against its vagueness and incompleteness. Yet, 
the assumed autonomous nature of lex mercatoria is perhaps the area, where the theory 
of the `new' lex mercatoria encounters criticism most frequently as it constitutes the 
central pillar of the new sources theory of global law, which is asserted to lay beyond 
the nation-state. 
As discussed previously, according to the new non-state international legal sources 
doctrine, international law's original exclusive focus on states as the only legal subjects 
and law makers is no longer compatible with the emergence of non-state actors on the 
international stage as a result of globalisation. As it is maintained by the proponents of 
the emergence of a spontaneous new transnational lex mercatoria, the state has lost its 
previously dominant position in international policy and rule making process along with 
the decreased significance of sovereignty, around which the traditional theory of legal 
sources was centred. According to this line of understanding, the contractual rule 
making has been transformed into a source of law as a means of business self- 
organisation as a result of pressures from the dynamics of globalisation. 516 Hence, the 
freedom of the parties in international contract law is not only breaking down the 
paradigmatic concept of state-centred law and legal order, but also decreases the 
importance of political law-making. International contract becomes instead the central 
means as a source of `law' in international business requiring a reconsideration of the 
traditional theory of legal sources. 
The concept of autonomous contract refers to two distinct yet interrelated concept of 
autonomy. (i) Substantive autonomy, which describes lex mercatoria as a supranational 
legal order, distinct from both national and international public law which emerges 
sýs Teubner (1997) p. 10 
sia Berger (2001) p. Il 
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spontaneously in the framework of international trade. The parties enter in the field of 
application of this legal order when they conclude an international contract, especially 
in the cases when they submit the disputes to arbitration. Thus, the autonomy of the 
contract refers to the `will' of contracting parties, which includes both the "choice of 
law" and the means of dispute resolution as the law governing trade relations. (ii) 
Institutional autonomy describes lex mercatoria as independent from any national 
system of law and institution that is capable of functioning as a self-governing legal 
order. The greater uniformity brings about the greater autonomy. The greater autonomy, 
in turn, leads to the diminishing role of the state and decreasing relevancy of borders. 
Methods employed to attain greater uniformity for contracts include (i) the use of 
standard contracts; (ii) the choice of lex mercatoria; 
517 (iii) the reference to uniform 
principles and rules; (iv) the use of self-regulating contracts that attempt to internalise 
all aspects of the parties' relationship for example selecting the law of an acceptable 
state; (v) and the recourse to international commercial arbitration. 518 
As already noted, the search for new forms of private governance are not limited to lex 
mercatoria. As stated by Teubner, similar combination of globalisation and informality 
displaying "a highly `public' character" can be found in many other areas. 519 The so- 
called "international private regimes", which refer to those organisations that are created 
by negotiation and interaction among firms, inter-organisational negotiating systems, 
and world-wide standardisation processes, are among the most advanced examples of 
such market-based private regulatory developments. 520 They create mostly soft law in 
the form of voluntary and formally non-binding agreements to govern their activities. 521 
sl' The difficulty in determining the content of lex mercatoria has been a subject of endless debates about 
the practical usefulness of it. To provide evidence of the existence of lex mercatoria and to make it more 
accessible by formulating or codifying has been an important goal of many scholars and institutions. One 
significant example of such attempts is the so-called UNIDROIT principles (The Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts of the "International Institute for the Unification of Private Law") 
published in 1994-1995. Another is the Principles of European Contract Law of the so-called "Lando 
Commission" (the Commission on European Contract Law). For a comprehensive survey on the subject, 
see Berger, Klaus, Peter, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague, London, Boston, 1999. 
518 Amissah, Ralph, the Autonomous Contract, the International Trade Law Monitor, available at 
http: //www. cisg. law. pace. edu/cisg/biblio/amissah2. html#endnotes 
519 Teubner (2002) p. 207 
szo Cutler, Haufler, and Porter (1999) p. 14; Teubner, Gunther, Global Private Regimes: Neo-spontaneous 
law and dual constitution of autonomous sectors in world society?, Paper prepared for the Workshop on 
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To give but a few examples, the maritime transport regime, the "autonomous 
law of 
Internet", 522 the internal legal regimes of MNEs (corporate governance), professional 
self-regulation, and technical standardisation. In the environmental area, private non- 
profit and for-profit certifications, such as Eco-Labeling, Green Seal and Eco-Rating, 
which are used to ensure that those products meet specified environmental standards. 
For instance, an eco-label is a form of certification placed on a product to boost the 
market value of the product by communicating its environmentally friendly 
characteristics, such as "non-toxic" or "ozone-friendly". 
523 These certifications are 
issued by predominantly private regulators, such as "The Forest Stewardship Council" 
and "International Organization for Standardization" (ISO). It is important to note 
however that in terms of institutional structures, some of these organisations display a 
`hybrid', rather than entirely private character. For instance the French member body of 
ISO (Association Francais de Normalisation -AFNOR) is a governmental agency. 
524 
'Globalisation and Public Governance' 17/18 March 2000 European University Institute, Florence, 
available at http: //www. jura. uni-frankfurt. de/ifawzl/teubner/dokumente/global_private regimes. pdf 
521 ̀Regime theories' initially emerged to analyse international organisations from a less state-centric and 
more liberal optic. Keohane, one of the earliest `regime theorists' for instance, explains "international 
regimes" as institutions, such as international monetary regime and trade regime, with sets of formal and 
informal rules, created to facilitate cooperation among states (Keohane, Robert, 0., "Hobbes's dilemma 
and institutional change in world politics" in Keohane, Robert, 0., Power and Governance in a Partially 
Globalized World, Routledge: London and New York, 2002, p. 71). However, according to Cutler, regime 
studies did not fulfil their initial promise of including non-state actors and regime analysis was 
consequently gradually `captured' by a neo-realist synthesis of realism focussing excessively on states, 
state power and formal rule structuring (Cutler, 2002, p. 26). Koskenniemi also reaches a similar 
conclusion though on a contrasting ground. According to the writer, regime theories do not replace 
realism but embrace it. The basic unit in these theories remains power, interests and rational actors 
seeking to maximise both (Koskenniemi, Martti, Formalism, Fragmentation, Freedom, paper presented in 
Frankfurt, 25.11.2005 at a conference titled "Kantian Themes in Today's International Law" available at 
http: //www valt fielsinki. ft/blogs/eci/Frankfurt-Formalism-05h[Ij vdf). Susan Strange's early and 
prominent critique of regime analysis should also be deemed useful in this respect (Strange, Susan, Cave! 
Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis 36 International Organization [1982] 2). On the other hand, 
the injection of the concepts such as "private" and "hybrid" regimes into "state-centric" regime theories 
can be interpreted as the revision of the (neo realist) character of the regime theories to open up new 
avenues for neo-liberal school in international relations. 
522 The issue of whether the Internet has, or even constitutes, its own legal order increasingly attracts the 
attention of academics, especially in parallel to the growing importance of Internet commerce. Internet 
law has frequently been linked to lex mercatoria. For some recent examples, see Trakman, Leon E., From 
the Medieval Law Merchant to E-Merchant Law, 53 University of Toronto Law Journal (2003) and 
Polanski, P., Paul, Towards a supranational Internet law, ('Journal of International Commercial Law and 
technology (2006)1. 
523 See generally, Staffin, Elliot, B., Trade Barrier or Trade Boon? A Critical Evaluation of 
Environmental Labelling and its Role in the "Greening" of World Trade, 21 Columbia Journal of 
Environmental Law (1996) 
524 ISO has 156 national standard bodies: http: //www. iso. org. 
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Besides, it is important to remember that the interstate or international organisation 
involvement often plays an important role in the establishment or enhancement of the 
normative authority of such regimes. For instance, in the case of the ISO, the adoption 
of "the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement)" and "the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement)", 
both endowed by the WTO, have improved considerably the normative authority of the 
ISO through several provisions in the SPS and the TBT Agreements. 
As discussed in the following chapter, some of these "private regimes" are closely 
related to the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR). For example, to the 
extent that social or eco-labeling certifications communicate the social and 
environmental process and conditions relating to the manufacture of the product to 
consumers, they can be considered within the realm of the concept of CSR. Likewise, 
despite the fact that the concept of corporate governance concerns primarily the 
behaviour of corporate professionals, outlining business goals and drawing ethical 
principles, the scope and content of it also intersects with those of CSR in many subject- 
areas, in particular with accountability, transparency, and information disclosure. 
Obviously, the recognition of lex mercatoria and other forms of the so-called 
international private regimes as constituting `positive law' would not be possible 
without rehabilitating the doctrine of legal sources as well as the subject theory of 
international law. The underlying assumption of such rehabilitation is the blurring 
boundaries between the public and private domains, the transformation of state-society 
relations as well as the disappearance of the distinction between legal norms and other 
kinds of social norms. Once the distinction between `political law-making' and 'social 
norm-making' has blurred, then there is no obstacle left to assert that social groups such 
as the community of merchants are also capable of producing legal rules. 
Initially, the concept of legal pluralism (multiple sources of law) referred to the law of 
colonial societies as well as the simultaneous existence of different rules of law 
applying to identical situation within a single legal order. In the latter case, legal 
pluralism has meant the recognition of the reality and existence of especially 
indigenous, religious or ethnic law in a given society. 525 Legal pluralism, recognising 
525 According to an early definition of the concept, legal pluralism refers to the situation in which two or 
more laws interact (Hooker, M. Barry, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-colonial 
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the possibility of the simultaneous existence of multiple legal orders, contradicts the 
"ideology of legal centralism", according to which law is a "single, unified and 
exclusive hierarchical normative ordering and within which the conception of the state 
is the fundamental unit or political organisation". 526 
On the other hand, the idea of international legal pluralism might have been expected to 
threaten the traditional sources and subject theory less seriously, in particular when the 
term solely refers to inter-state law pluralism, which is often used to describe the 
`fragmentation' of international tribunals applying international law. 
527 As should be 
expected however, the antagonism grows visibly bigger when international legal 
pluralism also includes the non-state and/or hybrid (public-private mixed) legal orders, 
as in the case of lex mercatoria. Snyder uses the term "global legal pluralism" to 
describe the interconnectedness of multi-layered governmental institutions and 
networks as well as non-state ones. In other words, Snyder's conceptualization 
envisages the togetherness of both non-state and inter-state forms of governance. 
528 
Likewise, Teubner uses the concept of global legal pluralism to describe both state law 
and the "unofficial laws of world market" in which MNEs and business associations 
emerge as new legal order creators. 
529 As should be expected, however, the call for the 
Laws, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1975, p. 6). Santos defines the concept as following: "legal pluralism 
concerns the idea that more than one legal system operate in a single political unit" (Santos, 2002, p. 89). 
526 Griffiths, John, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law (1986)., 
p. 3. Santos also states that legal pluralism "originated as a scientific concept at the end of nineteenth 
century in the European anti-positivistic legal philosophy as a reaction against the reduction of law to 
state law" (Santos, 2002, p. 89). However, it is interesting to note that the recognition of the legal nature 
of customary law' within a single legal order as a form of non-state law can be the starting point of the 
concept of legal pluralism. Nonetheless, some writers hold that there is also a form of "state law 
pluralism", for instance, "when different rules, standards of proof or judges operate with respect to 
commercial issues from those with respect to other issues" (Woodman, Gordon, R., Ideological Combat 
and Social 'Observation: Recent Debate About Leal Pluralism, 42 Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law, 1998, p. 23. In this article, Woodman compares different approaches to legal pluralism 
chronologically). 
527 Among many, see Koskenniemi, Martti, Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and Multiple 
Modes of Thought, Harvard speech, 5 March 2005, available at 
http: //www. valt. helsinki. fi/blogs/eci/PluralismHarvard. pdf. Challenging the idea of the "fragmentation of 
international law", Burke-White also defines international legal pluralism in terms of the diversification 
of international tribunals applying international law, the expanding possibility for non-state actors to 
access to international tribunals, and the development of hybrid courts incorporating national and 
international law. (Burke-White, William, W., International Legal Pluralism, 25 Michigan Journal of 
International Law, 2003-2004). 
sza Snyder (1999) p. 334 
529 Teubner (1997) p. 4 
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recognition of "global legal pluralism" (or multiple international legal regimes) as an 
empirical example of how globalisation is governed does not go without being 
challenged. As will be discussed in chapter 8, some others consider global legal 
pluralism as an example of social engineering leading to the deformalisation of 
international law, which aims to smooth the path of neo-liberal globalisation. 
It is also important to note that although there is a general consensus among the 
supporters of lex mercatoria on the point that this legal body has developed 
spontaneously from the practices of commercial actors, there are different 
understandings of the degree of its autonomy. On the one hand, lex mercatoria is by 
some scholars portrayed as ultimately `autonomous'. For instance, in Teubner's 
approach states and international organisations are principally not given any role but 
through the enforcement of arbitral awards, which, according to the writer, by no means 
impairs the authentically global character of lex mercatoria nor invalidates its quality as 
a legal order. 530 On the other hand, the claim of a complete autonomy is by many 
considered as rather ambivalent, on various grounds. It is contended for example that 
lex mercatoria, though transnational in its origin, can only exist because of state laws, 
which give it effect. 531 In a similar vein, it is argued that lex mercatoria has emerged 
from a long experience with both commercial practice and material/procedural law 
formed within the nation-state". 532 Indeed, in many instances, it is still through the 
`recognition' by `official' law as a part of state law that the standards of lex mercatoria 
achieve their applicability. For instance, Lloyds Ship and Goods Form (SG Form) was 
used as the basis of the Insurance Act of 1906 and thereby it was recognised as the legal 
530 Teubner also contends that sanction is losing its place as being a constitutive part of law (Teubner, 
1997, p. 12-13). For an identical approach, see Robe, Jean-Philippe, "Multinational Enterprises: The 
Constitutions of a Pluralistic Legal Order" in Teubner, Gunther, Global Law Without a State, Dartmouth: 
UK&USA, 1997. It can be added that Robd's arguments for the desirability, necessity and reality of this 
"new legal pluralism" in the "post-absolute sovereignty era" are based on an extreme interpretation of 
liberal history and market economy. According to the writer, the definition and protection of property 
rights and the acknowledgement of freedom of contract necessarily involve the decentralisation of norm 
making in any liberal legal system (Ibid. p. 57). 
531 See, for instance, Schmitthoff, C. M., Clive Al. Schminho j''s Select Essays on international Trade 
Law, edited by Chia-Jui Cheng, Martinus Nijhoff: Dordrecht, 1988, p. 223. 
532 Zumbansen, Peer, Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial Arbitration and Transnational Law, 8 
European Law Journal (2002) 3, p. 406. 
193 
standard of the common law in the marine insurance field. 533 Just as importantly, it is 
said that the autonomy of lex mercatoria consists in the contracting parties' autonomous 
selection of the law, i. e., the so-called "choice of law" clause. 534 Indeed the provision. 
most commonly added to the International Chamber of Commerce arbitration clauses 
was choice-of-law clause, which specifies a particular law to govern the contract. 
However, in only very few examples, contracting parties have chosen that dispute 
resolutions are to be governed by the rules of lex mercatoria. Instead, the choice of law 
clauses in the majority of these contracts have provided that a possible dispute arising 
from the contract is to be resolved under one or another national law of a preferred 
country. 535 
Perhaps more importantly, the claim of the ultimately autonomous character of lex 
mercatoria fails to recognise the exclusive role of national courts, states as well as 
regional organisations, such as the EU and the NAFTA, as well as international 
organisations, such as the WTO, in its, development. Dismissing the approach that lex 
mercatoria is purely contractual, Santos points at the hierarchical structure and unequal 
character of business practices and stresses that lex mercatoria is not able to sustain 
itself as a normative order without being supported by non-contractual elements and 
political facilitation. He also adds that dominant business actors in transnational 
contracts "enjoy state like political prerogatives, immunity privileges, special access to 
political resources -tax incentives, special rights on infrastructure". lie concludes, "the 
dominant practices at the basis of this global law are the practices of the dominant 
actors". 536 
Showing a total belief in the force of private order, Teubner argues that lex mercatoria 
is "more a law of values and principles than a law of structure and rules". Its softness, 
indeterminacy and the lack of enforceability are its strength, virtue rather than a 
133 Muchlinski (1997) p. 86-87. Muchlinski traces back the historical development of English marine insurance law and the influence of Lloyds on it as the market leader as well as some other "collective 
standardization" examples (Ibid. ). 
s34 Zumbansen (2002) p. 406 
s3s Bond, Stephen R., How to Draft an Arbitration Clause, I ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin (1990) 2, p. 14 
536 Santos (2002) p. 211 
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deficiency. 537 However, such an over-emphasis on informal soft law not only fails to 
appreciate the role of `hard' law in the establishment of the principles of lex mercatoria 
performed by national and international public authorities/institutions, but also the 
interaction and continuum between hard and soft law. 538 To give but one example is the 
IMF loans, which are generally conditional on the adoption of appropriate economic 
policy reforms like trade liberalisation and privatisation or removal of legal restrictions 
on private entrepreneurship and elimination of price control. 
6.5 Lex mercatoria: the shift from public ordering to self-regulation 
This section discusses lex mercatoria within the context of blurring boundaries between 
the public and private spheres. This section also discusses the shift from the traditional 
patterns of public ordering to societal self-governance, from national/inter-`national' to 
transnational. By doing so, it is intended to provide a ground on which a clearer 
distinction can be drawn between the sovereign national state centred model of 
international economic law and the "non-state actor" model of law. The section further 
deals with the relative advantages and disadvantages of lex mercatoria as a model of 
commercial self- regulation compared to use national/international law as a basis for 
commercial regulation. In the conclusion part, the key elements of lex mercatoria as an 
example of the "non-state actor" paradigm and its distinctions from the NIEO model are 
reviewed in order to establish the nature of the paradigm shift that this study examines. 
As viewed above, it is said that the transnational expansion of the market economy in 
the globalisation process has led to the denationalisation of trade and investment rules 
and activities of MNEs and the eradication of economic nationalism. There has been an 
increasing pluralism and heterogeneity in both legal sources and subjects as regards to 
law creation and enforcement. In this process, as it is maintained, law becomes more 
and more detached from the nation-state. The new and expanding sources of law 
emanate from privatised, non-state authority. The `new' lex mercatoria, which is the 
privatisation of law creation and dispute resolution, therefore should be interpreted in 
the larger context of the transformation of state-society relations. Its proponents identify 
S)' Teubner (1997) p. 21 
538 Snyder (1999) p. 342 
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the private ordering mechanisms in transnational commerce as a noble reflection of 
societal self-government by embracing a matter of fact affirmation of lex mercatoria as 
the expression of private, autonomous, market-related power. 
539 The underlying 
conception of a pure, private law, free from political intervention and influence is based 
on the conceptual separation of state and society, which is derived from the nineteenth 
century laissez faire liberal economic model, according to which economic sphere is 
apolitical and belongs to the society. 
540 
Consistent with the above-described developments, it is suggested that the definition of 
the international public sphere has changed. Unlike the domestic public sphere, which 
refers to "the sphere of private people come together as a public" engaging in public 
debate ("rational-critical discourse") on political ("state-related") matters, 54 1 the 
traditional international public sphere was composed exclusively of states, for the 
reason that states were the only recognised and legitimate public in the Westphalian 
system. 542 It is claimed, however, that in connection with globalisation and the rise of 
non-state actors a new and non-state based global public sphere is emerging. 
S" Zumbansen (2002) p. 419 
540 The historical background of this non-interventionist state is discussed at length below in chapter VIII. 
541 Habermas, Jürgen, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Polity Press: Cambridge, 
2003, p. 176. The `contemporary' use of the concept of public sphere is virtually associated with the 
German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, who examines the concept of public sphere as the historically 
specific phenomenon that arose in conjunction with a society separated from the state in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries (Ibid. p. 127). In the first part of his above-mentioned book, Habermas examines 
the development of public sphere in the period of liberal capitalism while he in the second part 
investigates the transformation (degeneration) of the public sphere in the 'organised capitalism' where the 
distinction between private and public realms becomes blurred and where a rational-critical debate is 
replaced by apolitical/passive culture of consumption and where the public sphere becomes dominated by 
states and corporate actors. It is however important to note that Habermas' idealisation of the early 
bourgeois public sphere is criticised, among others, for exaggerating the emancipatory potential of the 
bourgeois public sphere as it was composed of only educated and propertied men. In other words, the 
early (ideal) bourgeois public sphere did not include the largest part of the population it did not include 
workers nor women. For a detailed criticism of Habermas' work, see, Calhoun, Craig (ed. ), labermas 
and the Public Sphere, The MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, 1999. 
542 Ruggie, John, Gerard, Reconstituting the Global Public Domain, 10 European Journal of International 
Relations (2004) 4, p. 504-505. It is interesting to note that there is also a social-democrat version of the 
'return' or 're-constitution' of the public sphere narrative. In relation to the neo-liberalism's crisis, some 
writers argue that there is a move beyond the Washington consensus, which represented everything 
against what is public in essence. According to this view, the more it becomes apparent that liberalised 
trade, open markets and diminished state activities have failed to create a more equitable distribution of 
social goods among citizens and people the advocates of this approach have put more emphasis on 
strengthening the public domain (i. e. civil society, institutions and governance, democratic values and the 
rule of law). For a collection of texts holding this view, see Drache, Daniel (ed. ), The market or the public domain? Routledge: London and New York, 2001 
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Accordingly, this new global public sphere "exists in transnational non-territorial spatial 
formations, and is anchored in norms and expectations as well as institutional networks 
and circuits within, across, and beyond states". 543 Thus, law is not any longer 
considered as an inter-state normative system created by states to regulate inter-state 
relations, but as a social field among many others, where both states and non-state 
actors negotiate about the validity of norms on various levels. 
The increasing tendency of self-regulation can to some extent be justified on the ground 
of efficiency, flexibility and dynamism as well as economical in producing diminished 
transactional costs. However, if law is defined as the circumstantial result of multilevel 
negotiations between different actors then it would be difficult to distinguish law from 
other social norms. Just as importantly, if law is not any longer able to provide 
predictability, certainty, or consistency due to the oscillations between the legal and the 
social, one can rightly ask what is the point attributing any normative value to 
propositions of law? 544 There are two additional factors that enhance the criticism of 
uncertainty about lex mercatoria. The first can be related to its vagueness; despite the 
recent codification efforts, such as the UNIDROIT principles, there remains great doubt 
as to the precise regulatory content of lex mercatoria. Second reason is the 
incompleteness of codifications with regard to the legal development outside of the text 
of the UNIDROIT principles. 545 Also, as Zumbansen puts it, the focus on the possibility 
of law existing outside the nouns set by states involves the risk of "seeing `law' in 
every economic agreement". 546 Moreover, even when self-regulation might be 
considered democratic for allowing the parties to regulate their own activities, it 
nonetheless raises legitimacy question of its actors who empowered themselves. As 
Günter points out, for instance, how can fragmented procedures of self-regulation take 
547 Ruggie (2004) p. 519. However, the author further adds that the new global public sphere is "constituted by interactions among non-state actors as well as states" and it does not replace states, but "embed systems of governance in broader global frameworks of social capacity and agency that did not previously exist" (Ibid. ). 
544 Twining, William, Globalisation and Legal Theory, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2000, p. 41 
545 Zumbansen (2002) p. 407 
546 Ibid. p. 406 
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into account third party interests and rights? 547 Finally, the possibility of guaranteeing 
that procedures of self-regulation are transparent enough to hold decision-makers 
responsible for decisions and their consequences is considerably limited compared to 
national law with one legitimate legislator and one coherent system of norms and 
precedents. 548 
6.6 Concluding remarks 
The aim of this chapter was to analyse lex mercatoria as a model of spontaneous 
societal self-regulation and a new form of non-state legal order. Against this 
background, the following remarks are intended to provide an account of the significant 
characteristics of the new lex mercatoria as an example of "non-state actor" paradigm 
and its difference from the NIEO as an example of the state-centred international law: 
(i) Contrary to the NIEO, lex mercatoria has not occurred out of an inter-state 
bargaining process, but it has spontaneously emerged from the custom, practices and 
behaviour of traders. Its modern version is claimed to have emerged out of the 
contractual activities of MNEs and the practices of transnational lawyers and other 
professionals engaged in international commerce: Hence, MNEs and other non-state 
business actors are the primary `subjects' of this new law. (ii) Lex mercatoria is mainly 
produced by "the social peripheries" and not by the "political centres of nation-states 
and international institutions". 549 Hence, as a non-state, "bottom-up" model of self- 
regulation, lex mercatoria breaks the imperative link between state and law. (iii) Related 
to the first two points, the `will' of state as the basis of obligation in the NIEO model is 
in the lex mercatoria replaced by the `will' of contracting parties. In other words, the 
contract has become the main source of international commercial law. (iv) 
Diametrically opposed to the NIEO's state-led economic nationalism, lex mercatoria is 
a private, market-led economic model, whose principal conviction is that the greater 
547 Gunter, Klaus, Legal Pluralism and the Universal Code of Legality: Globalisation as a Problem of Legal Theory, paper presented at Colloquium in Legal, Political and Social Philosophy, New York 
University School of Law, 25 September 2003, available at http: //www. law. nyu. edu/clppt/program2003/readings/index. htmi 
548 Ibid. 
549 Teubner (1977) p. 7 
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efficiencies and the generation of wealth and happiness can be generated through liberal 
political economy, where a distinction between politics and economics is deemed 
necessary. Although the latter recognises the importance of some governmental 
functions, especially in the domain of domestic and international security, the focus on 
theory and practice of international economic regulation has changed from law-making 
by national sovereigns or international organisations centred on the UN system to 
informal rule-making and self organisation by the international business community. To 
put it differently, the NIEO was a nation-to-nation model whereas lex mercaloria is a 
business actors-to-business actors model. (v) The NIEO intended to create a highly 
regulated international economic environment and legally binding rules for MNEs 
whereas the lex mercatoria model favours informal, flexible, discretionary, and soft 
regulations, which are responsive to fast changing economic conditions in the quest for 
enhanced market competitiveness. However, it is important to keep in mind that the last 
point describes a discursive tendency rather than the reality itself. As shown in this 
chapter, even though the law merchant itself is portrayed as autonomous, this is rather 
an ambivalent claim that obscures the fact that much commercial custom and practice 
gets `codified' either through statue or by way of its recognition in litigation, especially 
in common law countries where such recognition may acquire the status of a precedent. 
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7 THE NON-STATE ACTOR SUB-PARADIGM: THE 
EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the `new' lex mercatoria has been described as an example of a 
"bottom-up" model of self-regulation. This chapter deals with the evolution of the 
international standards of corporate social responsibility (CSR), which is seen as an 
example of a "top-down" model of self-regulation. CSR, at least as it is understood 
today, is a relatively new form of regulation. The changing character, scope and ever- 
growing magnitude of corporate social responsibility can be explained by the 
restructuring of state-market relations that have characterised the contemporary era of 
globalisation and economic liberalisation, promoting self-regulatory and non-binding 
approaches to business regulation that relates to human rights, social and sustainable 
development. Therefore CSR is analysed in this chapter within the context of the 
decreasing power of the public authorities as regulators of economic, financial or 
commercial activities and as organ i sers/guarantors/supe rv isors of public services of 
general interest. 
Section 7.2 describes the concept of corporate social responsibility, highlighting its 
distinctive features as a non-state normative order and gives examples of specific 
initiatives. The section also gives a brief account of its evolution. Section 7.3 examines 
the sources of CSR dividing it into three types based on its regulatory body. 7.3.1 
describes the first type public international CSR instruments and identifies some of their 
achievements and limitations; 7.3.2 explores the second type CSR instruments authored 
by NGOs and examines some of the most prominent multi-stakeholder initiatives. Sub- 
section 7.3.3 examines the third type CSR issued by enterprises themselves or business 
organisations in a particular field. This section also includes a discussion on the concept 
of corporate governance and examines MNEs motivations to adopt CSR codes. Section 
7.4# examines the shift toward non-governmental regulatory systems and assesses the 
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complexity of self-regulation and external regulation focusing on the role of soft 
law in 
this change. Moreover, section 7.4 assesses the motivations of MNEs to adopt CSR 
codes. Lastly, the conclusion part relates the concept of CSR to the `new' lex 
mercatoria and the NIEO in order to provide an overview of the similarities and 
differences between these three models. 
7.2 The definition, evolution and content of CSR550 
The past twenty years have seen a radical change in the relationship between business 
and society. Key drivers of this change have been economic globalisation, privatisation, 
deregulation, liberalisation, the increased size and influence of companies, and the 
declining regulatory and economic policy-making capacity of the state. 
It is a widely shared perception that MNEs are among the principal drivers and most 
important beneficiaries of globalisation, including privatisation, deregulation, and 
freeing of international trade and investment flows, which has led to MNEs rising 
influence on the development of the world economy. 551 Likewise it is generally 
recognised that the existing international instruments regulating the conduct of MNEs 
are insufficient compared to the power they have obtained in the globalisation process. 
The concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR), as frequently suggested, has 
developed as an answer to fill this perceived gap between the power and responsibility 
that MNEs possess. The 2001 European Commission Green Paper on CSR defines this 
responsibility as "a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental 
concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a 
voluntary basis". It is also added that being socially responsible means not only 
fulfilling legal expectations, but also going beyond basic legal obligation. 552 It should 
however be noted that there is no consensus over either the definition or precise content 
550 The concept of corporate social responsibility has several close terms, such as corporate citizenship, 
corporate governance as such to anti corruption obligations, consumer protection and ethical business 
standards, corporate responsibility, etc. In this study the term CSR is used as an umbrella term for all of 
these concepts, though a bit indiscriminate. 
151 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 1999, UN: New 
York and Geneva, 1999, Chapter XII, available at http: //www. unctad. orglen/docs/wirl999_en. pdf 
552 "Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility: Green Paper", July 2001, p. 
7, available at http: //europa. eu. int/commm/eniployment_social/soc-dial/csr/ rcenniner en. odf. 
201 
of CSR. Bearing this fact in mind, the international standards of CSR can be accepted as 
referring to informal and legally non-binding rules and standards adopted or issued by 
non-state actors as well as intergovernmental organisations to regulate business conduct 
especially in the domains of human rights and environment in an increasingly de- 
regulated or under-regulated global economy. 
The proliferation and growing interest in these codes during the last two decades is 
intimately connected to the increasing demand for MNEs to be more socially 
responsible. S53 However, some scholars argue that the roots of the present form of CSR 
go back to a period prior to globalisation or "the last wave" of globalisation. As early as 
the 1930s, the question whether enterprises' responsibility is limited to their 
"shareholders" or if it should go beyond shareholders and also include "stakeholders" 
(i. e. all that may be influenced by the activities of the enterprise in question, such as 
workers and citizens) was passionately discussed. 5S4 In 1953, Bowen stated that "by 
virtue of their strategic position and their considerable decision-making power", the 
social responsibility of the businessman is "to pursue those policies, to make those 
decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the 
objectives and values of our society. "sss in a similar vein, in a speech to the Harvard 
Business School, in 1969, Henry Ford II referred to CSR as the indirect obligation of 
business based on the concept of "social contact" between industry and society. 356 
Certainly, there have been contrasting views on this matter. For instance, in 1970, in his 
famous article entitled The Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Its Profits, 
... The concept of CSR is currently enjoying an unprecedented popularity. To illustrate the almost 
absurdly soaring interest in CSR, Ruggie cites some calculations performed in March 204 as a part of a 
collaborative research project, conducted by the Center for Business and Government and Harvard 
University. Accordingly, the quantity of the available information on the World Wide Web that addresses 
various aspects of CSR amounts to nearly 15 million pages (Ruggie, 2004, p. 513). 
554 See Berle, Adolf, A. and Means, G. C., The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 3d edition, Transaction Publishers: US, 1991 (The book was originally published in 1932 by Macmillan, New York). 
555 Bowen, Howard R., Social Responsibility of the Businessman, Harper & Brothers, Cop: New York 
(1953) p. 36 
556 Donaldson reformulated the idea of constructing a `social contract' for business using the analogy of how Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau used the metaphor of "social contract" to explain state-society 
relationship (Donaldson, Thomas, "Constructing A Social Contract For Business" in White, Thomas, 1. 
(ed. ), Business Ethics, Macmillan Publishing Company: New York, 1993). See also Muchlinski, Peter, 
"International Business Regulation: An Ethical Discourse in the Making? " in Campbell, Tom and Miller, Seumas (eds. ), Human Rights and the Moral Responsibilities of Corporate and Public Sector Organizations, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht, (2004). 
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Milton Friedman criticised those businessmen, who employed the concept CSR, of 
being "unwitting puppets of the intellectual forces" and "preaching pure and 
unadulterated socialism". 557 For, according to Friedman, the only responsibility of 
business is to achieve profit maximisation for the owners of the enterprises through 
competitive advantage, cost minimisation, market efficiency, and optimal returns on 
investments and market dominance. 558 
Since then, however, the concept of CSR has been transformed considerably. Although 
the issues of human and workers rights and the environment are the most central, the 
scope of social responsibilities of MNEs is at the present stage considerably extensive. 
These CSR standards are ranging from the abstention from corrupted practices, seeking 
or accepting exemptions related to environmental, health, safety, labour, taxation, 
financial incentives, or other issues, to the duty of MNEs to contribute to the sustainable 
development of the host country and encouragement of local capacity building. 559 
Therefore, some scholars maintain that the contemporary CSR standards differ from its 
earlier interpretations both in terms of motive and normative force these instruments 
possess. Before, according to this account, CSR, focused either on short-term corporate 
interests or on long-term corporate success strategy and has therefore essentially been a 
form of philanthropy. On the other hand, it is maintained that the current contemporary 
CSR has gained the character of `soft law' due to the involvement of public 
international bodies and NGOs at some or all four levels of the self-regulation 
process. 56o 
557 Originally published in "New York Times Magazine, September, 13,1970, republished in Business 
Ethics, White, Thomas, I. (ed. ), Macmillan Publishing Company: New York, 1993, p. 162. For an 
overview of the changing attitude of business approach to CSR and a criticism of Friedman's above- 
quoted interpretation, see Avery, Chris, "Business and Human Rights in a Time of Change" in 
Kamminga, Menno, T. and Zia-Zarifi, Saman, Liability of Afultinational Corporations under 
International Law, Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2000 
558 For a detailed survey of the so-called "shareholders approach", see Korhonen, Jouni, The dominant 
economics paradigm and corporate social responsibility, 9 Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Environmental Management (2002) 1 
"I See, for example, Chapter 11 titled "General Principles" in the revised OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, available at http: //www. oecd. org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428. pdf. 
56° These four levels are standard setting, monitoring, enforcement, and adjudication. On the subject, see 
Bantekas, Ilias, Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 22, Boston University International 
Law Journal (2004), p. 317 
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In respect to the development of the substantive content of 
CSR standards, which focus 
on corporate human rights obligations, an analogy 
has been drawn between the 
evolution of the concept of CSR and the so-called 
"three generations of human 
rights". 561 Leisinger, for instance, argues that although 
human rights together represent 
an indivisible whole and integral unity, it is still 
important to distinguish between 
different generations of human rights obligations of business. Accordingly, the 
first 
generation is composed of civil and political rights and the obligation of 
MNEs is not 
only to make sure that MNEs do not benefit from the violations of third parties 
(often 
host state), but also to support these rights in their "sphere of 
influence". The second 
generation deals with the rights of entitlement to a 
life of dignity, such as food, 
accommodation, and medical care. The CSR obligation of MNEs with regard to these 
rights is to protect and promote them mainly through 
doing business with good 
management principles. Lastly, the third generation CSR refers to the so-called 
collective or solidarity rights, such as the right to sustainable development. In this 
respect the CSR obligations appear to be rather a moral than legal duty with the aim to 
promote the possibilities of a full realisation of human development. 
562 
To sum up, CSR is based on the recognition that commercial enterprises are not only 
responsible to their shareholders, but also to their stakeholders, which include, among 
others, employees, customers, investors, suppliers, and all others, who are directly or 
561 According to "three generations of human rights" approach, First-generation human rights deal 
essentially with civil and political liberty and participation in political life. They serve to protect the 
individual from excesses of the state. First-generation rights, which include, among other, freedom of 
speech and right to a fair trail, have been first enshrined at international level by Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 and then by International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
created in 1966 and entered into force in 1976. The second-generation human rights are related to 
substantive equality, social justice and security. Likewise, these rights, which among others include right 
to housing, work, social security and health care, are also first embodied in the UDIIR and then in the 
International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, created in 1966 and entered into force 
in 1976. The third-generation of human rights, which existence is not widely recognised, refers mainly to 
the so-called `collective rights, including the right to development and environment. For a detailed survey 
of the discussions concerning three-generations approach, see The Universal Declaration of human 
Rights: a common standard of achievement, edited by Alfredsson, Gudmundur and Eide, Asbjern, 
Nijhoff: The Hague, 1999 
562 Leisinger, Klaus, M., On Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights, the Special Advisor of the UN 
Secretary General on the Global Compact, Basel, April 2006, available at 
http //www. novartisfoundation. com/ndf/On Corporate Responsibility for lluman Rights pdf. For 
further reading on the ̀ third generation rights in the context of the CSR standards developed by 
intergovernmental organisations, see Muchlinski, Peter, Human Rights, Social Responsibility and the 
Regulation oflnternational Business, 3 Non-State Actors and International Law (2003) p. 133 
204 
indirectly affected by the operations of these enterprises. 
563 Even though international 
CSR standards are undertaken voluntarily by MNEs they have essentially developed as 
a result of the increasing societal expectance, the pressure made by NGOs, consumer 
awareness and other external forces. Therefore, CSR can be considered as an example 
of a "top-down" informal (i. e., non-state) soft law development, driven by an external 
regulatory impulse. 
7.3 The sources of international CSR standards 
MNEs are increasingly adopting CSR codes of conduct. The incentive to do so is 
mainly coming from NGOs, trade unions, and consumer groups. However, the 
instruments dealing with the social responsibilities of MNEs have emanated not only 
from non-state and non-business groups, organisations or activists, but it has its origin 
in a much broader range of sources, including public national and international bodies 
as well as individual companies and business organisations themselves. This section 
examines the sources of CSR standards dividing them into three categories. Sub-section 
7.3.1 gives an account of public international instruments containing CSR standards. 
This section also briefly looks at the some recent governmental attempts to regulate 
business' conduct related to social and human rights responsibility through domestic 
legislation. Thereafter, sub-section 7.3.2 outlines the CSR codes emanating from NGOs. 
Lastly, sub-section 7.3.3 depicts CSR codes adopted by MNEs and business 
organisations. This section also assesses the business' motivations to adopt these codes. 
7.3.1 International instruments addressing the issue of business' social 
responsibility 
The question of whether there is any binding international regulatory regime 
specifically and/or directly addressing the social responsibility of MNEs should be 
principally answered negatively. As is well known, the existing international human 
563 For a recent survey of the "stakeholders theory", see Carroll, A. B. Managing ethically with global 
stakeholders: A present and future challenge, 18 Academy of Management Executive, (2004) 2. 
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rights regimes are designed to protect individuals 
from the power of states-564 There are 
only a few multilateral conventions that regulate directly the social responsibility of 
MNEs as a `legal person' in a particular business area. The most noteworthy examples 
are the "International Convention on Civil Liability for Damage 
Resulting from 
Activities Dangerous to the Environment" (not in force)565, the "International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage", 
566 which directly impose 
liability on legal personals including MNEs. However, it should be remembered that the 
former example is not in force yet, and both conventions are subject to a number of 
specific exemptions and reservations, which means that these conventions 
have a 
reduced capacity to be enforced. Another example of legally 
binding international 
instrument is the OECD "Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in 
International Business Transactions. "567 One could also add the numerous ILO 
Conventions as examples of legally binding international instruments even though the 
enforceability of the formally binding obligations embodied in ILO conventions are 
limited due to the fact that their application has to take into consideration the specific 
conditions of each country. 
568 As discussed in chapter 2, section 2.5 in this study, such 
564 For instance, the International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which covers all 
essential aspects of economic, social and cultural rights, is designed either to protect individual or group 
of individuals against the abuse of state power or to hold the state responsible for the improvement of 
these rights. Likewise, numerous subsequent `specialised' international instruments, such as Convention 
on the "Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women" and "International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families", which govern one 
or more of area(s) embodied in this Conversant are designed to provide similar protection or to define 
state responsibility. Moreover, even when the hard treaty form of some of these instruments may invoke 
that they constitute hard law, it is not often the case. Since most provisions of such `formally binding' 
instruments have been formulated in a general or hortatory language to reach an agreement, these 
instruments are in reality not enforceable. On the issue of soft provisions of hard law, see chapter 2 in this 
study. 
565 It has been opened for signature by the Council of Europe in 1993, not only to the member states but 
also to those non-member states, which took part in its elaboration, to the non-member states which were 
invited to do so by the Committee of Ministers and to the European Community. European Treaty Series - 
No: 150, available at http: //conventions. coe. int/Treaty/EN/Reports/litml/l50. htm 
566 Signed at Brussels, November 29,1969, entered into force in 1975, reproduced in 64 American 
Journal of International Law (1970) 2. The Convention covers pollution damage resulting from spills of 
persistent oils suffered in the territory (including the territorial sea) of a State Party to the Convention. 
The Protocol of 1992 extended the scope of the 1969 Convention to also cover the exclusive economic 
zones of the state Parties. There have also been additional Amendments in 2000, which have raised the 
compensation limits for persons who suffer oil pollution damage. 
567 It entered into force in 1999 and ratified by 36 all member and S non-member countries as of 24 
November 2005. See 
http: //www. oecd. org/document/2I/0,2340, en 2649_34859 2017813_1_I_1_1,00. html#text 
568 See, ILO Constitution, available at http: //www. ilo. orglilolex/english/constq. htm 
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compromises give the governments the possibility to 
decide the content of the 
undertaken obligation, which makes such instruments essentially soft. 
Thus, there are only a few international instruments that lay down legally 
binding rules 
that regulate the social aspects of MNEs' activities. To put 
it differently, MNEs have 
largely been able to operate in the absence of direct legal obligations on them. 
On the 
contrary, MNEs have traditionally been given rights and protection under 
international 
law. For instance, one could mention the concept of "international minimum standards 
of treatment for aliens and their property", which was developed 
during the nineteenth 
century particularly in relation to expropriation and compensation. 
569 A more recent, 
though failed, attempt to formulate a binding investor protection regime at the 
international level is the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), which did not 
provide provisions as regard to environmental, social or 
human rights obligations of 
MNEs, but provisions "for the promotion of investors and their investments". 
570 
Another example is the rapid proliferation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Over 
the last two decades or so, BITs have emerged as an important tool in the protection of 
foreign investment, which enable a foreign investor to directly seek alleged damages 
from the host foreign government by bringing a claim before an independent arbitral 
tribunal. 
Likewise, the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 
created by an international treaty under the auspices of the World Bank, enables MNEs 
to submit disputes arising from the contracts between states and MNEs to binding 
arbitration by the ICSID. 
571 Another example of an international agreement regulating 
international business, whose legal framework as regard to social dimension is minimal, 
w9 For more than two hundred years international law has laid down a minimum international standard for 
the treatment of aliens (that is, nationals of other states). Failure to comply with the minimum 
international standard engages the international responsibility of the defendant state and the national state 
of the injured alien may exercise its right of diplomatic protection" (Malanczuk, 1997, p. 256). For a 
survey on business regulation in international law, among others, see Sornarajah, M., The International 
Law on Foreign Investment, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004; Muchlinski, Peter, "A Brief 
History of Business Regulation" in Picciotto, Sol and Mayne, Ruth (eds. ), - Regulating International 
Business: Beyond Liberalizm, Macmillan Press Ltd.: New York, 1999; Muchlinski, Peter, T., 
Multinational Enterprises and the Law, Blackwell: Oxford UK & Cambridge USA, 1999; Lowenfeld, 
Andreas, International Economic Law, 2003: Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002 
570 Muchlinski (2003) p. 127. See also section 3.7.2 in this study. 
571 On the subject, see section 3.7.2 in this study. 
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is the GATT/WTO regime. 572 Notwithstanding, some writers contend that the 
GATT/WTO regime trade and human rights regimes need not be in conflict, so long as 
the trade regime is interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with the human rights 
obligations of states. 573 Indeed, as the recent Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health shows, 574 trade and investment related agreements and institutional frameworks 
might contain potentially relevant human rights provisions. Yet, such a potential should 
realistically be deemed as fairly limited. 
The existing international instruments that cover the social responsibilities of business 
display essentially a soft law character. That is to say, they are on the whole legally non- 
binding voluntary codes or declarations. Still, it can be observed that there is an 
increasing demand for and interest in regulating the social aspects of MNEs activities at 
international level. Below, three recent examples of such normative development will 
be discussed, namely the Global Compact, the UN "Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises With Regard to Human 
Rights" (the Norms, hereinafter), 575 and the "World Bank's Policy Guidelines and 
Inspection Panel". Other examples of such non-binding international instruments 
include notably the OECD 1976 Guidelines for multinational Enterprises (revised in 
2000) and the ILO's 1977 Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policies, and the long-before shelved Draft UN Code of Conduct 
for Transnational Corporations. 576 The issue of social responsibility of MNEs is also 
addressed in non-binding UN conferences, declarations and summits. The most 
noteworthy and influential examples are the United Nations Conference on the Human 
572 On WTO and human rights generally, see Marceau, Gabrielle, IVTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 European Journal of International Law (2004) 4; Various chapters in International Economic 
Law with a Human Face, Weiss, Friedl; Denters, Erik and de Waart, Paul (eds), Kluwer Law 
International: The Hague (1998); and Ala'i, Padideh, A Human Rights Critique of the IVTO: Some Preliminary Observations, 33 George Washington International Law Review (2001) 34. 
57 See for instance, Qureshi, Asif, "International Trade and Human Rights From the Perspective of the WTO" in Weiss, Friedl; Denters, Erik and de Waart, Paul (eds), International Economic Law with a Human Face, Kluwer Law International: The Hague (1998). 
574 WT/MIN(0I)/DEC/2, adopted on 14 November 2001. 
575 U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/2003/12/Rev. 2, adopted on 13 August 2003, also available at http: //www. unhchr. ch/Huridocda/Huridoca. nsf/0/64I55e7e8l4l b38cc 1256d63OO2c55e8? Opendocument 
576 Since the OECD Guidelines and the ILO's Tripartite Declaration and the UN Draft Code have already been examined in the context of the NIEO in this study, there is no need to deal with them here once again (See section 5.4 in this study). 
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Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972; the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development and the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, 25 
April 2003. 
The "Global Compact" represents an international initiative that brings companies 
together with UN agencies, labour representatives, and civil societies to support ten 
principles in the area of human rights, labour, the environment, and anti-corruption in 
2000. As of March 2006,2,900 companies from 90 countries had become participants 
in the Global Compact. 577 However, the Global Compact is not a new set of codes of 
conduct nor a regulatory instrument but a value-based platform using transparency and 
dialogue to promote institutional learning. 578 It was said that despite the absence of 
national governments, the Global Compact, with the involvement of the UN in its 
formation and the broad participation of business, trade unions and NGOs, had the 
potential to fill a vital gap in global governance. Yet, as should be expected, this UN 
initiated partnership with big business has evoked harsh criticism due to the fact that 
some of the most important business partners of the Global Compact are known as the 
worst violators of the principles that the Global Compact embodies. It is said that these 
enterprises are now given the opportunity to wash themselves under the UN flag. Still, 
albeit such weaknesses, the Global Compact can on one level be deemed important 
considering that it promotes principles derived from international law and that it 
reinforces the notion that international human rights law apply not only to states but 
also to MNEs. 
Unlike the Draft UN Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, which contained 
provisions ranging from respect for the sovereignty to observance of tax laws of the 
host state, the "Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises With Regard to Human Rights" emphasises human rights. 
Consistent with its focus on human rights, "the Norm" originated from a human rights 
body within the framework of the UN. 579 The Norms", as opposed to, for instance, the 
577 htt //www. unp, lobalcompact. org/docs/about the /stakeholder I 006 
578 http: //www. unplobalcompact. org/ 
579 For the background of the institutional development of "the Norm" see Weissbrodt, David, "The 
Beginning of a Sessional Working Group on Transnational Corporations within the UN Sub-Commission 
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities" in Kamminga, Menno, T. and Zia-Zarifi, Saman, Liability of Multinational Corporations under International Law, Kluwer Law International: The 
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OECD Guidelines, do not emphasise their non-binding nature. However, "the Norms" 
incorporate by reference to a long list of not only soft and hard international instruments 
adopted by multilateral organisations, but also private industry or commodity group 
initiatives, framework agreements between MNEs and workers' organisations and 
corporate codes of conduct. Moreover, they display some other features common to 
international non-binding instruments. For instance, the implementation of their 
obligations is to be undertaken by MNEs themselves by adopting disseminating and 
implementing them as internal (i. e., non-binding, voluntary) corporation rules. 58° 
The "World Bank's Policy Guidelines" covers three areas: (i) environmental protection 
and sustainable development, (ii) protection of indigenous people (iii) gender equality. 
None of these provisions have legal force, but these guidelines give the possibility to 
scrutinise the conduct of the Bank in these three areas. Failure by the Bank to comply 
with its own Guidelines may result in the Bank's withdrawal from a project. The Bank 
can also block companies that do not comply with the Guidelines from participating in 
future projects. In 1994 the World Bank established an independent "World Bank's 
Inspection Panel". Private individuals in the territory of the borrowing state, who have 
been adversely effected by a World Bank project, are entitled to register grievances with 
the Panel, alleging that a project does not conform with the Bank's Guidelines or 
operational procedure. Even local NGOs are able to lodge the claim on behalf of 
individuals that they have been adversely affected. If the World Bank's Board of 
Executive Directors approves the inspection panel has authority to investigate a 
particular project. 581-It can be noted that although these mechanisms incorporated in the 
framework may seem impressive, they are "often stronger on the paper than in 
reality". 582 
Against this background, it can be said that even though these above-named public 
international CSR instruments are all non-binding they do not constitute the same type 
Hague, 2000; Vagts, Detlev, F., The UN Norms for transnational Corporations, 16 Leiden Journal of 
International law (2003); and Muchlinski (2003), especially pages 135 to 145 
58o Section H, entitled "General Provisions of Implementation". 
"'http: //web. worldbank. org/W BSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEUO,, menuPK: 64129249-pa 
gePK: 64132081-piPK: 64I 32052-theSitePK: 3 80794,00. html 
582 Beyond Voluntarism: Human Rights responsibility and the developing international legal obligations 
of companies, report published by "International Council on Human Rights Policy" in February, 2002, p. 
107, available at http: //www. ichrp. org 
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of soft law. For instance, the OECD Guidelines are the only multilateral codes 
addressed by governments to MNEs. The other instruments are not directed at MNEs 
themselves, but at states whose duty is to apply them within their jurisdiction, though 
this duty is not legally binding. Also, some of the standards that the Global Compact 
and the "Norms" contain are open-ended and general compared to provisions in the 
OECD Guidelines or the ILO Declaration. 583 Another difference among them is that the 
Global Compact does not outline a monitoring and enforcement mechanism whereas the 
"Norms", the OECD Guidelines and the ILO Declaration, extend beyond pure 
voluntarism to include the creation of a "follow-up" mechanism for implementation 
especially enabling MNEs conduct to be scrutinised. However, it should be stressed that 
the mechanisms that these instruments contain can hardly be considered as either proper 
or independent monitoring and implementation mechanisms, a characteristic that 
considerably weakens their enforceability. 
Yet although the majority of public international instruments governing MNEs' social 
responsibility can be categorised as soft law, this should not be understood as saying 
that they are altogether legally or practically irrelevant. As it has been discussed in 
chapter 2 in this study, soft law can develop into hard law. Non-binding initiatives can 
pave the way for harder or legalistic initiative once particular standard is seen as 
constituting evidence of an emerging customary rule, as at least partly occurring in the 
example of the evolution of the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights". Also, 
international soft law, which is the basis of most CSR standards, carries a considerable 
moral authority. These soft law initiatives may therefore encourage or require national 
governments to incorporate its provisions in legislation at the national level. By the 
same token, soft law adopted by governments or intergovernmental processes is, often 
considered to have greater legitimacy and carry more legal weight than the form of the 
legal instrument may evoke, which in turn may encourage voluntary private initiatives 
to incorporate such standards into their policy. 
As Bantekas maintains, any reference to CSR legislation at the national level can easily 
be deemed paradoxical considering that the whole rational behind CSR rests on de- 
583 For instance, "the Norms" embodies the obligation to "provide workers with remuneration that ensures 
an adequate standard of living" without taking into consideration the wide differences in wage standards between different parts of the world (Section D, entitled "Rights of Workers"). See also, Vagts (2003) p. 801 
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regulation. 584 Indeed, with a few exceptions, which are essentially designed to secure 
the proper functioning of the market economy rather than a social concern, such as the 
regulation of bribery and tax evasion, the MNEs' extraterritorial operations are not 
subject to home state regulation. However, there have been few examples where 
proposals for legislation to deal directly with certain human rights obligations in the 
overseas activities of MNEs have been made, notably in Australia, 585 the UK, 586 and the 
US. 587 However, none of these have reached the statute book. 
Also, beyond these examples, the US Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) should be 
considered important. 588 The ATCA allows foreign victims of serious human rights 
abuse abroad to sue the perpetrators in U. S. district courts. The accused perpetrator must 
be in the U. S. to be served court papers, but otherwise neither the victim nor the 
perpetrator needs to reside in the United States. However, this 200-year-old statue, 
which provides the sole source of detailed jurisprudence in this domain, has several 
procedural and substantial limitations to be able to account for MNEs' human rights 
violations overseas. 589 
7.3.2 CSR codes and standards issued by NGOs 
NGOs have grown in number, power, and influence since the 1980s. These societal 
groups emanate from a variety of sources and include religious institutions, 
environmental groups, human rights organisations, trade unions, public health activists 
and groups that are concerned with global poverty. NGOs have been among the most 
58a Bantekas (2004) p. 325 
sss Corporate Code of Conduct Bill, 2000, available at http: //www. natural- 
resources. org/minerals/csr/docs/csr/Australia%20Corporate%2OCode%2OB ill%202000. pdf 
586 As introduced as a Private Member's Bill in the House of Commons on 12th June 2002, available at http: //www. parl iament. the-stationery-office. co. uk/pa/cm200 l 02/cmb ilI s/ 14 5/200214 5. htm 
s8' Corporate Code of Conduct Act, H. R. 4596,1061h Cong. (2000), quoted in Kinley, David and Todaki, Junko, From Talk to Walk, 44 Virginia Journal of International Law (2003-2004) p, 942 
S88 The US Alien Tort Claims Act, U. S. Code, Title: 28, Section: 1350. The ATCA was written in 1789, 
one of the first laws of the new American republic. The text of the law reads, in its entirety: "The district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort (personal injury) only, 
committed in violation of . the 
law of nations or a treaty of the United States", see http: //caselaw. lp. findlaw. com/scripts/ts search. pl? title=28&sec= 1350) 
589 Only 13 cases remain ongoing compared to 20 dismissals and three out-of-court settlements. For an 
account of the ATCA, see Kinley and Tadaki (2003-2004) p. 939 
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influential factors on the development of the concept of CSR. 590 This has mainly been a 
combined result of the following two reasons: (i) Neo-liberal policy agenda and the 
processes of trade liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation as well as the neo-liberal 
focus on the reduction of fiscal deficits and the minimisation of the role of the state 
resulted in the growing global poverty and inequality in many parts of the world. These 
developments have created governmental gaps in many public policy areas. NGOs have 
moved in to fill the void and they have even started taking the role of government in 
many social service areas. (ii) The progress in the domain of communications has 
allowed NGOs to link up with and empower individuals and groups world-wide using 
Internet-based campaigns. 
Business social responsibility concerns have attracted much attention among 
governments, business and the consumer groups in developed countries. The growing 
interest in this area has consequently been accompanied by a corresponding 
proliferation of civil society initiatives to the extent that these initiatives are 
increasingly overlapping each other creating a "risk of inducing a code fatigue". 591 
Considering the plenitude of NGO codes of conduct on CSR, to examine them it is 
imperative to divide these NGO originated instruments into different categories using 
different criteria. One example could be to divide them by the subject-matters they 
cover or to divide them in terms of their organisational structures, i. e. whether they are 
local, national or international. The diversity of NGO codes of conduct on CSR is 
examined here in three broad categories based on the institutional mechanisms they are 
equipped with. By doing so, it is intended to provide an overview of the varying 
normative content of these codes. 
The first category is composed of those codes, which solely express a set of CSR 
standards without providing any follow-up or reporting mechanisms. The examples of 
such guidelines that have no mechanisms for verifying whether signatories comply with 
the code, and has no structures in place through which a breach of the code can be 
590 See, among many others, Broad, Robin (ed. ). Global Backlash: Citizen Initiatives for a Just World Economy, Rowman and Littlefield, New York, (2002); and Crowther, David and Raymon-Bacchus, Lez, 
Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility, Ashgate: UK (2004) 
591 UNCTAD The Social responsibility of Transnational Corporations, p. 47, available at http: //www. unctad. org/en/docs/poiteiitm2 I. en. pd f 
213 
reported are The Red Cross Code of Conduct592 and the South African NGO Coalition's 
(SANGOCO) code of ethics. 593 The second type of category of NGO guidelines on 
CSR consists on those guidelines, which set down mandatory reporting requirements 
where signatories have to deliver copies of their annual reports and audited statements 
to a council or committee that scrutinises and assesses them against agreed upon 
standards. The Canadian Council for International Co-operation's (CCIC) Code of 
Ethics594 and Global Sullivan Principles, 595 which include reporting requirements for 
endorsers, can be given as examples of this category of codes. The third category of 
codes of conduct lay down more strict compliance procedures. An example of these 
types of codes are the "InterAction"596 and "People in Aid"597 which require pledge 
from CEOs to certify their organisation will operate in accordance with the code 
standards. These codes also have complaint mechanisms in place for parties to hold 
organisation responsible for their compliance with their code. 
It is true that NGOs can develop power and legitimacy. However, there are also some 
concerns about NGO's own legitimacy, transparency and accountability. For instance, 
earlier, NGOs operated by challenging the system. They sought to hold MNEs 
accountable for the negative impact that their activities created, especially in developing 
countries through the exposure and denunciation of MNEs in the mass media, consumer 
campaigns, direct actions and governmental lobbying. "They generated funds by 
fuelling public anger or guilt". 598 Today, the NGO-business-government relation has 
been transformed considerably. They do not only attempt to exert pressures on business 
through confrontational activism but often operate as part of the system via mechanisms 
592 http: //www. ifrc. org/publicat/conduct/index. asp 
593 http: //www. sangoco. org. za/index. php? option=content&task=view&id-8&ltemid=30 
594 http: //www. ccic. ca/e/001/index. shtml 
595 http: //www. globalsullivanprinciples. org. The Sullivan Principles initially developed for enterprises in 
apartheid South Africa and then in post-apartheid era they have been transformed into general guidelines. For a detailed examination of the role of "the Sullivan Principles", see McCrudden, Christopher, "Human 
Rights Codes for transnational Corporations: The Sullivan and McBride Principles" in Shelton, Dinah, 
Commitment and Compliance, Oxford University Press: New York, 2003. 
596 InterAction is the largest alliance of US-based international development and humanitarian NGO. See, 
http: //interaction. org 
191 http: //www. peopleinaid. org 
598 Nalinakumari, Brijesh, and MacLean, Richard, NGOs: A primer on the evolution of the organisations 
that are setting the next generation of regulations, 14 Environmental Quality Management (2005) 4, p. 9 
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such as strategic alliances with companies 
business associations, and governmental and 
intergovernmental organisations. 599 NGOs are taking the lead in organising and 
participating in multi-stakeholder initiatives associated with standard setting, company 
reporting, monitoring, certification and learning about good practice. 
They are, among 
many others, certification schemes, such as the 
International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) 14001,600 Social Accountability International's (SAM) SA8000,60' 
and the Forest Stewardship Council. 
602 
Such multi-stakeholder initiatives may help with harmonising standards and 
implementation procedures, and to impose some order in what has become a confusing 
array of codes of conduct. Moreover, they can encourage companies to 
internalise social 
and environmental standards more systematically throughout their corporate structures. 
To some extent, they can be seen as a positive step towards an 
improved dialogue 
between MNEs and NGOs, and beneficial to democratic governance by engaging a 
broader range of actors or stakeholders in consultative and decision-making processes. 
However, such collaborations also raise concerns involving the reliability and 
trustworthiness of NGOs. Furthermore, the NGOs increasingly compete between each 
other to raise funds from MNEs, business organisations and governments, which 
arguably caused a shift in their accountability. 
603 As Lloyd points out, NGOs' self- 
599 For example, in 1997, the World Wildlife Fund joined with companies, among others Unilever, Marks 
& Spencer and Tesco to create the Marine Stewardship Council system for promoting responsible fishing 
practices (http: //www. msc. org). 
600 ISO 14001 was first published in 1996 and specifies the actual requirements for an environmental 
management system. It applies to those environmental aspects, which the organisation has control and 
over that it can be expected to have an influence. See http: //www. isol4000-isol4001-environmental- 
management. com. 
601 Social Accountability International (SAI), which is a non-profit organisation, promotes workers' rights 
primarily " through voluntary SA8000 system based on the ILO standards and UN Human Rights 
Conventions. see http: //www. sa-intl. org/index. cfm? fuseaction=Page. viewPage&pageld=473 
602 The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is an international network to promote responsible 
management of the world's forest. See http: //www. fsc. org/en/about. . 
603 According to Krut, as of 1997, eight large NGOs controlled almost half of the US' total $8 billion 
resources for NGOs (Krut, Riva, Globalization and Civil Society, Discussion Paper no: 83, the UN 
Research Institute for Social Development: Geneva, 1997, p. 8). In her cited research, Krut comes to the 
conclusion that NGOs are increasingly differentiated to be able to act in a cohesive fashion. Krut also 
pints out the increasing tensions between Northern and Southern NGOs due to, among others, the power 
imbalance among them, limited access to technology and recourses and conflicting interests (Ibid. p. 14 
and 50). The problematic nature of the relations between local and developed country-based international 
NGOs is also drawn attention to. Blackett contends that some NGOs need to safeguard close relationships 
with international donor agencies, because this, ' according to the writer, might affect their local delivery 
(Blackett, 2000-2001, p. 48). For more scholars questioning the accountability and legitimacy of NGOs, 
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regulatory initiatives are increasingly preoccupied with "clarifying and strengthening 
upward accountability relationships to donors and governments to the neglect of 
increasing downward accountability to beneficiaries". 604 Thus, it can be predicted that 
accountability is becoming one of the key issues determining the possibility of a 
continuing influence and success of NGO guidelines on CSR. 
7.3.3 CSR codes as a response from business 
Corporate codes of conduct, which differ substantially from industry to industry and 
from company to company, can be defined as a statement of a public commitment that 
outline the ethical standards of conduct that companies will adhere to. In the beginning 
of 1990s, corporation codes of conduct have appeared as a response of MNEs to the 
increased social pressure. Hence by adopting voluntary codes of conduct that appear to 
address the concerns, of the critics on a wide array of human rights, human rights-related 
labour issues and environment the pressure is internalised. In other words, MNEs have 
essentially been driven by a concern for their public image and the desire to protect their 
brand names. However, even if the adoption of voluntary codes, to a large extent, has 
been a response to public pressure, they are essentially voluntary and. self-regulatory in 
their nature. Yet, it should be added that the social pressure induced by NGO, consumer 
groups or trade unions is not the only explanation to the bloom of corporate codes of 
conduct. 
A related subject to the issue of corporate social responsibility is `corporate 
governance', which primarily refers to the rights and responsibilities of a company's 
management, its board, shareholders and various stakeholders. However, it is generally 
recognised that corporate governance and corporate social responsibility are closely 
linked to each other and to business, performance. For, corporate governance plays a 
large part in determining the extent to which a company is accountable to shareholders 
see Anderson, Kenneth, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, The Role of International Non- 
governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11 European Journal of 
International Law (2000); Wallace, Tina, NGO Dilemmas: Trojan horses for Global Neoliberalism? in 
"Socialist Register 2004"; Petras and Veltmeyer (2001); and Okafa, Obiora, Chinedu, The Global Process 
of Legitimation and the Legitimacy of Global Governance, ' 14 "Arizona Journal of International & 
Comparative Law (1997). 
`i04 Llyod, Robert, The Role of NGO Self-Regulation in Increasing Stakeholder Accountability, paper 
prepared for "One World Trust" in July 2005, available at http: //www. un-ngis. org/cso/cso9/Self. 
Regulation. pdf 
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and can fulfil its responsibilities to society at large, including those relating to 
environmental, social and ethical issues. 
Almost all large enterprises have adopted their own corporate codes of conduct. 605 
Besides some independent business associations have adopted codes of conduct for their 
members. 606 Some of these codes outline business goals and sketch ethical boundaries. 
Others deal with CSR and human rights. The majority of CSR codes combine goals, 
ethical boundaries and duties in relation to human rights. Other issues that are 
incorporated in CRS cores are conflict of interest, confidential information, insider 
trading, labour relations, gifts, and political contributions. Moreover, most of these 
corporate governance codes set out some sort of procedures for self-evaluation and 
investigation mechanisms and possess a relatively high degree of institutionalisation. 607 
It is also interesting to note that in 1999, the OECD, which is an inter-governmental 
organisation, also issued (revised in April 2004) its non-binding Principles of Corporate 
Governance. They are designed "to assist governments and regulatory bodies in both 
OECD countries and elsewhere in drawing up and enforcing effective rules, regulations 
and codes of corporate governance". 608 
There are a number of factors that have been influential on the widespread adoption of 
corporate codes. For instance, avoiding interference by government is said to be a 
frequent reason for corporations adopting voluntary schemes. 609 The possibility to limit 
financial liability and litigation risk can also be pointed out as another reason for the 
increasing interest in adopting corporate codes. Of course, it would equally be possible 
605 Ninety per cent of Fortune 500 enterprises have some type of codes (Wiley, Carolyn, The ABC's of business ethics: definitions, philosophies and implementation, "Industrial Management", January 1, 
1995). 
606 For example, members of "Association for Investment Management and Research" are governed by 
the organisation's own code of ethics and practice standards (AIMR's Code of Ethics and Standards of 
Professional Conduct [Code and Standards], available at 
http: //www. sec. gov/ruies/proposed/s73002/dalambl. htm). 
607 "Notes" in 116 Harvard Law Review (2003) 7, p. 2126 
608 "The Principles" also aim to provide guidance for stock-exchanges, investors, companies and others 
that have a 'role in ' the process ' of developing good corporate governance. See 
http: //www. oecd. org/department/0.2688, en 2649 34727_1 1 11 1 00 html 
609 For a literature review and a three-country comparative study on the question why corporations use 
codes of conduct, see Bondy, Krista; Matten, Dirk; and Moon, Jeremy, The Adoption of Voluntary Codes 
of Conduct in MNCs, 109 Business and Society Review (2004) 4 
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to claim that codes may, by setting out duties of care, increase litigation risk. However, 
considering the current practices of the courts in various countries it is reasonable to say 
that for the time being such a risk is comparatively minor. The impact of the 
rediscovery of the 1789 Alien Torts Claim Acts has already been mentioned in the 
beginning of this chapter. Another noteworthy development is the "Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines for Organizations" (FSG), enacted by the US Congress in 1991. It holds the 
existence of corporate codes of conduct as a mitigating factor. Accordingly, if an 
enterprise is proved criminally liable as a result of its employees' unlawful action, the 
enterprise can reduce its penalty by showing that it has an established code to prevent 
such unlawful actions. The leniency under this act however depends on whether the 
internal compliance programme meets the specific instructions that have been provided 
by the FSG, which set up rules for how such codes should be made. 610 Thus, adopting 
corporate governance rules could help to escape tort liability until 2004. However, since 
November 2004, due to some significant changes in the FSG, it is not enough any 
longer to simply adopt an ethics and compliance program and then not enforce it; 
according to the revised FSG, companies have to prove that they are enforcing them as 
well. 611 
An additional reason for the proliferation of corporate codes of conduct is the internal 
mechanisms that bolster the adoption of corporate codes. The desire to protect or 
enhance company's reputation is generally seen an important motive for MNEs to adopt 
corporate codes. The relationship between a positive image, which increases the 
credentials of the company and CSR, is obvious. As it is often said, "CSR sells" by 
appealing to customers' consciences. CSR helps companies to build brand loyalty and 
develop a personal connection with their customers. Closely related to this category of 
CSR are the increasingly used social or eco-labelling; initiatives such as SA 8000, 
WRAP, 612 and SRI613. These initiatives are designed to contribute to the positive public 
610 Goldsmith, Michael and King, Chad, W., Policing Corporate Crime: The Dilemma of Internal Compliance Programs, 50 Vanderbilt Law Review (1997) 1, p. 1786 
611 http: //www. uhv. edu/compliance/pdfs/MaryLBrownFederalSentencingGuidelines. pdf 
612 Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP) is an independent non-profit corporation dedicated to the promotion of ethical and human manufacturing. The objective of the Apparel Certification Program is to independently monitor and certify compliance with its standards. See http: //www. wrapapparel. org. 
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perception of individual MNEs. However, brand image and good reputation is not the 
only motivation. By adopting such codes, MNEs may also create a cohesive company 
culture and a set of values that help them to develop a long-range point of view, which 
creates an internal company tradition. 614 Besides, CSR codes may improve crisis 
management within the company. Finally, the adoption of corporate codes by especially 
leading companies in a particular sector may create wave effect on the other companies 
in the same field to do likewise. 
In some cases the US governmental agencies require enterprises to adopt `voluntary' 
codes. For example, broker-dealers have been obliged to adopt codes of conducts on the 
ground of the "Insider Trading and Security Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988", which 
authorises the governmental agencies, among others, to `require' enterprises or 
professions to adopt their codes. 615 Of course, such state involvement in market 
economy is hardly incompatible with the liberal ideology, which generally recognises 
the necessity of the governmental interference with the market especially in the 
occurrence of "market failure", such as monopoly power, negative externalities, or 
inadequate information. As Abbott puts it, "open market rules will be subject to 
governmental constraints that operate in the public interests, such as restricting 
oppressive labour conditions for children". 616 Likewise, such involvement can also be 
justified as a method of promoting self-regulation by encouraging enterprises or 
professionals to police themselves or to take safety measures against market failure. 
Nonetheless, one might still wonder to what extent such corporate codes could be 
deemed as voluntary and autonomous when the term "voluntary " is defined as "acting 
or done with no external compulsion or persuasion", as the OECD does in stressing 
voluntary nature of CSR codes. 617 
613 Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) intends to integrate personal values and societal concerns with investment decisions. Its basic idea is that they offer an alternative investment possibility to the socially 
concerned investors. Investors that seek to own profitable companies with respectable employee relations, 
strong records of community involvement, excellent environmental impact policies and practices, respect for human rights around the world, as well as companies producing safe and useful products. See httpi/www. socialinvest. org/areas/sriguide. 
614 Levis (2006) p. 52 
615 Pitt, Harvey, L. and Groskaufmanis, Karl, A., Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability, 78 Georgetown Law Journal (1990), p. 1591 
616 Abbott (1999) p. 194 
617 Corporate Responsibility: Private Initiatives and Public Goals, OECD Publishing (2001) p. 12 
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Lastly, a series of corporate scandals, accounting fraud and corporate misdeeds in 
globally important and well known companies, such as Enron 
618 WorldCOM619 and 
Tyco International, 620 reinforced the idea that corporate self-governance is not enough; 
some sort of regulation and control mechanism is needed. It is for instance held that 
markets have failed to stop poor management performance and been unable to discipline 
the managerial function by a strong supervisory function. Often the CEO sets the 
business strategy and strongly influences the choice of the accounting practices that 
measure the success of that strategy. It is likewise argued that market have not managed 
to impose the use of single set of accounting standards that would reflect business 
performances in an objective and comparable way, which would ensure transparency 
and disclosure more efficiently. 
621 
7.4 Assessing CSR codes within the context of self-regulation 
This section aims to examine the concept of CSR within the complex interaction 
between self-regulation and external norm-setting processes. It critically assesses the 
institutional elements of self-regulatory instruments, such as competition, which is seen 
as the main mechanism for the non-coercive compliance, the effectiveness of self- 
regulation, and legitimacy issue of CSR codes. Lastly the section looks at the legal 
impacts of corporate codes. 
618 Enron, was a leading an energy and energy-related product and services provider company in the US 
before its bankruptcy in 2001 when it was revealed that its reported financial condition was sustained 
mostly by institutionalised, systematic, and creatively planned accounting fraud. See, 
http: //www. time. com/time/business/article/0.8599.263006 00. html. 
619 In 2002, WorldCom, another leading American company in telecommunication branch admitted a 
multi-billion dollar accounting fraud and filled for bankruptcy protection. See, 
htto: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/business/2143725. stm 
620 In 2002, the international CEO, the CFO and general counsel of Tyco International were charged of 
orchestrating a web of deals that looted the company of at least $600 million. They failed to disclose 
multimillion-dollar low-interest and interest-free loans they took from the company, and in some cases 
never repaid. Besides, these three executives failed to disclose their personal sales of millions of dollars' 
worth of Tyco stock On June 17,2005. In 2005, they were found guilty sentenced to between eight and 
twenty five years in prison. See http: //edition. cnn. com/2002/BUSINESS/asia/09/12/us. tyco. 
621 Corporate Governance: Does Capitalism need fixing?, "US Bilderberg Meeting", 30 May 2002, 
available at httn: //ee. eurona. eu/archives/commission 1999 2004/bolkestein/doc /speechesl/ 40'0530 
governance en. pdf 
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It can be maintained that even when it is accepted that self-regulatory informal soft law 
is the principal determinant of corporate behaviour, it should nonetheless be recognised 
that the interaction between self-regulation and external standard setting is an important 
aspect of self-regulation. For instance, governmental agencies set in many instances the 
standards for such self-regulatory private instruments, as exemplified by the "Insider 
Trading and Security Fraud Enforcement Act" in the previous section. At the 
international level, international organisations, in particular the UN and the OECD, 
have attempted to set down some soft standards of behaviour and regulation dealing 
with or check regulatory arbitrage by MNEs (though without laying down effective 
sanctions to enforce their rules and standards). Certainly, such efforts to constrain 
behaviour of MNEs do not originate only from states and intergovernmental 
organisations but both sides. As the UN "Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises With Regard to Human 
Rights" (the Norms) mentioned earlier, 622 shows, the norm-like activities of non-state 
actors can also play a role in shaping public international regulations, though to a 
considerably more modest degree. For instance, the preamble of "the Norms" refers to 
the private or hybrid normative initiatives as its source of inspiration. 
The discourse of free market ideology typically conveys that self-interest is the most 
natural way to motivate each citizen, with competition acting as the main regulatory 
device. According to this view, unlike state regulation, which is costly, anti-competitive 
and inefficient, the market's voluntary self-regulatory system incorporates the necessary 
mechanisms for generating an efficient allocation of available resources. In such a 
system, where consumers are considered sovereign in their choices, the self-regulating 
nature of competition would assure adequate levels of consumer welfare. 
However, even if it were accepted that the societal ideal of free market capitalism is 
attainable, there would still be many questions to be answered about the basic premises 
and conceivable outcomes of such idealised market capitalism. Above all, it is a false 
assumption that business always favours a voluntary and flexible regulation system over 
a compulsory one. As the WTO-based Agreements on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMs), Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS); the failed MAI, and the 
622 See section 7.3.1 
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establishment of the ICSID unmistakably demonstrate, international business can 
aggressively support "hard" law and institutionalisation when it suits their trading 
interests. For instance, Braithwaite and Drahos illustrate how Pfizer and IBM have been 
key actors on the intellectual property trade agenda. 
623 Sell also shows another TRIPS- 
related case, in which twelve MNEs actively sought for binding rules. 
624 
Competitiveness, which is generally seen to be fundamental to enhance the efficiency of 
market economy, is not often an achievable or in many cases even desired condition in 
the market economy. It is for instance maintained that state regulation is often sought- 
after by established big business as a means of keeping out potential entrants in a 
particular sector, among others, by raising the costs of entry such as minimum wage and 
compulsory parental leave. 625 Thus competition is not in every circumstance a desired 
end for business. Since the aim of this study is not to discuss the claims and nature of 
the free market economy, this point will not be further elaborated here. However, it 
suffices to say that today a worldwide merger of already large domestic and 
multinational enterprises are at an all-time high. "Global oligopoly seems a near certain 
prospect for the commodities areas" it is no longer only the case for the oil, aluminum 
industrie§, but also for the automobile manufacture as well as telecommunication, bank, 
and insurance businesses. 626 
We are often reassured about the reliability of competition as the main device for the 
non-coercive compliance with privately set voluntary standards. A company's 
reputation, it is held, is potentially its most important asset, which would function as an 
assurance of the non-coercive compliance. 627 Thus the sense of right and wrong, which 
consumers would possibly hold, is the key corrective in this mechanism. Accordingly, if 
62' Braithwaite and Drahos (2001) p. 200 
624 Sell, Susan, K., Private 
. 
Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2003. See also Picciotto, Sol, "Defending the Public Interest in 
TRIPS and the WTO" in Drahos, Peter and Mayne, Ruth (eds. ), Global Intellectual Property Rights, 
Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2002. 
625 Blundell and Robinson (2000) p. 15 
626 Branson, Douglas, M., Teaching Comparative Corporate Governance: The Significance of `Soft Law' 
and International Institutions, 34 Georgia Law Review (1999-2000), p. 672-675. The functions of the 
TRIPS agreements should also be reconsidered with a view of facilitating monopoly formations. 
627 "In competitive conditions, companies have strong incentives to strive to enhance their reputations by 
meeting customer needs and distinguishing their products from those of others, for example by branding" 
(Blundell and Robinson, 2000, p. 30). 
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a company does not comply with its privately set voluntary standards, then consumers' 
purchasing decisions will determine the fate of such a non-coercive non-compliance. 
It should indeed be acknowledged that CSR codes have to some extent been effective at 
raising public awareness because they recognise and draw upon the asymmetry of 
economic globalisation. As Blackett maintains, although commodities are produced in 
different parts of the world, the majority of these goods are imported by developed 
countries. Therefore, the consumer power strategy to influence the conduct of MNEs 
essentially targets the consumer groups in developed countries. This strategy has been 
particularly efficient in industries such as footwear and garment. 
628 There have been 
more than a few examples in which customers' choice and public opinion have been 
influential on enterprises' CSR policies and the degree of compliance with them. It is 
also true that having a reputation of being ethically and socially responsible may indeed 
be a crucial part of the business strategy for some enterprises, since such a reputation 
may bring them a competitive advantage as in the cases of Body Shop and Co-op. 
However, the notions such as "consumers' conscience" and "public opinion" are hardly 
those mechanisms that could ensure consistency, generality of practice and sense of 
bindingness that rule and rule observance would demand. Besides, it should be kept in 
mind that in today's world the "necessary material resource base" for forming `public 
opinion' or `public discourse' is not dominated by the "free press model" but primarily 
by the big business controlled oligopolic media. As Habermas put it, "the public sphere, 
simultaneously prestructured and dominated by the mass media, developed into an 
arena infiltrated by power in which, by means of topic selection and topic contributions, 
a battle is fought not only over influence but over the control of communication flows 
that affect behaviour while their strategic intentions are kept hidden as much as 
possible". 29 
628 Blackett, Adelte, Global Governance, Legal pluralism and the Decentred State: A Labor Law Critique 
of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (2000-2001) p. 425. Campaign 
against Nike is among the best-known examples of how enterprises can be forced to be responsive to 
consumer pressure and media exposure. Nike has been criticised for contracting with factories that 
apparently used sweatshop labour in countries like China, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and 
Mexico. The company has often been subject to much critical coverage of the poor working conditions 
and exploitation of cheap overseas labour employed in the free trade zone where their goods are typically 
manufactured. Sources of this criticism include Naomi Klein's well-known book titled "No Logo". On 
the subject, see "Clean Clothes Campaign": http: //www. clcanclothes. org/companies/nike. htm. 
629 Habermas, Jürgen, "Further Reflection on the Public Sphere" in Calhoun, Craig (ed. ), Ilabermas and 
the Public Sphere, The MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London (1999) p. 437. 
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Relatedly, NGÖs' influence is not always consistent and dependable not least because 
of their media-centred campaign strategies. One inevitable consequence is the 
discriminatory practice where those MNEs that may attract more media attention are 
more likely be targeted. To put it differently, while NGOs may raise public awareness 
to a certain degree, this contribution is often limited to particular situations and far from 
bringing a systematic and multifaceted understanding of the risks and complexities that 
the self-regulatory initiatives of enterprises present. Moreover, as pointed out by Levis, 
if NGO pressure is crucial for the adoption of CSR codes, it is then important to 
question NGOs' capacity to efficiently bargain with MNEs. 630 
Legitimacy is also an issue for CSR codes. Indeed, self-regulatory CSR may conflict 
with the principles of democratic legitimacy. One may regard self-regulatory business 
codes as the exercise of a legislative power that society did not give. Another question 
that is important to consider is how far is it justifiable to accord private enterprises, 
whose primary goal is to generate private profit and wealth, the regulatory power to 
design common good and control the direction and nature of societal development. An 
equally essential concern is whether public goods such as education, health, public 
transport and environmental management could (and should) be provided within the 
sphere of "business' social or indirect obligation", and if so, to what extent? 
It can further be added that CSR codes suffer from a credibility problem mainly due to 
their limited or non-existing enforceability. It is a widespread perception that companies 
adopt corporate codes mostly as a matter of creating good public relations. These codes 
have been characterised as being an empty gesture, window-dressing, and even a "fig 
leaf'. 631 In the words of Muchlinski, "Internal codes of conduct can be dismissed as 
little more than public relations exercises lacking any opinio juris from among the 
community of managers that they seek to regulate. This view may be reinforced by 
reference to the issue of enforceability (... ) such codes often contain no sanctions 
against non-compliance". 632 Indeed, all these companies, such as Enron, which have 
been involved in recent financial fiascos, had ethical codes. The question therefore 
appears to be whether corporate codes are effective as social documents. 
63o Levis (2006) p. 52 
631 "Notes", 116 Harvard Law Review (2003) 7, 'p. 2131 
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It should nonetheless be noted that CSR codes might create legal impact though to a 
limited extent. First, proclamations made by corporations of standards may have legal 
enforceability. The most interesting development in this regard is the perception in 
relation to the effect of public statements about a company's socially responsible 
practices on the choices of consumers. In the Kasky v. Nike case, Nike was sued by the 
consumer activist Marc Kasky in 1998, for violating California's consumer-protection 
laws concerning allegedly false public statement and advertisement. 
633 Although the 
case was settled in September 2003, it is important to note that the Supreme Court of 
California concluded that Nike's statements were `commercial' in nature and therefore 
subject to the limitations under unfair competition -law. 
634 Second, standards embodied 
in industry codes can be adopted by regulatory agencies as reporting requirements. As 
in the example of mandatory annual disclosure and reporting requirements for the 
largest MNEs under French corporation law, such standards may become indirectly 
binding on these enterprises. 635 
Yet, it is important to underline that the above-expressed concerns should however not 
be understood as suggesting that private enterprises can by definition not have larger 
societal concerns than to generate profits. Nor is a critical analysis of the concept of 
CSR as a model of self-regulation the same thing as arguing that only the state is able to 
know what is good for the society as a whole. Governmental regulation system may 
indeed lead to the accumulation of layers of regulation, which may result in a reduced 
democratic accountability. 636 It should also be evident that non-state actors can or 
should take part in norm-creating and standard-setting processes, especially when their 
632 Muchlinski (1997) p. 84 
633 Prior to this case, Nike publicly stated against the criticisms concerning wages, treatment and safety 
conditions of Nike's workers at overseas factories. Nike v. Kasky, 79 Cal. App. 4th 165,93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
854 (Cal. App. 2000), available at 
http: //www. firstamendmentcenter. ora/faclibrarv/casesummaryasnx? case=Nike v Kasky 
634 The California Supreme Court, Kasky v. Nike, Inc. , 27 Cal. 4th 939,45 P. 3d 243 (Cal. 2002), 
available at http: //www. firstamendmentcenter. org/faclibrary/casesummary. aspx? case=Nike v_Kasky 
635 Bantekas gives Nouvelles Regulations Economique (NRE) as an example of the increasing pressure 
from society in all developed countries to impose legally enforceable public disclosure requirements upon 
enterprises. Article 21 of French Law No: 2201-152 of 2001 "imposes reporting obligations (public 
disclosure) on all nationally listed companies, pertaining among others to the environment, domestic and 
international labour relations, local community, and others" (Bantekas, 2004, p. 327). 
636 Blundell, John and Robinson, Colin, Regulation Without State, "Reading 52", The Institute of 
Economic Affairs: London, 2000 p. 2. 
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" technical knowledge and other types of experiences within a particular 
business activity 
are needed to develop a regulatory framework in an efficient and more participatory 
way. Such participation may also enhance compliance level. 
7.5 Concluding remarks 
The last two decades have seen a proliferation of corporate codes of conduct and an 
increased emphasis on corporate social responsibility. This development has emerged in 
the aftermath of a period that saw a major shift towards policies enhancing the role of 
MNEs and foreign direct investment. As has been discussed in chapter 5, in the 1970s 
many national governments sought to regulate the activities of MN Es, whereas the 
1980s were a decade of deregulation and increased efforts to attract foreign investment. 
These changes required a significant modification of state-market relations resulting in a 
decrease in the economic and regulatory role of the state and the rise of the authority of 
non-state actors in relation to standard setting and implementation. 
The key findings of this chapter are: 
(i) CSR has gained currency especially in the 1990s promoting non-state and voluntary 
initiatives to regulate social, environmental and human rights dimensions of business 
activities. (ii) As self-regulatory initiatives, both CSR and lex mercatoria can best be 
understood through the three interrelated key discourses: economic globalisation, 
decline of state power and legal pluralism. (iii) As opposed to the NIEO, which 
conceived regulation of MNEs falling strictly in the realm of public sphere, CSR has 
developed as a model of a self-regulated market economy, in which deregulation and 
increased flexibility assume a central position. Indeed, both CSR and lex mercatoria are 
favoured on the ground that they are more flexible, competitive, efficient and less 
expensive than other legal solutions. (iv) CSR, like lex mercatoria, has largely 
developed outside the realm of states and international organisations' political and legal 
structure. It involves a transfer of regulatory authority to non-state actors. Therefore, the 
shift from the NIEO to the `new' lex mercatoria and CSR can be understood as a shift 
from public ordering to self-regulation. (v) Non-coercive voluntary compliance is the 
primary mechanism of enforcement in both CSR and lex mercatoria. (vi) Although CSR 
is often referred to as "voluntary", most CSR codes have been adopted under strong 
pressures from NGOs, legal and regulatory arrangements, workers' organisations, and 
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from the need to protect the brand or the reputational capital. Therefore, CSR can be 
seen as an example of "top-down" model of informal soft law. Finally, (vii) even 
though CSR may potentially undermine and marginalise the public nature of the issues, 
such as utilisation and redistribution of common resources and wealth, it can 
nonetheless contribute to raising awareness of certain social and environmental 
problems. 
227 
8 THE HEGEMONIC. STATE PARADIGM: FROM 
THE GATT TO THE WTO 
8.1 Introduction 
It is stressed throughout this study that deregulation and non-state soft law development 
have been central to the liberal legal discourse of globalisation. In the previous chapters 
the trend of the transfer of regulatory authority from state to non-state actors has been 
exemplified as an integral part of the policy of deregulation, privatisation and economic 
liberalisation, promoted by neo-liberal ideology. However, it is argued in this study that 
this informal, flexible and soft regulatory promotion of globalisation has gone hand in 
hand with the hardening of governmental and intergovernmental rules to protect 
property rights and to minimise barriers to the mobility of goods, services and capital in 
the areas of international trade and investment. This hardening has been especially 
visible under the GATT/WTO system, the World Bank sponsored the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the IMF, and the regional 
organisation, in particular the NAFTA and the various institutions of the EU, notably 
European Monetary Union (EMU) and not least, bilateral agreements dealing with the 
issue of trade and investment. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine this rather quieter evolution involving hard 
law development in international economic law aiming to create a disciplinary 
liberalism through designing a new generation of international economic institutions 
and redesigning old ones, which include the mandatory dispute settlement mechanism 
in the WTO, the acceptance and enforcement of WTO-based Agreements on TRIMs 
and TRIPS, near-defining power on the terms of the IMF conditionality, and bilateral 
trade and investment agreements. Since these developments have been closely related to 
the changing international power structure, section 8.2 discusses the relations between 
international law and politics and assesses the constraining possibility/function of 
international law in general and international economic institutions in particular. Sub- 
section 8.2.1 on the other hand focuses on a particular aspect of power-law relations, 
namely, the concept of hegemonic ` international law. Section 8.3 looks at the 
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complementary roles of de-regulation and re-regulation 
discourses, which have been 
dominant in the post-1980s period as a result of the shift from state-led to market- 
oriented, neo-liberal economic policies, associated with privatisation and 
de-regulation 
but not so often with (re-) regulation. This section therefore proposes a 
framework that 
explains how neo-liberal reforms, along with unleashing market forces, also generate re- 
regulation processes. Section 8.4 sketches out a general panorama of the 
institutional 
development created to manage the world economy, including the IMF, the World 
Bank, and the GATT/WTO focusing on their expanded mandates, missions, and 
increased involvement in the process of globalisation. Section 8.4 looks closer at the 
exclusive role of WTO in creating a global market discipline. Section 8.5 surveys the 
evolution of the dispute settlement procedures of the GATT/WTO from a `soft law' 
into 
a `hard law' system. In the conclusive remarks, this development will comparatively be 
related to the other examples examined in this study. 
8.2 What roles for politics in the globalisation of international 
economy? 
In the context of neo-liberal perception, as viewed in chapter 4, section 4.3, `economics' 
and `politics' are conceived as separate spheres of social activities, where wealth is 
produced in the private sphere while political community is exclusively expressed in the 
public. In order to fully appreciate the roles of international economic institutions in the 
asymmetrical character of globalisation, this section intends to provide an overview of 
the relations between international law, politics and economy in general and to discuss 
the significance of the activities of the US and other advanced capitalist countries in the 
restructuring of neo-liberal hegemony in particular. 
The connection between international law and politics is obvious but at the same time 
complicated. It is obvious, because international law has basically emerged as the law, 
made by states themselves to govern relations among themselves and international 
organisations that they have created. It is complicated, because the state practice 
(politics and policies) constitutes the content of international legal rules, whose 
application depends on the will (consent) of its subjects (states). 
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Koskenniemi has argued that international law oscillates between utopia and apology. 
According to him, the diplomatic history of the 19`h century is a history of a fight for an 
international Rule of Law, which is the same as struggling to substitute politics with 
law. 637 The vision of establishing the primacy of law in relations between states as a 
means for escaping politics has been criticised by the realist approach as being too 
moralistic. In the realist account, the separation of international law from (power) 
politics would result in the fact that international law becomes a utopia and 
consequently irrelevant to the conflicts between states over matters of crucial national 
interests. 638 According to this understanding, international law is an instrument over 
which powerful nations have substantive control. On the other hand, if international law 
is only politically determined in the name of responsiveness to the reality (concreteness 
requirement) it would then hardly be possible to consider it law but just another tool for 
power politics and as it would lack the quality of objectivity (normativity requirement) 
it would be too apologetic. Krisch argued that even hegemonic power needs to be 
regarded as legitimate. Through this legitimacy it enhances its authority in order to 
reduce the difficulties and costs to maintain and enjoy its position. This trade-off 
between enhanced legitimacy and wider constraints would inevitably result in 
producing constraints on the power. 639 On this ground, it is maintained that international 
economic institutions, likewise international law and its institutions, are more than mere 
tools for power: by creating and complying with these institutions, the powerful states, 
or even hegemonic states, can reassure other states that they will not take advantage of 
them. 640 
The complexity of the relation between international law and politics is particularly 
obvious in the decentralised character of the legislative function (i. e. rules exist only for 
those nations which have recognised them) and in the lack of centrally organised 
637 Koskenniemi (2005) p. 5. Yet, Koskenniemi further notes that efforts for putting diplomatic practice into legal rules did not hindered European powers from attempting to pursue their interests (Ibid. p. 6). 
638 Answering to the question why nations obey law, Henkin held that "Nations act in conformity with law not from any concern for law but because they consider it in their interest to do so, and fear 
unpleasant consequences if they do not observe it. In fact, law may be largely irrelevant. Nations would 
probably behave about the same way if there were no law" (Ilenkin, 1979, p. 88). 
639 Krisch, Nico, International Law in Times of Hegemony, 16 European Journal of International Law (2005) 3, p. 375 
6'0 Milner, V. Helen, Globalization, Development, and International Institutions: Normative and Positive Perspectives, 3 Perspective and Politics (2005) 4, p. 833 
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sanction. As a consequence, international law encounters difficulties to restrain 
sovereign states to pursue their own interests using whatever instruments they may 
consider suitable to them. In other words, it is up to each individual state whether an 
international dispute is to be submitted to an international court. Besides, even in the 
case of such a submission, to identify an existing valid rule to be applied to the legal 
dispute in question, it can still be troublesome. Two reasons can be mentioned: First, in 
the case of customary international law, it is not always easy to establish applicable 
rules to the state parties of a legal dispute and whether they have consented to the 
applicable rules. Second, even when there is a rule and consent, it may still not be 
evident to define the precise obligation that the state parties have undertaken. 
641 
Another challenge to distinguish between international law and international politics is 
the influence of powerful state(s) on the law creation (and law application) process. It 
can be argued that the togetherness rather than mutually exclusiveness of politics and 
law in international law making is recognised in the definition of customary 
international law. According to Article 38(1) (b) of the ICJ Statute, the Court shall 
apply "international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law". Hence, 
state practice (politics) and opinio juris (normativity -accepted as lawb42) are both 
essential for the formation of a customary rule 643 In this sense, it is possible to define 
the process of customary law creation as a process in which state practices (expressions 
of power) are converted into legal obligations. 644 Therefore, politics is not only present 
when powerful states do not observe international legal rules, when they deem non- 
observance suitable to them, or when they "shift away from legal mechanisms in areas 
641 Krisch holds that in the case of customary law creation and especially at its application stage, the 
formally equal position of sovereign states would likely cause comparatively less trouble for hegemonic 
state(s) than multilateral treaties. Because, customary law making process is flexible and customary rules 
usually are vague enough to allow for a broad impact of power at the application stage (Krisch, 2005, p. 
377-378). However, the difficulty of defining the legal obligation does not exist only for customary 
international law but also treaties. For lack of precision and generality of the obligations is sometimes the 
only way of reaching an agreement. 
642 Of course, to say that opiniojuris is central of customary international law does not solve all problems. 
The questions such as "How can this `feeling of obligation' be identified? " remains to be answered. 
643 Besides, as Georgiev maintains, the same 'opposite' requirement applies to another source of international law, namely, "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" (Article 38(1) 
(c) of the ICJ Statute). General principles is completed with being recognised (Georgiev, 1993, p. 8). 
644 Simpson (2000) p. 445 
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central to dominant state's interests", without violating existing law. 
645 Politics is also 
present in law creation and application processes, in which powerful nations' 
preferences generally prevail over the interests of less powerful nations. Their 
possibility to use their economic or political pressure and legal and diplomatic 
capacities to influence and shape international legal rules are incomparably stronger 
than the possibilities of economically and militarily weaker states'. 646 In that sense, as 
argued by De Visscher, "every international custom is the work of power". 647 
However, this is not to say that powerful (or hegemonic) state(s) can do whatever suits 
them. As stressed earlier in this section, international law is not only an instrument for 
power but also for constraint on power. For instance, the relatively egalitarian character 
of international law can be a significant obstacle to the development of hierarchical 
international legal order According to the principle of sovereign equality of states which 
is one of the constitutive principles of international law, 648 as seen in chapter 3, section 
3.6, all sovereign states are equal and `unanimity' is required in the creation of a new 
international legal rule. This consent-based theory of law formation on the basis of 
sovereign equality excludes the establishment of formal hierarchical relationship 
between sovereigns. 
It is nonetheless important to note that the relationship between international law and 
state power often displays a more complex nature in the context of international 
organisations, where the principle of sovereign equality may operate in a significantly 
perverted way. This can be so, especially in the institutional framework of those 
645 Ibid. p. 379 
646 In Byers words, powerful states are better able to enforce claims and use extra-legal techniques to 
acquire support for their position on legal developments (Byers, Michael, Custom, Power and the Power 
of Rules, Cambridge University Press: UK, 1999, p. 205). Likewise, according to Kwakwa, there are two broad sets of state players in the international economy. The writer refers them as the "paradigm-setting 
states", exemplified by the US and other advanced capitalist countries that determine the content of the international economic rules, and the "paradigm-receiving States", most of which were ex-colonies with inadequate economic-human-capital resources. In his cited work, Kwakwa examines the 'technical' 
reasons, such as the abundance of experienced personals, representation and financial resources that allow 
the first group of states to have comparatively great influence over the rule creation process in the institutional context (Kwakwa, Edward, "Regulating International Economy" in Byers, Michael (ed. ), The 
Role of Law in International Politics, Oxford University Press: Oxford/New York, 2002, p. 232-240). 
647 De Visscher, Charles, Theory and Reality in Public International Law, 1968, cited in Schachter, Oscar, 
"The Role of Power in International Law". 93 American Society of International Law Proceeding (1999), 
p. 202 
648 As it is well familiar, the UN Charter in Article 2(1) proclaims that the UN is "based on the principle 
of the sovereign equality of all its Members". 
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international organisations, over which powerful states have control, where decision- 
making is formally based on the principle of sovereign equality of its members. The 
GATT/WTO consensus decision- making and related procedural rules is likely the most 
consequential example of such a complexity. For instance, despite the fact that a 
consensus based decision-making procedure potentially entails risk especially in an 
organisation, like GATT/WTO, which produces hard law and where weaker countries 
have formal power to influence the legislative outcomes, the US and the EU have 
preferred to maintain sovereign equality decision-making system of the GATT/WTO 
despite having the possibility to alter it in 1994, when the GATT was replaced by the 
WTO at the end of the Uruguay Round. Scholars have offered various explanations to 
clarify this complexity are discussed in section 8.4 more detailed. It is argued for 
instance that the institutional framework of the GATT/WTO allows powerful states to 
use "invisible weighting" to define not only substantive rules, but also future decision- 
making rules. According to Steinberg, powerful states have preferred sovereign equality 
rules to weighted voting in the GATT/WTO because they provide legitimisation as well 
as incentives and opportunities for collecting information necessary for a successful 
agenda-setting. 649 However, that is not to say that the possibilities of powerful states to 
define the outcomes of the GATT/WTO are absolute and unlimited. In the first place, 
the limitation comes from the need for observance of an acceptable legitimation ground. 
Otherwise, the outcomes of such decision-making processes would be perceived as less 
and less legitimate, hence less useful for, powerful states. In the second place, the 
principle of sovereign equality may still work as a constraining method in case of a 
possible block formed by developing countries. Also, cooperation problems between 
major powers could reduce the effective use of power tactics 650 
Against this background it can be concluded that the power-law dichotomy is not 
capable of embracing all aspects of the dynamic interaction between international law 
and politics; even though international law is not dependent on power politics by 
definition, it is nevertheless an integral part to the power structure of the nation-state 
system. I 
649 Steinberg (2002) p. 360 
650 On the subject, see Blackhust, Richard, "The Capacity of the WTO to Fulfil Its Mandate" in Krueger, 
Anne (ed. ), The WTO as an International Organization, Chicago University Press: Chicago (1998) and Steinberg (2002) 
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8.2.1 Hegemonic international law 
This sub-section deals with the concept of hegemonic international law in order to 
demonstrate the influence of the changing post-Cold War power structure on the 
functioning and outcomes of the international economic institutions. 
During the 1990s, the struggle of international law "to have an existence of its own"65' 
seemed to have entered a new phase. Paradoxically, in this period, two apparently 
competing visions of international law and the world order, namely the so-called 
legalist/moralist/utopian approach and the (neo-) realist approach, have simultaneously 
gained strength. 
The former approach has been based on the hope that the UN would guide us in a new 
period of international relations by putting an end to power politics, arms races and the 
politics of spheres influence. It prophesied that humanity would enter an era of Rule of 
Law. This optimism has been materialised by declaring the period 1990-1999 to the 
"United Nations Decade of International Law". 652 However, the enthusiasm for "norm- 
based cosmopolitanism as an international order", 653 which arguably reached its highest 
moment with the Pinochet Case, has in the 2000s increasingly proved illusory. Instead 
of a united, just and a "New Global Human Order", we have been left with a 
fragmented, troubled and even more deeply divided world not only in terms of extreme 
concentration of poverty/hunger/disintegration/ in the South and wealth/power in the 
North, but also in terms of social/cultural exclusion and expressions such as "West and 
East", "we" and "the others", 654 lawful and outlaw states, liberal and non-liberal 
states, 655 and so forth. 
651 Georgiev (1993) p. 4 
652 U. N. General Assembly, United Nations Decade of International Law, A/RES/44/23,17 Novembcr 
1989 
653 Gowan Peter, Neoliberal Cosmopolitanism, 11 New Left Review, September-October (2001) p. 85 
654 As in the wording of President George W. Bush: "Either you are with us or you are with the terrorist". Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, September 20,2001, published in 25 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 2001-2002, p. XXII or Samuel lluntington's, "The clash of 
civilizations". 
655 Slaughter has created a division of the world's states to serve as an argument for why international law 
should change: "The resulting behavioural distinctions between liberal democracies and other kinds of States, or more generally between liberal and non-liberal States, cannot be accommodated within the 
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The "market-led" version of the liberal cosmopolitan project pictured a new world 
order, in which free trade and common markets would bring countries peacefully 
together creating the conditions for a depoliticised relationship among them. 
Accordingly, as a consequence of the demand for economic growth from the citizens, 
the necessity of the satisfaction of the required conditions of the access to the 
international markets and cooperation with the financial/trade institutions would be 
indispensable for the governments. These conditions for access and cooperation 
between institutions would, in turn, "lead to the rule of law, and with law come 
democratization and human rights". 656 However, the "unity", which this market-led 
civilisation offered, has in most part of the world been felt as the subordination of most 
nations to the powerful few. During the post Cold War period, most states have to a 
considerable degree lost the control over their domestic spheres as well as their power to 
the international institutions of `global governance' while, as seen in the following 
section, there is no evidence supporting the claim that this process is influencing every 
country equally. 
Whereas the (neo-) realist approach, which is more widespread in the US than anywhere 
else, understands the end of the Cold War as the triumph of American power politics 
and American values as well as the confirmation of the superiority of liberal democracy 
and free market ideology. Today, there is * indeed a widespread acceptance among 
scholars and laymen that with the end of the Cold War, the US has become the 
dominant power in the world and controls or influences every important aspect of 
international life as well as the domestic affairs of other countries. Indeed, the 
economic, political and military domination of the US on the globe is unmistakably 
identifiable. Presently, the US has "more WestphalianNattelian sovereignty, more 
ability to exclude external authority structures than any other states"637 to such an extent 
framework of classical international law" (Slaughter, Anne-Marie, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 European Journal of International Law, 1995, p. 504). 
616 Kahn Paul, W., American Hegemony and International Law, I Chicago Journal of International Law (2000) p. 2. Kahn exemplifies this paradigm with China policy pursued by the Clinton Administration. 
However, in his cited article, the writer criticises the idea that trade may replace politics maintaining that 
politics is not dead in the globalisation process but diversified (ibid. ). 
657 Krasner, Stephan, D., Power and Constraint, I Chicago Journal of International Law (2000), p. 232 
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that it can today define what is justice and what is peace. In Krasner's words, the US "is 
primarily an initiator, not a recipient, of external pressures" 
658 
Besides, in parallel to the deepened and expanded US predominance, we have also 
witnessed an increasing US disengagement from international law. This development 
has gone so far that even its closest ally cannot restrain grumbling about the US' "lack 
of global team sprit". 659 Such "withdrawal from international law"660 has basically two 
forms: (i) American unilateralism either acting alone or building an alliance with a 
group of countries as in the cases of the NATO's war against Serbia, the "war against 
terrorism" in Afghanistan, and the occupation of Iraq. Even though some assert that 
"peace and stability in the contemporary international system utterly depend on the 
American military power", 661 the uncomforting truth is that US military expenditure 
today is as high as it was in the Cold War period and it will likely increase further in the 
coming years. 662 This is hardly "Good News" for the ideal of "Perpetual Peace". (ii) 
The avoidance of multilateralism or the selection of "multilateralism ä la carte", which 
is exactly the strategy employed in the examples of the "Convention on Biodiversity", 
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty", the "Kyoto Protocol", "Anti-Personnel 
Mines Convention" (Ottawa Convention), "the "Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention", and the "Statute of the International Criminal Court" 663 
651 Ibid. 
659 In a foreign policy address delivered at Georgetown University in May 2006, Tony Blair, the Prime 
Minister of the UK, given the examples from the areas such as poverty, climate change, Middle East 
conflict and terrorism, reproached the US for its 'multilateral ism a la carte' pointing out that" Powerful 
nations want more effective multilateral institutions -when they think those institutions will do their will. 
What they fear is effective multilateral institutions that do their own will" (quoted in The Guardian, May 
27,2006, I'll miss his ties -Bush's tribute to tongue-tied ally). 
660 Krisch explains the notion of "withdrawal from international law" as the tendency of predominant 
powers to evade a defiant legal order as even when they are shaping international law according to their 
interests (Krisch, 2005, p. 401-402). 
66' Krasner (2000) p. 235 
662 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reports that in 2005 world military expenditure 
reached $1001 billion, which is 34 per cent more than ten years ago and US is alone responsible for 48 
per cent of the world total (The yearbook 2006, available at httV: /_/yca[book-20 0/ hav8lchapg). 
According to a report by the Friends Committee on National Legislation, The US military budget was in 
2005 almost 29 times as large as the combined spending of the six "rogue" states (Iran, North Korea, 
Syria, Cuba, Sudan and Libya). Likewise, in the same year, Russia and China, the "potential enemies" of 
the US' had 'together' a military budgets of $139 billion, less than a third of the US' 
(http: //www. fenl. org. now/pdf/2006/marO6. pdf). 
663 Krisch evaluates the US "turn from multilateral to bilateral treaties" either in the form of their 
complete rejection or limiting obligations flowing hem through reservations, as the search for "forms that 
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Koskenniemi traces three specifically American experiences that have led to this move 
from `law' and `multilateral ism' to `values' and `morality'. Accordingly, (i) the liberal 
victory during the Cold War ("There is now no risk of a mutual destruction. Thus there 
is no need to follow `old rules'), (ii) In addition to the "old, well-established real 
legalism" the adoption of new normative concepts, such as legitimacy and justice in the 
American policy-analysis, and (iii) a commitment to the idea that rules or institutional 
forms might be policy-determining. This new tendency that Koskenniemi names 
"imperial naturalism", is situated between legal realism and legalism and favours 
legitimacy over law, governance over government, and decision over institution 
introducing a new vocabulary to replace the vocabulary of law: globalisation, ethics, 
democracy, good governance and market. 664 
It is interesting to note that Oppenheim much earlier considered balance of power as 
essential for an effective international law arguing that "where there is neither 
community of interests nor balance of power, there is no international law". 665 
Oppenheim also considered balance of power as a condition for formalism in law. 
According to him, in case one state becomes hegemonic among others, that state would 
likely pursue `anti-formalistic' policy wherever non-formalism suits it better. Krisch 
maintains that "the international legal system resists that development; it insists on 
stability, equality and coherence, and dominant states thus prefer other forms of 
international government, thereby creating a global legal order with a more limited role 
of international law as such". 667 Not surprisingly, therefore, in this new world order, the 
concepts and institutions of the `old' international law, such as sovereignty, sovereign 
are more amenable to unequal power and seek to reshape the international legal order so as to allow more 
inegalitarian elements" (Krisch, 2005, p. 389). Krisch also gives some statistics to materialise "US 
resistance to multilateral treaties". Accordingly, the US has become party to only 60 per cent of the 
treaties deposited with the UN Secretary-General since World War 11 whereas the other members of the 
G8 to 93 per cent of them. Of course it is not easy to decide on whether, and if so, to what extent, the 
historically and culturally rooted "isolationist" tradition of the US has played a role in its current 
reluctance to international treaties (Ibid. p. 388-389). 
"'' Koskenniemi, Martti, Between Empire and Legal Formalism, Speech at Recife, Brazil, IS may 2003, 
available at http: //www. valt. helsinki. fi/blogs/eci/Recife. pdf 
6s Oppenheim, L. International Law, Vol. 1,2nd ed., Longmans: London (1911) p. 193. For an interesting 
analysis of Oppenheim's normative positivism as political position, see Kingsbury, Benedict, Legal 
Positivism as Normative Politics, 16 European Journal of International Law (2005) 2, p. 421. 
666 Oppenheim (1911) Vol. 1, p. 275 
Krisch (2005) p. 407 
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equality of states and the notion of international law as being a framework for formal 
inter-sovereign relationships are increasingly challenged and seen as a formalistic 
obstacle against the dynamic of `real life'. 668 This challenge however is not only due to 
the contrast between states' being formally equal with the factual asymmetrical power 
relations among them, but it is also due to the US' imperial position, "as the hegemon 
comes to occupy a position above the law, not under it". 669 Thus, under the 
circumstances where "sovereignty breaks down and globalization becomes the order of 
the day the dynamic of a politically oriented law will no longer tolerate formalism". 670 
Legal formalism can be described as an attempt to make the law both autonomous, in 
the particular sense that it does not depend on moral or political values of particular 
judges. Legal formalists also want to make law deductive, in the sense that judges 
decide cases mechanically on the basis of pre-existing law and do not exercise 
discretion in individual cases. According to Sustein, formalism is closely related to legal 
positivism: "If positivism is understood as an explanation of what law is, formalism can 
be said to be .a positivist explanation of 
how law and legal systems operate" . 671 It is 
interesting to note that the `anti-formalist feeling' is not necessarily linked to the project 
of hegemonic international law. Even in the post-Second World War period optimism, a 
pragmatism arising from the "move to institutionalism", which reigned during this 
period, entailed a strong rejection of formalism and a near-total disregard of theory. 
Kennedy illustrates colourfully the mood of the period with international law education. 
He points out the correlation between the intellectual and theoretical disinclination of 
international legal academic discipline and the refusal of formalism in favour of 
pragmatist/managerial account in the post-war period, during which international law 
paradoxically seemed to develop: more rules, more rule-observance, and wider variety 
668 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, (2004) p. 488-489 
669 Krisch (2005) p. 407. A number of American scholars, such as Glennon and Slaughter overtly defended this position. Glennon held for instance that the UN Charter provisions governing the use of force "cannot guide responsible US policy-makers in the US war against terrorism or elsewhere" (Glennon, Michael, J., The Fog of Law: Self-Defence, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article SI of the United Nations Charter, 25 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 2001, p. 541). Orford critically 
reviewed such reasoning (Orford, Anne, The Gij? of Formalism, 15 European Journal of International Law, 2004,1). 
670 Koskenniemi (2002) p. 30 
671 Sunstein, Cass, R., Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 The University of Chicago Law Review (1999) 3, p. 639 1.: _. 11 1 
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of subject matters than before while there was no noticeable interest in the philosophical 
dimension of the field. 672 In the words of Kennedy, "The `increasingly independent 
world' seemed to require management, not reconstruction", and as a result, most of the 
international law courses in law faculties "were about the management of international 
life, about the process and the avoidance of 6politics"'. 673 In a similar vein, Purvis also 
points out that the post-Second World War pragmatism "sought to incorporate the 
modernist insights of Legal Realism (which set itself in opposition to legal formalism, 
emerged during the 1930s) into international law, to make legal argument 
674 contextual". 
Yet, there can be found a fundamental difference between functional pragmatism, 
developed after the 1950s, and the current depoliticised pragmatism, developed after the 
1990s. The former was "a modern consequential philosophy that emphasised 
institutional process, functional progress, or rule centred doctrinal specificity, while 
denying the relevance of coherent abstraction". 675 It was related to efforts to build 
institutions and regimes that still were based on formal equality of sovereign states and 
attached to the ideal of international community. Anti-formalism in its present form, has 
been incorporated in the neo-liberal/hegemonic politic agenda, which aims to narrow 
down international public sphere and transfer power from the nation state to IEI and 
global capital. As Koskenniemi maintains, "the call for a dynamic, flexible and 
deformalised concept of law aims to facilitate decision-making in the context where 
American power is dominant. 676 
At a closer look, however, this is not the whole story. Slaughter, one of the most 
influential American scholars and the former president of the American Society of 
International Law, argued that instead of rejecting international institutions and treaties, 
the US must work to shape them so that they conform to US interests even though such 
6. z Kennedy, David, International Legal education, 26, Harvard International Law Journal (1985) p. 369- 370 
673 Ibid. 
674 Purvis, Nigel, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32 Harvard International Law Journal (1991) 1, p. 81 
675 Ibid. 
eye Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 2004, p. 483 
239 
involvement would inevitably entail some degree of loss of sovereignty. 
677 Indeed, the 
US "withdrawal from international law" has hardly been uniform. As shown in the 
following sections, in certain areas, such as the protection of foreign investment and 
intellectual property rights, the US promotes the idea of the necessity of adopting 
universally binding rules and "the agreements to create open transnational markets with 
appropriate regulatory mechanisms"678 
I 
8.3 De-regulation and re-regulation 
Deregulation in various forms has been widely used in the recent process of 
globalization to restructure the legal and political frames of the market-state 
relationships at national and international level seeking to reinforce the hegemony of 
capital globally. This section however argues that the rise of neo-liberalism in the post- 
1980 period has not only involved a process of de-regulation and economic 
liberalisation, but also re-regulation processes mainly through the international 
economic institutions-based multilateralism as well as inter-state bilateral trade and 
investment agreements in order to create a free market constitution and constitutional 
market discipline at the global level. 
De-regulation can be defined as "reducing the number, stringency or enforcement of 
rules connecting it to the classical liberal conception of freedom as freedom from 
restriction". 679 The liberal rationale for deregulation is that fewer regulations will lead 
to a raised level of competitiveness, therefore higher productivity, more efficiency and 
lower prices overall. However it is important to note that the wording `de-regulation' 
may be misguiding. The concept does not suggest a regulatory void or an `unregulated' 
market as an alternative to state regulation. Nor does deregulation mean an end to all 
67 Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Building Global Democracy, I Chicago Journal of International Law (2000) p. 
225. In the same vein, Krasner and Byers, utterly sympathetic to the aspirations of the "benevolent 
superpower", insist on the importance and indispensability of using international law and institutions to 
maximise American interest (Krasner, 2000); Byers, Michael, International Law and the American 
National Interest, 1 Chicago Journal of International Law, 2000. See also Byers, Michael and Nolte, 
Georg [eds. ], United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law, Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, 2003). 
6's Kahn (2000) p. 9 
679 Braithwaite and Drahos (2001) p. 515 
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regulation, but frequently less restrictive or rigid regulation, which may take diverse 
forms, such as the deregulation of specific industries, such as telecommunications; the 
privatisation of the stateowned enterprises and the economic liberalisation of 
previously protected segments of national economy, such as the establishment of free 
trade zones. 680 
As a political ideology, neo-liberalism is generally understood to have had its sources in 
the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s when Thatcher and Reagan came to power 
in the UK and the US, instituting policies based on the monetarist ideas and the 
criticism of the interventionist state. As viewed earlier in chapter 4, sections 4.3, the 
proponents of laissez-faire economy consider markets as the natural and spontaneous 
social orders, in which the "market-friendly state" has a limited role as a 
legal/regulatory power. It has been argued that through deregulation and privatisation, 
market forces would be set free, which, in turn, would create economic well-being for 
all. According to the neo-liberal discourse, state regulation is counterproductive and 
costly. Besides, as it has been claimed, technological revolution in the globalisation 
process has increased the mobility of capital and goods, which as argued consecutively 
has led to the diminishing regulatory power of the state. In other words, it is understood 
that technological advances "have produced de facto deregulation", 681 given that MNEs 
are today able to engage in regulatory arbitrage, transferring their activities or capital to 
another country, which offer lesser or more favourable regulation. Thus, together with 
the shift in ideological perspective on the role of the state, these developments have 
"produced a competitive dynamic between national regulators that fosters 
deregulation". 682 Deregulation has rapidly become a central measure within "market- 
friendly reforms" which are designed to enhance the competition among national 
governments to keep or attract MNEs' investment. First, the US and the UK showed the 
way to deregulate the economy, particularly in sectors such as transport, health services, 
6so Emadi-Coffin, Barbara, Rethinking international organization: deregulation and global governance, Routledge: London, 2002, p. 59 
681 Vogel, Steven, Kent, Freer Markets, More Rules, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY, 1998, p. 11. Note however that Vogel criticises the proponents of the neo-liberal perspective arguing that neo-liberal theorists often overstate their case "implying that markets not only stimulate regulatory change but determine its timing and nature". He also contends "governments can respond to market pressures in a wide varieties of ways" (Ibid. ). 
682 Ibid. p. 11 
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telecommunications, media, banking and insurance. Soon many more governments have 
been forced to take the same deregulatory direction. 
To be sure, deregulation has been an important component of the neo-liberal "counter- 
revolution" which has taken place over the last two decades. 683 However, a more 
nuanced analysis of the relationship between state and market exposes the over 
simplistic and ideological character of the rhetoric of "less rules, more market". Today, 
there is a growing acceptance among scholars that economic liberalisation and 
deregulation processes have often involved a process of re-regulation "often as an 
international process, in the form of more elaborate legal frameworks for business"684 
rather than eradication of public regulation. Emadi-Coffin examines the establishment 
of free trade zones as a widely utilised policy instrument involving deregulation in the 
cases of South Korea, the UK and the China and comes to the conclusion that the 
establishment of free trade zones has necessitated a high degree of international 
regulation, both in its hard and soft forms, especially in the areas of monetary regulation 
and trade relations. 685 As Lipschutz and Fogel observe "while `deregulation' is the 
mantra repeated endlessly in virtually all national capitals and international capitalists, it 
is domestic regulation that capitalists desire, not the wholesale elimination of all 
rules". 686 Accordingly, domestic deregulation in the forms of privatisation, the removal 
of tariff and exchange controls and the like has been important to the further 
advancement of international capital whereas at the international level the general 
tendency has been to enforce or create new rules wherever it is considered necessary to 
protect and promote their interests or ensure the orderly functioning of global markets. 
In a similar vein, the authors of "Legalization and World Politics" remark a "move to 
law" in international relations without failing to note that this move is uneven and not 
683 Gill considers the 1990s as a period, which represents a counter-revolution of capital that has 
reconstituted "state and capital as well as intensifying social hierarchies associated with class, race and 
gender relations on a world scale" (Gill, 2000, p. 3). 
684 Picciotto, Sol and Mayne, Ruth, Regulating International Business Beyond Liberalization, MacMillian 
Press Ltd.: New York, 1999, p. 2 
683 Emadi-Coffin (2002) p. 119. According to the writer, in this context, soft law has been used to constrain government policy regarding the level of deregulation, for instance, to harmonise the degree of competition between free trade zones in different countries (Ibid. p. 122). Further it is also suggested that soft law concerning free trade zones has an additional ideological function serving to the separation the economic from the political through its focus on the deregulation of the market (Ibid. p. 123). 
686 Lipschutz and Fogel (2002) p. 119 
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uniform. 687 Understanding legalisation as a particular 
form of institutionalisation, they 
detect greater institutionalisation in many areas, and 
in particular in international 
economic regimes, in the sense that the behaviour of actors 
has now been "more deeply 
regulated" by institutional rules. 
688 It is ' possible and necessary to critically assess 
various aspects of the approaches, analyses and 
findings brought forward by the writers 
of "Legalization and World Politics". 
689 However, for the purpose of this section, their 
portrayal of the tendency of "increasing legalisation" 
is particularly remarkable in two 
interconnected aspects. First, the international re-regulation in both formal hard and soft 
law forms and institutionalisation is a constitutive measurement, 
690 which has been 
employed concurrently with the deregulation policies, 
in the recent process of the neo- 
liberal restructuring of international economy and politics. Second, the writers of 
"Legalization and World Politics" point out that the legalisation of contemporary 
politics has been uneven. 
691 Viewing law as deeply embodied in politics and 
687 Abbot, Kenneth W.; Keohane, Robert 0.; Moravscik, Andrew; Slaughter, Anne-Marie, and Snidal, 
Duncan, The Concept of Legalization, 54 International Organization (2000) 3 
688 Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane, and Slaughter (2000) p. 387. For the criteria of the definition of 
legalisation, see Chapter 3 of the present study. 
689 Related to his criticism of `regimes', for instance, Koskenniemr argues that `legalisation' in regime 
theories is reduced to"a policy-choice, sometimes dictated by strategic interest. And the alternation of soft 
law with hard law as normative politics through the variables such as `delegation', 'obligation', and 
precision' corresponds to a move from law rather than to law (Koskenniemi, Martti, International 
Legislation: Today's Limits and Possibilities, speech at the conference "Speaking Law and Politics" at the 
University of Wiscosin-Madison, March 5-6,2004, available at 
http: //www. valt. helsinki. fi/blogs/eci/Madison. pdo. Likewise, Finnemore and Toope criticise this 
understanding of legalisation of being liberal institutionalist and positivist and limited to the bureaucratic 
formalism. They also object to the selection of obligation, precision, and delegation as the defining 
characteristics of law and conclude that such a definition of law would be too narrow (Finnemore and 
Toope, 2001). Picciotto takes further this criticism and holds that although the WTO agreements lay down 
an enormous quantity of legally binding rules, these rules are still far from being precise and 
unambiguous (Picciotto, 2005). Setear's criticisms are rather twofold. According to Setear, the writers of 
"Legalization and World Politics" make a 'biased' selection of cases involving dramatic increases in the 
prominence and prevalence of international 
law, while in reality the relevancy of international law to 
international politics is not always the case using the international regulation of whaling as an example of 
the areas where legalisation has remained either constant or diminished. Setear also argues that to single 
out the variables obligation, precision, and delegation arbitrarily without offering any perimeter to defend 
it (Setear, John, K., Can Legalization Last?, 44 Virginia Journal of International Law (2003-2004] 3). 
690 From the point of view of "regime theory", one could possibly complete this conclusion with the 
'informal' or 'implicit' regulation resulting from the interrelations between states, international 
organisations, and non-state actors, in particular MNEs. According to Emadi-Coffin, regulation in 
regimes goes "beyond soft law" and in some cases, implicit regulation may occupy the structural level of 
social relations (Emadi-Coffin, 2002 p. 47). 
691 Braithwaite and Drahos also indicate "mixed fortunes" for the deregulation principle of liberalism in 
"global regulatory contests". Their findings show that, deregulation has prevailed only in eight areas out 
of fifteen key areas (2001, p. 515). 
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understanding legalisation as a particular form of institutionalisation that imposes 
international legal constrains on governments, 692 they conclude that "the most powerful 
actors in the international system -the United States and the European Union- are 
among the strongest proponents of legalization" though to varying degrees across issue- 
areas. 693 They furthermore contend that legalisation has been dramatically advanced in 
the realm of international economy due to the fact that "traders and investors demand a 
stable policy environment, guaranteed legalized commitments and prefer predictable 
dispute-settlement procedures over intergovernmental bargaining". 694 
To a large extent, increasing legalisation of international economic relations can be 
understood as a strategy central to the foundation of "new constitutionalism", which has 
both coercive and consensual dimensions to secure and expand the gains of global 
capitalism. According to Gill, the WTO and international financial institutions aim to 
create a set of forward-looking mechanisms through bilateral and multilateral trade and 
investment agreements to render a constitutional status to the power of capital on a 
world scale. 695 Thus, legalisation also aspires to prepare the long-term economical and 
political conditions for the future of the hegemony of capital through imposing on 
government decision-making autonomy. Kahler for instance observes that particularly 
in the policy areas of monetary, trade and investment, international legalisation 
functions as a substitute or reinforcement for domestic legal and constitutional restraints 
on government actions. 696 Therefore, it can be concluded that the consequences of 
legalisation are not only international but also national. 
Against this background, it can safely be said that re-regulation processes have aimed (i) 
to restructure peripheral states to ensure that they operate under the discipline of 
international capital to deliver the tasks such as an improved long-term investment 
692 Though they also recognise that in certain instances institutionalisation can occur without legalisation 
as in the case of the G7 and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Kahler, Miles, Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization, 54 International Organization [2000] 3, p. 662). 
691 Ibid. p. 666 
694 Ibid. P. 668 
695 Gill (2000) p. 9. 
696 Kahler (2000) p. 676 
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climate and better protection of private property rights697 through the regional and 
international instruments such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
bilateral trade and investment agreements, the failed Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI), and the Bretton Woods institutions, i. e. the IMF, the World Bank 
and the WTO. (ii) To redefine and stabilise the rules of international economic/financial 
competition between national territorially divided country-based MNEs. (iii) Lastly, in 
the advanced capitalist country context, to set limits on the redistributionist capacity of 
the welfare state and ensure its withdrawal from the market. That is "a shift in the role 
of the state "from a guarantor of progress to a manager of destinys698 by privatising or 
denationalising real or financial assets as well as facilitating "the private supply of 
certain goods and services by `contracting out' and 'commercial isation"'. 
699 
8.4 Regulating the global market 
In the previous section it has been demonstrated that despite the fact that re-regulation 
has widely been employed as a complementary tool at both domestic and international 
level, "the language of deregulation has obscured (this) quieter truth , 701 due to the 
dominant position of the discursive arguments putting forward the virtue of the self- 
regulating market system. The aim of this section is to deconstruct this discourse on 
deregulation to illustrate its character as the language of the myth of a self-regulatory 
market economy and to explain the nature and direction of this neo-liberal regulatory 
policy. For this purpose, the section depicts two developments that took place during the 
1980s and the 1990s: First, it shows that the most influential international economic 
institutions have been structurally transformed, their rule-based character has been 
strengthened and their mission expanded. Second, it demonstrates that during the same 
period bilateral trade and investment agreements have become commonplace tools for 
697 Gill (2000) p. 9 
698 Donzelot, Jacques, "The Mobilization of Society" in Burchell, Graham, Gordon, Colin, and Miller, 
Peter (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Harvester W heatsheaf: London (1991) p. 176 
699 Schneiderman, David, "Investment Rules and New Constitutionalism, 63 Law and Contemporary 
Problems (2000) p. 83 
700 Blake, Jonathan, D., Remarks to "The Internationalization of Legal Relations", 96 American Society 
of International Law Proceedings (2002) p. 146. 
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investment protection and promotion as well as for the achievement of further trade 
liberalisation in the process of redesigning the international economic structure to make 
it consistent with the neo-liberal ideology. 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, several international institutions were 
created as a part of a planned global regulatory system for trade and finance. These 
institutions were established at the initiative from the US and reflected the US and 
British approach of how trade and finance should be regulated . 
70 1 The most important 
organisations were created under the so-called Bretton Woods system, which consisted 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, widely known as the World Bank, the International Trade 
Organisation (ITO), which never were realised because of the concerns of the US, 
instead, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created, which in 
1995 expanded and was institutionalised into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 702 
The significance of this multilateralism was that "for the first time there was a codified 
form of rules and principles that imposed some obligations on states in the conduct of 
their monetary affairs". 703 As Gilpin writes; at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, 
the major capitalist powers agreed that economic activities should be regulated in a rule- 
based way and that states were not to interfere in the determination of international 
economic outcomes. 704 
The IMF was initially designed to build up a monetary system and assist the 
governments of developed countries in stabilising their exchange rates by providing 
them with short-term loans in order to avoid a reversion to the monetary policies of the 
1930s. 705 Similarly, the World Bank, whose membership requires membership in the 
IMF, was originally designed to help the developed war-torn European countries to 
reconstruct or upgrade their economies and industries, 706 The voting system and the 
701 Gilpin (2000) p. 57 
702 Braithwaite and Drahos (2001) p. 98 
703 Ibid. 
704 Gilpin (2000) p. 57 
70' Dillon, Thomas, J., The World Trade Organization: A New'World Order For Trade?, 16 Michigan Journal of International Law (1994-1995) p. 352 
706 Braithwaite and Drahos (2001) p. 98 
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structure of the main organs are similar in both institutions; the rights and duties of 
members are based on quotas, which determine the level of financial contribution to be 
made to these organisations. This quota defines the voting power of each member. 
707 
That is to say, both organisations make decisions according to a weighted voting system 
reflecting the amount of capital each state gives as an input into these organisations. 
This secures the influence of the advanced capitalist countries. Since the decisions of 
these organisations, based on weighted voting and extensive use of special majorities, 
are legally binding on all members without requiring their unanimous concurrence, it is 
widely asserted that this is incongruent with the principle of sovereign equality. 
Since their inception in 1944, the membership of these two organisations has increased 
from an initial 29 membership countries to 184 and most importantly, since 1979 their 
roles have changed considerably. The mission of the World Bank has evolved from 
being facilitator of post-war reconstruction to the present day mandate of worldwide 
economic development programs and it has expanded from a single institution to a 
closely associated group of five development institutions. 708 Among these new 
institutions within the framework of the World Bank is the ICSID, which is designed to 
globalise international investment law through the case law The MIGA, which entered 
into force in 1985, is the first multilateral system for investment insurance against 
political risks in the developing countries. As Muchlinski notes, MIGA, together with 
the ICSID, constitutes a further step of the World Bank in the creation of a multilateral 
system of investment protection and promotion, which aimed to move international 
regulation away from the NIEO in the 1970s. 709 
The IMF on the other hand has as an institution undergone little structural change, but 
its functions has been "silently revolutionized 19710 in order to orchestrate the changes in 
707 http: //www. imf. org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa03. htm# 1'., 
708 They are: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 
See http: //web. worldbank. org. 
709 Muchlinski (1999) p. 519 
710 Boughton, James, M., Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund 1979-1989, the IMF: Washington, 2001. From a legal point of view, the most striking feature of the ICSID Convention is that it firmly establishes the capacity of a company to proceed directly against a state in an international forum, thus contributing to the growing recognition of MNEs as the new subject of international law. For 
further discussion on the ICSID, see section 3.7.2 in this study. 
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the world economy during the 1980s. As shown in chapter 3, these changes, involved a 
diametrical turn away from state-centered economic activity towards a common set of 
liberal beliefs and policies based on the primacy of market and private economic 
activity. Correspondingly, the IMF, as well as the World Bank, began to decrease their 
relations with the developed countries and increased their relations with the developing 
countries. In addition to its initial role as a monetary institution and the overseer of the 
international monetary system, the IMF assumed a role as a guiding force in economic 
restructuring of developing countries. In the mid-1970s developing countries could 
easily borrow money directly from the US, Japan and European countries either in the 
form of "sovereign borrowing" or through commercial banks in these countries to 
finance state-led projects and import-substitution strategies. The real interest rate was 
low at that time and there was a huge international capital market. In 1979 however, the 
circumstances changed dramatically as a result of the changing US policy involving the 
increase of interest rates, which "plunged the world into a severe recession in which less 
developed country borrowers found themselves with huge debts". 711 The developing 
countries that lacked access to private capital markets increasingly turned to the IMF 
and the World Bank to borrow more or to reschedule their debt. Both organisations 
were drawn into more active lending. However, they assisted the indebted countries 
conditionally. They "began attaching increasing number of conditions to those loans 
(conditionality712), negotiating with countries to make major changes in their domestic 
policies and institutions"713 to adapt to market oriented economic policies involving 
inter alia, detailed reform in various fields, including privatisation corporate 
governance, banking regulation, tax reform, liberalisation of trade and capital market, 
eliminating ceilings on foreign investments, permitting foreign banks and companies to 
establish subsidiaries and price controls, more central bank independence, etc. 
Moreover, compared to the original tasks of the IMF, for instance "surveillance", the 
new policy of "conditionality", which is precise and binding on borrower countries, also 
entails a move towards a higher degree of `legalisation'. Indeed, Simmons argues that 
the purpose of legalisation is to make "more credible monetary commitments; because, 
'll Gilpin (2000) p. 85 
712 "Conditionality" s the principle that access to and use of a lender's funds is linked to the borrower 
agreeing to meet certain requirements set out by the lender (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2001, p. 125). 
711 Milner (2005) p. 836 
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markets prefer certainty in the legal framework". According to the same writer, 
legalisation of international monetary affairs has improved the compliance with IMF's 
monetary rules under Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement because 
legalisation 
increases countries' commitment to these rules and the reputational costs of reneging on 
them. 714 
The GATT, similar to the IMF and the World Bank, was designed as a forum for the 
developed countries. Originally it was set up with the specific purpose to reduce tariffs 
in order to promote trade liberalisation among its members. And again, like the other 
Bretton Woods institutions, membership in the WTO has over the years grown from 23 
in 1947 to 149 countries in December 2005.715 As will be discussed in more detail in the 
following section, the GATT/WTO's undertakings have widened significantly with the 
increasing liberalisation of the world trade in the 1980 and 1990s. With the considerable 
decrease of the tariffs and quotas, "many domestic policies such as intellectual property 
laws, environmental policy, domestic subsides, and tax law are now seen to affect trade 
flows and hence to reside within the WTO jurisdiction". 
716 
In addition to the increased and strengthened institutionalisation, the post-1980s has 
also witnessed a proliferation of bilateral trade and investment agreements. The total 
number of international investment agreements reached about 5,500 at the end of 2005, 
of which 2,495 have been "bilateral investment treaties" and 2,758 "double taxation 
treaties". 717 Moreover, although a growing number of bilateral investment agreements 
and free trade agreements are concluded between developing economies, most of these 
agreements have still been concluded between a developed and a developing country, 
imposing binding constraints on the macroeconomic, trade and investment policies of 
the developing countries. 718 These agreements usually require state parties to comply 
714 Simmons, Beth A., The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs 54 International Organization 
(2000) 3, p. 573 
716 http: //www. wto. org/english/thewto-e/whatis_e/whatis-e. htm 
716 Milner (2005) p. 836 
717 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006, p. 26, available at 
http: //www. realinstitutoelcano. orgJmateriales/docs/WorldlnvestmentReport2006 en p)lf 
718 Peterson, Luke Eric, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Development Policy-Afaking, International 
Institute for Sustainable Development: Canada (2004) p. 6. According to the World Investment Report 
2006, at the end of 2005, the number of "South-South" bilateral investment agreements represented 26% 
of the total number of such agreements and developing countries have been party to 75% of all bilateral 
investment treaties (UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006, p. 228). 
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with a number of key provisions, most of them centred on the principle of non- 
discrimination and most favoured-nation status, which binds a country to apply to the 
treaty contracting state party any lower rate of import duties that it may later grant to 
imports from some other country. 719 In addition, they embody substantive constraints 
on state parties including protection from expropriations and national isations. 
720 Also, 
these agreements typically provide an arbitration clause whereby foreign investors are 
entitled to submit disputes to binding investment arbitration in order to depoliticise' 
investment disputes. The arbitration rules of the Washington-based International Center 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) are most commonly referred to in 
these agreements. 721 
It should be added that in particular the US has busily engaged in drawing developing 
countries into highly uneven bilateral bargaining processes over which the developing 
countries have little control. The aim of these processes has been to (i) encourage the 
adoption of market-oriented domestic policies in partner countries, which provide 
greater market access and the reduce or eliminate non-tariff barriers; (ii) protect private 
investment and increase the protection of intellectual property; (iii) support the 
development of international law standards consistent with these objectives. 722 The 
most fundamental US strategy "has been to act tough on bilateral negotiations to set 
frameworks for subsequent multilateral negotiation", as in the case of TRIPS 
agreement, and "never go directly to seeking a multilateral agreement in the way weaker 
719 The most-favoured-nation (MFN) clauses have become a significant instrument of economic 
liberalisation in the investment and trade areas. A MFN clause may cover a list of specified products only, 
or specific concessions yielded to certain foreign countries. Alternatively, it may cover all advantages, 
privileges, immunities, or other favourable treatment granted to any third country whatever. The clause is 
intended to provide each signatory with the assurance that the advantages obtained will not be attenuated 
or wiped out by a subsequent agreement concluded between one of the partners and a third country. It 
guarantees the parties against discriminatory treatment in favour of a competitor. See 
http: //www. oecd. org/dataoecd/21/37/33773085. pdf. 
720 Schneiderman (2000) p. 101 
721 Parra, Antonio, Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment, 12 ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal (1997) p. 297 
722 From the U. S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, available at http: //www. ustr. gov/Trade_AgreementsBIT/Summaryof US Bilateral lnvestment Treaty_(BIT) Prog 
ram. html 
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states regularly do". 723 As Braithwaite and Drahos have famously stated; "Bilateralism 
is like cooking an elephant and rabbit stew. However you mix the ingredients, it ends up 
tasting like elephant. Multilateralism is the only prospect for constraining the elephant 
by rules under which it agrees to submit to binding arbitration. "724 
On the other hand, even though multilateralism is generally preferred by less powerful 
states for the reason that multilateralism and international institutions may exert a 
constraint on the role of power in determining outcomes through binding commitments 
on market openness and trade rules, the rules of the bargaining process however often 
play a decisive role in the outcomes. As Steinberg points out, "bargaining power in 
international organisations is derived from substantive and procedural legal 
endowments. Decision-making rules determine voting or agenda setting power, which 
shapes outcomes". 725 Therefore, multilateralism does not always ensure transparency 
nor provides protection against the asymmetries of power and influence. For instance, it 
would hardly be possible to maintain that the IMF and the World Bank may exert a 
constraint on the powerful states considering that decisions in these institutions are 
taken by weighted voting, which gives the US, Japan, the UK, France and Germany the 
possibility to define the outcomes of the decision-making process in these institutions. 
The same applies to the WTO. Even though the GATT/WTO is based on the principle 
of sovereign equality and decisions therefore are taken, unlike the IMF and the World 
Bank, not through a weighted vote system but through consensus, such a consensus- 
making process may still function as an "organised hypocrisy" in the procedural context 
by serving "as- an external display to domestic audiences to help legitimize WTO 
outcomes". 726 As will be shown in the following section, the often-pointed out 
unbalanced outcome of the GATT/WTO favouring the powerful states makes evident 
that multilateralism does not only constrain the power, but it can also magnify it. 
723 Braithwaite and Drahos (2001) p. 198. Elsewhere, Drahos remarks that the US and EU push bilaterally 
for TRIPS plus standards and standards beyond TRIPS at a time when trade rules cover a much broader 
range of subjects than ever before and as a result have become intertwined with non-trade issues such as 
human rights (the right to health especially) and environmental protection (Drahos, Peter, Bilateralism in 
Intellectual Property, paper prepared for Oxfam, available at 
http: //www. oxfam. orst. uk/what we do/issues/trade/download s/biltatcralism in rtf 
724 Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?, Braithwaite, John and Drahos Peter, 
Earthscan: UK, 2002, p. 194 
725 Steinberg (2002) p. 342 
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8.5 The Primacy of the WTO 
There seems to be a consensus that the GATT/WTO has become one of the most 
influential international institutions in the process of globalisation. 727 Since the 
formation of the GATT in 1947 the trading regime has gradually evolved from a 
moderately legalised negotiation forum to a highly legalised adjudication regime as a 
result of the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1994 ("The Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations"). The most important 
features of the "Final Act" can be listed as follows: (i) The Final Act established the 
WTO. (ii) It created new international obligations in the area of services with the 
General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS). (iii) It extended the obligations of 
the GATT to protect intellectual property rights with the Agreement on Trade Related 
aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). (iv) The Final Act both 
clarified and extended the existing GATT obligations, by providing a method to 
interpret them. (v) The Final Act created a unified dispute resolution system through the 
so-called Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), whereby the GATT's consensus- 
based dispute settlement system has been transformed into a quasi-judicial form. 
Against this background, it seems reasonable to arrive at two conclusions: First, the new 
multilateral obligations go beyond the GATT's original scope of trade in goods, within 
which the GATT's mandate was to lower trade barriers between nations - such as 
custom tariffs, quotas, and other border measures. 728 It now includes the GATS and 
TRIPS, whereby the WTO puts in effect the "globalisation of law" in the meaning that a 
wide spectrum of domestic laws regarding economic regulation is now pushed into a 
726 Ibid. 
727 Among others, see for instance, Bronckers, Marco and Quick, Reinhard (eds. ), New Direction in 
International Economic Law, Kluwer Law International: The Hague (2000); Guzman, Andrew, T., Global 
Governance and the WTO, 45 Harvard International law Journal (2004) 2; Picciotto, Sol, The WTO's 
Appellate Body: Legal Formalism as a Legitimation of Global Governance, 18 Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions (2005) 3; Dillon, Thomas, J., The World 
Trade Organization: A New World Order For Trade?, 16 Michigan Journal of International Law (1994- 
1995); Abbott, Frederick, M., Incomplete Rule Systems, System Incompatibilities And Suboptimal 
Solutions, 16 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law (1999) 1; Kelly, Claire R., Power, 
Linkage and Accommodation, 24 Berkeley Journal of International Law (2006); and Van den Bossche, 
Peter and Alexovicova, Iveta, Effective Global Economic Governance by The World Trade Organization, 
8 Journal of International Economic Law (2005) 3. 
72B Reich, Arie, The WTO As a Law-Harmonizing Institution, the University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Economic Law (2004) 1, p. 324 
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convergence process with the WTO rules backed up by a neo-liberal agenda of 
regulatory reform globally. 
729 Also equally important, with the extensive obligations on 
state members, WTO has moved from a system of rules prohibiting trade measures to a 
system of rules requiring affirmative government actions. 
730 This development has gone 
so far that the new system obliges the governments to incorporate its rules and standards 
into their national economic regulations. The TRIPS agreements, which have been 
concluded as part of the Uruguay Round in 1994, may exemplify the gradually 
developed interventionist approach of the neo-liberal institutionalisation. As Reich 
points out, the subject matter of the TRIPS can hardly be classified as international trade 
measures, but rather domestic laws and policies. Under the TRIPS agreement, all 
member states, whose domestic legal systems do not provide the minimum standards of 
legal protection of intellectual property, are required to amend their laws accordingly. 731 
Furthermore, as will be shown in the following section, to ensure compliance with its 
commitments, "the WTO agreements give its dispute settlement system very extensive 
powers to decide whether national regulation complies with a variety of international 
standards". 732 
Second, the transformation of the GATT into the WTO system in some crucial aspects 
displays a transition from soft law to hard law. Even though the GATT had a legal 
status of an international agreement on "basic trade policy goals combined with a code 
of relatively detailed rules governing the major instruments of trade policy", the GATT 
system of 1947 was essentially a soft law system. 733 GATT rules were basically 
unenforceable; it did not lay down the nature and scope of its obligations, but imposed 
only an obligation to negotiate. As Abbott points out, the GATT operated through a 
729 It is also maintained that the impact of the WTO system is felt in areas that are not subject to any 
specific WTO regulation; for example, environmental policy, human rights, labour and competition 
policy (Guzman, 2004, p. 304). 
73° See Ostry, Sylvia, "WTO: Institutional Design for Better Governance" in Porter, Roger, B.; Sauve, 
Pierre; Subramanian, Arvind; and Zampetti, A. B. (eds. ), Efciency, Equity and Legitimacy: The 
Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Brookings Institutions Press: Washington, 2002 
711 Reich (2004) p. 338 
nZ Picciotto, Sol, The WTO's Appellate Body: Legal Formalism as a Legitimation of Global Governance, 
18 Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions (2005) 3, p. 481 
733 Carlson (1984-1985) p. 1227, footnote 174 
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flexible process of political bargaining as opposed to a fixed set of rules. 
734 Moreover, 
disputes in the GATT system were resolved by consensus. As Braithwaite and Drahos 
point out, while compliance was generally obtained by non-legal means in the GATT 
system, in case a significant dispute arose there was so much flexibility "in deciding 
what matters that the GATT (was) hardly a rule-of-law regime". 
735 
The rules and standards laid down within the WTO agreements, by contrast, are 
frequently specific, clear and legally binding even though they may require some degree 
of interpretation for which the "Appellate Body" is delegated as an adjudicator. 
736 Also, 
these rules and standards are backed-up by an automatic and compulsory dispute 
settlement system, which consists of the "Panel" and the "Appellate Body". As 
Pauwelyn holds, at least in this sense the dispute settlement system makes WTO law 
"hard law" that can be enforced. 737 Indeed, according to Picciotto, the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO is "a full-blown trade court in all but name". 739 
On the other hand, it is also true that the WTO system lacks certain basic powers of a 
court. For instance, the "Appellate Body" does not have the power to award 
compensation 739 or automatic recognition of the binding character of its decision, which 
have to be approved by the "Dispute Settlement Body" (DSB). Moreover, this system 
does not have the authority to impose sanctions directly on those who violate WTO 
obligations. Furthermore, as Wolf stresses, the remedies of the WTO dispute settlement 
system are in practice of little use to less powerful countries since the countries with big 
markets have greater ability to market access and deter actions against their 
exporters. 740 Besides, as it is argued, at the end of the day, rule-breakers do not have to 
734 Abbott, Frederick, M., Incomplete Rule Systems, System Incompatibilities And Suboptimal Solutions, 
16 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law (1999) 1, p. 195 
735 Braithwaite and Drahos (2001) p. 185 
736 Picciotto (2005)p. 478 
737 Pauwelyn, Joost, The Role of Public International Lmv in the INTO, paper presented at "Sustra 
International Workshop, Berlin 9-10 December 2002, p. 2 
738 Picciotto (2005) p. 481 
739 Article 3.7 of the DSU stresses that the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure 
withdrawal of the WTO-inconsistent measure. The compensation may be resorted (as a "last resort) to 
only if "the immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable" and subject to authorisation by the 
DSB. 
Tao Wolf, Martin, Globalization and Global Economic Policy, 20 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 
(2004) 1, p. 76 
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pay any damages for past inconsistency; and in case of persistent wrongdoers, the 
aggrieved member can only be allowed to retaliate to re-balance the scale of concession, 
and nothing more. 741 However, it should be underlined that lack of `direct' 
enforcement is by no means `non-enforcement'. Indirect and `informal' enforcement 
may occur when one or more actors (states, international organisations, and others) 
impose costs on a rule-breaker. Such indirect or informal enforcement can employ not 
only retaliation, but also `diminished reputation and credibility' and `manifestations of 
reciprocity'. And also, even though the decisions of the "Appellate Body" need to be 
approved by the DSB, this requirement should be deemed as hypothetically so, since 
rejection of a decision of the "Appellate Body" is only possible by `consensus'. As 
discussed in the following section in detail, even the aggrieved party (or parties) is 
represented in the DSB and therefore it is highly unlikely that the complaining country 
(or countries) would vote against a report of the "Appellate Body" in favour of the 
complaining side. It can therefore be concluded that the WTO now stands at the point 
where it is almost a self-enforcing regime whose members commit to a series of precise 
obligations, which "can be adjudicated and compliance can be sought through means 
that fairly automatically impose real costs on regime defectors". 742 
The WTO system assaults the principle of state sovereignty at several levels. The most 
visible occurrence of such an assault is that as shown above, the WTO constrains the 
policy autonomy of less powerful states mainly by forcing countries to harmonise their 
domestic law and policies with the principles of the free market economy. Yet, 
interesting to note, the decisions of WTO are based on the (formal) consent of sovereign 
states. As mentioned in section 8.2, when the GATT was replaced by the WTO in 1994, 
the powerful states did not choose to adopt a weighted vote system as in the IMF and 
the World Bank but have preserved the principle of sovereign equality, which entails by 
definition "decision by consensus" principle, according to which all the WTO members, 
regardless of their political and/or economic influence, are at least theoretically given 
the possibility of blocking a decision by formally objecting to it. The `veto right' gives a 
guarantee to (in particular small) member countries that WTO decisions cannot be 
701 Pauwelyn (2002) p. 3 
742 Kelly, Claire R., Power, Linkage and Accommodation, 24 Berkeley Journal of International Law (2006) p. 81 
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imposed on them despite their opposition to a particular rule. Steinberg explains the 
apparent contradiction between powerful state hegemony and the consensus-based 
decision-making in the WTO by the fact that the procedural mechanisms make it 
possible for the powerful states to achieve the outcome they desired within the WTO 
system. These mechanisms and strategies are: (i) "invisible weighting", (ii) "relative 
market size", (iii) "coercion" in various forms, like a threat to exit or withdrawal from 
the deadlocked organisation and reconstituting a new organisation under different terms, 
and (iv) the domination over the formal and informal "agenda-setting" process (the 
formulation of proposals that are difficult to amend). 743 
Of course, as the "Seattle protests" in November 1999 symbolically showed, 744 the 
asymmetrical outcomes of the WTO system, favouring the powerful states and MNEs, 
have created considerable frustration and encountered growing criticism. The critical 
voices argue for example that the WTO essentially serves MNEs' interests, and it 
increases inequality, undermines the sovereignty of less powerful states and destroys the 
environment. 745 The WTO has also been accused of having a highly undemocratic and 
secretive decision-making and dispute resolution mechanisms. 746 The issues regarding 
transparency, democratic control, and accountability must be considered fundamental to 
the legitimacy of the WTO, bearing in mind that the rules agreed on within the 
framework of the WTO extend deeply into national economic and social order and even 
more importantly they are legally binding and enforceable. 
743 Steinberg (2002) p. 341 
744 Estimated 100.000 protesters ranged from human rights groups, students, environmental groups, 
religious leaders, labor rights activists, etc gathered to protest the current rules and implementations of the 
"corporate-led free trade", which sideline developing countries to a large extent. See, 
http: //www. guardian. co. uk/wto/article/0,2763,195956,00. html. 
745 For an overview of such criticisms and the response of the WTO, see 
httpJ/www. wto. org/english/theWTO a/minist e/min99 a/english/misinf e/00list-C. htm 
746 See for instance, littp, //www. foc, couk/resource/briefinmlwlo di vulesJeslrerh dP and http: //www. greenpeace. org/intemationaVcampaigns/trade-and-the-envi ronment/why-is-the-wto-a- 
problem/secretive-and-undemocratic. 
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8.6 The evolution of the GATTIWTO dispute settlement procedures 
There is no doubt that one of the key events in the establishment of the World Trade 
Organisation was the creation of the dispute settlement system, which presents a 
markedly significant change compared to the GATT's consensus-based dispute 
resolution system. The adoption of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) within 
the WTO has created a unified dispute' settlement system, which virtually resembles a 
national court system. 747 It contains rules on the pre-panel phase, called `consultation' 
as well as detailed working procedures for the panel phase. 
748 Two novel and distinctive 
features of the DSU are (i) the reverse or negative consensus rule for the adoption of 
Panel reports, which means that any member intending to block the decision to adopt 
the report(s) has to persuade all other WTO Members (including the adversarial party in 
the case) to join its opposition or at least to stay passive. Therefore, a negative 
consensus is largely a theoretical . possibility and, to 
date has never occurred. For this 
reason, one may speak of the quasi-automaticity of these decisions in the DSB. This 
contrasts sharply with the situation that prevailed under GATT 1947 when panels could 
be established, their reports adopted and retaliation authorized only on the basis of a 
positive consensus. Unlike under GATT 1947, the DSU thus provides no opportunity 
for blockage by individual Members in decision-making on these important matters. 749 
(ii) The establishment of an Appellate Body (AB). The AB has been established for the 
review of legal issues decided by the panels. Article 17(13) of the DSU defines the 
powers of the AB in the following terms: "The Appellate Body may uphold, modify or 
reverse the legal findings and the conclusions of the pane 19%750 What is radically 
different in this procedure is that according to Article 17(14) of the DSU, AB decisions 
(reports) must be "unconditionally accepted by the parties to the disputes unless the 
747 Davey, William, J., "WTO Dispute Settlement: Segregating the Useful Political Aspects and Avoiding 
`Over Legalization"' in Bronckers, Marco and Quick, Reinhard (eds. ), New Direction In International 
Economic Law, Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2000, p. 291 
748 The panels are not standing bodies but ad hoc tribunals that must be established for each case by the 
WTO "Dispute settlement Body" (DSB), which is composed of member state representatives. I lowever, 
even though the establishment procedure of the panels may evoke arbitration, their actual functioning 
leaves no doubt that panels are judicial in nature. (Pauwelyn, Joost, The Role of Public International Law 
in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 American Journal of International Law [2001) p. 535). 
749 See, http: //www. wto. org/English/tratop a/dispu e/disp settlement cbt_e/c3sl p1 e. htm 
750 http: //www. wto. org/english/docs-e/legal-e/28-dsu. pdf 
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DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body". 
751 As Picciotto observes, 
this reverses the GATT rule, which required a positive decision to adopt panel reports 
including the assent of the disputing parties. This of course would give governments a 
power to block adverse ruling. 
752 In other words, AB operates as a judicial tribunal in 
international law. Moreover, states are obliged to implement the decisions of the AB 
within a reasonable period (Article 23/2). If the state at issue fails to comply with the 
decision, the complainant may request mutually acceptable compensation, in the 
absence of such an agreement, the complainant may request trade sanctions. To end 
with, it is possible to claim that although the WTO Dispute Settlement system lacks the 
power to enforce directly its judgement, its existing power still makes the AB 
exceptional as an international body. 
The hard law transformation of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism has 
become one of the central pillars of the multilateral trading system. This development 
reflects WTO's evolution into a more legalised and thus powerful institution. Yet, this 
more potent and `legalistic' development of the WTO dispute settlement system is 
hardly unique. Considering the recent proliferation of international and supranational 
tribunals, such as various dispute settlement mechanisms within the system of the 
NAFTA, the ICSID, and international commercial arbitration, it becomes evident that 
the hard law development of the WTO dispute settlement system should be interpreted 
within a broader tendency towards a more disciplined and regulated international 
economy. For, as Abbott puts it, dispute settlement mechanisms may function as 
regulatory/disciplinary mechanism in international economy; "they may promote open 
market conditions, and they may also be used to restrict markets, for example by the 
acceptance of market/quota allocations". 753 
8.7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has shown that the employment of the deregulation and re-regulation 
policies that served as tools to pave the way for the neo-liberal constitutional isation 
731 http: //www. wto. org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu. pdf 
752 Picciotto (2005) p. 478 
753 Abbott (1999) p. 194 
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project, has been designed to secure internationally guaranteed private property rights 
and create the necessary discipline for markets through redefining the terms of 
international competition. In the chapter it is argued that in the process of market 
liberalisation and deregulation there is an inbuilt and simultaneous process of re- 
regulation rather than the total eradication of regulations of state/international 
organisation. The re-regulation process as part of disciplining market that has developed 
in the international institutional context took two distinctive forms: (i) an extended 
scope and broader mandate of the international economic institutions; (ii) the changing 
nature of these institutions both in terms of a deepening hard legalisation and 
interventionist approach in the domestic law and policies of the member states. 
Examples of such a development are abundant: IMF for instance, has evolved into a 
financial institution, handling payment systems, banking, capital markets, and financial 
crises, from initially being an international monetary institution. Moreover, through the 
mechanism of 'conditionality', both the World Bank and the IMF have imposed the 
policies of market economy on borrower countries. Likewise, the WTO has evolved 
from being an organisation, whose mandate was to lower trade barriers into a principal 
actor in the harmonisation of national laws in the fields of trade, intellectual property 
rights and services. The "new generation" of multilateral provisions addressing these 
issue-areas has turned into veritable standard setting. These standards are prescriptive in 
nature, setting standards and defining outcomes of how national law must be shaped. 
The institutional evolution of the GATT/WTO from a soft law to a hard law system 
bears the basic characteristics of what this study labels the "hegemonic state" paradigm. 
In this model, inter-state relations are reordered based on the post-Cold War hierarchical 
power structure. As exemplified by the development of the Bretton Woods institutions, 
the neo-liberal ideas associated with globalisation, such as liberalisation, deregulation 
and privatisation, have been institutionalised through a multilateral rule-based 
framework that has substantial authority over national governments of developing 
countries. In other words, globalisation is not disconnected from the Bretton Woods 
institutions. 
Thus, considering that those international institutions, which are regulating and 
governing globalisation, were initiated and still to a considerable extent are controlled, 
by the US and a few other powerful states, it can be assessed that in the `hegemonic 
state' paradigm, like in the NIEO, the state has a central role. Yet, these two "statist" 
259 
models are significantly different in a number of aspects. First, the NIEO was initiated 
by developing countries whereas the WTO/hegemonic state-model represents a 
developed country initiative. Second, although both initiatives are based on the principle 
of sovereign equality, in the NIEO-model this principle is rather asserted in a nearly 
aspirational sense whereas in the WTO/hegemonic state-model this principle is 
preserved due to its effect on the legitimacy of the process and the effect on the 
generation of information necessary for a successful agenda-setting process. 754 Third, 
the NIEO-model categorically discarded any vital role for MNEs either as norm or rule 
makers whereas the WTO/hegemonic state-model actively encourage an active 
participation of private entities. In a sense, the NIEO was a product of the ideological 
conditions of power balance between capitalist and socialist block whereas the power 
balance on which the WTO/hegemonic state-model is based is between powerful states- 
MNEs and (to a lesser degree)- NGOs. Both models entail a highly' regulated 
international economy. However, the NIEO endeavoured the international regulation to 
regulate the activities of MNEs as well as to ensure financial and technology transfer 
from North to South whereas the purpose of regulation in the WTO/hegemonic state- 
model has been to promote the activities of MNEs. Therefore along with deregulation, 
re-regulation has also been an essential policy. Another reason for the increasing 
regulation of international economy in this model is to regulate the competition between 
countries and developed country-based MNEs. As in the example of the OECD 
"Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business 
Transactions", when defining the rules of the proper functioning of international 
business competition, international organisations favouring market-based mechanisms 
become willing to endeavour hard law solutions. Lastly, in the NIEO-model, the 
regulatory outcome originated from the numerical majority of the developing countries 
in the UN General Assembly. Since it was based on a sort of "majority voting" model 
against economically powerful states, the legal outcome of this process was soft law 
whereas the WTO/hegemonic state-model is based on hard law development and the 
legal outcome has to a large extent been hard law. 
754 Steinberg (2002) p. 361 
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9 ANALYSIS: THE EVOLUTION OF SOFT LAW IN 
ECONOMIC REGULATION 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to analyse the relationship between the two legal paradigms identified 
in this study; the "state-centric" and the dual "globalist" paradigms. The analysis will 
focus on the development of international economic regulation and examine the 
changing nature and role of soft law within each of these paradigms. 
Section 9.2 gives a brief overview of the examined paradigms and the underlying 
reasons for the paradigm shift. As stated in chapter 1, section 1.2, a paradigm is in this 
study understood as a device for explaining the pervasiveness of world views. Each 
paradigm is seen to be composed of an underlying discourse and its connected practices. 
Section 9.3 maps the basic characteristics that distinguish the discourse and the social 
and institutional practices of the state-centric paradigm. In order to identify the 
conditions that made this discursive formation possible this section also examines the 
context upon which the state-centric paradigm is based. Section 9.4 discusses the 
underlying reasons for the-paradigm shift. Section 9.5 maps the basic characteristics that 
distinguish the discourse and the social and institutional practices of the dual globalist 
paradigm. This section also analyses the interrelation between the two globalist sub- 
paradigms. Section 9.6 examines the relations between two paradigms and the changing 
nature and role of soft law as a result of the paradigm shift. 
9.2 An overview of the structure of the paradigms 
The state-centric paradigm had two main sources: 
(i) Decolonisation 
(ii) The need for restructuring the national economies of the developed countries 
of Europe. 
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The common grounds of these two sources were the Cold War (balance of power in 
international relations) and the Keynesian commitment to create national economic 
policies that were directed towards creating a steady economic gro'kth and full 
employment backed up by international economic institutions centred around the 
Bretton Woods institutions. At this time these institutions were charged with 
constructing an institutional infrastructure of' financial stahility and multilateral free 
trade, i. e., 'embedded liberalism'. 
Figure 2 pictures the main characteristics of' the examined paradigms and the 
underlying reasons for the paradigm shift. 
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Figure 2. The structure of the paradigms and paradigm shift 
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While the process of decolonisation gave rise to the developing country model of state- 
centrism, which is exemplified by the NIEO in this study, the second source that 
involves the need for reconstruction of the national economies, brought about the 
European type of welfare state model; a combination of liberal democracy and 
capitalism, which sees government intervention in the economy as necessary for the 
stability and development. In both variations of the state-centric paradigm, the nation- 
state was seen as the primary and legitimate institution of policy creation, enactment, 
and enforcement and the only agent in economic development through public sector and 
planned investment and. This entailed a relatively segregated and self-sustained national 
economy in the sense that the major part of economic activity had to take place 
domestically. 
Following globalisation of the international economy and the collapse of the socialist 
system in the 1980s, international relations and the world economy went through far- 
reaching transformations. Globalisation had by the 1980s led to the breakdown of 
national economic development strategies and paved the way for the rise of neo-liberal 
policies and ideologies. This shift resulted in the abrupt disappearance of the NIEO and 
the progressive replacement of the Keynesian welfare model of the state-centrism by the 
ideological underpinnings of the dual globalist paradigm. In contrast to the emphasis on 
national economic growth and state-controlled development, the globalist paradigm 
involved policies such as economic liberalisation, deregulation, i. e., the removal of 
trade barriers, government interference in financial and capital markets as well as 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises. These neo-liberal policies have been promoted 
by a politicised intervention of international economic institutions and incorporated a 
pro-market, anti-state emphasis as in the example of 'conditionality' of loans to 
developing countries from the World Bank and IMF . 
755 The dual globalist paradigm is 
based on the idea of a global community, which is characterized by a multitude of 
decentralised law-making processes in the national, international and transnational 
economy. 
ass gender, John, From `Structural Adjustment' to 'Comprehensive Development Framework: 
Conditionality Transformed?, 22 Third World Quarterly (2001) 3, p. 399 
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9.3 The discourse formation and practices of the state-centric 
paradigm 
As discussed in chapter 5, the NIEO was a negotiation process between countries of 
North and South. It involved a comprehensive package of multilateral policy options 
that aimed to improve the position of Third World countries both by revising the 
existing international economic policies and reforming international economic 
institutions. This included the reform of the power relations within these institutions, 
which were seen to generate and sustain international asymmetries and to reproduce the 
structures of underdevelopment. According to the perceptions underlying the state- 
centric paradigm, of international economic relations should be based on the principles 
such as respect of sovereign equality of states, the right of every state to freely exercise 
full and permanent sovereignty over all of their natural resources and economic 
activities and non-interference in internal affairs. 
The programs of the NIEO were designed to achieve national economic development of 
developing countries through a wide range of policy measurements, which 
paradoxically required the autonomy of the nation-state and the inter-national 
cooperation through revising international economic policy and restructuring 
international economic institutions. The autonomy of the nation state meant that states 
should retain sufficient autonomy to pursue economic and social objectives 
domestically providing social welfare for their citizens. International cooperation was 
seen as a tool to increase the influence and endorse the demands of the increasing 
number of "free" developing countries. To achieve this goal these countries made 
recourse to, a variety of international forums and institutions, in particular the UN 
General Assembly. At the domestic level, the state-centric model had five basic 
elements: 
(i) The state had the primary responsibility for the development of national economy 
through planning all important aspects of the economy and to guide and direct 
various policies and actors in an integrated way. At this point, it should also be 
remembered that central planning is a way of making law, not just commodities. 75' 
756 Cooter, Robert, D., Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy, 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1996) 5, p. 1644 
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(ii) States did not only plan the economy but they also played as a principal economic 
actor by creating public enterprises in various sectors ranging from manufacturing 
and service to insurance and transportation. 
(iii) The promotion of industrialisation was a primary function of the state in developing 
countries where capital is scarce and the economy is dependent on agriculture and 
raw materials. Hence, state investment was seen as the only means of capital 
accumulation. 
(iv) As a consequence of state planning and reliance on public enterprises, both 
domestic, but especially foreign private enterprises were subjected to large-scale 
regulation on every important aspect of business operation, such as business 
formation, technology transfer, price and currency exchange. 
(v) In order to achieve a complete independence, developing countries also pursued 
policies that would lead to self-reliance and economic independence through 
adopting economic policies including expropriation of foreign investment, 
restriction and control of capital inflow, and a controlled import of foreign goods 
through high tariffs and exchange controls. "The basic thrust of these measures was 
to restrict foreign influences on developing economies and to control economic 
interactions with the outside world. t9757 
Figure 3 depicts the conditions for the formation of the discourse underlying the state- 
centric paradigm as well as its key characteristics. Moreover the figure illustrates the 
legal and political tools as well as the legal outcomes of this paradigm: 
757 Salacuse, Jeswald, W., From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets, 33 The International 
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At the inter-national level, it was prescribed that states should cooperate to: 
(i) 
(ii) 
Improve the purchasing power of developing countries; 
Stabilise and raise the prices of the commodities developing countries 
generally relied upon to earn foreign exchange; 
(iii) Reduce tariffs of industrialised countries and offer Southern exporters 
preferential access to their markets; 
(iv) Control foreign investors through a binding multilateral code of conduct; 
(v) Facilitate the transfer of technology from the North at minimal costs; 
(vi) Obtain debt relief and higher levels of development assistance; and 
(vii) Secure a more powerful voice for the Third World on the boards of the IMF 
and World Bank. 
To conclude, the NIEO demonstrated a strong belief that the full implementation of the 
new multilateral rules would effect a redistribution of global income and allow 
developing countries more autonomy from asymmetrical economic relationships. Thus, 
in this sense, it can be asserted that firstly the NIEO was to a considerable extent a call 
made by developing countries for the generalisation of the benefit of the European 
model of `embedded liberalism'. Secondly both domestic and international law was 
seen as determinant in reconstructing the international system and changing 
international economic relations, in this model. In other words, being regarded as a tool 
for social engineering, the underlying task of law and regulation was to bring about 
desired social and economic change. 
9.4 The context for the paradigm shift 
By the 1980s, both developing country and welfare versions of the state-centric 
approach to economic regulation faced changing world conditions as a combined result 
of the demise of the socialist system (the end of the Cold War), globalisation and debt 
crisis. 
The Cold War was based on the competition of two rival world system, capitalism and 
socialism, which constituted the definite framework for inter-state relations. The demise 
of the socialist system had consequently profound implications on international 
relations in general and international economic and legal order in particular. Above all, 
the possibility of developing countries to play two rival camps against each other in 
order to pursue their objectives has disappeared with the collapse of the socialist 
system. Related to this, the end of the socialist system deprived many developing 
countries of sources of psychological and material support. This was particularly critical 
within the framework of the UN. Equally importantly, with the demise of the socialist 
system, the centrally planned economic model was discredited in most developing 
countries. ' Although this `victory' of liberalism did not alone cause a shift towards a 
liberal economic reform, it nonetheless reinforced the claim of the market economy of 
being the superior solution in managing the global economy. 
The increasing globalisation of international economy has been pointed out as another 
crucial reason for the shift examined in this study. Globalisation has involved the 
fragmentation and decentralisation of national productive processes and the dismantling 
of national economies. It has also implied a shift from an inter-national economy, in 
which national production systems were linked to each other through trade and financial 
flows, to a globally integrated world economy. 758 In the new globalised era, the notion 
of development is no longer meant national economic growth, but successful 
participation at the world market. In other words, in the globalisation process of the 
world economy, the notion of `economic development' has been decoupled from the 
national connotation it had within the state-centric model. 
This new approach to development advanced mainly by the IMF and World Bank and 
other policy-making circles, such as G7, found its intellectual ground in the neo-liberal 
ideology, which prescribed that the route to development passed through deeper 
integration of the world economy (the so-called "export-led development"). By the 
1980s, developing countries uniformly adopted this new approach to development, 
which meant a shift from the central role of the state basing the societal development on 
welfare goals to the neo-liberal principles that emphasised the importance of the market 
forces. The most important reason for this shift in approach to Third World 
development was the necessity of developing countries to obtain financial assistance 
758 Robinson, William, I., Remapping development in the light ofglobalisation, 23 Third World Quarterly 
(2002)6, p. 1056 
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from the IMF and the World Bank due to the deep economic crisis and huge debt 
problem the developing countries were struggling with in the end of the 1970s. These 
economic problems included budgetary, inflationary, and debt servicing burdens. The 
resources that were made available by the IMF and the World Bank to combat these 
severe payments problems were made conditional through the adoption of the Structural 
Adjustment Program (SAP). The conditionality linked to the SAP basically entailed: 
(i) The liberalisation of trade and financial systems and the reduction of trade and 
investment barriers, opening the economies to the world market; 
(ii) Deregulation, which removed the state influence on macro-economic decision 
making; 
(iii) The privatisation of public owned enterprises; 
(iv) The withdrawal of all subsidies; and 
(v) The protection of property rights protecting investors from expropriation of 
private property. 
Thus, SAP generally called for the elimination of state intervention in the economy and 
the regulation of individual nation-states over the activities of international capital 
within their territories. 
Between 1978 and 1992 more than 70 developing countries undertook 566 stabilisation 
and structural adjustment programmes imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. 719 
Developing countries adjusted themselves to these new conditions to varying degree, 
depending on diverse factors specific to each country's population, history, culture, geo- 
political location and then existing level of capital/technological accumulation. This has 
resulted in an increased economic and developmental differentiation between different 
groups of developing countries resulting in increasingly contradictory agendas of these 
countries. Especially some East Asian countries performed well in this rather dramatic 
restructuring of the world economy. As a consequence this has lead to a decreasing 
incentive for these countries to stick together to promote the same development and 
goals within the international organisations and forums. 
759 http: //www. imf. org/externaUnp/pdr/cond/2001/eng/collab/comment. pdf 
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9.5 The discourse formation and practices of the globalist paradigm 
A central debate in the neo-liberal globalisation process has involved discussions on the 
capacity of states to independently and effectively pursue domestic economic strategies. 
According to the neo-liberal accounts, the forces of globalisation have increasingly 
rendered the nation-state less powerful as well as less meaningful. Many have also 
claimed that non-state actors have acquired an unchallenged power and implicitly been 
accorded a legitimate authority as a result of: 
(i) Changes in information, communications, and financial technologies, which 
have altered the basic relationship between authority and market; 
(ii) The emergence of new global problems, such as transnational environmental 
problems that require transnational action; and 
(iii) The decline of the nation-state as regulatory power as a result of 
privatisation and de-regulation. 
These developments have resulted in a greater participation from MNEs and NGOs in 
rule and policy-making processes as well as a turn to markets as mechanisms to allocate 
society's resources. As a consequence, the 1980s and 1990s have witnessed shifts from 
binding to increasingly voluntarist, non-state/hybrid and self-regulatory frameworks 
involving non-binding standards and rules, and public-private co-operation. 
Neo-liberal approach to the economy basically involves the policies of market 
deregulation, state decentralisation, and reduced state intervention in economic affairs. 
Its two central elements are the self-regulating market, i. e., a categorical belief in 
market performance as the governing mechanism for allocating goods and services and 
the rejection of state interference in economy, i. e., regulation. On the other hand, the 
actual practices of neo-liberal globalisation have showed that the transformation of 
international economic relations has not only entailed de-regulation, informal and 
voluntary normative development corresponding to the rising authority of non-state 
actors as rule makers and the emergence of a multilayered governance, but also an 
increasing legalisation, in the forms of re-regulation and hard law development. In other 
words, the shift from state-centred economic development and regulation to market- 
based mechanisms should not be conceived as an overall conversion from `public' to 
`private'. For, this shift entails not a definitive rolling back of state intervention, but it 
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should rather be interpreted as the political, economical and institutional re-organisation 
of the role of the state. Thus, even though free markets and deregulation are presented 
by the neo-liberal ideology as a way to exclude state involvement in economic 
regulation, the process of globalisation has entailed both deregulation and re-regulation. 
Figure 4 depicts the conditions for the formation of the discourse underlying the dual 
globalist paradigm as well as its key characteristics related to each of the two sub- 
paradigms, the non state actor paradigm and the hegemonic state actor paradigm. 





















V -t ý 
wO ý Q O 
z 
N 










































; '; cUa 




dö : t. ý -- ° 
uC 
V"4r, 'Ij °ý wC 
V .. -; I 
W ii Cý ýý, ^ 
0 00 
c ý a u E 
v ý ý. C3 5f J U O. O ýv ,ýs C7 ý v O O O C. C Oý ýp ý 





r- i u 








ýý., 'ý ,. 
`~ '
C 





" " " " " " 
N 





1A 0 4- GJ V) cd i 
} 
Q Ü - V, 'L7 
ý v  
-Vi 




WD L + (/ý O "ý y U n 
V 
'ý v = " 
O 
v 




















S ý ý' 'b 
ý ýý / 
f 
ý _ n - . I cd i--I s -i ý-"ý .a r- i --/ 































v r. a ti +N 
yýä 





'T7 ce v bA 




ro ýy lý 
vý ýEm 
.a öUý QJ 
ý LS. ýy.: ý) E vý ý ti C f1, ý 









ý, ý ý 
ý aý 8 
0 

































Z zu Z cn 
-o ö 
V 
The basic rationality behind re-regulation is that for the realisation of a free and self- 
regulated global market it is not sufficient only to dismantle barriers to the free flow of 
goods, services and capital, but also it is necessary to put in place the essential political, 
legal and institutional framework in and through which a market is constituted, like 
property and contract rights. The reality of a free global market place "not being self- 
constitutive" required the re-organisation of the nation-state. 
Such a re-organisation has in turn entailed a necessity for states to take up new roles 
that involve managing and facilitating the development of markets and market 
performance, such as privatisation, deregulation, and negotiations of free trade. This 
type of re-organisation has also required a re-regulation though this re-regulation has 
arguably been different from the traditional state regulation at least in two important 
ways: Firstly this market-based re-regulation entails both state-market co-operation 
('governance') and state-market co-existence ('legal pluralism') in standard setting and 
implementation processes. Such co-operation and co-existence hence imply the 
fragmentation of the domestic sovereignty and give rise to a growing authority of non- 
state actors, which imposes the recognition of multiple sources of authority and no 
single decision-making centre. Secondly, it has led to an interventionism of 
international economic institutions. This has involved the transformation of external 
sovereignty from non-intervention to regulated intervention aiming at the harmonisation 
of domestic rules and policies in the areas of trade, investment and property rights. 
9.6 The changing nature and role of economic soft law and 
regulation 
As highlighted in chapter 2, soft law initially emerged as a result of the structural 
shortcomings of international law to respond to the increasing complexity of the post- 
war inter-state life. However, the growing role of non-state actors and decreasing/re- 
organised regulatory power of the state has had significant impact on the nature and role 
of international economic soft law. Most importantly, in the globalisation process soft 
law has increasingly been used to develop instruments and regimes that rely primarily 
on non-state actors in their making, implementation and enforcement. Thus, in this 
perception soft law is no longer a concept of international law and a tool for 
governments and inter-state agencies, but it is the norm-like activities of the private 
actors within a combined public-private transnational realm. Due to this conflicting 
nature and role of law and regulation as understood and employed in the two paradigms 
described in this thesis, the shift from state-centric to globalist paradigm has had 
important implications for the development of soft law. 
The NIEO is an outstanding example where law and regulation is perceived as a tool for 
social engineering. Within the NIEO it is understood that domestic and inter-national 
legislation can bring about social/economic changes. Whereas in the laissez-faire 
economy promoted within the globalist paradigm, it is held that the actions of private 
individuals, motivated by self-interest, will work together for the greater good of society 
as long as markets are free and competitive. The supporters of this latter conviction 
traditionally argue in favour of reducing or eliminating state interventionism in the 
economy. This line of reasoning maintains that state regulations wrongly protect 
companies from competition at the expense of consumers. In practice, however, laissez- 
faire principles have not prevented private interests from turning to the government and 
international economic organisations for help on various issues including accepting 
grants and public subsidies appealing for protections through trade policy, and seeking 
for investment protection when facing strong competition from abroad. 
A summary of the main differences in the approach to law and regulation between the 
two paradigms are described in table 2. 
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Table 2: A summary of the differences in approach to law and regulation between 
the state centric and the Globalist paradigm 
Source: Original formulation based on the analysis in chapter 3-8 
State-centric paradigm Globalist paradigm 
" Law is a tool for social engineering " Law is a tool for creating discipline for 
(legal interventionism) international markets and to secure the 
" Non-interventionism is an important interest of global capital 
basis for creating domestic law " Regulated interventionism by 
" Legal centrism; state is the only law- international economic institutions to 
maker 
homogenise domestic law 
"A move from contract to law and " Decentralised 
law-making and legal 
regulation pluralism; non-state actors, international 
" Demand for international binding rules economic 
institutions and 
for regulating MNEs and for securing arbitration/dispute settlement 
financial and technological transfer mechanisms are also 
law-makers along 
from developed to developing with states 
countries "A move from law and regulation to 
" Formally and highly regulated domestic custom and contract 
and international economies " Less state-based rules for regulating 
business (deregulation, self-regulation); 
more and harder rules facilitating 
international business activities and 
protecting property rights 
" Deformalisation of the international 
norm making process 
The NIEO was associated with the Westphalian model of the international society, 
based on the idea that sovereign nation-states comprise the exclusive actors of 
international sphere, in which intervention is considered as legally and morally' 
unacceptable. Chapter 1 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 
entitled "Fundamentals of International Economic Relations", expressly says: 
"Economic as well as political and other relations among States shall be governed, inter 
alia, by the principles of (b) Sovereign equality of all States, (d) Non-intervention". 
Likewise, Article 1 of this Charter reads: "Every State has the sovereign and inalienable 
right to choose its economic system as well as its political, social and cultural systems 
in accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion or threat 
in any form whatsoever. " On the other hand, the hegemonic state sub-paradigm entails 
interventionism in various forms. One example of this type of interventionism is the 
structural adjustment programs of the IMF and World Bank, and the policy of 
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conditionality associated with it. This system arguably constituted an infringement on 
the sovereignty of mainly developing states because it constrains and undermined their 
ability to manage, accumulate, and redistribute economic resources within their own 
territory. Similarly, the convergence/harmonization of domestic laws under the WTO 
regimes, especially the TRIPS and GATS agreements can be considered as constituting 
a limitation on the national policy choice of sovereign states as it mainly focuses on 
shrinking the role played by domestic politics. In other words, the harmonisation and 
supra-nationalisation involved in adding conditionality to loan agreements and the 
WTO regime challenge the effectiveness of both domestic and international state 
policies. 
Another major consequence of the paradigm shift for the role of law and regulation is 
that the "non-state actor" sub-paradigm represents a movement from plan to contract, 
from public ordering to private ordering of economic activities. State-centrism involves 
the intervention of the state in domestic and international economic activities in various 
degrees and forms using law and regulation in which governments formulate the goals 
of the state(s) and force other actors to conform to these goals. Such a centralised top 
down law-making process crowds out any bottom up initiative of regulatory 
mechanisms and especially self-regulation. For instance, during the post war period 
when the state-centric paradigm was prevailing, there was a rapid increase of new laws 
and regulations where none had existed before: public enterprises law, foreign 
investment codes, currency control regulations, nationalisation decrees, price 
regulations which meant that there were little space for bottom up initiatives. "This new 
public law, not the commercial code, became the basic law of economic and business 
activity in the Third World". 760 Conversely, the globalist paradigm has emphasised the 
role of markets and private ordering and has consequently promoted a decentralised law 
making, which promulgates the rule-making of non-state actors. This shift in state- 
market relations that has characterised the contemporary era of globalisation and 
economic liberalisation is particularly evident in the arena of lex mercatoria and CSR, 
where the norms arise outside of the state's law making apparatus. In the case of lex 
mercatoria, business actors have gained increased autonomy through regulating their 
economic transactions with contracts. In the example of CSR, self regulatory, voluntary 
760 Salacuse (1999) p. 881 
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and soft approaches to business regulation has been promoted in an attempt to improve 
aspects of company performance that relate to social and human rights responsibility. In 
short, in both occurrences of self-regulatory regimes the emphasis is put on the market- 
based mechanisms developing as an autonomous process in which the rules are 
elaborated in a decentralised way. 
Central to the discourse that proclaims the superiority of the market in relation to 
legalistic approaches involving state-based regulation, the globalist paradigm has 
required a new approach to the notion of regulation. In addition to an enhanced role for 
non-state actors in standard setting, implementation and enforcement which mainly can 
be seen as a result from deregulation and privatisation, this process has also involved 
(re-)regulation of markets and private transactions due to the necessity to provide rules 
for a proper functioning of the global market. However, unlike the state-centric 
paradigm, in which regulation was to direct the nature and principles of private 
transactions, the role of regulation in the globalisation paradigm is to keep a close watch 
on the functioning of transactions in order to "protect the participants in the market 
from fraud, coercion, and abuse by other participants". 761 Such a regulatory mechanism 
can be seen as the states' attempt to set up institutional conditions under which business 
or non-state/hybrid institutions operate in a self-regulatory manner. 762 In this regard, the 
shift from a state-centric to a globalist approach implies a shift in focus from directive 
regulation to supervisory regulation, which is primarily concerned with laying down 
standards and general regulatory principles rather than directly regulates business 
behaviour. 
Lastly, the rational behind the characterisation of the regulatory efforts as soft law 
within the NIEO model can hardly be explained barely with the international law- 
making `technique'. This study argued that such a classification has been used by the 
developed countries as an instrument to challenge to the strategy of developing 
countries to use UNGA resolutions to put pressure on developed countries in order to 
restructure international economic legal order. Since developing countries tried to force 
developed countries to adopt the objectives of the NIEO by using their numerical 
761 Ibid. p. 887 
762 Teubner describes this development with the concept of the "regulation of self-regulation" (Teubner, 
Gunther, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 Law and Society [1983] p. 239). 
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superiority in the UN system, developed countries used soft law as a mechanism to 
reduce the legal effect of the NIEO. In other words, in the NIEO model, the occurrence 
of soft law was as a result of the ideological differences between developing and 
developed countries mainly in relation to how the underlying principles of international 
economy should be organised (centrally planned economy versus market economy). In 
the globalist paradigm, on the other hand, soft law and informal rules have been created 
and promulgated as a result of the neo-liberal prescription characterised by a multitude 
of decentralised law-making processes in international economy. In this model, 
international economic soft law mainly originates from (i) voluntary standards, such as 
those issued by MNEs or NGOs, (ii) international governmental, quasi-governmental or 
informal institutions that depend on voluntary compliance and participation by non-state 
actors or other governments, such as ISO, and finally, (iii) non-state custom and 
practices that have emerged independently from nation-states, such as law merchant. 
Against this background, it can be concluded that the shift to the globalist paradigm has 
involved the transformation of state sovereignty on at least at two levels: First, there is 
an increasing gap between the Westphalian model of domestic-sovereignty and its 
actual effects on governance of territorial economic activities in the face of the 
emergence of non-state economic legal orders. Second, the shift from inter-national 
economy towards global economy has also fragmented the Westphalian model of inter- 
national sovereignty as a result of both the interventionism by international economic 
institutions and non-state international regulatory regimes. 
278 
10 SUMMARY AND REFLECTIONS ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF SOFT LAW 
10.1 Introduction 
This study aimed to explore the changing nature and role of soft law in international law 
in general and in international economic law in particular. It is contended in the study 
that the evolution of international economic law in the 1980s has experienced a 
paradigm shift from state-centric towards a dual globalist paradigm. This move has also 
entailed a change in the nature and role of international economic soft law. 
Section 10.2 summarises the paradigm shift and the changing nature and role of 
international economic soft law examined in the thesis. Section 10.3 reflects on the 
possible courses that soft law development may follow in the context of the present de- 
formalisation of international law, which refers to the increasing management of the 
world's affairs by flexible and informal non-territorial networks, lex mercatoria, and 
private dispute-settlement. 763 
10.2 Summary 
As a matter of fact, soft law has long existed in international law, in the first place, as a 
result of the problem of the doctrine of sovereignty. Soft law initially emerged in inter- 
sovereign relations through an inherent tension in the very concept of international law. 
This tension has its origin in the so-called normativity demand, i. e. a formal process 
wherein states create law, and the behaviour, will or interests of sovereign states. Hence, 
soft law was born as a `by-product' of the need to reconcile sovereignty with the 
normativity -of law. Not surprisingly, therefore, the tension between the external 
(binding) normative order and a continued autonomous sovereign authority has given 
763 Koskenniemi, Martti, Global Governance and Public International Law, speech delivered in 
Frankfurt, 9 February 2004, available at http: //www. valt. heisinki. fi/blogs/eci/Frankfurt. pdf 
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rise to the arguments that the normative structure of international law is essentially 
`soft' as a whole. Thus the aforesaid reason for the emergence of soft law concerns 
"inter-sovereign life". In other words, soft law was a mean of sovereign states to 
reconcile the incompatibility of autonomous sovereignty with normative authority (or 
`international reality'). 
However, as many other `living' social institutions, soft law did not remain in its initial 
form or nature. It has gradually evolved from being a relatively simple concept to a 
more complex one in parallel to the growing heterogeneity of international society and 
increasing complexity of the international social order. The present study has identified 
two important changes in international life that have been particularly influential on the 
evolution of international law in general and soft law in particular: (i) the foundation of 
the UN and the subsequent decolonisation process in the context of the Cold War; (ii) 
the process of globalisation in the context of post-Cold War. 
The United Nation system, established in the aftermath of the war, has aimed to create a 
new world order based on not only state sovereignty but also "peaceful" and "friendly" 
"coexistence" of international society (Article I and 2 of the Charter of the UN). In this 
new era, sometimes called the "UN Charter law", 764 the number of states increased 
almost twofold reaching 130 in 1960. At the same time the UN General Assembly 
adopted the Declarations on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, which resulted in the creation of a more pluralistic and heterogeneous 
international society. Even though this Declaration gave more independence and power 
to the new countries the Western states retained their dominant position in the Security 
Council and in the relevant international financial institutions, such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund, as weighted voting applied according to the share 
of financial contribution. 
During the "UN Charter law" era, international law has experienced a series of 
substantive changes. Along with states, international organisations, individuals, 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have 
appeared as new actors in international arena and been claimed to might have obtained 
certain degree of international legal personality. Moreover, compared to the period prior 
764 Cassese (2001) p. 4 
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to 1945, a period during which the primary concerns of international law were rules of 
conduct of diplomatic relations and immunities, the adjustment of territorial 
sovereignty, and the regulation of war, the scope of international law has also 
broadened. In addition to these domains international law is now engaged in 
international economy, social/technological/ human development, regulation of 
international organisations, nuclear energy, environment, and human rights. This 
broadening of domains has also resulted in a broadening of `participants' in the 
international legal order and this has been a major challenge to the traditional sources of 
international law enumerated in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ. 
It is generally held that the concept of soft law in the "UN Charter era comprises two 
types of international instruments and norms: First, those instruments which are 
formally binding but nonetheless lack the required normative content to create 
enforceable rights and obligations. International treaties with vague obligations or weak 
commands are the typical examples of such soft law. The soft characteristics of such 
instruments may be evident from the employed language or the explicit indication that 
the nature and degree of adherence to the norm(s) is a matter of national discretion. 
Hence, the legal form is not decisive in this category of soft law: even though the form 
is treaty, which is by definition binding, the rules embodied in treaties with more open- 
textured or general in their content or wording can thus be seen as soft. Consequently, 
treaties may be either hard or soft, or often both. Second, there are those instruments, 
which do not strictly fall within any category of the traditional sources of international 
law embodied in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, nevertheless they are capable of 
creating certain legal effects. Soft law instruments in this category may take a number 
of different forms, including `declaration of principles' or `guidelines' that they 
explicitly state that compliance with the norm is voluntary, like "the OECD 
Guidelines"; declaration of intergovernmental conferences, like "the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development"; resolutions of the UN General Assembly; or codes of 
conduct, guidelines and recommendations of international organisations, like "the 
United Nations Environment Programme" and "the Food and Agriculture 
Organization". The study has demonstrated that the legal effect of these different soft 
law instruments is not the same and may vary to a considerable degree. 
It has been noted that soft and hard law are not always alternative to each other. They 
may be a part of the same international law-making process or they may interact among 
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them. Likewise, it has been stressed that the `softness' of an international instrument 
does not necessarily and always entail that soft law does not have a bearing in practice 
because matters subject to soft law are essentially within the discretion of states. It has 
been held that by undertaking obligation(s) embodied in a soft law instrument, states 
join in the expectation that the rules at issue will be respected, even though the breach 
of this `shared expectation' does not amount to a breach of legal obligation. 
The legal nature of the resolutions or declarations of international organisations 
particularly became an important issue and a source of a continued tension in the North- 
South bargaining process during the 1970s, when developing countries attempted to 
restructure the asymmetrical international economic legal order by adopting resolutions 
within the UN system calling for a new international economic order. The most 
prevailing examples of soft law created on the basis of lack of legality are the UN 
General Assembly resolutions which set down the principles of the so-called New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) and the subsequent Charter for the Economic' 
Rights. 
Developing countries saw the NIEO as a legal means that would lead to greater equality 
in the global distribution of wealth. Developed countries on the other hand held that 
international law should not interfere with liberal market forces contending that the 
fewer interventions in the market, the better. They therefore showed no enthusiasm to 
be legally bound by the NIEO principle through the established law-making mode of 
international law, i. e., multinational treaty and custom, since the `consent' of each state 
is traditionally seen as the constitutive condition for a new international norm's coming 
into being. As a consequence developing countries had to find another legal strategy in 
their search for a legally binding NIEO. The basis of this new legal strategy was the 
unanimously or near-unanimously adopted UN General Assembly resolutions. Some 
pro-Third World lawyers argued that such resolutions have to be considered as a new 
source of law while some others argued that such resolutions could be a step towards 
the formation of customary law. Considering the slowness of the process of forming 
customary law, some lawyers in the latter group even argued that these resolutions 
could amount to `instant customary law'. However, even though such normative 
activities have had some legal significance and influence on the content of international 
economic law, in view of Article 10 of the UN Charter, which states clearly the nature 
and limit of the power of the UN General Assembly, in the absence of concordant 
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consent of the industrialised Western countries, the principles of the NIEO could hardly 
be seen as having attained a sufficient level of legality to be considered legally binding. 
On the other hand, it can be claimed that the soft law labelling of the principles of the 
NIEO can be seen as the strategy of developed countries, aiming to diminish the legal 
effects of the NIEO principles on the conduct of developed countries. Otherwise, as 
Carlsson argues, "the industrialised states have generally been willing to give a positive 
response to the NIEO demands, but "only in principle. "765 In other words, the 
disagreement between developed and developing countries in this regard did not arise 
from the principles of the NIEO, but their intended legal nature. Thus, industrialised 
capitalist countries wanted to retain the power to decide on how and to what extent they 
would comply with the principles of the NIEO. Examples of such "only in principle" 
soft law endorsement by developed countries could be found in the legal provisions 
dealing with non-reciprocity, preferences and generalised system of preferences in the 
GATT. In the framework of the GATT, developing countries demanded for obligatory 
non-reciprocity and preferential treatment. Developed countries were indeed ready to 
accept these demands only "in principle" and as a matter of "purposeful effort". 
As exemplified by the NIEO, this study has argued that the leading paradigm in 
international economic law in the post-war period was "state-centrism". In this period 
soft law exclusively belonged to the inter-state domain and its proliferation was 
primarily related to the increasing activities of states and international organisations as 
well as to the extension of the scope of international law into new areas, such as 
international economy, environment and human rights. The NIEO, as a model of state- 
centrism, typically advanced the idea that governments had the primary responsibility 
for bringing about economic development through public ordering, state planning and 
public enterprises at the domestic level while at the international level it promoted the 
idea of the necessity of restructuring of international economic legal order through inter- 
national solidarity based on the legally binding international economic rules. 
However, during the 1980s, the state-centric paradigm was, as a result of diverse factors 
that occurred in international relations and economy, replaced by a dual `globalist' 
paradigm, which consists of two sub-paradigms, namely the "non-state actor" and the 
765 Carlson (1984-1985) p. 1274 
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"hegemonic state". The factors that were most influential on the replacement of 
paradigm were (i) the end of the Cold War, (ii) the globalisation process (iii) the 
reconfiguration of the roles of the nation-state, (iv) the growing role of international 
economic institutions, especially that of the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, and (v) 
the reordering of state-market relations and the expanding activities of non-state entities 
on the international scene. 
The "non-state actor" sub-paradigm, which has been boosted up by the liberalisation of 
national economies, privatisation and deregulation policies, entails multiple sources of 
authority and consist of a dispersed power structure that promotes new forms of soft law 
whose "defining features are dominance by actors and by sources of authority other than 
governments". 766 Soft law in this sub-paradigm relies primarily on the non-state actors 
even though state involvement in some stage and to some extent is also required. The 
non-state actor sub-paradigm is in this study exemplified by the so-called "new lex 
mercatoria" and international standards of corporate social responsibility. Although 
both examples have occurred as a result of the gradual shift from public to 
private/hybrid ordering, the former nonetheless represents the so-called "bottom-up" 
type of self-regulation, evolving spontaneously from the practices of commercial actors 
themselves while the latter is categorised as a "top down" informal soft law, driven 
essentially by a regulatory impulse. 
The so-called new lex mercatoria, which is presented by its proponents as the revival of 
the mediaeval merchant law, refers to a transnational legal order for global markets. 
This legal order has developed outside national or international law through the self- 
regulation by the business community. It is claimed that the revival of lex mercatoria as 
a self-regulatory mechanism is an answer to the need for flexible legal instruments to 
meet the demand of economic actors that operate in the dynamics of transnational 
networks of production and distribution. Providing such flexibility as it is stated, 
commercial contracts have become the main source of lex mercatoria. These contracts 
often include non-state arbitration for 'transnational' business and the application of a 
transnational common code or law that is independent of any national legal order. This 
common code or law is claimed to be a form of `global law without a state'. Yet, the 
'" Kirton, John, J. and Trebilcock, Michael, John (eds. ), Hard Choices, Soft Law, Ashgate: UK, 2004, p. 10 
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very existence of such a code as an autonomous private legal order of the new lex 
mercatoria has been disputed. Although some scholars contend that there is a "de- 
nationalising" of international commercial arbitration, this study has argued that 
national courts and national laws continue to play a central supporting and supervising 
role in the operationalisation of this regime. In other words, on the one hand, the 
dynamics of international/transnational commercial transactions is seen as requiring a 
different, informal, softer and flexible approach to business regulation. On the other 
hand, the actual business practices show that economic transactions are still strongly 
based in the nation state's provision of a statuary system of legal enforcement and 
granting stability to commercial actors. Thus, lex mercatoria could hardly be 
understood as law of transnational economic transactions organised in a decentralised 
fashion. Instead, lex mercatoria should be seen as the formation of self-regulatory 
standards for business that are materialised within the legal order of the nation-state. 
The proliferation of CSR instruments in the last two decades have generally been 
associated with the rising power of MNEs in relation to the increase of FDI, the lack of 
international legal framework regulating MNEs activities, the pressure from NGOs to 
induce MNEs to become more accountable for their actions, and MNEs' desire to 
respond to societal expectations. However, this study holds that it would hardly be 
possible to explain the increasing use of CSR codes solely in terms of such factors. 
Instead, CSR codes should be interpreted in the larger context of economic 
globalisation, legal pluralism and the decentred state. Moreover, within the ideological 
context of the neo-liberal consensus, CSR and internal legal regimes of MNEs 
(corporate governance) are considered as the signs of fairly established and commonly 
practised private governance or as a prominent examples of new forms of normativity, 
which are not principally anchored and legitimated by formal legal structures. Yet, 
claims about the existence of a broad consensus on CSR or other types of voluntary 
self-regulatory model that "have emerged from multifaceted dialogue in a variety of 
forums"767 should be approached with prudence. Because, the consent and consensus 
building process always embodies explicitly and implicitly the `truth' and interest of the 
dominant ideology. To put it differently, the discourse of "decentralised regulation" 
767 Cragg, Wesley, "Multinational Corporations, Globalisation, and the Challenge of Self-Regulation" in Kirton, and Trebilcock, 2004, p. 214 
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does not simply entail the fragmentation of the state power and the blurring distinction 
between the public and private spheres, but it also functions as a rhetorical devise that is 
"used in attempts to persuade others of the discursant's view". 
768 This study has 
therefore argued that the discourse of CSR has essentially developed as a globalist 
strategy employed in response to either repeated crises of legitimation, like corporate 
scandals, or the growing societal demand and criticism involving business social 
practices, or market pressures such as the drive for competitiveness and increased 
exposure to social and environmental expenses and liability, or reducing the risk for 
binding international corporate regulation. 
The study has further argued that many of the political-economy aspects of 
globalisation can be seen as the reorganisation of the international economy via global 
regulation. The "hegemonic state" sub-paradigm, as used here, refers to the tendency of 
increased institutionalisation and legalisation of international economic relations, which 
has taken both hard and soft law forms (neo-liberal institutionalism). Starting from the 
end of 1970s, market-based economic policies have been institutionalised mainly, 
through international economic institutions, which were created at the Bretton Woods 
Conference in 1944 under the initiative of the US. The initial missions 'of these so-called 
"Bretton Woods institutions" were to support the fixed exchange system in the 
developed capitalist countries (IMF); to reconstruct the war-worn developed capitalist 
European countries (World Bank); and to promote trade liberalisation by fostering 
negotiation among member countries to reciprocally lower their trade barriers and 
provide information about member countries' trade policies (GATT). As it has been 
demonstrated, however, in the 1980s and 1990s, the missions of these organisations 
have been transformed, targeting now mainly developing countries and their full 
integration into the ongoing neo-liberal process of globalisation while the GATT/WTO 
has additionally been concerned with making international markets work well. 
The "hegemonic-state" sub-paradigm has been exemplified in this study by the 
evolution of the WTO system, which has replaced the GATT in 1994. It has been shown 
that the WTO has increasingly involved both domestic and international policy-making 
768 Black, Julia, Regulatory Conversations Journal of Law and Society (2002) 1, p. 192. Indeed, in 
Cragg's examples, the participants of the "multifaceted dialogue" in regard to CSR are International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the OECD, the IMF, the World Bank, and Pax Christi International. One 
could tempt to call such a `dialogue' a 'trouble-free monologue'. 
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related to not only trade, but also intellectual property rights, tax, domestic subsidies 
and services. It has also been seen that the WTO has moved from a system of rules 
prohibiting trade measures to a system of rules requiring affirmative government 
actions. Moreover, the evolution of the GATT to the WTO has involved a radical 
change in the dispute settlement process. Unlike pre-WTO trading system, WTO law is 
backed up by an automatic and compulsory dispute settlement mechanism. Under the 
GATT a consensus of member states was required ("positive consensus") in order for 
dispute rulings to become binding. With the WTO, on the other hand, dispute rulings 
are accepted as binding unless all the members - including the winning party - vote 
against its adoption, meaning that to achieve a "negative consensus" has become only a 
`theoretical possibility'. 
Sir Joseph Gold once argued against the hardening the law of exchange arrangements in 
the context of the IMF stressing that "firmer rules of law would be undesirable because 
they would reduce the choice of policies available to governments". 769 Indeed, one of 
the most prevailing implications of the evolution of the GATT to the WTO has been 
that the whole WTO disciplines, but in particular its dispute settlement mechanism, has 
become an effective tool for constraining domestic political autonomy of the member 
states. Yet, although the WTO primarily relies on a "hard law" approach of sanctions 
and binding rules and procedures to enforce members' WTO commitments rather than a 
"soft law" approach of ongoing dialogue and negotiation with noncompliant nations, 
this study has nonetheless maintained that the new "WTO discipline" displays some 
"soft" features. For example, even though the WTO rules are legally binding upon its 
members, there still exist some safeguards, exceptions and possibilities to re-negotiate 
concessions in a way that allows the member states to deviate from the undertaken legal 
obligations thereby making WTO disciplines to some extent "soft". Likewise, as the 
collapse of the competition policy at Cancun has confirmed, in certain policy domains, 
like competition law and its enforcement, national governments can reject the 
negotiation of hard rules in favour of softer alternatives, leading to the agreement of 
non-binding recommendations on regulatory. standards and enforcement practices. 77° 
769 Gold, Joseph, Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements, 77 American 
Journal of International Law (1983) p. 482 
770 The "International Competition Network" (ICN), created in 2001 is a highly successful example of 
soft law alternative for `hard competition law'. The ICN, whose rules are `non-binding' upon its 85 
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Lastly, as shown in chapter 8, even the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO has 
become more potent and more legalistic than ever before, it notwithstanding bears signs 
of `soft' institutionalisation. For instance, the WTO system still has a relatively weak 
sanction, which organises and disciplines the unequal capacity for self-help of member 
states rather than perform the functions of a `traditional' court. 
This study has further drawn the attention to the relative incompatibility and tension 
between the principle of state sovereignty, which includes policy autonomy that 
basically refers to the ability of a national government to implement and sustain 
domestic and international economic policies of its own choosing and the 
transnationalisation and supranationalism involved in the use of conditionality in 
relation to loans given by the IMF and the World Bank and the increasing 
interventionism of the WTO. It has consequently been argued that the increasing de- 
formalisation, which encompasses liberal policies like de-regulation and self-regulation 
on the one hand, and the increasing legalisation and regulated interventionism on the 
other, are two seemingly contradictory yet complementary tendencies of the process of 
globalisation. To that extent, globalisation is understood by this study as constituting the 
political juridical expression of the structural transformation of the international 
economy and relations that aspire to establish a `new constitutionalism' of the neo- 
liberal ideology. 
10.3 What future for soft law? 
In this study it has been argued that since the 1990s the function of soft law as a bridge 
between facts and norms in inter-state relations has entered a new era. A number of 
significant and interrelated changes, such as globalisation, the end of the Cold War, the 
hegemony of neo-liberal ideology, the rise of non-state actors, and the re-configuration 
of the nation-state, have transformed the structure of international relations 
significantly. A central theme within the liberal legal discourse of globalisation is the 
creation of a deformalised yet universal system of legal norms as a means to acquire 
greater flexibility and dynamism in the name of a continued relevancy of the role of 
competition enforcement agencies, aims to encourage cooperation on competition law and enforcement 
matters and promote greater procedural convergence of among competition agencies (See, 
http: //www. intemationalcompetititonnetwork. org). 
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international law. It is claimed by many that the currently dominant mode of traditional 
state-centred understanding of authority is becoming less and less able to capture the 
increasing private authority and its regulatory power. The trend to reconstruct the 
relationship between state and capital through privatisation, deregulation, re-regulation, 
and globalised production and finance has resulted in the privatisation of international 
rules. Moreover, the strategy of the dominant states to reinforce private property rights 
through multilateral and bilateral trade and investment agreements has strengthened the 
idea that asymmetries of power between states has a significant bearing on the 
functioning of international law. 
The development of informal non-state soft law is not all that is happening in the 
changing nature and role of soft law. Even in the realm of inter-state relations, the role 
of soft law has notably altered. Since the end of the Cold War, soft law and soft 
institutionalisation in international public sphere have effectively been used to achieve a 
less formal hence less constraining form of rules that have been seen as useful by 
hegemonic power(s). Likewise, Kingsbury observes: "A US scholarly focus on 
`governance', `regimes', `managerial compliance', `decision process', and the like, and 
a US tendency to negotiate detailed multilateral rule-making treaties which it does not 
ratify, may reflect in some areas of international law a US preference for anti-formal 
malleability (softness) that is influenced by the aura of preponderant power. 77' 
In this post-"balance of power" era, in which the US has emerged as the sole dominant 
power, a continuing search for the creation of a new legal status quo that would reflect 
the recent structural changes in realpolitik more accurately should be expected. One of 
the most convenient techniques of such a search is an increasing deformalisation of 
international law that would deliver more flexible law-making, interpretation and 
implementation possibility for the dominant states enabling them to shape international 
social processes and outcomes according to their interests ("intrumentalisation of 
international law"). Aside from a handful of international domains, above all economy, 
where the interest of powerful states in reinforcing international law is greatest, in a 
foreseeable future the quest for a softer international law and informal policy networks 
that serve decision-makers' "preferred values by facilitating decision-making in 
771 Kingsbury, Benedict, Legal Positivism as Normative politics, 16 European Journal of International 
Law (2005) 2, p. 421 
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7 
contexts where they were dominant", 
772 will continue to be the prevailing tendency. Just 
as Krisch observes, "informality allows the strictures of sovereign equality to 
be 
circumvented in the formal law-making process, and it thus is a far more suitable tool of 
hierarchy". 773 
Associated with the rising neo-liberalism, deformalisation in the field of international 
economy has occurred mainly in the forms of market deregulation (reduced state 
intervention into economic affairs), decentralisation of norm-making (privatisation of 
law and legal pluralism), and the emergence of a multilayered and transnational 
economic governance. The most salient outcome of this process has been the emergence 
of "informal soft law", whose defining features are claimed to be flexible, discretionary, 
ad-hoc, voluntary, non-binding and unenforceable rules. Indeed, the whole rationality of 
the economic globalisation discourse can be characterised by an informal/softer 
vocabulary that includes `governance', `market', `efficiency', `flexibility', `voluntary 
standards', `customer orientation', `speed' and `self-regulation'. 
One important implication of these developments on the conceptual evolution of soft 
law is that soft law has ceased to be the "substitute" (or "second-best" solution) for hard 
law alternative in inter-state relations and it has become the major `legalisation form' of 
the norm-like activities of private and public-private crossbreed authorities. Closely 
related to the emergence of private authority and the proliferation of informal or hybrid 
institutions on the international scene, the new type of informal soft law has come to 
primarily rely on private (i. e. non-state) and public-private mixed authorities. Therefore, 
by implying the multiplicity of legal sources and subjects of international law and 
giving rise to a flexible and context-dependent norm-making process, informal soft law 
has been a central mechanism in privatising public power. 
On the other hand, this development has not been directed to eliminate the nation-state, 
but rather to reorganise it. As a political project, neo-liberalism has also been concerned 
with institutional changes at both domestic and international levels aiming at 
dismantling social welfare state and transforming it into a `competitive national state', 
which refers to "the capacity of a state to compete with other states for shares of so- 
772 Koskenniemi, Martti, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870- 
1960, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004, p. 483 
773 Krisch (2005) p. 399 
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called footloose investment capital". 
774 In addition, neo-liberal integration of national 
economies creates an international competitive dynamic, in which institutional change 
in one or more countries induces similar changes in other countries, which lead to the 
reductions in all sorts of policy-driven barriers between economies, from capital 
controls to tariff and non-tariff barriers on trade. 
775 Hence, further deregulation as an 
incentive is to be the likely outcome of the economic pressures from the necessity of the 
formation of a `competitive national state' for attracting financial capital and enhancing 
their competitive performance. 
It can be anticipated that in this process the voluntary self-regulatory initiatives will 
become more important, mainly because of the following reasons: (i) national policy- 
makers are increasingly reluctant or unable to intervene in markets due to free market 
ideology and the re-problematisation of the concept of the `competition state'; (ii) the 
possibility of creating new markets, such as green products by adopting voluntary 
standard setting; (iii) business is also focusing more on their relations with governments 
and civil society, as they want to avoid the costs of state regulation, litigation and bad 
publicities. A similar course can also be expected for co-regulatory activities, which 
refers to some form of relationship between state regulation and voluntary agreements 
in a particular area, especially to limit the negative consequences of market-failure; 
correct distortions or imbalances in the markets, for example by promoting competition, 
rooting out fraud or enhancing safety and consumer confidence. 
One significant factor that should be considered when assessing the possible future 
course that both formal and informal soft law development may take is that markets do 
need a regulatory response to survive. Contrary to the neo-liberal rhetoric involving the 
arguments about inevitability that the world economy has been integrated through 
expanded trade and capital flows usually promulgated by technological determinism, 
and that the integration of the global economy is making national boundaries obsolete 
and is laying the basis for a new and truly global era, this study has drawn attention to 
the critical involvement of the state and international economic institutions as the 
774 Fougner, Tore, The state, international competiveness and neoliberal globalisation, 32 Revirew of 
International Studies (2006) p. 166 
775 Helleiner, Eric, Explaining the Globalization of Financial Markets: Bringing States Back, 2 Review 
of International Political economy (1995) 2, p. 315 
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regulatory agencies in paving the road to the free market either by removing restrictive 
regulations or re-regulating domestic and international economy whenever deemed 
necessary. As Polanyi stated, "laissez-faire was not a method to achieve a thing, it was 
the thing to be achieved". 776 This implies that states and international economic 
organisations are ascribed a central role in granting the proper functioning of a 
competitive global market place and securing private property rights. As the example of 
inclusion of competition policy on the WTO's agenda makes it evident, 777 the basic 
principles of the so-called free and self-regulating market economy cannot be left to the 
`natural' mechanisms of the free market, but rather should be regulated and controlled 
on a continuous basis by the state, the global economic policy-making institutions 
including informal ones, like the World Economic Forum. The regulatory implication of 
this reality is to be the continued efforts to govern the world economy via bilateral and 
multilateral trade and investment agreements, the increasing conditionality attached to 
structural adjustment loans and other means of a creeping multilateral investment 
regime and the broadening and strengthening of the existing multilateral trade and 
property regimes. 
Final words 
This study has conceded the risk that the increasing calls for an informal, context- 
dependent and socially responsive international law on the basis of a more speedy and 
flexible international law to respond to the ever-increasing dynamism of world's affairs 
may undermine the role of international law as a regulatory (thus, restrictive) apparatus 
for the hegemonic power(s). In the same vein, this study has also argued against the 
increasing informalisation of soft law and its proliferation in international economic 
legal order as a facilitator for the neo-liberal deregulatory impulse. However, soft law 
should not necessarily be understood as an alternative to the `traditional' law making, 
but rather as a complement to it where it is designed as preparatory instrument as to the 
76 Polanyi (1957) p. 139 
77 At the Fifth WTO Ministerial meeting held at Cancun in September 2003, negotiations on competition 
policy was failed, mainly due to the opposition of-developing countries. Of course, this collapse at 
Cancun does not mean that competition policy negotiation has been dropped off the WTO's agenda 
altogether. 
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future adoption, or interpret as a `post-law' instrument, which may provide 
interpretation for its application, such as the "General Comments of the Human Rights 
Committee" on various issues, or a steering instrument in establishing and advancing 
the effect to the law's objectives, such as many declarations and general 
recommendation of international organisations. Moreover, the present study recognises 
the potential of soft law in reforming traditional sources of international law and the 
modalities for their creation by allowing wider participation and opening up new 
channels for further legalisation. Without doubt, against the instrumentalisation of law 
in the hand of powerful states, it is important to insist on the rule-based decision making 
in international life. Yet, it is equally important to bear in mind that the strictly 
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